WOOLWICH PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

PLUMSTEAD LIBRARY.

The Lending Library shall be open from 10 a.m. until 9 p.m. on weekdays except Wednesdays, when it shall close at 1 p.m.

The Children's Library shall be open on school-days from 12 noon to 1 p.m., and from 4 to 7.30 p.m., and on Saturdays and School holidays from 10 a.m. to 7.30 p.m., except Wednesdays, when it shall close at 1 p.m.

The time allowed for reading each issue, whether one volume or more, is 14 days. For any book not returned within that period, a fine shall be paid of one penny for the first week or portion of a week, and twopence for each succeeding week or portion of a week.

No book can be issued unless the borrower's ticket is presented or a book returned. No book can be exchanged on the day of issue.

There is a complete Catalogue at each Library.

Any change in the residence of borrowers or their guarantors must be notified to the Librarian within one week of such change.

Borrowers leaving the Borough or ceasing to use the libraries are required to return their tickets to the Librarian, otherwise they and their guarantors will be held responsible for all liabilities incurred.

Borrowers are required to keep the books clean, to refrain from turning down the leaves, or making pencil or other marks upon them. They must take the earliest opportunity of reporting any damage or injury done to the books they receive, otherwise they will be held accountable for the same. In wet weather borrowers are required to protect the books in their transit to and from the Libraries.

Borrowers should carefully read the Rules, &c., which are exhibited in the Libraries, and from which the above are abstracts. See especially Rule 31 respecting Infectious Diseases, non-compliance with which involves a penalty of £5.

L.49
NF

PLUMSTEAD

The card in this pocket must NOT be removed.

If this book is not returned to the library on or before the last date shown on the card above a fine will be charged in accordance with the Libraries' Regulations.

Please quote the number and the last date stamped on the card if you wish to renew the book by post or telephone.

MON.—FRI. ... ... 9 a.m.—8 p.m.
SAT. ... ... 9 a.m.—5 p.m.

WOOLWICH LIBRARIES

Basement

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/worksofplato0006geor

BOHN'S CLASSICAL LIBRARY

THE WORKS OF PLATO

VOL. VI.

GEORGE BELL & SONS

LONDON: YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN
NEW YORK: 66 FIFTH AVENUE, AND
CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.

THE

WORKS OF PLATO

VOL. VI.

THE DOUBTFUL WORKS

WITH LIVES OF PLATO, BY DIOGENES LAERTIUS,
HESYCHIUS, AND OLYMPIODORUS
GRAY'S NOTES, ETC., ETC.

AND

A GENERAL INDEX TO THE SIX VOLUMES

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE BURGES, M.A.

LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1902

[*Reprinted from Stereotype plates.*]

CONTENTS.

PAGE

PREFACE v

Introduction to the Epinomis 1
EPINOMIS; or, The Philosopher 3

Introduction to the Axiochus 37
AXIOCHUS; or, On Death 39

Introduction to the Eryxias 57
ERYXIAS; or, On Wealth 59

Introduction to the Dialogue on Virtue 83
ON VIRTUE 85

ON JUSTICE 91

Introduction to the Sisyphus and Demodocus 97
SISYPHUS; or, Upon taking Counsel 99
DEMODOCUS 109

Introduction to the Definitions 121
DEFINITIONS 123

Introduction to the Treatise of Timæus 145
THE TREATISE OF TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN, ON THE SOUL OF THE WORLD AND NATURE 147

THE LIFE OF PLATO, by DIOGENES LAERTIUS 175
——— by HESYCHIUS OF MILETUS . . . 227
——— by OLYMPIODORUS 232

THE INTRODUCTION OF ALCINOUS TO THE DOCTRINES OF PLATO . 241
——— ALBINUS TO THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 315

APULEIUS ON THE DOCTRINES OF PLATO 323

PAGE

Some Account of the Dialogues and of the Epistles of Plato, by Thomas Gray 405
Preface by Matthias 406
General View of the Works of Plato, by Floyer Sydenham 409
On the Writings of Plato.
Brief Notices of Socrates and of his Friends . . . 416
Phædrus 421
Lysis 424
Alcibiades I. 425
Alcibiades II. 427
Theages 428
Euthyphro 429
The Apology of Socrates 430
Phædo 432
The Rivals 434
Laches . . . . . *ib.*
Hipparchus 436
Philebus . . . . . *ib.*
Meno 441
Gorgias 444
Minos 447
Charmides 448
Cratylus 449
Symposium 450
Euthydemus 451
Hippias Major 452
Hippias Minor 453
Protagoras . . . . . *ib.*
Io 462
Theætetus 464
The Sophist 465
The Statesman 467
The Republic 469
The Laws 487
The Epistles 499

General Index to the six volumes 507

PREFACE.

In the present volume are contained those dialogues which, although considered spurious by the generality of critics, are always found in the complete editions of Plato. To these are added the three several Lives attributed to Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius, and Olympiodorus, and the two Introductions to the Platonic System by Alcinous and Albinus; also the three books of Apuleius relating to the Philosophy and Logic of Plato and Aristotle.

Of all these works, the only portions which have hitherto appeared in an English dress, are the Epinomis, the Life of Plato by Diogenes Laertius, and the Introduction of Alcinous. But even of these not one has been translated directly from the original.* In the Epinomis, Taylor followed the Latin version of Ficinus as revised by Grynæus; and Stanley, strange to say, adopted, in preference to the Greek, Ficinus's Latin version of Alcinous as revised by D. Heinsius; while Smith, in

* Since this preface was written, a complete translation of Diogenes Laertius (from the Greek) has been published in Bohn's Classical Library.

his abridged translation of Diogenes Laertius, has followed the Latin version given by Stephens.

To render this edition as perfect as possible, it has been deemed advisable to insert Sydenham's Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato; a copious selection from the Notes of Gray, as published by Matthias in the 2nd volume of his edition of the Works of that poet; and a General Index to the entire work.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EPINOMIS.

Although this dialogue is called the Epinomis, which might be rendered into English by "A Sequel to the Laws," yet it contains not a single hint for an enactment of any kind. It is in fact little more than a Homily, written for the most part on the Laws, vii. § 20—22, p. 300—308, and it seems to be the production of some Pythagorean; who, perceiving that Plato had adopted some of the ideas promulgated by that school of philosophy, was desirous of showing that he had only partially touched upon their tenets relating to numbers. For with this question were intimately connected all their ideas relating to the power and attributes of the deity. And this the writer was the more willing to dilate upon, as Plato had expressed his unwillingness to discuss the subject of religion at a greater length. For after witnessing the fate of Socrates, who had endeavoured to rationalize the creed of his country, Plato probably thought it dangerous, as Aristotle certainly did afterwards, to run counter to popular prejudices; and he was therefore led to remark, that all the enactments relating to religion should be left to the discretion of its ministers, assisted by the interpreters of the voice of the gods.

Respecting the author of the dialogue, nothing is known for certain. Thus much however is tolerably clear, that it was not written by Plato. For, as remarked by Ast on § 7, where mention is made of the five elements, out of which all living things are said to be formed, this doctrine is at variance with that promulgated in the Timæus, where only four are enumerated. But when in § 5, where the Athenian Guest alludes to some memoranda made by Clinias and Megillus of the previous conversation, Ast would infer that the Laws had been published already, he seems not to be aware that an

inference the very reverse ought to be drawn. For the memoranda would rather be made shortly after the conversation had taken place, just as was done by Xenophon in the case of Socrates, with a view to their being published afterwards. And hence we can account for the tradition, that the Laws were not given to the world, till after the death of their author.

The Epinomis is indeed attributed to Plato by Nicomachus; but not by Proclus, as has been sometimes asserted. For Boeckh has shown that the Neo-Platonist on Euclid i. p. 12, originally expressed himself in a way to indicate that he did not know who was the author of the dialogue. Boeckh himself feels inclined to assign the authorship to Philip of Opuntium; who appears from Suidas to have written not a little on subjects relating to Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy, all of which are discussed at greater or less length in the Epinomis.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself has, like the Laws, come down to us in rather an unsatisfactory state; and hence I have been compelled to write longer notes than would otherwise have been necessary.

THE EPINOMIS

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS A CRETAN, AND MEGILLUS A LACEDÆMONIAN.

[1.] *Clinias.* ACCORDING to our agreement, we have all of us, guest, come correctly, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, to consider the question of intellect, in what manner it is meet to go through in a discourse that, which we say belongs to the constitution of man, (and which,)[1] when it has been thought upon, causes[2] it to be in the best state with regard to itself,[3] as far as it is possible for man to possess it. For, as we assert, we have gone through all the other matters, that existed, relating to the laying down of laws. But that, which is of the greatest moment to discover and to speak of, namely, by learning what will a mortal man become wise, this we have neither spoken of nor discovered. Now then let us endeavour not to leave this behind. For we should nearly do that imperfectly, for the sake of which we have all rushed onwards, with the view of making clear (every thing)[4] from the beginning to the end.

Athenian Guest. You speak well, friend Clinias. But I

[1] I have translated, as if ὅ τε had dropt out before ὅταν—

[2, 3] I have adopted ποιεῖ, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of ποιεῖν: which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted it in his version, adopted in part by Taylor, "quo intellecto, humanus habitus optime se, quantum natura fert, ad prudentiam habet." From which however it is easy to see that he found in his MS. πρὸς ἑαυτὴν, of which πρὸς φρόνησιν would be the interpretation.

[4] I have translated, as if πάντα had dropt out before ποιήσοντες. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by thus abridging two sentences into one, "cujus aperiendi gratia hucusque profecti sumus."

think you will now hear a strange discourse, and on the other hand in a certain respect not strange. For many, who meet us in life,[1] tell[2] the same story, that the human race will be neither blessed nor happy. Follow me, then, and see whether [3]to you I likewise appear together with them to speak correctly on a point like this.[3] I assert then that it is not possible for men, except a few, to be blessed and happy; [4]I limit this to as long as we live;[4] but there is a fair hope that a person will after death obtain every thing, for the sake of which he would desire, when alive, to live in the best manner he could, [5]and dying to meet with such an end.[5] And I assert nothing (very) wise,[6] but what all of us, both Greeks and Barbarians, after a certain manner know, that to be produced is at the beginning difficult for every animal. In the first place, it is difficult to partake of [7]the state of conception, next to be born,[7] and, further still, to be brought up and educated; (for) all these things take place, as we all say, through ten thousand troubles. The time too would be short, [8]not only with respect to the calculation of annoyances, but what every one would imagine to be moderate; and this seems to

[1] Ficinus evidently found something different in his MS., for his version is "multi enim fluctibus hujus vitæ jactati—"

[2] I have adopted λέγουσι, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *φέρουσι* · for λόγον *φέρειν* is said only of a messenger bringing news.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus has thus abridged, "utrum et ipse recte hac de re dicere videar—" while Taylor has given this unaccountable mistranslation, "whether it appears to you, as well as to me, that by speaking as follows about this affair, we shall speak well."

[4—4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor, and in their place is introduced "in this life" in the sentence preceding.

[5—5] Here again Ficinus and Taylor after him omit all between the numerals, and in their place substitute one word, in Latin "exegit," and in English "die," in the sentence preceding.

[6] Ficinus has more fully "nec inauditum aliquid novumque adduco;" but Taylor merely "Nor is my assertion novel."

[7—7] Ficinus has "in conceptione et utero primum; deinde in nativitate et partu—" while Taylor omits "to be born—"

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek. In the MS. of Ficinus there was something wanting, as shown by his version, adopted almost to the letter by Taylor, "non solum respectu diuturnitatis malorum, verum etiam quocunque modo quis cogitet, quod quasi circa humanæ vitæ medium respirare parumper nos facit," where are omitted the words *μέτριον οὗτος δὲ σχεδὸν*, that made up the twenty letters in each line of the Codex Archetypus.

make almost a kind of breathing-time in the middle of the life of man.[8] Old age however, quickly overtaking a person, would make him not at all willing to live his life over again, [1] after he has considered the life he has lived,[1] unless he happens to be full of the thoughts of a child. Now of this what is to me the proof? It is, because what is sought for in our discourse exists naturally in this way. Now we are seeking by what manner we shall become wise, as if there were to each of us some such power as this. But it flies quickly away then, when any one proceeds to an [2] investigation of the so-called arts or notions,[2] or any other things of that kind, which we imagine to be sciences; whereas not one of them is worthy to be called by the name of that wisdom, which is conversant with the affairs of man; while on the other hand, the soul is very confident, and divines, as if this wisdom were existing in her by some gift of nature; but what it is, and when, and how it exists, it is wholly unable to discover. Does not then in this manner our difficulty about, and search after, wisdom, [3]seem somehow greatly to be full of the hope, which exists[3] to each of those amongst us, who are able to examine both themselves prudently, and others harmoniously,[4] through reasonings of all kinds and spoken in every manner? Shall we agree that these things are not thus, or thus?

Clin. We will agree in this, O guest, in the hope perhaps, which will arise in the course of time, of having hereafter with you opinions the most true on these points.

Athen. We must then first go through the other sciences, as they are called, but which do not render him wise, who receives and possesses them, in order that, by putting them out of the way, we may endeavour to place by our side those, of which we are in want, and, after placing them by our side, learn them.

[1]—[1] Ficinus has—"cum præteritas molestias cogitet—"

[2]—[2] I cannot believe that the author wrote *φρόνησιν—φρονήσεων*—but what he did write I am no less at a loss to know; unless it were *ἐρεύνησιν* for *φρόνησιν*: for *ερ* and *φρ* are elsewhere confounded as I have shown in Præf. Eurip. Tro. p. xviii., and so I have translated.

[3]—[3] The Greek is in one MS. *σφόδρα προσέοιχ' ἡμῶν—πλείων—γιγνομένη*—but in three, *προσέχοι*, in two *προσέχει*, and in one *προσὲχ'*—while Ficinus has—"huc spectat—plena nimirum spe"—I have translated as if the Greek were—*σφόδρα πως ἔοιχ'—πλέως εἶναι—γιγνομένης*—for the other I cannot understand.

[4] I confess myself unable to see what is meant here by *συμφώνως*.

[2.] Let us, then, first look into the sciences, of which the race of man is first in want; since these are nearly the most necessary, and truly the first. Now he, who becomes skilled in these, even though he seemed at first to be wise, yet now he is not considered to be wise, but obtains rather a disgrace by a science of this kind. We will therefore mention what they are, and (show) that nearly every one, to whom is proposed the contest of seeming to become the best man, avoids them through the possession of intellect and study. Let the first art then be that, [1]which, withdrawing us from eating human flesh, that, as the story goes, took place formerly amongst mankind after the manner of savage animals, has recalled us to a more lawful food.[1] [2]And may those before be propitious to us, and they are. For whosoever we are, who have spoken, let them be bidden the first farewell.[2] The manufacture of wheaten flour and barley meal and moreover the food is indeed beautiful and good; but it will never be able to work out the man completely wise. [3]For this very thing, under the appellation of a manufacture, would produce a difficult handling of the things manufactured.[3] Nor would the cultivation of nearly the whole country (do so); [4]for we all appear to take

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus—"quæ ab humanarum carnium esu, qui ferarum ritu quondam inter homines inoleverat, ut fabulæ ferunt, abstinere jussit et ad victum modestiorem nos revocavit"—This is at least intelligible; what cannot be said of the Greek—*ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας τῶν ζώων ἡμᾶς, τῶν μὲν, ὡς ὁ μῦθός ἐστιν, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ, εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα*—which Ast says is obscure; nor has his attempt to explain it made it, I conceive, less so; for it is literally—"Let that be in the first place, what has withdrawn among some animals us from eating each other, as is the story, and of others instituted for lawful eating."

[2]—[2] Here again is a passage, of which the literal translation proves it to be perfectly unintelligible. And so have thought Stephens, Ast, and Winckelmann on Euthyd. p. 69, of whom the two last have suggested alterations from which nothing is gained; while the first has been content to draw attention to the version of Ficinus—"in quo sane prisci homines, quamvis mansuete et humaniter nobis consuluerint, valeant tamen, nec sapientiæ nomen usurpent;" which is certainly what the train of thought requires; but whether Ficinus found in his MS. the Greek words answering to the Latin, is another question.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus has thus abridged and improved—"difficultatem enim et molestiam potius quam sapientiam afferet."

[4]—[4] Here again Ficinus has expressed in his Latin version, adopted by Taylor, what is far more elegant than the original Greek. "non

in hand the earth, not by art, but by nature, according to a god.[4] Nor yet would the weaving together[1] of dwellings nor the whole of house-building, and the manufacture of all kinds of utensils, and copper-work, and the preparing of instruments for carpenters and moulders, and weavers, and trades in general, although possessing what is useful for the common people, be suited for virtue. Nor yet does the whole of hunting, although various and full of art, contribute what is greatly becoming[2] together with what is wise. Nor yet does the diviner's and interpreter's art at all; for such merely knows what is said, but has not learnt whether it is true. Since then we see that the possession of necessaries is worked out indeed by art, but that not one of these arts makes any person wise, there would be left after this a certain sport,[3] imitative for the most part, but by no means a serious pursuit. For persons do with many instruments, [4]and with many imitations, effected by their own bodies,[4] not altogether graceful, make an imitation of things, expressed [5]in prose and verse,[5] and of those, of which painting is the mother, while colours many and various are worked out,[6] by many substances moist and dry; by operating upon none of which with the greatest care does the imitative art render a person wise. [7]And when all has been done,[7] there would be something remaining in the assistance without number given to persons without number; the greatest of which and for the most numerous occasions is the art of war, called by the name of generalship, of the highest repute in the case of need, but requiring the greatest good fortune, and that which is assigned naturally rather to bravery than wisdom. And what persons

enim arte sed natura, dei quodam favore, terræ culturam aggressi videmur—"

[1] On the expression *οἰκήσεων ξυννφὴ*, see my note on Æsch. Prom. 460, *πλινθυφεῖς δόμους*—

[2] I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot, why *τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς σὺν τῷ σοφῷ* is thus introduced instead of *τὸ σοφὸν* by itself.

[3] The *παιδιὰ* is here opposed to *σπουδὴ*, as in Epist. 6, p. 499, where I have referred to Wyttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 14.

[4—4] Ficinus has more elegantly "corporum gestibus et figuris—" Did the author write *κινήμασι*?

[5—5] Ast quotes opportunely Legg. viii. § 5, p. 835, A., *κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατ' ᾠδάς*—

[6] One MS. has, what seems preferable, *ἀποτυπουμένων*, "put into a form"—similar to "exprimuntur" in Ficinus.

[7—7] Ficinus has—"imitatione vero sublata—" From which it is difficult to ascertain what he found in his MS.

call the medical art is [1] surely itself an assistance nearly of such (ills) as the seasons cause by cold and unseasonable heat, and make by all such matters,[1] the nature of animals their spoil. But not one of these (arts) is in good repute for the truest wisdom; for being made the subject of conjecture, they are carried along without measure by opinions. And assistants we will call pilots and sailors likewise. But not one of these let any person, by cheating us with words, proclaim a wise man on every ground. For not one of them would know the rage of the winds or their kindness, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet such as say they are assistants in lawsuits by their power in speaking, and, by their memory and practice, give their minds to unusual [2] opinions, but stumble outside the truth in cases of real justice. There still remains a certain strange power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which the many would then call by the name of nature rather than wisdom, when any one perceives that he is easily learning, what even a child [3] could learn, and is remembering many things and firmly so, and can call to mind what is suited to each thing, and quickly do it, when it would be becoming, if it took place. Now all this some will place [4] under nature, others under wisdom, and others under a cleverness of nature. But no prudent person would ever be willing to call any one of these a truly wise man.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*βοήθεια δέ που καὶ αὐτὴ σχεδὸν ὅσων*—where *καὶ αὐτὴ* is without meaning, and so too is *σχεδὸν* by itself; while *βοήθεια ὅσων*, which is the same as *βοήθεια τόσων ἃ*—would introduce the relative *ἃ*, to which nothing is to be referred. Ficinus indeed avoids all the difficulty by his version—"medicina quoque nobis opitulatur contra immoderati caloris et frigoris impetum cæterorumque hujusmodi—" But this he got rather out of his own head than his MS. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote something to this effect —*βοήθεια, ἄλυπος καὶ θεία τις σχεδὸν, νόσων, αἳ ἀώρῳ ψύχει καὶ καύματι ἀκαίρῳ*—i. e. "an assistance painless and almost a divine one in diseases, which through cold before its season, and heat out of its season—"

[2] The Greek is at present *δόξῃς ἤθεσι*—which Winckelmann, unable to understand, would correct into *δόξαις ἢ ἤθεσι*— But the sophists, to whom the author is here alluding, were wont rather to run counter to opinions and customs, than to pay attention to them. Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were originally *δόξαις ἀηθέσι*: for *ἀηθέσι* and *ἀληθείας* would be opposed to each other here as in Euthyd. § 16, n. 35; Laws vi. § 5.

[3] Two MSS., in lieu of *περ ἂν*, read *πᾶσαν*, in which lies hid *παῖς ἂν*—as I have translated.

[4] All the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus, as shown by his "nuncupabunt," read *θήσουσι* for *φήσουσ* .

[3.] It is however necessary for a certain science to become apparent, by which he, who possesses it, would be wise in reality, and not be so in opinion merely. Let us, then, consider. For we are endeavouring by a reasoning, difficult in every way, to find some other science beyond those already mentioned, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom; while he, who receives it, will be a person neither vulgar nor silly, but wise and good through it; and, whether he governs or is governed by the state, in justice[1] become an elegant[2] person.

Let us, therefore, consider that science first, which singly proceeds from human nature, and which, amongst all that are present, would, by not being present, render the race of man of (all) animals[3] the most senseless and thoughtless. Now this it is not very difficult for any one to consider. For that, which has given number to the whole race of man, would, so to say, being compared [4]one against one,[4] effect this. I conceive however that a certain god himself, rather than a certain accident, gave it to us to preserve us; but whom I conceive to have been the god, it is necessary to state, strange although it be, and, on the other hand, somehow not strange. For how must we not conceive that he, who is the cause to us of every good thing, should not have been the cause likewise of intellect, the greatest good by far? Now what god am I speaking of, Megillus and Clinias, and making an object of worship? It is almost[5] Heaven, whom it is most just we should honour, as all the other dæmons and gods do, and pray pre-eminently to it. For all of us would confess that it is the cause of all good

[1] Instead of *ἐνδίκως* Ast would read *ἔνδικος*, and unite *ἔνδικος ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής*. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits *ἐνδίκως* entirely.

[2] This word *ἐμμελής*, strangely introduced here, is translated by Ficinus "modestus." It seems to have been one of those, to which Plato and his imitators attached no specific meaning, or at any rate to which there is no definite equivalent in English.

[3] Instead of *ζῶον* all the MSS. read *τὸ ζῶον*— I have translated, as if the author had written *πάντων ζώων* without *τὸ*— Ficinus has—"quæ ex omnibus humanis artibus ita se habet, ut si hæc una semoveatur amentissima et insipientissima hominis natura reddatur"— which has led me to read *ἥτις* for *τις*, and *καὶ* for *ἢ*— Ast too is here equally at a loss.

[4]—[4] On this expression see Ast on Legg. i. § 14.

[5] This *σχεδὸν* is strangely introduced here by itself. It should be united to *δικαιότατον*—

things to us. And we assert to boot that it has given us number, and will give it us still, if any one is willing to follow us. For if a person will proceed to a right view of it, whether it be the pleasure of any one to call it the World, or Olympus, or Heaven, let him so call it; but let him follow, wherever it assumes a varied form, when it causes the stars in it to revolve along all their courses,[1] and when it imparts the seasons and food for all, and the remaining gift[2] of intellect, as we should say, together with all number, and every other good. Now this is the greatest thing, when any one, receiving from it the gift of number, proceeds through every period. Returning back still a little in our discourse, let us call to mind that we have conceived very correctly, that if we take away number from human nature, we should be intellectual not at all. For the soul of the animal, from whom reason is absent, would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue. Now the animal, which does not know two and three, even and odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, would never be able to give a reason respecting those things, of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it (from possessing)[3] the other virtues, fortitude and temperance. But he, who is deprived of true reason, will never become wise; and he, to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, would never be perfectly good, nor happy. In this way there is every necessity for number to be laid down as a principle. But why it is necessary, there would be a discourse longer than all that has been spoken. And correctly will the present one have been stated likewise, that of the things, mentioned as belonging to the other arts, which we have gone through, [4]and permitted them all to be arts,[4] not even one would remain, but all perish entirely, when any one

[1] Ast says that in *διεξόδους* there is an allusion to the notion, that the stars formed an army, which went out upon expeditions. But, unless I am greatly mistaken, the author wrote *λοξοὺς ὁδοὺς*— For not only was the apparent course of the Sun through the ecliptic said to be oblique— and hence he was called *Λοξίας*—but those of the other stars likewise. See at the Rivals, p. 420, n. 6. On the confusion of *λοξὸς* see at Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 65, and here, § 9, p. 26, n. 1.

[2] In lieu of *δὲ οὖν*, which could not thus follow *καὶ τὴν ἄλλην*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *δόσιν*, similar to *ἀριθμῶν δόσιν* just afterwards.

[3] Ficinus alone adds, what the sense requires, "habere—"

[4—4] The words *ἐῶντες εἶναι* are omitted by Ficinus and Taylor.

takes away the science of numbers. But to some of those, who have looked to the arts, the race of man would appear sufficiently[1] for the sake of some small matters to have no need of number. And yet is it a thing of moment. And if any one looks to what is divine and mortal in generation, in which piety towards the gods and true number are known, [2] he could not mention the person, who [2] knows the whole of number, and of what power it is, when present, the cause; since it is evident that what relates to all music, requires numbered motion and sound; and, what is the greatest, that it (number) is the cause of all good things, but of nothing evil, this must be known well, [3] which would perhaps take place by another road; for [3] the movement, which is without reason, and order, and shape, and rhythm, and harmony, and all such things as partake of any evil, is deficient in nearly all number. And this it is meet for him to conceive in this way, who is about to end his days happily; and no one,[4] except him, who knows the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and has laid hold of a true opinion respecting them, [5] will through number know how with regard to any thing [5] to persuade himself and others at all.

[4.] Let us then proceed to consider this very thing, how we learnt to number. Say, from whence did it arise that we have understood one and two? [6] Do persons possess from the

[1] Instead of *ἱκανῶς*, which is unintelligible here, Ficinus has "forte," from which Cornarius elicited *ἴσως*, adopted by Ast. The author wrote, I suspect, *οὐ κενῶς*— See at Hipp. Maj p. 258, n. 6; Epist. 7, p. 515, n. 4.

[2]—[2] The Greek is in some MSS. *οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πᾶς ἄν τις*— in others *πᾶς μάντις*— similar to "inveniet nullum vatem" in Ficinus. But then *πᾶς* ought to be omitted, or *τις* introduced. I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' εἴποι τιν'*, *ὃς*—

[3]—[3] The Greek is at present, *ὃ καὶ τάχα γένοιτ' ἂν. ἀλλ' ἡ σχεδὸν*,— all of which Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits. I have therefore adopted, what Stephens suggested, *γένοιτ' ἂν ἄλλῃ· ὅτι σχεδὸν*— Ast indeed asserts that *ἀλλὰ* means "enimvero," but that it never does, nor could do.

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐδείς ποτε, πλὴν ὁ γιγνώσκων*, not *οὐδεὶς ποτε μὴ γιγνώσκων*—

[5]—[5] The Greek is *διαριθμήσεται*, which Ficinus translates "numen rationisque vi uti poterit," as if his MS. read *διαριθμήσεται καὶ διαλογίσεται*, the origin of *διαλογίζηται* as a var. lect. in one MS. I have translated, as if the Greek were originally *δι' ἀριθμοῦ γνώσεται πρός τι*— not *πρὸς τὸ*—which I cannot understand.

[6]—[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *φύσιν τοιαύτην ἴσχουσιν ἐκ*

creator a nature of this kind towards their[6] being able to understand them? Nature, indeed, has not been present to many other animals for this very purpose, so that they are able to learn from their father to number; but the deity has established within us[1] this very thing first, so as to be competent to understand what is shown to us; and afterwards he showed it and is still showing; of which things what can a person see one, as compared with one,[2] more beautiful than the birth[3] of day? [4]and then, when he comes to the portion of night, he will have a sight,[4] from whence every thing will appear to him quite different. And when[5] he ceases not revolving upon these very matters for many days and many nights, [6](he will see) how[6] Heaven ceases not in teaching men one and two, until even the most hard to learn shall learn sufficiently how to number. For[7] thus each of us, on perceiving these, would understand three and four and many. And amongst these the deity has formed one thing, the Moon; which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, [8]proceeds through (her path), showing continually another day[8] up to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to establish the whole circle as one; so that the most indocile animal, so to say, would learn to number, if it were one, to whom the deity had imparted the nature of being able to learn. And up to these points, and in these matters, the whole mass of animals have the power to be-

τοῦ ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὸ δυνατοὺς—not φύσιν ταύτην ἴσχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πρὸς τὸ δυνατοὺς: where τοῦ ποιοῦντος is similar to τοῦ πατρὸς just afterwards.

[1] I cannot believe that the author wrote παρὰ ἡμῖν—ἐνῴκισεν, contrary to the genius of the language. Hence I would read γέρας for παρὰ—

[2] I have adopted ἑνὸς ἀνθ' ἑνὸς, as suggested by Stephens, from "si unum uni conferatur," in Ficinus.

[3] I have translated γένος "birth." Ficinus has "diei lucem," as if his MS. read σέλας.

[4]—[4] The Greek is εἶτα εἰς—ἔλθοι—ἔχων— where ἔλθοι is without regimen. I have translated as if it were originally εἶτα εἰ εἰς—ἔλθοι—, ἔχοι ἂν—where εἰ is due to Ast.

[5] I have adopted ὅταν, furnished by three MSS., in lieu of ὄντα—

[6]—[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were not ἃς, but εἴσεται ὡς, to which I have been led by finding in Ficinus "videbis—"

[7] Ast would read καὶ γὰρ for ὡς γὰρ, with the usual change of ὡς and καὶ, noticed by Schæfer in Meletem. Crit. p. 73. See below, p. 24, n. 3.

[8]—[8] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has "ita quotidie varia—cernitur:" which leads to ἄλλην αὐτὴν ἀεὶ φαινουσ' ὁσημέραι— "showing itself ever different daily—"

come skilled in numbers, by considering one thing, itself by itself. But always to reckon up all numbers, when compared with each other, I think is [1] a greater work.[1] And for the sake of this, the deity having formed, as we have said, the Moon, increasing and decreasing, has put together months into the year, [2] and caused us to compare every number with number, with a prosperous fortune.[2] Hence, there are [3] fruits for us, and the earth has become pregnant,[3] so that there is food for all animals; while winds and showers take place, neither out of season nor measure. But if any thing occurs contrary to this on the side of evil, it is meet to accuse not the divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. Now to us, while we were investigating the laws, it appeared, that the other things, which are nearly the best for man, are easy for us to know; and that every one would be competent to understand what was said, and to do it, if he knew what is that, which is likely to be a benefit, and what is not. But it has appeared, and now appears still, that all the other pursuits are not very difficult; but in what manner it is meet for men to become good, is very difficult. And, again, to acquire all the rest of good things, as the saying is,[4] it is both possible and not difficult; but with respect to substance, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the body, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the soul, that it ought to be good, every one agrees with every one. But in what manner it ought to be good, every one (when asked)[5] answers, by being [6] just, and temperate, and brave,

[1]—[1] So Ficinus translates *μείζονος*, which is at present without regimen. Winckelmann suggests *μείζονος πόνου*—I should prefer *δοκῶ νοῦ μείζονος εἶναι, ἕνεκα*—

[2]—[2] Such is Taylor's translation of the version of Ficinus, "conferri docuit—" which Ast too seems disposed to adopt. But how the Greek words *ἤρξατο συνορᾶν*, "he began to look together," can have that meaning, I cannot understand. Did the author write *ἤρξατό τις συνείρειν*, i. e. "a person began to combine—"

[3]—[3] This mention of fruits before the pregnancy of the earth seems a rather strange *ὕστερον πρότερον*.

[4] To what saying the author here alluded, I confess myself unable to explain. I would therefore read *ἃ λέγομεν*—"of which we have spoken," for the best MS. Z. offers *ὃ λέγομεν*—

[5] Ficinus alone has, what is required by the sense, "interrogatus—"

[6] Such I presume is the meaning of *ὅτι—δικαίαν*— But I can scarcely make out the syntax, unless we read *διὰ τὸ εἶναι* in lieu of *ὅτι μὲν αὖ*—where *αὖ* is perfectly unintelligible; while for *ὅτι δὲ σοφὴν*, the balance of the sentence requires *τὸ δὲ αὖ σοφὴν*, to answer to *τὸ δὲ—ἀγαθὴν*—

and this ;[1] but (in what manner) to be wise, [2] or what wisdom is,[2] not one, as we just now observed, agrees at all with one of the many. Now therefore, besides all the previous kinds of wisdom, we have discovered one, by no means vile for this very purpose, that he, who has learnt what we have discussed, will seem to be wise ; but whether he, who is skilled on these points, is wise and good, on this it is requisite to hold a discussion.

Clin. How reasonably, guest, did you say, that you are endeavouring to speak greatly about great things !

Athen. For they are not trifling things, Clinias ; and, what is still more difficult, they are in every respect and entirely true.

Clin. Very much so, guest ; [3] but do not however be faint-hearted in stating what you mean.[3]

Athen. Truly so ; nor do you in hearing.

Clin. This shall be ; for I will speak to you for both of us.

Athen. It is well. [5.] But it is necessary, as it seems, to speak first of all from the beginning, especially if we are able to comprehend in one name what is that, which we consider to be wisdom ; but if we are quite unable, (to consider) in the second place, [4] what and how many are the (arts) [4] through which he, who receives them, will, according to our story, be a wise man.

Clin. Say on.

Athen. What follows after this will be without blame to the legislator ; who, making a conjecture about the gods, speaks more beautifully and better than those, who have spoken [5] before ; and who passes his life in making use, as it were, of a beautiful discipline, and honouring the gods, and exalting them with hymns, and felicity,[6] and thus passes through life.

[1] The phrase in Greek, answering to "et cetera" in Latin and English, is not *καὶ ταῦτα*, but *καὶ τοιαῦτα*, as shown by Demosthenes perpetually ; and so probably found Ficinus in his MS., for his version is "cæteraque hujusmodi."

[2—2] The Greek is *ἦν τινα δὲ—* It was, I suspect, originally, *ἢ ἦν τινα δή*—as I have translated.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed in part by Taylor, has "labori ne cedas, quin, ut cæpisti, progrediare."

[4—4] The Greek is *τίνες—καὶ ὁπόσαι τινες—* But *τινες* I believe is never thus repeated. Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has, what the sense requires, "quænam et quot sunt artes," and hence his MS. probably read *τέχναι* for *τινες—*

[5] Three MSS. offer *εἰρηκότων* for *εἰρημένων* ; and so found Ficinus in his, as Stephens elicited from his "quam prisci," adopted by Taylor.

Ast vainly, I think, endeavours to explain the strange expression

Clin. [1] Well and beautifully [1] are you speaking, guest; and may the end of your laws be this, that after falling down [2] before the gods, and passing a life the most pure,[3] you may meet with its close the best and the most beautiful.

Athen. How then shall we speak, Clinias? Does it not seem to you that we honour the gods greatly by hymning them, and by praying that it may come into your minds to say things the most beautiful and the best respecting them? Say you in this way, or how?

Clin. In this way, wonderfully. But do thou, O godlike man, confiding in the gods, offer up a prayer, and speak the one amongst your beautiful speeches that comes into your mind relating to the gods and goddesses.

Athen. This shall be, if the deity himself be our leader Do you only pray with me.

Clin. Say then what is to follow this.

Athen. It is necessary then, as it seems, for me, since those, who have gone before, have represented improperly the generation of gods and of animals, to give in the first place, according to our former reasoning, a better representation, by resuming the discourse, which I took in hand against impious assertions, and to assert that there are gods, who have a care for all things both small and great; and that they are not to be softened down by those, who are engaged in unjust [4] acts, if you remember, Clinias; for you took down a memorandum of it; for what was then said was very true. But this was the great-

εὐδαιμονίᾳ γεραίροντι. The author wrote, I suspect, *ὕμνοις τε γεραίροντι κατ' εὐδαιμονίαν διάγειν τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον*, answering to "feliciter vivat," in Ficinus.

[1]—[1] The Greek is at present *ἢ καλῶς λέγεις*. But the formula *καλῶς λέγεις*, never is nor could be preceded by the interrogative *ἢ*— The author wrote, no doubt, *Εὖ καὶ καλῶς*—as I have translated.

[2] How Stephens and Ast could patronize here *προσπαίσαντι*, I cannot understand; as if Clinias could mean to say that the Athenian was playing with or making fun of the gods. I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense evidently requires—*θεοὺς προσπεσόντι*— Sydenham suggests *προσπαιανίσαντι*, answering to *ὑμνοῦντες*—

[3] Although I am well aware that the comparative is sometimes found, where one would expect the superlative, yet here the superlatives in the next sentence imperiously demand, as I have translated, *καθαρώτατον* instead of *καθαρώτερον*.

[4] I have adopted, what Ast saw the sense required, *ἄδικα* in lieu of *δίκαια*. Ficinus too has—"præter justum"—as if his MS. read *παρὰ δίκαια*: but *παρὰ* could not thus follow *εἰσὶ*—

est, that every soul is older than every body. Do you not remember (this)? or this at least perfectly, that what is better, and older, and more divine, is credibly prior to that, which is worse, and younger, and less honourable; and in every way that what governs, is (prior) to what is governed: and that what leads, to what is led. Let us then receive this at least, that soul is older than body. Now if this be the case, it is more credible that, what is first in the generation of the first, would be almost the beginning; and let us lay down that the beginning exists in a more becoming manner than a beginning,[1] and that we have most correctly come upon [2]the greatest (parts)[2] of wisdom, relating to the generation of the gods.

Clin. Let these things be stated [3]to the best of our power.[3]

Athen. Come, then, let us assert that an animal is said most truly (to exist)[4] according to nature then,[5] when one combination of soul and body coming together produces one form.

Clin. Correctly so.

Athen. A thing of this kind then is most justly called an animal.

Clin. It is.

Athen. Now it is requisite, according to a probable account, for five solid bodies to be mentioned, from which a person might model the most beautiful and best of things; but the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is nothing else, which can be generated without a body, and possessing in no respect and at no time colour, except the really most divine genus of soul. Now this is nearly that alone, to which it pertains to mould and fabricate; but it belongs to body, as we call it,[6] to be moulded and produced,

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρχῆς*, not *τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς*—which I cannot understand. The author meant, I presume, to say that the first cause is superior to any other cause.

[2]—[2] Ficinus omits *τῶν μεγίστων*—which Ast says are to follow *σοφίας*—But in that case *σοφίας* would require the article.

[3]—[3] Ficinus has—"pro humanis viribus"—as if his MS. read *δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην*, i. e. *ἀνθρωπίνην*—

[4] From *γε* I have elicited *εἶναι*—or else we must read *γενέσθαι* for *λέγεσθαι*—by the perpetual confusion in those words.

[5] In lieu of *τοῦτο* Stephens would read *τότε*—obtained from "tunc" in Ficinus; and this, which is confirmed by three MSS., the Zurich editors have adopted, as Ast too feels half inclined to do. Stalbaum however scornfully rejects it, for he did not remember that the author had repeated in p. 974, B. and 976, B., the same formula, *τότε, ὅτ' ἄν*—

[6] Ficinus, followed by Taylor, omits *ὃ λέγομεν*—

and to be visible. But to the other (soul)—for let us say it again, [1]since it is to be said not merely once,[1]—(it pertains) to be invisible, and to know and to be intelligible,[2] and to have a share of memory and of the reasoning power in the changes of even and odd. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that fire [3](is the first), and water (the second),[3] and air the third, and earth the fourth, and æther the fifth; and in the dominions of each of these there is produced many an animal and of every kind. Now it is meet to learn this singly, thus. Let us, in the first place, lay down the whole of the things of earth as one, namely, all human beings, and all such animals as are with many feet, or none, and such as can move on, and such as are stationary, as being held down by roots. And it is requisite to consider the one thing belonging to it as this, that all these are formed of all those genera, but that the greater part is of the earth and the nature of solidity. It is, however, requisite to lay down another kind of animal, which is generated, and, at the same time, able to be seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but contains likewise a small portion of earth and air, and of all the other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that animals of every kind and visible are generated from them. [4]It is necessary likewise to think that all in the heavens are these genera of animals,[4] [5]which it is necessary to say[5] is the whole divine race of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. [6]It is requisite moreover to impart to them, at least in opinion, one of two fates.[6]

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and Taylor after him.

[2] In lieu of *νοητῷ* I have adopted *νοερῷ*, suggested by Sydenham from "cognitionis compos" in Ficinus.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πῦρ φάναι ᾱ καὶ ῶ ὕδωρ*—where *ᾱ* is "first" and *ῶ* "second"—On *ϖ* as one form of *β*, see Bast in Palæograph. p. 708.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has more briefly—"hæc cœlestia putamus animalia esse."

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. Taylor has—"or in other words—"

[6]—[6] Such, I presume, is the meaning of the Greek, *δυοῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν χρὴ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν*: which Ficinus thus translates, "his utique animalibus e duabus sortibus alteram tribuendam putamus:" where *δόξῃ* and *σχεδὸν* are both omitted, as being here equally unintelligible, and *ἑτέραν* taken in the sense of "alterutram;" for so, I suspect, Ficinus wrote, not "alteram," which would be without any meaning. Taylor's version is—"It is also requisite to consider this respecting the two genera of animals—" where there is scarcely a word like the original.

For each of them is either indestructible and immortal, and altogether, from every necessity, divine, or [1]possesses some long-aged life of life, sufficient for each, than which[1] there would be never any need of more.

[6.] Let us then consider first, that there are, as we have said, these two kinds of animals; and[2] let us say again that both of them are visible, the one being, as it would seem, wholly of fire, and the other of earth, and that the earthy is moved in a disorderly manner, but the fiery in all order. Now it is meet to consider that, what is moved without order, is senseless, [3]as the animal, which is around us, acts for the most part;[3] but that, what has its going in order and in the heavens, it is meet to make for ourselves as a great proof of its being intellectual; for it goes on ever according to the same and in a similar manner; and by doing and suffering [4]it would afford a sufficient proof of its living intellectually.[4] Now the necessity of a soul possessing intellect would be by far the greatest of all necessities. For it lays down laws as governing, and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing the best, deliberates according to the best intellect, that, which is not to be changed by turning, comes out perfect in reality according to intellect; and even adamant would not be superior to such a soul, and less to be changed by turning. But in reality the three Fates hold and guard, so as to be perfect, that, which has been deliberated upon by each of the gods with the best counsel. It was necessary therefore that there should be to man a proof that the stars are endued with intellect through[5] the whole of their pro-

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *μακραίωνα βίον ἔχειν ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς, ἧς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε*: where to avoid the tautology in *βίον ζωῆς*, Ast would read *ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς ὥστε*— but Winckelmann, *ἕκαστον ὥστε*, without *ζωῆς*— omitted by Ficinus, who has merely "vitam longævam—"

[2] In lieu of *γὰρ*, omitted by one MS., Ficinus found *δὲ*, as shown by his "rursusque—"

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in the version of Ficinus, "quod plerumque faciunt, quæcunque apud nos animalia sunt:" from which it would seem that his MS. read *δρᾷ τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα*, not *τὸ—ζῶον*.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and by Taylor, the former however adding "eadem" after "agitque et patitur," translated by the latter "the same—"

[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *κατὰ*, not *τε καὶ*— For though

gression, because they always do the same things, through its having been planned of old that they are to do so for some wondrous length of time, and through a change not taking place in the plan, by their doing some things at one time, and others at another, and by wandering [1] up and down [1] and altering their orbit. Now the very reverse of this has appeared to the majority of us, that, by their doing [2] the same things and in a similar manner, they have not a soul. The masses, too, have followed persons so senseless, as to conceive that the human race is intellectual and vital, as being moved, but the divine race unintellectual, as remaining in the same movements. But it is allowable for the man, who places himself on the side of what is more beautiful, and better, and more agreeable (to the gods),[3] to conceive that he ought, on this very account, to consider as intellectual that, which does always the same things [4] according to the same and in a similar manner; and that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to behold, and which by a progression and dance,[5] the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, completes for all animals what is needful. Now (to show) that we are justly saying they possess a soul, let us consider first their size. For they are not in reality so small, as they appear to be; but each of them is of immense bulk, as is worthy to be believed; for this is admitted by competent demonstrations. For it is possible to conceive correctly that the whole Sun [6] is larger than the whole earth, and that all the stars, which are borne along,[7] possess a wonderful size. Let us then take into our thoughts what

the stars might be supposed to be endued with intellect, the path they described could scarcely be thought to be equally intellectual.

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* followed originally *πλανᾶσθαί τε*, not, as at present, *μεταβουλευόμενον*— Compare Aristoph. Ὄρν. 3, *ἄνω κάτω πλανύττομεν.*

[2] Instead of *πράττειν* Stephens proposed *πράττει*, adopted by Bekker, Ast, and Stalbaum. The author wrote rather, as I have translated, *ὅτι τῷ τὰ*— to which *ὅτι τὸ τὰ—πράττειν* in the best MS. Z. plainly leads.

[3] Ficinus alone adds, what the sense requires, "dius," to "gratiora."

[4] In lieu of *διὰ τοῦτο* Ficinus has "eadem," which led Cornarius to propose *ταὐτὰ*— The preposition *διὰ* was a var. lect. for *κατὰ*, as shown by "per eadem similiter profecta."

[5] On the dance of the stars Ast refers to Lucian in Astrolog. § 7, and Julian Or. iv. p. 135, A.

[6] Ast refers to Cicero N. D. ii. 19.

[7] By the stars borne along the author meant perhaps the planets.

would be the method of any nature in causing so great a bulk to revolve for ever for the same time[1] that it revolves at present. Now I assert that a god would be the cause, and that it could not be possible otherwise. For it would not otherwise become animated than through a god, as we have shown. But since a god is able in this respect, to him there has been every facility for every animal, in the first place, to be produced, and every body, and every bulk; and next, to cause them to move in that way, which he conceived to be the best. And now upon all these points we will make one true assertion. It is impossible for the earth and heavens and all the stars and all the bulky bodies made from them to subsist, unless a soul were present to each, or in each, so that[2] they proceed with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and for every good, which is produced, to be produced for us all. But it is requisite that, by how much the more vile is man, (the less) ought he to be seen to trifle, but to assert something clear concerning them. Should then any one assert that certain violent motions of bodies or natures or any thing of this kind are the causes, he will say nothing that is clear.

[7.] It is however requisite to reconsider seriously what we have said, whether our discourse has a reason for it, or altogether comes after it. In the first place then, (we said,) there are two things, the one, soul, and the other, body, and that many things pertain to each; but that all are different from one another, [3]and each from each;[3] and that there is no other third thing common to any one; and that soul differs from body; and[4] that the former is intellectual, but the latter unintellectual; and that the one rules, but the other is ruled; and that the one is [5]the cause of all (that happens), but the other is not the cause of any accident;[5] so that to assert that the things in

[1] In lieu of *χρόνον*, which is unnecessary after *ἀεὶ*, I should prefer *δρόμον*, "course—"

[2] In *εἶτα*, furnished by five MSS., lies hid *ὥστε*, as I have translated.

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus, who has "et quæ ad utriusque genus pertinent esse multa; eaque ab aliis in suo genere differre, et utraque genera a se invicem esse diversa," where Ast conceives that Ficinus added something for the sake of rendering the sense clearer.

[4] In the Greek is strangely introduced *θήσομεν*, which is properly omitted by Ficinus, and after him by Taylor; although it is difficult to say how or why it came here.

[5—5] The Greek is *αἴτιον ἁ-άντων, το δὲ ἀναίτιον τάσης παθης—*

heaven were generated by something else, and that the productions of soul and body do not exist in this way, is a great folly and a want of reason. If then it is requisite for the reasons, relating to all such matters, to be victorious, and for all things of this kind to seem confidently to be divine, we must lay down one or the other of these two points; we must either hymn[1] those things most correctly, as being gods themselves, or (we must) consider them, like images, to be resemblances of the gods, the gods themselves having manufactured them. For they [2](are the works of artificers)[2] neither senseless nor of little worth. But, as we have said, we must lay down one or the other of these points. [3]And what is laid down, we must honour pre-eminently before all statues.[3] For never will there be seen statues more beautiful and [4]more common of all[4] men, or put up in pre-eminent places, and excelling for their purity, and solemnity, and the whole of life,[5] than are these, [6]how they have been generated altogether in this way.[6] Let us then endeavour (to prove)[7] so much, at least, relating to the gods, by perceiving that these are the two visible ani-

thus translated by Ficinus, "illa omnium passionum corporibus, hoc nullius causa."

[1] From "putabimus" in Ficinus, it is evident that his MS. did not read *ὑμνητέον*, but *ἡμῖν νοητέον*—

[2—2] Of the words between the numerals, Ast has supplied *ἔργα*, "works," and Ficinus, "artificibus—" Hence the author probably wrote *οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνοήτων ἔργ' ἐστὶν*—

[3—3] To avoid the absurdity in this sentence, Ast would read *ταῦτα δὲ τεθέντα*, in the sense of "and on this being laid down—" But as I cannot see what is gained by the change, I suspect the author wrote *τάδε δ', ἅτε θεῖ' ὄντα, πάντων ἀγαλμάτων ἀντιτιμητέον διαφερόντως*, "and these, as being divine, are to be honoured before all statues pre-eminently," and that he put those words after *ἐργασαμένων* just above; while *ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἰρήκαμεν—θετέα* must be placed after *ἢ ταῦτα* a little below.

[4—4] I confess I cannot understand *κοινότερα ξυμπάντων ἀνθρώπων*, as if it were any praise for a statue to be common. I could have understood *εὐκμητότερα*, "better made—"

[5] Here again I am at a loss in *ξυμπάσῃ ζωῇ*.

[6—6] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*ὡς πάντῃ γεγένηται*: which Ficinus could not understand; for his version is—"quæ undique similiter constructa sunt"—as if he wished to read *τῇ αὐτῇ*— Unless I am greatly mistaken, the author inserted here—*ἀλλ', ὅπερ εἰρήκαμεν, τούτων ἡμῖν θάτερα θετέον*, before *ὡς πάντα τῇ ἢ τῇ γεγένηται*, i. e. "that all things have been produced in this way or that."

[7] I have inserted "to prove" for the sake of the sense. Ficinus for the same reason rendered *ἐγχειρῶμεν* by "asseveremus"—

mals, of which we have spoken, (one) immortal; but the whole of the [1] other has been created of the earth, mortal; (and)[1] let us attempt[2] to speak of the three, which are in the midst of the five [between them],[3] and exist according to reasonable opinion, most clearly. For after fire let us place æther; and let us lay down that from it the soul moulds animals, which possess a power, like some other genera, the greater portions from their own nature, but the smaller portions, for the sake of a link, from other genera; and after the æther that soul moulds from air another genus of animals, and a third from water. And it is probable that soul, after it had fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with living matter, by making use, to the best of its power, of all genera, since all of them exist, partakers of life; but that the second and the third, and the fourth and the fifth, beginning their generation from the gods, who are manifest, end in us, who are men.

[8.] The gods, then, Zeus and Juno, and all the rest, (let any one place)[4] where he pleases, according to the same law; and let him consider this reasoning as fixed.

We must call therefore the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive existing together with the stars, the visible gods, the greatest and the most worthy of honour, and who as seeing on every side the most acutely, are the first in rank. And after them, and under them in due order, it is very meet to honour with prayers the dæmons, [5]for the sake of their silent going to and fro,[5] an aërial genus, that occupies a third[6] and middle seat, and is the cause of interpreting. But of these

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *γέγονε καὶ*, not *γεγονέναι*—

[2] Ast says that *πειραθῆναι* depends upon *ἐγχειρῶμεν*—but what is the meaning of "let us endeavour to attempt," he has not attempted to show. The author wrote *πειραθῶμεν*—as I have translated.

[3] The words *τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων* are evidently an explanation of *τὰ μέσα τῶν πέντε*.

[4] Ficinus alone supplies "locato"—Ast would insert *ὀνομάζων*, understanding by *θεοὺς—φανεροὺς*, the stars, or planets; one of which, commonly called Venus, had likewise the name of Juno, as shown by Timæus Locrus, p. 96, E. and Apuleius De Mund. p. 58.

[5]—[5] So I have translated *εὐφήμου διαπορείας*—remembering the passage in the Banquet, § 28, where mention is made of a race, that is *ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν*.

[6] "The dæmons are said to possess a third seat, as coming after the gods, visible by the mind, and the stars, visible by the eye." Ast.

two kinds of living beings, [1] one (formed) of æther, and the other in due order of air, neither of them is entirely visible; [1] and though present and near at hand, they do not become manifest to us; but let us say that, participating in a wonderful intelligence, as being docile and of a good memory, they know all our thoughts; and that in a wonderful manner they love the honourable and good man amongst us, and hate excessively the wicked, as being himself a sharer in pain; for the deity, who possesses the completion of a divine allotment, is (placed) beyond these (two), pleasure and pain, but has had a share in thinking upon and knowing, according to all things.[2] And as the heaven is full of living beings, they interpret to each other and the highest gods all things and in all ways,[3] through the living beings in the middle being carried to earth and through the whole of heaven with a light and rapid motion. But he, who assimilates the fifth genus of living beings, which is from water, to a demigod, will assimilate rightly; and this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from view; but when visible,[4] it exhibits a wonder through an obscure vision. Since then there are these five kinds of living beings really existing, in whatever manner any of us meets with them, [5] falling in with them in a

[1]—[1] So I have translated the Latin of Ficinus, "alterum ex æthere, alterum deinceps ex aëre est; ac neutrum conspici totum potest—" who found in his MS., as Aldus did in his, *οὐ διορώμενον*—not *ὂν διορώμενον*, which could not thus precede *εἶναι*—even if they were in other respects intelligible. The reading *οὐ διορώμενον* is confirmed by Varro, quoted by Augustine De Civitate Dei, vii. 6, "aërias animas—animo, non oculis, videri et vocari—genios—" as remarked by Ast.

[2] I scarcely understand here *κατὰ πάντα*. I suspect the author wrote, *πάντα κάλλιστα*, i. e. "all things in the best manner—" Ficinus has "sapientia cognitioneque penitus fruitur," and thus avoids all the difficulty in *γιγνώσκειν* thus standing without its object.

[3] I have adopted *πάντως*, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *πάντας*—

[4] Ast has adopted *καὶ δῆλον* from Ficinus—"et cum videtur," in lieu of *καὶ ἄδηλον*—

[5]—[5] Such is the literal translation of the unintelligible Greek; where Stephens was the first to confess himself at fault; nor has Ast been able to make out the syntax and sense satisfactorily. Ficinus, apparently in despair of being able to translate literally, has given what he conceived to be the general sense in his version, adopted in part by Taylor—"quæ aut somnis aut vaticinio audituque per vocem sanorum aut ægrotantium auribus percepta, aut etiam in ipso e vita excessu nobis sese offerentia nostros animos movent; unde multa multis sacra et privatim et publice his opinionibus instituta sunt, instituenturque in posterum."

dream, in an interpretation of a dream, or spoken by oracles and prophecies to some in hearing, healthy or sick, or being met with at the close of life, and opinions being present privately and publicly, from whence many sacred rites of many have taken place, and some will take place;[5] of all these the legislator, who possesses even the smallest particle of mind, will never dare, by making innovations towards a god-worship, which does not possess something clear, to overturn his own state; nor will he, knowing nothing at all (himself), forbid any portion[1] of what the law of his country has spoken, on the subject of the gods.[2] For [3] it is not possible for human nature to know any thing on points of this kind. And does not the same reason hold good, that those are the worst of men, who do not dare to speak to us of the gods really existing [4]in a manifest form, and to make them manifest,[4] by permitting[5] the other gods to be without sacred rites, and not to receive the honours that are due to them? But now there happens a thing of this kind to take place, as if some one of us had seen the Sun and Moon existing and looking upon all of us; and, [6]although able to speak, had not said[6] that they remained still[7] sharing in no honours; nor was he anxious for his part to bring them into a place of honour, nor to cause festivals and sacrifices to take place for them; nor, through the computed time,[8] to distribute to each of them the seasons of fre-

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐδ' ἓν*—not *οὐδ' ὧν*—

[2] I have adopted *θεῶν*, found in the margin of two MSS., in lieu of *θυσιῶν*—

[3] In lieu of *ὥσπερ*, which he could not understand, Ast suggested *ὡς*—He should have proposed *καὶ γὰρ*, as I have translated. On the confusion of *ὡς* and *καὶ* see § 4, p. 12, n. 7.

[4—4] Others may, but I will not, believe that the author wrote *ὄντως ἡμῖν φανεροὺς ὄντας θεοὺς*—and afterwards *φανεροὺς ποιεῖν*—For if the gods were really manifest, it would be unnecessary to make them so. But what he did write, I confess my inability to discover.

[5] In lieu of *ὄντας* Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐῶντας*, as shown by his version—"relinqui—patiuntur."

[6—6, 7] Grou was the first to read, what the sense requires, *δυνατὸς*, for *ἀδύνατος*. But as Ficinus omits *καὶ μὴ ἔφραζεν ἀδυνατὸς ὢν πῃ φράζειν*—Ast would omit those words likewise, without even venturing to assign a reason for their being found here. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were (7) *τιμῆς ἔτι—μεῖναι*, not *τίμῆς τε—ἅμα*: where *ἅμα* is perfectly unintelligible.

[8] Ast, unable to understand *ἀπολαμβανόμενον- -χρόνον*, suggested *ἀπολαμβάνοντα*—He should have proposed, as I have translated, *ἀπολαμβανομένου—χρόνου*—

quently longer and shorter years.[1] Would not such a one, if he were said to be bad both to himself and to any other, who knew him, be justly said to be so?

Clin. How not, O guest, as being the worst (of men)?

Athen. Know then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

Clin. How say you?

[9.] *Athen.* Know that amongst those, relating to the whole heaven, there are eight powers, sisters to each other, on which I have looked; and yet I have done nothing of consequence; for this is easy even to another person.[2] Of these there are three, one of the Sun, one of the Moon, and one of the not-wandering[3] stars, which I mentioned a little before, and there are five others. With respect to all these, and the (gods) in them, whether they move of themselves, or are carried along in cars, let not one of us all think even that some are gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are genuine,[4] but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but let us all say that they are all of them brothers, and live in fraternal allotments; and let us honour them, not one for a year, and another for a month, nor let us ordain for others any allotment or time, in which (each) proceeds through its revolution, and completes the arrangement, which reason, the most divine of all, has ordained to be visible; (and) which he, who is under a good dæmon,[5] has first wondered at, and then felt a desire to learn, as much as it is possible for a mortal nature, from thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and being thus truly initiated and in reality participating in prudence, one in one, will pass the rest of his time as a holy spectator of things the most beautiful, as far as sight is concerned.

It now remains for us to state after this how many and

[1] By "the longer years" are meant the solar, and by "the shorter" the lunar, which were made to coincide, when requisite, by necessary intercalations.

[2] Ficinus has, what is preferable, "cuivis"—Perhaps the author wrote —*ἀγρίῳ τῳ· τούτων*— i. e. "to even a savage. Of these—"

[3] All the MSS. offer *πλανητῶν*: from which Ast has elicited *ἀπλανῶν* —which I have adopted.

[4] I confess I hardly understand *γνήσιοι* here.

[5] So I think *εὐδαίμων* ought to be translated.

what they are. For we shall not be seen to be false. Thus far at least I firmly insist upon. For I say again, that of these there are eight; and that of the eight, three have been already spoken of, and there are five still remaining. Now [1] the fourth and fifth onward movement and oblique path [2] are nearly [3] equal in velocity with the Sun,[1] and are neither slower nor swifter. And let us say that he, who possesses intellect, is altogether competent to lead these three; and that these (movements) belong to the Sun, and Lucifer. But the third it is not possible to speak of by name,[4] through its not being known; and the reason of this, that the person, who first saw it, was a Barbarian. For an ancient place[5] was the nurse of those, who first thought of these matters, in consequence of the beauty of the summer season, which Egypt and Syria[6] possess sufficiently, (enabling) persons to look upon all the stars, visible, so to say, perpetually; inasmuch as they dwelt (in a part)[7] of the world at a distance from clouds and rain.[8] Hence to every where else and hither too has reached what has been tested by the time of thousands of years, and even infinite; and on this account it is meet with confidence to lay down these matters as laws. For (to think)[9] that divine (natures) are not to be held in honour, or that these are not divine, is clearly the province of persons not endued with intellect. It is necessary however for this to be assigned as the reason, why they

[1]—[1] According to the Timæus, p. 38, D., and Macrobius in Somn. Scip. i. 19, quoted by Ast, the fourth and fifth, having the same velocity as the Sun, were Venus and Mercury. See here shortly afterwards.

[2] Here again, as in § 3, p. 10, n. [1], I have translated as if the Greek were λοξὴ ὁδὸς, not διέξοδος: unless it be said that διέξοδος answers to "trajectio" in Cicero, and in English to "passage across the heavens."

[3] This "nearly" appears to be strangely added. For if the movement were neither slower nor swifter, it could not be said to be nearly equal.

[4] The author is supposed by Ast to refer to the name Σπίλβων (Mercury), on the authority of Pseud.-Aristot. Περὶ Κόσμ. ii. p. 1204, translated by Apuleius De Mund. p. 58, and of Chalcidius in Tim. p. 176.

[5] As the adjective παλαιὸς is not elsewhere, I believe, united to τόπος, and as all the MSS. offer τρόποις, the author wrote, I suspect, παλαιοῖς —τρόποις τόπος—

[6] Ast refers opportunely to Cicero de Divinat. i. 1.

[7] To support the syntax, it is easy to read ἀεί τι τοῦ κόσμου, as I have translated, instead of ἀεὶ τοῦ—

[8] That Syria is free, like Egypt, from rain, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere.

[9] I have translated, as if ἡγεῖσθαι had dropt out after μὴ θεῖα—

have no names [1] with the masses; for they have appellations with some divine persons.[1] For Lucifer and Hesperus, being the same, have the appellation almost of Venus, and are very well suited to a Syrian name-giver.[2] But the star, which revolves with an equal velocity with the Sun and this (Lucifer), has (the name) almost of Mercury.[3] And further, let us speak of three onward movements (of those stars), that take their course to the right hand, together with the Sun and Moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb one, which a person may most correctly[4] call the upper world, which proceeds contrary to all those,[5] and draws the others along with it, as it would appear to persons who know little on these matters; but what we know sufficiently, it is necessary to speak of, [6] and we do speak.[6] For wisdom really existing is somehow in this way apparent to him, who has a share, although a small one, of consciousness[7] correct and divine. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest[8] by the slowness of its motion. Some call it by the name of Phænon [Saturn];[9] but that, which is after this in slowness, it is meet to call Phaethon

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were—*πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν· ἀλλὰ γὰς ἐπωνυμίας εἰλήφασιν πρὸς θείων ἐνίων*—where *πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν* has been preserved by the best MS. Z, and has thus led me to elicit *θείων* from *θεῶν*, acknowledged by "deorum" in Ficinus, and found subsequently in five MSS. in lieu of *ἐνίων*— And thus there is a proper antithesis between *πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν*, and *πρὸς θείων ἐνίων*—

[2] In lieu of *νομοθέτῃ* Ast happily conjectured *ὀνοματοθέτῃ*, not, as Stallbaum says, *ὀνομαθέτῃ*. The words are constantly confounded, as shown perpetually in the Cratylus. With regard to the name of Venus being suited to a Syrian name-giver, Ast correctly explains it by showing that Venus was worshipped in Syria under many names.

[3] Such is the reading of the MS. of Ficinus, and of all the others but the best Z, which offers *Στίλβων*, without *σχεδὸν*— Now, since so rare a word could hardly be introduced as an explanation, I suspect that the more common *Ἑρμοῦ* is the explanation of *Στίλβωνος*—

[4] Ficinus has "jure," as if his MS. read, what the sense requires, *κάλλιστ'* instead of *μάλιστ'*—for the two words are constantly confounded.

[5] Ast quotes Cicero in Somn. Scip. 4, "Huic (extimo orbi) subjecti sunt septem, qui versantur retro contrario motu atque cœlum."

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals Ficinus and Taylor omit.

[7] In lieu of *συννοίας*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἐννοίας*, as shown by his "intelligentiæ—"

[8] So Ficinus, whose "ceteris" plainly proves that he found in his MS. *τῶν ἄλλων* instead of *αὐτῶν*—

[9, 10, 11] As I have rejected just before *Ἑρμοῦ*, the interpretation of *Στίλβωνος*, so here *Κρόνου*, *Διὸς*, and *Ἄρεος* are the explanations respectively

[Jupiter];[10] and after this follows Puroeis, [Mars,][11] which has the reddest colour of all. Of these things when a person is speaking, it is not difficult to have a notion; but after learning, it is requisite to think of them, as we have said.

[10.] This however it is necessary for every Greek to have in his thoughts, that we inhabit a spot, [1]belonging to the Greeks,[1] [2]nearly the best,[2] as regards virtue. But it is proper to say that it deserves praise for being situated in the middle of the natural qualities of summer and winter. [3]But though its nature, as regards summer, falls short of that, which belongs to the region there,[4] as I have stated, it gave subsequently to them the mental perception relating to these gods of the world.[3] Let us then admit that, whatever the Greeks have received from the Barbarians, they work it out to a more beautiful end.[5] And the very same notion we ought to have with respect to what has been said now, that it is difficult to discover all matters of this kind without feeling a doubt. There is however a hope, both much and glorious, that the Greeks will respect all these divinities in a manner more beautiful and more just than the tradition, which has come from the Barbarians, by employing both discipline and the Delphic oracles and every attention according to the laws. Nor let any Greek be afraid of this, that mortals ought not to busy themselves about divine matters; but to think quite the contrary of this, that the deity is not senseless, nor ignorant of human nature; but knows that, where he teaches, (man) will follow, and learn what has been taught; and that he surely knows that he does teach us this very thing, and that we learn both number and to number. For being ignorant of this, he would be the most stupid of all beings. For, according to the saying,[6] he would

of *Φαίνωνα*, *Φαέθοντα*, and *Πυρόεις*. Opportunely then does the best MS. Z. offer *Φαινωνα* for *Κρόνου*, and *ὄνομα* instead of *ἐπωνυμίαν*: for *ἐπωνυμίαν φθέγγεσθαι* is a phrase not be found elsewhere.

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals both Ficinus and Taylor omit.

[2]—[2] In the formula *ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον*, so common with Thucydides, and even Plato, the word *σχεδὸν* is never, I believe, added elsewhere.

[3]—[3] Taylor has followed here to the letter the loose translation of Ficinus, "quoniam vero magis quam barbari, ut diximus, ab æstiva serenitate distamus, horum deorum ordinem tardius intelleximus."

[4] By "there" is meant Syria.

[5] On this notion Ast refers to the anonymous biographer of Pythagoras in Porphyr. ed. Cantab. p. 65.

[6] I confess I cannot explain to what saying the author is here alluding.

in reality be ignorant of himself, if he were annoyed at a person able to learn, and did not rejoice without a feeling of envy at a person becoming good through a god. Now there is a reason great and good (for supposing) that, when men had their first notions about the gods, how they existed, and of what kind they were, and what actions they took in hand, ideas were then broached, not to the mind of the moderate, nor agreeable to them, nor even of those, who were next after them;[1] amongst whom what relates to fire and water and the other bodies, was said to be the most ancient; but posterior to them the wonderful soul; and that the movement, which the body has obtained by lot, is better and of more value for carrying on both itself (and soul)[2] by the aid of heat and cold, and all things of that kind; but that the soul could not (do so) to body and itself. But now, when we say that soul (exists),[3] if it exists in body, it would be not at all wonderful[4] for it to move and carry about both the body and itself; nor would, according to any reason, soul be believed[5] to be unable to carry about a weight.[6] Since then soul is the cause of the universe, and of all good things being such, and on the other hand of evil things being such, it is not at all wonderful that soul should be the cause of every bearing on and movement; but that the bearing on and movement towards the good belongs to the best soul, but the bearing on and movement towards the contrary, to a contrary[7] (soul); and that it is necessary for the good to have vanquished, and to vanquish still, what are not of this kind. [8]Hence let these

[1] Such, I presume, is the meaning of *οἱ δεύτεροι*, unless it be said that the author wrote *οἵ γ' ὕστεροι*—

[2] I have adopted Ast's notion, that *καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν* have dropt out here, for they are required to balance *σῶμά τε καὶ ἑαυτήν*.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἶναι*, not *μὲν*—

[4] Both the sense and syntax require, as I have translated, *θαῦμ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἦν*, not *θαῦμα οὐδὲν*—

[5] In lieu of *ἀπιστεῖ* Stephens was led, from "dubium—nullum est" in Ficinus, to read *ἀπιστεῖται*, subsequently found in the best MS. Z. But the syntax would require *ἀπιστοῖτ' ἂν*—

[6] In the Greek are found the words *διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων*, which Ficinus has omitted, either because they were wanting in his MS., or he could not understand them. I have transposed them to ([8]).

[7] The sense evidently requires *ἐναντίας* in lieu of *ἐναντίαν*, which Ast vainly attempts to defend.

[8]—[8] I have transposed hither the words *διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων*, and added *ἔστω ταῦτα, ἃ*— elicited from *τῶν ταῦτα*—

be the assertions of us, now thinking in this way;[8] all of which has been stated with reference to Justice, the punisher of the impious. [11.] With respect however to that, which has been brought to a test, it is not possible for us to disbelieve, that we ought not to consider the good to be wise.

Let us then see, whether to this wisdom, of which we were of old in search, we can direct our mind either by education or art; and being wanting in the knowledge of which we should be ignorant of things just. [1]Being such we seem to me,[1] and we must speak. For after seeking up and down, I will endeavour to make it at the end plain to you in the way it has become very plain[2] to myself. The greatest part of virtue, when it is not practised correctly, becomes the cause (of ignorance),[3] as, from what has been said, the thing itself[4] seems to me to signify forcibly. But let no one persuade us, that there is any (part)[5] of virtue belonging to the race of mortals greater than piety. Now that this does not exist in the best natures through ignorance, we must declare; since the best are those, which are produced with the greatest difficulty, and which, when produced, are of the greatest benefit. For the soul, that receives moderately and mildly what belongs to a nature slow and the reverse, would be of an easy disposition; and admiring fortitude, and being obedient towards temperance, and, what is the greatest in these natures, able to learn, and with a good memory, it would be able to rejoice much in things of this kind, [6]so as to be a lover of learning.[6] For these things are not easy to be produced; and when they are produced, and meet with the nurture and education of which there is a need, they would be able

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ὄντες τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦμεν δή μοι.* This Ast could not understand, and he therefore suggested *ὄντως τοιοῦτον*— But as Ficinus has "Ita profecto mihi videtur," I should prefer *οὕτως τι τοιοῦτον δοκεῖ εἶναί μοι δῆλον.*

[2] One MS. has *μετατυχοῦσα*, where evidently lies hid *μάλα τυχοῦσα*, as I have translated.

[3] Ficinus alone has "ignorantiæ," adopted by Taylor.

[4] The Greek is *ἄρτι*, but one MS. has *ἄν τι*, which plainly leads to *αὐτὸ*, for thus *αὐτὸ σημαίνειν* is similar to *αὐτὸ δηλοῖ* in Hipp. Maj. § 18.

[5] Ast would read, as Taylor had already translated, *μέρος τι* before *ἀρετῆς*— Winckelmann prefers *γέρας*—

[6]—[6] Ast translates *ὥστε—εἶναι* "through being—" But such could not be its meaning here, nor in the passage of Xenophon Cyrop. iv. 3, 7, which he quotes. Ficinus has "discendi studio deditus," as if his MS. read *διὰ τὸ φίλη μαθήσεως εἶναι*, instead of *φιλομαθὴς ὥστ' εἶναι.*

to keep down most correctly [1]the most part of their inferiors,[1] by instructing[2] them to do and say respecting the gods each of the matters[3] that are requisite, and when they are requisite, [4]relating to sacrifices and purifications,[4] connected with gods and men,[5] and not to make use of artifice in outward shows, but to honour virtue in truth, which is of all things of the greatest moment to every state. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most important; and if there be a person to teach, it is able to be learnt in the most beautiful and best manner possible. But no one can be a teacher unless a god leads the way. If however [6]a person teaches any thing correctly,[6] but does not perform any thing of this kind in a fitting manner, it is better not to learn. However, from what has been said, it is necessary to learn these things, and for me to say that a nature of this kind is[7] the best. Let us then endeavour to go through by a discourse what these are, and of what kind, and how it is requisite to learn them, both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those, who are able to hear, in what manner a person may learn some things about god-worship. It is a thing almost absurd for the hearer. But we mention its name, which is, what a person through his ignorance of the subject would not imagine, astronomy. Are you then ignorant that the person, who is truly an astronomer, is necessarily the most wise? Not, indeed, he, who is an astronomer according to Hesiod, and all such, and looks to risings and settings, but he, who (looks to [8]the circle) of the eight orbits, and the seven under the first,[8] while each is

[1]—[1] So Ast translates *τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χείρους*. But in *αὐτῶν* lies hid, I suspect, *ἀνῶν*, i. e. *ἀνθρώπων*—

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *φρενοῦν*, not *φρονεῖν*.

[3] The sense and syntax require *ἕκαστα ὧν*— instead of *ἕκαστα ὡς*—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are transposed by Taylor, although found in their proper place in the version of Ficinus.

[5] For the sacrifices relate to the gods, and the purifications to men.

[6]—[6] As there is nothing to which the subsequent *τὸ τοιοῦτον* can be referred, I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰ δέ τί τις εὖ διδάσκοι*, not *εἴ τ' οὖν*, or *εἰ οὖν τις*.— Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, "ab eo vero, qui modum in docendo non servat—"

[7] So Taylor, as if he wished to read *εἶναι* for *τε καὶ*—

[8]—[8] The Greek is at present *τὸν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰς ἑπτὰ περιόδους*, which Ast endeavours to explain by saying that *περίοδος* is to be taken in the double sense of an "orb" and "circuit." But such a double sense would be here out of place. Ficinus has "qui circuitus octo et quomodo septem sub primo versentur," which has led me to suggest that the

going through its own[1] orbit in such a way, that no nature would be competent to contemplate them easily, unless it partook of a wonderful nature,[2] as we have just now said, and say to those, to whom[3] we are stating what[4] it is meet to learn, and how. Let this be mentioned first by us.

[12.] The Moon goes through its orbit the quickest, and first[5] leads on the month and the full moon. The second it is meet to consider is the Sun, that leads on the solstices through the whole of its orbit, and those that describe their course together with it. But that we may not frequently converse in the same way about the same things, the other orbits, which we mentioned before, and [6] which it is not easy to comprehend, we ought to contemplate;[6] and for these objects it is requisite [7] to prepare natures, such as can exist,[7] by teaching them many things beforehand, and accustoming the party, while a boy or youth, to labour thoroughly at what is requisite [8] On this account there would be a need of mathematics; but the greatest and first (need) is of numbers in the abstract, and not of such as are connected with bodies.[9] but of the whole generation and power of the even and the odd, (and) so much as they contribute to the nature of things that exist. Now to him, who learns this, there comes in due order what we

Greek was originally *τὸν τῶν ὁκτὼ περιόδων κύκλον τάς θ' ἑπτὰ ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἰούσας*, as I have translated.

[1] The sense evidently requires *αὐτῆς* for *αὐτὸν*, as just afterwards *τῆς αὐτοῦ περιόδου*.

[2] This repetition of *φύσεως*, omitted by Ficinus, seems rather strange, and is scarcely intelligible.

[3] In lieu of *ὡς*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἷς*—

[4] Ficinus, "quid oporteat," as if his MS. read *ὅτι* in lieu of *ὅπῃ*—

[5] Instead of *πρώτην*, Sydenham suggests *πρώτῃ*, which I have adopted.

[6]—[6] I have translated literally the Latin of Ficinus, "quive non facile intelliguntur, contemplari debemus." who doubtless found something in his MS. superior to the unintelligible *τούτων οὐ ῥᾴδιον ξυννοεῖν*.

[7]—[7] I have translated, as if the Greek were *παρασκευάζειν τὰς φύσεις, οἵας δυνατοὶ εἶναι, χρεὼν* — not *παρασκευάζοντας φύσεις δι' ἃς δυνατὸν εἶναι χρεὼν*— out of which Ast can make nothing satisfactory, even with the aid of his alterations, *παρασκευάζοντα φύσεις, δι' ἃ δυνατὸν ξυνεῖναι. δι*

Opportunely then do three MSS. offer *οἵας*, and one *δι' οἵας*, which is *οἷς*—

[8] In *ἐθίζοντα δεῖ* evidently lies hid *ἐθίζοντα ἃ δεῖ*— Ast would read *ἐθίζοντα ἧδη* –

[9] Instead of *σώματα* Ast suggests *σῶμά τι*, from "corpus' in Ficinus

call very ridiculously by the name of geometry.[1] But the similitude of numbers, that are naturally not similar to each other, becomes conspicuous, when applied to the properties of plain surfaces; which wonderful thing, not of human but divine origin, will appear very clear to him, who is able to think. And after this, those numbers, that are increased by a triple[2] (ratio), and are similar to the nature of a solid, and those, that are on the other hand dissimilar, and are by another art similar to this, which those, who are conversant with it, call stereometry,[3] (to be considered):[4] which is indeed a thing divine and wonderful to those, who look into it; that,[5] while the power is ever revolving about the double, and that which is from the opposite to this, according to each analogy does every nature fashion out for itself a species and genus.[5] Now the first power of the double, according to number,[6] [1] proceeds, according to pro-

[1] Alluding to its name, literally, earth-measuring; which is a mechanical operation; while the geometry here intended is a speculative science. T.

[2] Bekker was the first to edit *τρὶς* for *τρεῖς*, which Taylor had expressed in his "triple increase," and Sydenham suggests in Not. MSS. Ficinus has "in tres usque dimensiones—"

[3] I have adopted *στερεομετρίαν*, found in the best MS. Z., in lieu of *γεωμετρίαν*.

[4] Ficinus alone has, what the sense requires, and is adopted by Taylor, "considerandi sunt," as if his MS. had *σκεπτέον* after *γεγονότες*—

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. Ast conceives that the author meant to say something to this effect, "As numbers are doubled, by passing from simple to compound, so nature, by preserving a kind of ratio in all things, fashions both genus and species."

[6] Of numbers, some represent lines, others superficies, and others solid and cubic quantities. To the first belongs the number 2; to the second, 4, which is the square of 2; and to the third, 8, which is the cube of 2. Double proportion was considered likewise by the ancients as perfect. First, because it is the first proportion, produced between 1 and 2; and secondly, because it contains all proportions within itself; for the sesquialter ($1\frac{1}{2}$), sesquitertian ($1\frac{1}{3}$), and the other proportions are, as it were, parts below double proportion. The numbers, which the author here adduces, are 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12. The ratio of 4 to 2 is double; and that of 8 to 4 is also double. Now these two excesses are equal in ratio; for each is double; but they are not equal in number; for 8 exceeds 4 by 4, but 4 exceeds 2 only by 2. Again, if we compare 6 to 4, and afterwards to 8, in the first case we have a sesquialter, and in the second a sesquitertian ratio; but these excesses are unequal in ratio, although equal in number. For the ratio of 6 to 4 = $1\frac{1}{2}$, and the ratio of 8 to 6 = $1\frac{1}{3}$; but 6 exceeds 4 by 2, and is exceeded by 8 by 2. Again, compare 12 to 6, which is a double ratio, and between these compare 8 to each. Then, 12 to 8 will be a sesquialter ratio, and 8 to 6 will be a sesquitertian ratio; but a double ratio

portion through one to two,[1] [2]possessing a double by power.[2] But that, which, as regards the solid and tangible, is again a double, proceeds from one to eight. [3]But that of the double quantity to the middle, and perhaps, what is more than the less, and less than the greater;[3] [4]while the other by the same part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremes.[4] But in the middle of six to twelve, there is found the sesquialter and sesquitertian proportions. And in the middle of these, a power, [5]turned to both,[5] has distributed to men a use,[6] where voice and measure are combined, for the sake of sports, rhythm, and harmony, after having been granted to the happy dancing of the Muses.

[13.] Let all these then be held to take place in this way, and let them exist. But as regards the finish to this, let us proceed to the divine generation and the most beautiful and divine nature of things visible, as far as a deity has granted to man to look upon them; [7]which nature, no one, after having beheld, will boast of having received with facility without the particulars mentioned above.[7] Besides this, in our several in-

arises from 12 to 6; while the excesses between 12 and 8, and 8 and 6, are unequal both in ratio and number. T.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Latin of Ficinus, who seems to have found in his MS., ἔστι δὲ ἓν, instead of ἓν—Ast too says that one would have expected ἀφ' ἑνὸς, but that ἓν is the subject of the words, ἡ μὲν πρώτη τοῦ διπλασιου. But how this could be, I confess I cannot understand.

[2]—[2] Such is the version of the Latin of Ficinus, "duplum potentia possidens." Taylor has "being double according to power," which would be in Greek, διπλάσιον κατὰ δύναμιν οὖσα. But διπλάσιον ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν οὖσα would mean, "that according to power being double," words I confess I cannot understand. I could have understood, had the author written to this effect, "But the double of one, as regards a superficies, proceeds to four."

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, where I am quite at a loss. Ast explains it by a paraphrase, "With regard to the power of the double, as regards the middle number (4), it exceeds by as much the lesser number (1), as it is exceeded by the larger number (8)."

[4]—[4] Ast considers all the words between the numerals as an interpolation, for they merely repeat the idea already expressed in the preceding sentence.

[5]—[5] Here again I am at a loss to understand the expression "turned to both;" for it was sufficient to say simply that there is 9, a middle number between 6 and 12, applicable to the 9 Muses; for such, I presume, is what the author meant to say.

[6] Ficinus has translated χρείαν by "usum commodumque," for he was uncertain here, as elsewhere, how he ought to render it by one word.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot under-

tercourse we must refer every individual thing to its species, [1](and all things to one,)[1] by asking questions and disproving what has been not correctly asserted. For this is truly a touchstone the most beautiful and thoroughly the first amongst men; but in the case of such, as are not (touchstones), and only pretend to be, there is a labour the most vain of all.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and how exactly it completes all that takes place in heaven; so that he, who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is a thing older and more divine than body, would also conceive it has been very beautifully and sufficiently said, that all things are full of gods; and that we have never been neglected through the forgetfulness or carelessness of superior beings. But as regards all such things as these, we should bear this in mind, that, if any one apprehends correctly each of these matters, there will be a great benefit to him, who has apprehended them; but if not, that it will be better for him to be ever calling upon a god, [2]according to method.[2] And let this be the method—for it is necessary to say so much at least as this—Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one agreement of all the stars in their revolutions, ought to be apparent to him, who learns in a proper manner. And that, of which we are speaking, will become apparent, if a person rightly learns, looking to one thing. For to those, who think upon the matter, there will appear to be naturally one bond to all of these. But if a person will take the matter in hand in any other way, he must, as we have said, call upon fortune. For, without these, no nature will become lucky in states. But this is the method, (and) this the nurture, and through these subjects of instruction we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. Nor is it lawful to neglect the gods; since the happy report, relating to all of them, has, according to a manner, become apparent. And I call him, who thus apprehends all these points, the man the most truly wise; who, I stoutly affirm, both in jest and

stand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose abridged version is "quam nunquam sine dictis artibus assequemur."

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets are found only in the version of Ficinus, "omnia denique in unum—"

[2]—[2] I have transposed *κατὰ τρόπον* from the end of the preceding sentence to its present place, as required by the words immediately following.

earnest, will, when he shall have filled up by death his allotted portion in things of this kind, [1] if he be still almost dying,[1] neither share any longer in many of his senses then, as at present; and he will, after being a partaker of one destiny alone, and becoming one out of many, be fortunate, and, at the same time, most wise and blessed; whether any one lives blessed on the continent, or in islands; and that he will participate in a fortune, which ever happens to be of this kind; and that, whether any one studies these questions, living a public or a private life, he will meet with the same fate and in a similar manner from the gods. But what we said at the beginning, the same assertion appears even now to be really true; that it is not possible for men to be perfectly blessed and happy, except a few. And this is rightly asserted by us. For such as are divine and at the same time prudent men, and naturally participate in the rest of virtue, and in addition have acquired all, that is closely connected with a blessed instruction, and such things as we have mentioned, to these alone have the gifts of fortune fallen by lot, [2]and are in a sufficient state.[2] To those then, who have laboured in this way upon such points, we say privately and lay down publicly as a law, that the greatest offices ought to be given to those, who have arrived at the period of an old man; and that all the others ought to follow them, and with good words hymn all the gods and goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, after having known and sufficiently examined the nocturnal assembly, most correctly exhort it to this wisdom.

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals Ficinus, followed by Taylor, has omitted, either because they were not in his MS., or, what is more probable, because he could not understand them; nor, in fact, do I see how they can stand here, unless *θανάτῳ* just before be omitted.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *εἱληχέ τε καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχει*—not *ἱκανῶς εἱληχέ τε καὶ ἔχει*. Ficinus has rather loosely—"iis solum modo satis ad felicitatem omnia se habere videntur."

INTRODUCTION TO THE AXIOCHUS.

Although the Axiochus and five following dialogues, all equally spurious, have been generally appended to the complete editions of Plato, yet, strange to say, they have never been translated into English. This fact, as regards the Axiochus especially, is the more remarkable, as that dialogue has been so great a favourite with scholars of different countries, that twelve translations have been made of it into Latin, four into German, and two into French. For though Cousin asserts that his own is the only French version, yet he might have known from Fabricius and Fischer, that Dolet had preceded him in 1544; whose tiny volume, that contains a translation likewise of the Hipparchus, is so scarce, that no copy of it is to be found in the National Library at Paris, as is stated distinctly in a modern reprint of it; nor is it mentioned, I may add, in the different Catalogues of the British Museum.

Of these twelve translations nine have appeared in print; but the remaining three are to be found only in MSS. from the pens respectively of Cincius Romanus, Rainutius, and Leonardus Aretinus; unless it be said that to one of these three is to be referred the copy, once in the possession of Swart of Altorf, in the Catalogue of whose library, says Fischer, it is described in P. 2, p. 277, n. 871, under the title of "Axiochus Platonis de contemnenda morte. Venundatur ab Alex. Haliatte, Mediolanensi, s. a. 4." Of the version by Cincius MSS. are to be found in Archbishop Parker's library at C. C. Camb., as stated in the Catalogue, p. 65, and in the British Museum, Burney MSS., 226, and in the National Library at Paris, Cod. 6729; while a copy of the version by Rainutius is in MS. Harl. 4923, and in Arundel MSS. 277. To these however I have paid no attention; as they are done too loosely to enable one to ascertain

what the translators found in the MSS. before them. But such is not the case with Ficinus, who has here, as elsewhere, kept very close to the original, except when he perceived the text to be manifestly corrupt. And a similar observation is applicable to the translation of Hieronymus Wolfius, printed, together with the text and notes, at Basle in 1577, 4, under the title of "Doctrina recte vivendi et moriendi," a fact not known, it would seem, to Cousin, who attributes that work to an anonymous scholar.

With regard to the author of the dialogue, Ficinus attributes it to Xenocrates, either because he found it so assigned in the MS. before him, or because he knew that the follower of Plato had written a treatise "On Death," as recorded by Diogenes Laert. iv. 12. By others the author was supposed to be Æschines, the follower of Socrates. But this idea was given up, when it was ascertained that none of the passages quoted by Athenæus and Pollux, from the Axiochus of Æschines, were to be found in the existing dialogue of that name.

But whatever uncertainty may exist as to the author, it is evident from § 8, p. 45, n. [1], as Wolf was the first to remark, that it was written at the time, when the successors of Plato occupied the Academy, and those of Aristotle the Lyceum, at Athens.

AXIOCHUS;

OR,

ON DEATH.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, CLINIAS, AXIOCHUS.

[1.] *Soc.* WHEN I had gone out on the road to Cynosarges,[1] and had arrived at the Ilissus, the voice of some one reached me, calling out, "Socrates, Socrates." And when on turning towards (the sound) I looked round to see from whence it might be, I beheld Clinias, the son of Axiochus, running towards the fountain Callirrhoe, together with Damon the musician, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. Of these,[2] one was the other's music-master, and the other was, from a feeling of friendship, at once the loving and beloved. I determined therefore to give up the direct road, and to meet them, that we might come together in the easiest manner. [2.] And Clinias, with tears in his eyes, said—Now, Socrates, is the time for you to exhibit the wisdom ever bruited by you.[3] For my father has at some sudden season[4] be- -ne

[1] This was a place, where there was a temple dedicated to Hercu- -, at which illegitimate children were registered, who were under the protection of the god, who was himself the illegitimate son of Zeus.

[2] I have adopted Wolf's correction, *αὐτοῖν*, confirmed in part by the best MS. V., which has *αὐτῶν*, while all the rest have *αὐτῷ*. It is however uncertain, as remarked by Wolf, which was the lover, and which the loved, Clinias or Charmides.

[3] As Socrates was never known to proclaim his wisdom, but rather the want of it, we must either omit *πρὸς* with Stephens, or read *περὶ* with Wolf, similar to "de te" in the version of Agricola.

[4] In lieu of *ὥρας*, to which Stephens was the first to object, as being improperly united to *αἰφνιδίου*, Fischer would read *συμφορᾶς*, which the

powerless, and is at the end of life, and with pain supports the idea of dissolution; although at a former period he used to ridicule those, who were afraid of the bugbear of death, and to rebuke them mildly. Come then, and console him as you are wont, in order that [1]he may without a groan proceed on the road of fate,[1] and that, [2]together with the remaining acts of piety, this too may be done by me.[2] In no moderate matter, Clinias, (said I,) shall you be disappointed in me; especially as you are inviting me to do a holy act. Let us then make haste; for if such is the state of affairs, there is a need of haste.

Clin. On merely seeing you, Socrates, he will rally; for often has he been on his legs again after a (serious) symptom.[3]

[3.] *Soc.* When we had traversed rather quickly the road along the wall,[4] at the Itonian gates[5]—for he dwells near there, close to the pillar of the Amazon[6]—we came upon him, when he had already[7] recovered his senses, and [8]his body some[8]

Zurich editors seem disposed to adopt. I should prefer *ἀρρωστίας*, "weakness," or *τινος νόσου φορᾶς*, "attack of some disorder."

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals; nor could Ficinus; whose version is, "unaque cum aliis pium opus exequere," as if his MS. read *καὶ ἅμα σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο εὐσεβείᾳ θῇς*.

[3] Although *σύμπτωμα* is elsewhere any symptom, yet here it evidently means "a serious one;" unless it be said that *δεινοῦ* has dropt out before *ἀνασφῆλαι*, as *ἐκ* has between *γέγονε* and *συμπτώματος*: for *ἐκ* is thus united to *νόσων*, and *κακῶν* with *ἀνασφάλλειν*, in the passages quoted by H. Steph. in Thess. L. Gr. Ficinus has merely "ut quodammodo resipisceret."

[4] In lieu of *ἤειμεν ταῖς*, Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. would read *ἤμεν ἐν ταῖς*—He should have retained however *ἤειμεν*, as I have done in the translation.

[5] By the Itonian gates are probably meant those, near to which Athéné had perhaps a shrine, and was worshipped there under the name of Itonia: and as she had the same appellation at Coronea in Bœotia, the gates, I suspect, at Athens were placed across the road that led from thence to the town in Bœotia. Ficinus has "per Itonios agros." An unknown critic has suggested *τῆς Ἰτωνίας*. The reading *Σιτωννιμίαις*, found in four MSS., is to be referred to the fact stated by Steph. Byz., that the town in Thessaly called *Ἰτών*, had likewise the name of *Σιτών*.

[6] The Amazon was Antiopé, as may be inferred from Pausanias i. 2.

[7] The word *ἀφή*, which properly means "the touch of the hand," is applied to the other senses likewise, as shown by Hesych. and Suid. in *Αφή*, and Pollux ii. 236. Correctly then has Cornarius, "collectis jam sensibus—"

[8]—[8] Instead of *τῷ σώματι*, the best MS. V. has *τὸ σῶμα*, which leads to *τὸ σῶμά τι*, as I have translated.

strength, although his mind was weak, and he stood greatly in need of consolation; and frequently did [1]he raise himself up,[1] and give vent to moans, together with the shedding of tears, and the noisy beating of his hands. On beholding him, Why is this, Axiochus? said I. Where are your former boastings and frequent praises of virtue, and your boldness not to be broken down?[2] since, like a cowardly combatant, you have exhibited yourself of noble bearing in the place of exercise, but have failed in the fight. Will not you, a man of so long a life, and the hearer of (the finest)[3] reasonings, and, if nothing else, at least an Athenian, after surveying[4] nature consider that this is surely a common (saying),[5] and bruited amongst all, that life is a kind of sojourn (upon earth);[6] and that we must pass through it in a reasonable and good-tempered manner, and take our departure, only not singing pæans[7] on the road to fate; while to conduct yourself in so cowardly a manner, and to be torn with difficulty from existence, is to exhibit, like a child, a period of life not over-wise.[8]

Axio. This, Socrates, is true; and you appear to me to

[1]—[1] Such seems to be the meaning of *ἀναφερόμενον* here. Hence Cornarius, "ut qui sæpe se attolleret;" but Ficinus, "respirantem—"

[2] In lieu of *ἄρρητον*, Stephens was the first to suggest *ἄρρηκτον*, adopted by Boeckh. To this passage however Ruhnken refers the gl. in Timæus, *Ἄρρατον· ἰσχυρὸν, στερεόν.*

[3] I have translated as if *καλλίστων* has dropt out between *καὶ* and *κατήκοος*—

[4] I have with Boeckh adopted *πριεσκεμμένος*, suggested by Horreus, in lieu of *περιεσκεμμένως*—

[5] Although *που* constantly follows *δή*, yet here it seems to conceal *ἔπος*, as I have translated, similar to "sententiam" in Ficinus. The sentiment emanated from the school of Pythagoras. At least Stobæus, in cvi. p. 573, Gesn., quotes from Hipparchus the Pythagorean, *οἱ ἄνθρωποι—ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἱονεί τινα παρεπιδημίαν ποιησοῦνται.* See too Marc. Antonin. ii. 17, *Ὁ βίος δὲ πόλεμος καὶ ξένου ἐπιδημία*, which seems to be a verse of Menander. Cicero De Senect. § 23, "ex vita ita discedo, tanquam ex hospitio."

[6] I have added "upon earth," what the sense seems to require.

[7] Wolf quotes opportunely from Cicero Tusc. i. "Si quid tale acciderit —ut exeamus e vita, læti et agentes gratias pareamus." Ficinus omits *μόνον οὐχὶ παιανίζοντες.* For those words, consisting of twenty-one letters, made up one line of the MS., from which his own was transcribed.

[8] So Fischer translates *περιφρονοῦσαν.* But such a sense would be incorrect Greek *περίφρον' οὖσαν* For *περιφρονοῦσαν* is properly "despising." It means however simply "to think upon" in Aristoph. *Νεφ.* 226, *περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον.*

speak correctly. And yet I know not how, when I am at the very point of what is dreadful, those powerful and very clever reasonings unconsciously fall away,[1] and are held in no honour; while in their stead a fear lays hold of me, tearing my mind in various ways, if I am to be deprived of this light here, and of the good things (of life),[2] and to lie rotting, wherever[3] it may be, unseen and unheard of,[4] after passing into worms and nondescript creatures.[5]

[4.] *Soc.* Through your own ignorance,[6] Axiochus, you are combining sensation with the want of sensation; and you are acting and speaking in a manner at variance with yourself; and you do not consider that you are at one and the same time lamenting your want of sensation, and pained at the idea of your rotting away, and of being deprived of what is pleasant, as if you are to die and live in another state,[7] and not to pass[8] into insensibility complete, and the same as that before you were born. As then none of the mischief during the political period of Draco and Clisthenes pertained to yourself—for you, to whom it might have pertained, did not exist

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὑπεκπίπτουσι*, not *ὑπεκπνέουσι*. For *λόγοι* is not elsewhere, I suspect, united thus in Greek to *πνέουσι*, although we speak in English of "words that breathe." Ficinus has "clanculum evanescunt."

[2] Faehse, perceiving that something was wanting here, proposed to read *τῶνδε ἀγαθῶν*, answering to *τοῦδε τοῦ φωτὸς*—But the good things could not be pointed out, as the light could. Hence I have translated as if *βίου* had dropt out after *καὶ*—

[3] I have adopted *ὅπῃ δήποτε*, from the best MS. V., in lieu of *ὅποι*. For *ὅποι*, an adverb of motion, could not be united to *κείσομαι*, a verb of rest. With the whole passage compare the speech of Claudio in Shakspeare's Measure for Measure, act iii. sc. 1, "Ay, but to die," &c.

[4] In lieu of *ἀγευστος* Stephens was the first to edit *ἄπυστος*, remembering no doubt the expression in Hom. Od. i. 242, *Ὤχετ' ἄϊστος, ἄπυστος*—where Hesych. explains *ἄπυστος* by *ἀνήκοος*—

[5] The word *κνώδαλα* seems strangely introduced here. For it is applied rather to the larger animals than the smaller; although Hesychius explains *κνώδαλον* by *ζῶον μικρόν*, where Heinsius refers to this very passage. Ficinus has "feras—"

[6] I have omitted *ἀνεπιλογίστως*, which is quite superfluous after *παρὰ τὴν ἀνεπιστασίαν*, and has evidently come from § 16.

[7] I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς ἑτεροζοΐαν*, not *εἰς ἕτερον ζῆν*, which is without regimen. Ficinus has "in aliam vitam transiturus," in lieu of *ἀποθανούμενος*.

[8] The best MS. differs *μεταβαλῶν*, in lieu of *μεταβάλλων*, as Wolf wished to read, similar to "migratus" in Ficinus.

at all—so it will not after death occur to you; for you, to whom it might occur, will not be in existence. [5.] Throw aside then all silliness of this kind, and think upon this, that, after the union of soul with body has been once dissolved by the former being settled in its own home-place, what is left of the latter is of the earth and devoid of reason, nor is it a man.[1] For we are soul, a thing of life and immortal, pent up in a mortal prison. And nature has for some mischief[2] fitted round this tabernacle, [3]to which pleasant things are in a recess,[3] and on the wing, and mixed up with the majority of pains; but the things of sorrow are unmixed, and last a long time, and have no share in what is pleasant; (I say nothing)[4] of diseases and inflammations in the sensoria and of internal ills, with which the soul, as if sown[5] with pores, does, when it sympathizes, of necessity desire its congenial atmosphere of heaven, and feels a thirst for the life that is there,[6] and a hankering after its dancing;[6] so that a removal from this life is but a change from an evil to a good.

[6.] *Axio.* Since then, Socrates, you consider life to be an

[1] Fischer quotes opportunely Cicero in Somn. Scip. 8, and Lactantius Instit. Divin. ii. 3, 8, "Hoc enim, quod oculis subjectum est, non homo, sed hominis receptaculum est." Ficinus has "umbraculum—"

[2] Such I presume is the meaning of *πρὸς κακοῦ*—

[3—3] This is the literal version of the Greek, *ᾧ τὰ μὲν ἥδοντα μυχιαῖα*—But *ἥδω* is a verb of naught, and *μυχιαῖα*, if derived from *μυχὸς*, and from nothing else it can be derived, is perfectly unintelligible. Hence from *ἀμυγιαῖα* in Stobæus, Stephens elicited *ἀμυχιαῖα*, for he found in Hesych. *Ἀμυχή· ἐπιπόλαιον ἕλκος.* The reading has been adopted by Boeckh; for he did not remember that nearly all words in *-ιαῖος* indicate either weight, or value, or length of time. Unless I am egregiously mistaken, the author wrote here, *ᾧ τὰ μὲν ἡδὲ ὄντα ὀνυχιαῖα*, and shortly afterwards *ἡδέων ὄντων*, not *ἡδόντων*— For *ὀνυχιαῖα* would mean "the length or value of a nail." Wolf was near the sense when he suggested *ἀκαριαῖα*—although from "adulterina" in Ficinus, he was once led to *μοιχικά*—

[4] To preserve the syntax, I have translated, as if the Greek were *νόσους δ' ἐῶ καὶ*—not *νόσους δὲ καὶ*—Perionius has "Quid morbos commemorem." On the loss of *ἐῶ*, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 121.

[5] To avoid the strange metaphor, *περιεσπαρμένη τοῖς πόροις*, one would wish the Greek had been *ἂτ' ἀπόροις πεπαρμένη τοῖς πόροις*, "as if pierced by pores stopt up," or something similar. Ficinus, "per singulos diffusa meatus."

[6] Correct Greek would, instead of *ἐκεῖσε*, require *ἐκεῖ*, or *ἐκεῖθι*, to which *ἐκεῖθεν* in one MS. seems to lead. Ficinus omits *ἐκεῖσε*—

[7] In lieu of *χορείας* I should prefer *χαρᾶς*. The two words are confounded in the Laws, vii. p. 273, n. 5.

ill, why do you remain in it? and this too, when you are a person of reflection, and excel us, the mass, in mind.

Soc. You do not, Axiochus, testify truly in my case; but you conceive, as the mass of Athenians do, that, since I am searcher after facts, I am acquainted with something. And indeed I would pray to know all things of even a common kind, so much am I deficient in what are superior. But what I am now saying are the proclaimed doctrines of Prodicus the wise, that have been bought, some for half a drachm, others for two drachms, and others for four; for that person never teaches any thing for nothing, but his custom is perpetually to proclaim the sentiment of Epicharmus—

Hand hand washes; give then something, [1] and get something in return.[1]

[7.] And lately, when he was making a display at the house of Callias, the son of Hipponicus, he spoke so much against living, that I drew a line through (the word) life as a thing of the least value; and from that time, Axiochus, my soul yearned for death.

Axio. And what was said then?

Soc. I will tell you all[2] I can remember. For what part of life, said he, is free from pain? Does not the infant cry at its first birth, beginning to live from pain? Nor is it deficient in any suffering, but is affected painfully either by the want of something, or excessive cold or heat, or a blow; and being unable to tell what it is suffering, it cries continually, possessing this voice alone of its discontentment. And when it reaches its seventh year, after having gone through many troubles, there are boy-leaders, and teachers of grammar, and drilling-masters tyrannizing over him. And as he grows bigger, there is a still larger number of despots, who teach him correctness in composition,[3] and geometry, and military tactics.

[1]—[1] In the fragment of Epicharmus, it is easy to restore the lost Doric words by reading *δός τι, κ', ἦν τι λᾷς, λάβ' αὖ*, i. e. "give something, and, if you wish for something, receive in return:" an emendation, of which Porson would, I think, have approved; for he has restored to the same poet *Τίς δέ κα λφ́η γενέσθαι*, in Adversar. p. 303.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *πάντα*, not *ταῦτα*—

[3] Such was no doubt the office of the *κριτικοὶ* alluded to; unless it be said that the author wrote *ῥητορικοί*. Ficinus has, what seems to be preferable in part, as it preserves the natural order of events, "Surgunt nimirum pædagogi, grammatici, gymnasticæ, pædotribæ—cum paulisper adoleverit, censores, arithmetæ, geometræ, distributores," although it is not easy to understand what he meant by "distributores."

[8.] And when he is registered amongst the young men, there are, what is a worse fear, the [1] Lycéum and Academy,[1] and the Gymnasiarchs and their staves, and a measureless amount [2] of ills. And the whole period [3] of youth is under Moderators and the selection of those placed over young persons by the Council of the Areopagus. And when he is forced from them, cares straightway come upon him in secret, and considerations as to what road of life he is to tread; [4] and (compared with) [5] the after difficulties the first appear to be childish, and the terrors in truth of infants; for there are campaigns, and wounds, and continuous contests. [9.] And then old age stealthily and unconsciously comes on, to which flow together all that is on the verge of death and hard to be remedied. And should a person not pay, as a debt, his life rather quickly, Nature, like an usurer, stands near and takes as a pledge from one his eye-sight, and from another his hearing, and frequently both; and should he still delay,[6] she brings on a paralysis, (or) a mutilation (or) a distortion of limbs; [7] while they, who on the threshold of old age are still vigorous,[7] [8] in mind, be-

[1]—[1] From this passage, says Wolf, it is clear that the dialogue was written after the death of Plato, when his successors occupied the Academy, and the followers of Aristotle the Lycéum.

[2] I have adopted *ἀμετρία*, found in Stobæus and the two best MSS. V. Z. Ficinus, "immoderatio—"

[3] Even if *χρόνος* had not been found in the two best MSS. V. Z., I should have adopted it in preference to *πόνος*. The two words are constantly confounded. Cousin too has shown the superiority of *χρόνος*.

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐμβήσεται*, not *ἐνστήσεται*, found in one MS. in lieu of *ἐνστήσονται*. Ficinus too leads to *ἐμβήσεται*, by his "ingredi."

[5] Wolf acutely saw that *παραβαλλόμενα* had dropt out here, or something similar, answering to "comparatione" in Ficinus.

[6] Ficinus, "quod si resistat quis."

[7]—[7] I have translated as if the Greek were, not *ἄλλοι πολυγήρως ἀκμάζουσι*, words that have hitherto baffled the sagacity of critics, but *ἀλλ' οἱ ἐπ' οὐδῷ γήρως*— The phrase first introduced by Homer in a passage quoted in § 10, has been restored by Valckenaer on Herodot. iii. 14, to Lycurgus from Suidas, in *Ἐπὶ γήρως ὁδῷ*, and by myself to the Banquet, § 21, n. 7, where I have corrected this passage. According to Pollux ii. 15, it was adopted by Hyperides. See too Meineke on Menander, Fr. Inc. 125. Ficinus has "nonnulli ad extremum usque senium vivunt."

[8]—[8] In the words *τῷ νῷ δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες γίγνονται*, lies hid a Choliambic verse, *Δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ νῷ*— written probably by Socrates, and adopted in part by Aristophanes in *Νεφ.* 1419, where see the Schol. and Bergler.

come twice children, though grown[8] old. And hence[1] even the gods, who take cognizance of human affairs, [2] release more quickly from life [2] those, on whom they set the greatest value. [10.] For example, [3] Agamedes and Trophonius,[3] who built up the close, sacred to the god at Pytho,[4] did, after praying that the best thing might befall them, lay themselves on their bed[5] and never rise from it again. So too the sons[6] of the priestess at Argos, after their mother had in like manner prayed for some honour to be paid them by Juno in return for their piety, when, through the pair (of mules) being too late, they undressed themselves,[7] and drew her (in the car) to the temple, they did, after the prayer, change, during the night, their existence. And long would be the story to go through of the poets, who, with their more divine mouths,[8] have told in holy hymns the tales relating to life, how they utter lamentations against living. Of one alone I will however remember me, the most worthy to be spoken of, who says, (Il. xxiv. 526,)

> The gods for mortals, in a hapless state
> To live, in sorrow wove the web of fate—

and, (Il. xvii. 446,)

> Of all that breathe and creep upon the earth,
> There's nought than man more wretched (from his birth).[9]

And what does he say of Amphiraus? (Od. xv. 246.)

> Him heartily the Ægis-bearing Zeus
> Loved, and Apollo with the feelings all
> Of friendship; yet he did not of old age
> The threshold reach.

And what does he[10] appear to you, who bids us

[1] I have adopted with Wolf *διὰ τοῦτο*, found in Clemens Alexandr. Strom. vi. p. 625, A., and subsequently in the best MS. V. Ficinus too has "quapropter—"

[2—2] Ficinus, "quos amat, ad se ex hac revocat vita."

[3—3] The same story told by Cicero in Tuscul. i. 47, and the authors quoted there by Davis.

[4] Delphi is rarely called by this name. See at Alcib. i. p. 358, n. 36.

[5] Ficinus renders *κοιμηθέντες* by "somno pressi—"

[6] These were Cleobis and Biton, as we learn from Herodotus i. 31, who was probably the first narrator of the anecdote.

[7] Ficinus renders *ὑποδύντες* by "subeuntes—"

[8] I have adopted with Boeckh *στόμασι*, from Stobæus, in lieu of *ποιημασι*. On the loss by corruption of *στόμασι*, see at the Laws ix. p. 401, n. 3.

[9] I have added "from his birth," for the sake of the rhyme.

[10] Namely Euripides, from whose lost play, called Cresphontes, the

Weep for the ills, to which the new-born comes.

But I will stop[1] here, lest, contrary to my engagement, I become prolix by making mention of others likewise. [11.] With what pursuit or art does not he, [2]who has chosen it, find fault, and is discontented with his present state?[2] Let us go to handicraftsmen and workers at a furnace, who labour from night to night, and with difficulty procure the necessaries of life, and let (us hear)[3] them bewailing their fate and filling up their sleepless hours with lamentations and tears. Or let us reckon up the sailor's (life),[4] passed in the midst of so many dangers, and which, as Bias has shown, is neither amongst the living nor the dead; [5]for the man who belongs to earth, has, as if he were amphibious, thrown himself upon the sea, and become wholly in the power of fortune.[5] But [6]farming is at least a pleasant thing. Clearly so. But is it not wholly a sore, for ever finding for itself a pretext for sorrow? crying now at a drought; now at a continued rain; now at a burning up; now at a mildew; now at unseasonable heat or cold.[6] [12.] And the much-honoured states-

verse is quoted, and has been wretchedly translated by Cicero in Tusc. i. 48.

[1] I have adopted *παύσομαι* from the best MS. V., in lieu of *παύομαι*. Ficinus too has "desinam—"

[2—2] Compare Horace—"Qui fit Mæcenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem Seu fors seu ratio dedent,—Contentus vivat?"

[3] I have translated as if *ἀκούωμεν* had dropt out after *δακρύων*: for otherwise the preceding genitives would be without regimen. Respecting the similarity of *δακρύων* and *ἀκούωμεν* see myself on Philoct. 367.

[4] Here again I have supplied *βίον*, which has evidently been lost after *πλωτικὸν*. On the change of *κον* into *βιον*, see myself on Æsch. Suppl. 336.

[5—5] Fischer quotes opportunely from Columella in Præf. de R. R. § 8, "Terrestre animal, homo, ventorum et maris objectus iræ, se fluctibus audet credere"—where lies hid a poetical distich—"Terrestre animal, homo, sese ventorum et maris Objectus iræ, fluctibus audet credere."

[6—6] In the Greek words between the numerals there evidently lies hid a dramatic fragment, taken probably from the Γεωργοί of Aristophanes—*Α. ἀλλ' ἡ γεωργία γλυκὺ Ἦν δῆλον.* Β. *ἀλλ' ἦν οὐχ ὕπουλον, ὡς λόγος, Κάλλος, πρόφασιν λύπης τιν' εὑρὸν εἰσαεί; Νῦν μὲν δι' αὐχμὸν, νῦν δ' ἐπομβρίαν θεῷ Ἦν ἐγκαλῶν, νῦν δ' ἐρυσίβην, νῦν θάλπος αὖ Ἄκαιρον, ἐπικαῦσαν δὲ νῦν ἀγροὺς κρύος*—a passage that Horace plainly had in mind while penning his stanza in Od. III. i. 29, "Non verberatæ grandine vineæ Fundusque mendax, arbore nunc aquas Culpante, nunc torrentia agros Sidera, nunc hyemes iniquas." And hence it is easy to see that

manship—for many things I pass over—through revolutions how great is it driven, while it possesses a pleasure, like that of a state of fever, in its quiverings and palpitations, but a failure, full of pain, and worse than a thousand deaths. Who then living for the mob can be happy? even if he has been favourably received with a gentle buzz, or noisy hubbub, as the plaything of the people, (but afterwards)[2] rejected, hissed, fined, put to death, and pitied. [3]Tell me this,[3] thou statesman, Axiochus, where died Miltiades? where Themistocles? where Ephialtes? and where recently the ten army-leaders?[4] when I did not put (the question) to the vote; for it did not seem to me a solemn act [5]to hold office in union with[5] a maddened mob;

the author wrote not *οὐχ ὅλον—ἕλκος*, but *οὐχ ὕπουλον—κάλλος*, similar to *κάλλος κακῶν ὕπουλον* in Soph. Œd. T. 1386, and not *κλᾶον*, which neither *ἕλκος* nor *κάλλος* could be said to do, but *ἐγκαλῶν*: and lastly, not *νυνὶ δὲ ἐπίκαυσιν*, which is superfluous before or after *θάλπος*, but *νυνὶ δ' ἐπικαῦσαν ἀγρούς κρύος*: for thus *ἐπικαῦσαν ἀγρούς κρυος* would be properly opposed to *θάλπος ἄκαιρον*, and the expression *ἐπικαῦσαν ἀγρούς κρύος* be similar to "tellus hiscit adusta gelu—" in Ovid.

[1] In lieu of *δεινῶν*, I have translated as if the Greek were *δινῶν*. On the confusion of the two words, see myself on Philoct.

[2] The sense requires *ἐκβαλλόμενον δ' αὖ*—as I have translated, opposed to *ποππυσθείη καὶ κροτηθείη*: which Ficinus not understanding has thus translated—"irridetur atque exploditur."

[3—3] In *ἐπεί τοί γε* evidently lies hid *εἶπ' οὖν τοῦτό γε*—as I have translated.

[4] This is supposed to allude to the ten naval officers, for whose condemnation Socrates, in his character of chairman of a public meeting, refused what he had the power to do, to put the question to the vote; as he knew well that they would in the then excited state of the people be put, as six of them subsequently were, to death, for neglecting to take up the dead bodies of the Athenians, who had fallen into the sea, in the naval battle at Arginusæ. With regard to the text, two MSS. read *πρώην βασιλεῖς καὶ στρατηγοί*: of the rest, some omit *βασιλεῖς καὶ*, and others only *βασιλεῖς*; and while Ficinus has "duces reliqui," Stobæus offers *πρώην οἱ δόκα στρατηγοί*, adopted by Boeckh. But as it is difficult to account for the introduction of *βασιλεῖς καὶ*, I suspect that those words are a corruption of *β. ποσι λέουσι*, i. e. "two-footed lions," and that *δίποσι λέουσι* ought to follow *ἐπηρόμην τὴν γνώμην*, i. e. "I did not put the vote to the two-footed lions"—for such might Socrates fairly consider the Athenians, roaring for their prey, just as Clytemnestra is described by Æschylus in Agam. 1231, *δίπους λέαινα*. The error is to be referred to the fact that *β* means "two:" as I have shown on the Statesman, p. 250, n. 66, where *β. ποσι*, i. e. *διπποι* has been corrupted into *νποσιν*.

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀναμίξ ἄρχειν*, not *συνεξάρχειν*, where *ἐξ* has a meaning. For though *ἐξάρχειν* is applied to the

whercas Theramenes and Callixenus did on the day after introduce secretly fictitious chairmen (of the meeting), and got against the men a vote of death without a trial; and yet did you (Axiochus) lawfully[1] defend them and Euryptolemus[2] likewise, while thirty thousand were at the general meeting.

[13.] *Axio.* It is so, Socrates. And from that time I have had enough of the platform,[3] and nothing has seemed to me more disagreeable than statesmanship. And this is plain to those who have been engaged in the business. And you indeed speak thus, as taking a view from a look-out; but we, who have made the experiment, know it more accurately. For the mob, my dear Socrates, is a thing ungrateful, satiated with the mere touch, cruel, envious, uneducated, as being made up of a mass of persons brought together, violent (and) triflers; while he, who acts the courtesan to it, is more miserable by far.

[14.] *Soc.* Since then, Axiochus, you lay down the science, which is the most free, as the least to be prayed for amongst the rest, what shall we think of the remaining pursuits? Are they not to be avoided? I once indeed heard Prodicus saying that death does not exist as regards either the living or those, who have changed their existence.

Axio. How say you, Socrates?

Soc. That as regards the living, it does not exist; while they, who are dead, do not exist; so that neither, as regards you, does it exist; for you are not dead; nor, should you suffer aught, will it exist, as regards you; for you will then not exist. Vain then is the sorrow in Axiochus grieving for

leader in a dance or song, as shown by Eurip. Tro., 148; yet *σὺν* could scarcely be united to it. Fischer indeed asserts that *συνεξάρχειν* means to "gratify"—But he has not been able to prove his assertion, nor could he do it. Wolf has suggested *συνεξαμαρτεῖν*, well aware that *συνεξάρχειν* would be here out of place.

[1] To avoid the absurdity in *μόνος—καὶ*—I have translated, as if the Greek were *νομίμως—καὶ*— Ficinus omits *μόνος* entirely.

[2] I have adopted *Εὐρυπτόλεμος*, suggested by Stephens, and found subsequently in a good MS., and confirmed by Xenophon, H. Gr. i. 7, 8. Ficinus has—"Eriptolemo—"

[3] This is the English idea, answering to the *βῆμα* of the Athenians, the place to which those went up, who wanted to harangue the people.

[4] To obviate the objection started by Stephens, I have translated, as if *καὶ* had dropt out between *βιαίων* and *φλυάρων*. Ficinus omits *βιαίων*.

Axiochus, touching a thing that neither is nor will be; and it is just the same, as if a person were to grieve for Scylla or the Centaur, which, as regards you, do not exist now, nor will they, after your close of life, exist. For what is fearful is so to those, who exist; but to those, who do not exist, how can it be so?

[15.] *Axio.* These clever things you have said from the talkativeness, which is floating on the surface (of society) just now. For from thence is this idle speaking, which has been cleverly got up for the young men. But the deprivation of the good things of life is what gives me pain, even should you rattle out reasons, Socrates, still more plausible than those just now.[1] For the mind, when it is wandering, thinks nothing of fine-spoken words; nor do these touch even its surface, [2]which affect indeed a mere pomp[2] and splendour of diction, but are wanting in truth. Now sufferings do not endure sophisms; and upon those things alone, that can reach the soul, rests there any aid.[3]

[16.] *Soc.* You are putting together, Axiochus, (words)[4] without reason, in bringing the perception of things that are bad as opposed to the deprivation of things that are good, through your forgetting that you are dead.[5] For the counter-suffering of ill pains him who is deprived of good; but he, who does not exist, does not lay hold even of deprivation. How then should there be a grief for that, which is about to furnish no knowledge of the things that will cause pain?

[1] I have adopted *τῶν ἄρτι* in lieu of *ἄρτι*, as suggested by Fischer, who refers to *τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα*, in Theætet. p. 165, A.

[2—2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἃ ἀλλως μὲν—ἀνύτει*— not *ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν—ἀνύτει*— For *τείνει*, not *ἀνύτει*, requires the preposition *εἰς*. With regard to *ἄλλως πομπὴν*, see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 199. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand *ἀνύτει*, has "etsi audit, negligit."

[3] In lieu of *ἀρκεῖται*, which is perfectly unintelligible, Hemsterhuis suggested *ἀκεῖται*, of which Wesseling approves on Herodot. iv. 91; and the same alteration is proposed by Segaar in Epistol. ad Valckenaer, p. 19, and in Præf. ad Observat. in S. Luc. p. 9. But it is rejected both by Fischer and Boeckh; for they doubtless knew that *ἀκεῖσθαι* is a deponent, not a passive, verb. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were *ἀρκεῖ τι ἐπὶ τοῖς*— Ficinus has "solæ hæc attendit."

[4] Although *γὰρ* might stand here, yet as *συνάπτεις* requires its object I have translated, as if the author had written *τὰ ῥήματα*—

[5] This seems strangely said to a person who was still alive.

[1]For had you, Axiochus, at the beginning laid down (with me),[1] in some way that there is no perception (to the dead),[2] you would not, through your ignorance, have shuddered at death. But now you are turning yourself round,[3] while fearing that you shall be deprived of soul, [4]and place a soul round deprivation;[4] [5]and you fear that you shall not have a perception; and yet you imagine that you shall by perception comprehend a perception, that will not exist.[5] [17.] [6]In addition to their being many and beautiful reasons for the immortality of the soul.[6] For a mortal nature would surely not [7]have proceeded and been lifted up[7] to such a greatness in action, [8]as to despise the violence of superior wild animals, and to pass over seas, and to build cities, and to lay down forms of polity,[8] and to look up to heaven and behold the revolutions of the stars, and the courses of the sun and moon, and their eclipses, and rapid return to their former state, and the equality of days, [9]and the two tropical movements, during winter and summer, and the rising and setting of the Pleiades,[9]

[1]—[1] I have adopted the correction of Wolf, *τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ, ὦ Ἀξίοχε, ἐμοὶ*, in lieu of *ἀρχὴν γὰρ, ὦ Ἀξίοχε μὴ*— Ficinus has briefly "principio enim nisi sensum quendam poneres—"

[2] I have inserted, what is required by the sense, *τοῖς θανοῦσιν*, which might easily have dropt out after *αἴσθησιν*.

[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *νῦν δὲ περιτρέπεις σεαυτὸν*, which I cannot understand. The author wrote, I suspect, *νῦν δ' ἐπ' ἄπορα τρέπεις σεαυτὸν*— i. e. "but now you are turning yourself to a difficulty—" Ficinus, "pervertis te ipsum—"

[4]—[4] Here again I am at a loss, as I cannot perceive how a soul or life can be placed round deprivation. Did the writer mean to say, "and you invest deprivation with existence?" similar to "amissioni animam addicis" in Ficinus.

[5]—[5] Here again I must leave for others to understand, what I cannot, all between the numerals.

[6]—[6] Unless I am greatly mistaken, there is a lacuna here; for the train of thought exhibits a sad want of connexion, which Ficinus supplies by "ex eo quod—"

[7]—[7] By the aid of the two best MSS. V. and Z., that read *τοσόνδε*, and of one, that offers *τόσον δίους*, and of V., that has also *ἂν ἤρατο*, I have been able to elicit *τοσόνδε ἰοῦσ' ἂν ἤρετο*, as I have translated, in lieu of the unintelligible *τοσόν δοίους διήρατο*, found in all the other MSS. Ficinus has "in tantam excellentiam surrexisset—"

[8]—[8] With this passage compare Soph. Antig. 332—368.

[9]—[9] I have adopted Wolf's certain restoration, who reads *καὶ τροπὰς διττὰς χειμῶνος καὶ θέρους, καὶ ἀνατολάς τε καὶ δύσεις τῶν Πλειάδων*: where *καὶ ἀνατολάς τε καὶ δύσεις* have been brought from the place they previously occupied between *σελήνης* and *ἐκλείψεις*. For not only do

and the winds, and the fall of rain, [1]and the ill-fated trailing along of fiery meteors,[1] and to lay down on a tablet what the universe is to undergo for ages,[2] unless there had been in the soul some [3]breath of divinity,[3] through which he possessed the power of thinking upon and knowing subjects of so vast a kind; so that you are not, Axiochus, changing your existence for death, but for immortality; nor will you have a deprivation of good things, but a still purer enjoyment of them; nor pleasures mixed up with a mortal body, but unmixed with every pain. For you will, when released from this prison, depart thither, where all is without trouble, and moanings, and old age, and life is a calm, and with no taste[4] of ill, and where in a mild atmosphere of unruffled tranquillity you (will dwell),[5] looking round upon Nature, and acting the philosopher not before a mob and a theatre, but in the presence of Truth, blooming around.[6]

[18.] *Axio.* You have by your discourse brought me round to a contrary point. For I have no longer a fear of death, but already a desire to say myself, in imitation of the orators, something still more; and for a long time I have been thinking upon things on high, and I will go through the eternal and divine course, since after my weakness I have collected my strength and am become a new man.

[19.] *Soc.* (Hear too),[7] if you are willing, another account which Gobryas related to me—a man of the Magi, (who)[8] said that during the expedition of Xerxes, his grandfather,

we thus recover a noun, required to govern Πλειάδων, but perceive likewise why the Pleiades are introduced here; since, as we learn from Hesiod Εργ. 383 and 615, both farmers and sailors were wont to pay attention to the rising and setting of the Pleiades.

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "jactum præsteris fulgurisque coruscum," and translates παραπήξασθαι by "mirifice sisteret—"

[2] Wolf refers here to the statement of Pliny, that Hipparchus had calculated the eclipses of the sun and moon for 600 years to come.

[3]—[3] So Horace, "divinæ particulam auræ."

[4] I have adopted Matthiæ's correction, ἄγευστος for ἄγονος, remembering the expression κακῶν ἄγευστος in Soph. Antig. 590.

[5] In καὶ, which Bekker has incorrectly omitted, with a single and inferior MS., lies hid οἰκήσεις—

[6] Fischer refers to Cicero de Finib. v. 19, and Augustine de Trin. iv. 2.

[7] I have adopted ἀκοῦσαι, supplied by the best MS. V. and Stobæus. Ficinus has "Referam—"

[8] I have translated, as if ὃς had dropt out between μάγος and ἔφη—Ficinus, to supply the want of connexion, has "Inquit enim—"

who was his namesake, was sent to Delos to watch over the island, where the two deities[1] presided, according to some brazen tablets, that Opis and Hecaergus[2] had brought from the Hyperboreans; and that he learnt that after[3] the soul was released from the body, it departed to the uncertain[4] spot, and some dwelling under ground, where is the royal palace of Pluto,[5] not less than the hall of Zeus, inasmuch as the earth possesses the middle portion of the world, and the pole (of heaven) is spherical; of which the gods of heaven have obtained by lot one portion of the hemisphere, and the gods below the other, being some of them brothers,[6] and others the children of brothers;[7] and that the gates before the road to Pluto's domain are fast bound by iron locks and keys; and that the river Acheron receives him, who has opened them, and, after it, Cocytus, both of which it is necessary for him to pass over, and to be led to Minos and Rhadamanthus, [8](where is)[8] what is called the plain of Truth. [20.] There are they seated as judges to sift each of the comers as to what life he had led, and in what pursuits he had dwelt in the body;[9] and that to tell a falsehood is out of his power. On such then as a kind dæmon has breathed during life, these are located in the region of the pious. [10]There without stint the seasons bloom with every kind of produce, and fountains of pure

[1] The two deities were Apollo and Artemis.

[2] By Opis was meant Artemis, and by Hecaergus, Apollo.

[3] In lieu of *κατὰ* Horreus once proposed to read *μετὰ*, which I have adopted, confirmed, as it is, by the best MS. V. Fischer however says that Horreus changed his opinion in Miscell. Crit. p. 171.

[4] Since a good MS. Z. reads "*Αδου* in lieu of *ἄδηλον*, perhaps the author wrote "*Αιδου ἀνήλιον*, similar to *τὰν ἀστιβῆ 'Απόλλωνι—χέρσον* in Æsch. S. Th. 857. Ficinus has "occultum—"

[5] In Ficinus it is "Junonis," evidently a literal error for "Plutonis."

[6] These were Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto.

[7] Namely Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus.

[8—8] I have translated, as if *ἵν'* had dropt out between *'Ραδάμανθυν* and *ὃ*, and *ἐστι* after *κλήζεται*. Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "in eam videlicet regionem, qui veritatis campus cognominatur."

[9] As the subject of *ἐνῳκίσθη* is wanting, it is to be supplied, I suspect, by reading *ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα*— For *ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα* might easily have dropt out before *ψεύσασθαι*. Ficinus avoids all the difficulty by omitting *βεβίωκε—σώματι*, and rendering "cujusque vitam," as if his MS. read *ἑκάστου τὸν βίον* in lieu of *ἕκαστον, τίνα βίον*—

[10—10] Wolf was the first to remark the poetica- colour of this passage;

water flow;[10] and every where are meadows made beautiful[1] by flowers of varied hues, and places of discussions for philosophers, and theatres of poets, and cyclic choirs,[2] and the hearing of music, and elegant[3] banquets, and feasts self-furnished, and an unmixed freedom from pain, and a delightful mode of living. Nor is produced there violent cold or heat, but a well-tempered air is diffused around, mixed with the sun's mild beams. There is the seat of honour to those, who have shared in the Mysteries;[4] for they perform together their holy rites even thither.[5] How then is there not to you first[6] a share in the honour, as being of the family[7] of the goddesses?[8] And there is a report that Heracles and Dionysus descended to Hades after having previously shared in the Mysteries here; and that they put on [9]a boldness for the journey thither from the Eleusinian (rites).[9] [21.] But they, whose life has been passed in a course of evil doings, are driven by the Furies to Erebus and Chaos through Tartarus, where

where it is easy to elicit a distich, probably of Sophocles, Ἐνθ' ἄφθονοι μὲν ἦρι παγκάρπῳ γύαι Βρύουσι, καθαρῶν δ' ἐκρέουσι ναμάτων Πηγαί: Ficinus too has—"ver æternum—"

[1] In lieu of ἐαριζόμενοι, which is not a Greek word, I have translated, as if the author had written ὡραϊζόμενοι—

[2] From the juxta-position of ποιητῶν, I have taken κύκλιοι in the sense of "cyclic." It may however mean "circular"—for κυκλίων χορῶν is found in Eurip. Helen. 1328.

[3] Instead of εὐμελῆ, five good MSS read ἐμμελῆ, similar to "jocunda" in Ficinus, which I have adopted; although the author wrote, I suspect, πιμελῆ —"rich."

[4] Compare Soph. Fragm. Inc. 52, ὡς τρισόλβιοι Κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη, Μόλωσ' ἐς Ἅιδου. τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ Ζῆν ἔστι· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' οἰκεῖ κακά.

[5] Correct Greek would require κάκεῖ, not κἀκεῖσε—in which word lies hid, however, κατὰ κίστας. On the box, used at the Mysteries, see Lobeck's Aglaophamus, p. 25, who quotes from Clemens Alex. Cohortat. p. 18, ἔλαβον ἐκ κίστης—ἀπεθέμην εἰς κάλαθον καὶ ἐκ καλάθου εἰς κίστην.

[6] In lieu of πρώτῳ one would prefer εἴπερ τῳ, i. e. "if to any one—" For Axiochus was not the first who had a share in the honour.

[7] So Fischer understands γεννήτῃ. But as three MSS. read γενήσῃ, and two γενειήτῃ, little doubt can remain of the truth of Wolf's correction, γε μύστῃ—

[8] I have adopted Wolf's elegant ἐνΔύσασθαι, in lieu of ἐνΑύσασθαι, which Fischer vainly attempts to explain. Ficinus has "suscipere—"

[9—9] Although τελετῆς might perhaps be understood after τῆς Ἐλευσινίας, yet I should prefer τῆς Ἐλευσῖνι ἀγνείας—

is the region of the impious, and the unfilled urns of the daughters of Danaus, and the thirst of Tantalus, [1] and the entrails of Tityus, and the uncompleted stone of Sisyphus,

To whom begins again his labour's end.[1]

There too are persons licked round by wild beasts,[2] and [3] terrified by the torches of the Furies glaring around them ;[3] and enduring every kind of ignominious treatment, they are by eternal punishments worn down. This account did I hear from Gobryas ; and you, Axiochus, can decide upon it. For carried along myself by reason I know firmly this alone, that the soul is wholly immortal, and that, when it is removed from this spot, it is there[4] without pain ; so that it must needs be, Axiochus, that, if you have lived piously, you will be happy either below or above.

Axio. I am ashamed, Socrates, to say a word.[5] For so far am I from fearing death, that already I feel a desire for it ; [6] so greatly has this beautiful discourse [6] of yours[7] persuaded me, as if it were a heavenly one.[8] And even now I

[1]—[1] In the Greek lies hid the following dramatic distich—Καὶ σπλάγχνα Τιτύου Σισύφου τ' ἀνήνυτος Πέτρος, οὐ τὰ τέρματ' αὐθις ἔρχεται πόνων.

[2] I do not remember to have read elsewhere of persons in Hades being licked round by wild beasts, except in the case of Bacchus, as described by Horace—"Te vidit insons Cerberus—leniter atterens Caudam et recedentis trilingui Ore pedes tetigitque crura"—nor in fact could the act of licking indicate any thing of a dreadful kind. Hence in lieu of *περιλιχμώμενοι* one would prefer *περίαλλα χασμωμένοις*—i. e. with jaws very widely opened. Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version—"ubi feræ mordaces inseparabiliter corporibus se circumplicant."

[3]—[3] The Greek is λαμπάσιν ἐπιμόνως· πυρούμενοι, i. e. "fired continually with torches." But as Stobæus offers *δασὶν* instead of λαμπάσιν, I have translated, as if the Greek were *δασὶ περιλαμπομέναις πυρόμενοι* : for *πυρόμενοι* would be another example of the verb *πύρεσθαι*, found in § 16, where the best MS. V. reads incorrectly *πυρείης* for *πυρείης*. Ficinus, unable to understand satisfactorily the Greek, has given, what I suspect he did not find in his MS., "ubi faces inextinguibiles carnes exurunt."

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were not *καὶ*, but *ἐκεῖ*, to balance *ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ χωρίου*.

[5] Ficinus has "ulterius loqui," as if his MS. read, *τι εἰπεῖν πλέον*—

[6]—[6] The Greek is at present *οὕτω με καὶ οὗτος*—but three MSS. read *οὕτω μὴν καὶ*—and one omits *καὶ*. Hence the Greek was, I suspect, originally, *οὕτως μ' ἄγαν καλὸς*—

[7] I have adopted *ὁ σὸς*, furnished by two MSS., in lieu of *σὸς* simply.

[8] Three MSS. omit correctly *ὁ* before *οὐράνιος*— One would prefer, however, *ὢν οὐράνιος*— Ficinus has "quasi cœleste oraculum."

have a contempt for life, as being about to remove to a better home. For the present then I will cast up quietly with myself[1] what has been said; and at mid-day you will be with me, Socrates.

Soc. I will do as you say. And for a while[2] I will go back for a walk to Cynosarges,[3] from whence I was sent for hither.

[1] In lieu of *ἀναριθμήσομαι*, the best MS. V. reads *ἀπαριθμήσομαι*, which seems to lead to *πάντ' ἀριθμήσομαι*— Ficinus has "animadvertam—" Wolf suggests *ἀναμηρυκήσομαι*, i. e. "nominabor—"

[2] In lieu of *δὲ*, two MSS. read *γὰρ*. I have translated as if the author wrote *τέως*—

[3] Matthiæ, as I learn from the Zurich editors, proposed to reject *ἰς Κυνόσαργες*. Why, I know not.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ERYXIAS.

Of this dialogue, which Fischer has, on the authority of Suidas, attributed to Æschines, a follower of Socrates, but Boeckh to an unknown writer, five translations have appeared in Latin, one in German, and one in French. But as they have been all made from a printed text, they are in a critical point of view of very little use. And a similar observation is applicable to the notes of the different editors, who have been apparently unwilling to meddle with the text, even when they could scarcely have failed to see it was corrupt. I have therefore been reluctantly compelled to supply partially their omissions, and to attempt to do, what would have come with a better grace from Boeckh.

From the allusion in § 2, to the embassy sent from Sicily to Athens, as recorded by Thucydides in iii. 86, Fischer infers that the dialogue is supposed to have taken place about Ol. 88, 2; and as regards the subject of it, that the wise alone are the really wealthy, he refers to Cicero, Paradox 6, and to Iamblichus, Protrept. p. 23, ed. Arcer.

ERYXIAS;

OR,

ON WEALTH.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ERYXIAS, CRITIAS, ERASISTRATUS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] We happened to be taking a walk, myself and Eryxias, of the ward of Steiria, in the portico of Zeus, who presides over Freed-men, and there came to us Critias the son of Phæax, (and)[1] the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus happened at that time to be recently arrived from Sicily and those places ;[2] and on approaching near he said—"Hail, Socrates." And (hail)[3] too thou, said I. What then, can you tell us of any news[4] from Sicily ? And very (good) too, said he ; but are you willing for us to sit down first ? for I am tired from having walked yesterday from Megara.[5] Perfectly so, (said I,) if it seems good to you. What then of the events there, said he, do you wish to hear the first ? Is it of the people there, themselves, what they are doing, or how they are affected towards this state of ours ? For they appear to me to

[1] I have translated, as if *καὶ* had dropt out after *Φαίακος*: and I have thus got rid of the difficulty, which others had seen, but failed to overcome.

[2] In the words *τῶν τόπων τούτων* there is an error, which I am unable to correct.

[3] In this formula *χαῖρε* is wont to be repeated. See Porson on Eurip. Orest. 470, and myself in Tro. Præf. p. xxiii.

[4] In lieu of *καλὸν*, Bas. 2, has *καινὸν*— Corradus renders "Ecquid novi—affers ? An habes pulchri aliquid ?" thus uniting both readings. But *καλὸν* ought to follow *καὶ πάνυ*, as I have translated.

[5] Megara was about 14 English miles from Athens.

be in a case similar to wasps; for if any one excites the latter in any slight manner to anger, they become difficult to battle against, until one falls upon them and destroys them nest and all. So, I think,[1] are the people of Syracuse. For unless, after entertaining angry feelings, one[2] shall go thither with a very large fleet, it is not possible for them to come under our power; but by all these little doings they will be enraged the more, so as to become the most difficult of all (to manage); and they have just now sent ambassadors,[3] intending, as it seems to me, to deceive in some way the state.

[2.] During our conversation the ambassadors from Syracuse happened to pass by; when, pointing to one of them, Erasistratus observed—That person, Socrates, said he, is the most wealthy of the [4] Siceliotes and Italiotes;[4] and how should he not be, who has land without stint; so that it is easy for him, if one wished it, to cultivate a great deal of it; and it is of such a kind, that there is none other so good,[5] at least amongst the Greeks; and he has still many [6] things leading to wealth, chattels,[6] (and)[7] slaves, and horses, and gold and silver. On seeing him excited,[8] as if about to dilate upon the man's substance, I asked him—What kind of person, Erasistratus, does this man seem to be in Sicily? This man, said he, both seems to be and is the most knavish of all the Siceliotes and Italiotes, by how much he is the wealthiest; so that, should you be

[1] Instead of *οὖν* the sense requires *οἶμαι*, as I have translated.

[2] I cannot understand *ἔργον ποιησάμενος*. Hence I have translated, as if the author had written *ὀργὴν ποιησάμενος*, a phrase found in Thucyd. iv. 122, and Demosth. F. L. p. 370, R., where Shilleto might have satisfied the doubts of Markland by quoting the two passages here adduced.

[3] The embassy, to which allusion is here made, is mentioned by Thucydides in iii. 86. From which it would seem that the dialogue was written much earlier than is commonly supposed.

[4]—[4] By Siceliotes and Italiotes were meant the settlers in Sicily and Italy, not the native people called Σικελοὶ and Ἰταλοί.

[5] Although *ἑτέρας ἀλλῃ* is found elsewhere, yet here the sense requires, as I have translated, *ἑτέρα καλῇ*—

[6]—[6] The Greek is *τἄλλα—ἀπλᾶ*. But Hemsterhuis and Toup suggested *ἔπιπλα*, adopted by Boeckh; and they should have suggested likewise *πολλὰ*— as I have translated.

[7] In lieu of *τὰ* the sense requires *καὶ*—

[8] Fischer conceives that in *ἀναγόμενον* there is a metaphor derived from a person setting sail, or appearing at a distance from the land at sea. See Arnold on Thucyd. i. 112, and myself on Philoct. 573.

willing to ask any Siceliote whom he thought to be the greatest rogue, not one would mention any other person than him.

[3.] Conceiving then that he was holding a conversation not upon trifling matters, but what seemed to be the greatest, namely, virtue and wealth,[1] I asked him which would he say is the wealthier person, he, who happened to have [2]two talents[2] of silver, or he, who had a field worth two talents? I think, said he, the person who has the field. By the same rule then, said I, he, who happens to have garments, or bed-furniture, or other goods of greater value than are those, which the stranger possesses, would be the wealthier. To this he assented. Now, should any one give you the choice, which would you wish? I would wish that, said he, which is the most valuable. Would you not (say so), as conceiving yourself to be more wealthy? Just so. For the present then he appears to be the wealthiest, who possesses things the most valuable. Yes, said he. [4.] Would not then, said I, persons in health be more wealthy than those who are ill? at least if health is a possession more valuable than the property of a person who is ill. For surely there is no one, who would not set a higher value on health, although he possessed only a little money, than on illness, although he possessed the property of the great king,[3] through his conceiving, it is plain, that health is of greater value; for he would never prefer it, unless he considered it of greater value than property. He would not. If then any thing else seems to be of greater value than health, the person, who possesses that thing, would be the wealthiest. Yes. If then a person were to come to us and ask—Can you, Socrates, and Eryxias, and Erasistratus,

[1] I have omitted *πέρι*, which could not be thus repeated; for *ἀρετῆς* and *πλούτου* are put in apposition with *τῶν μεγίστων*.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *δύο τυγχάνει τάλαντα*. But six MSS. read *ὃν τυγχάνει*, and one *τάλαντον*— Both are adopted by Boeckh. But no one would ask whether the owner of a field, worth two talents, was not richer than the owner of one talent; although he might compare a certain amount of money with the same amount of money's worth. Some reason should however be given to prove how the field was superior to the silver. Hence I suspect that something has been lost here to this effect, "For the talents might be taken away by force or fraud, or lost by accident, or be diminished in value by rust; none of which events would happen in the case of the field."

[3] Of Persia.

tell me, what possession is the most valuable to man? Is it not that, by possessing which a person would deliberate the best on this point, how he could best transact his own affairs and those of his friends? What should we say is this? To myself it appears, Socrates, that happiness is the thing of the greatest value to man. And not wrongly so, said I. But shall we consider those the most happy, who are the best to do? To me those appear so. [5.] Would not those then be the best to do, who err the least, in the case of themselves and the rest of mankind, and regulate affairs the most successfully? By all means. They then, who know what is evil and what is good, and what is to be done and what is not, would regulate affairs the most successfully, and err the least. To this too he consented. Now then, the same persons appear to be the wisest, and the best to do, and the happiest, and the wealthiest; if indeed wisdom is a possession of the greatest value. Yes. But, said Erasistratus,[1] taking up the discourse, of what advantage would food and drink, and if there is any thing else of this kind, be to a person, if he were wiser than Nestor, and yet did not happen to have the necessaries of life? How would his wisdom be a benefit? Or how could he be the wealthiest, when nothing prevents him from being poor, while he possesses no resources for the necessaries (of life)? And he thought indeed he had said something extremely (well).[2] But would the person, said I, who possesses wisdom, suffer in this way, even if he were in want of these things?[3] For[4] if a person possessed the residence[5] of Polytion, and the residence[5] were full of gold and silver, would he be in want of nothing? Nay, said he, there is nothing to prevent that person from immediately disposing of his property, and obtaining

[1] Fischer was the first to correct Ἐρασίστρατος into Ἐρυξίας, adopted by all subsequent editors except Bekker.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were Σφόδρα οὖν ἐδόκει εὖ λέγειν, not καὶ λέγειν, remembering the phrase in p. 399, B. § 16, σφόδρα δοκεῖς εὖ διειλέχθαι.

[3] In lieu of τούτων the sense requires πάντων, or rather πάντων τοιούτων—

[4] Instead of δὲ the train of reasoning requires γὰρ, as I have translated. The words are constantly confounded.

[5—5] To avoid the repetition in οἰκίαν and οἰκία, we must evidently read οὐσίαν—οἰκία—The origin of the error is to be traced to the similarity between ιc and κ in MSS. See Porson Adversar. p. 53, 131.

in return for it whatever he happens to want for his living, or money even; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them,[1] and to have on the instant all things in plenty. [6.] Provided, said I, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence,[2] more than of the wisdom of that person; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man,[3] and what results from it, he would have[4] much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of any thing, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely[5] of the residence[6] the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living[7] in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little,[8] and slight[9] is the difference for a person to be wise[10] or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. [11] And oh! that men should despise the one,[11] and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican[12] marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skilful physician, and able to practise well and creditably his art, [13]or any other of such kind of arts,[13] be of greater value

[1] In lieu of *ταῦτα* I should prefer *τοιαῦτα*, "such things—"

[2] Here again we must read *οὐσίαν* for *οἰκίαν*.

[3] Since the name of Nestor, who is here alluded to, has not been mentioned recently, I suspect that in *ἀνθρώπου* lies hid *γερηνίου ἱππότου*— with reference to the *γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ* in Homer.

[4] I have adopted *ἂν ἔχοι* from Fischer, who correctly saw that *ἂν* had dropt out after *μᾶλλον*—

[5] In lieu of *ἢ*, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the interrogative *ἦ* were written originally.

[6] Here again one would prefer *οὐσίαν* to *οἰκίαν*—

[7] Instead of *οἰκεῖν*, which is without regimen, the syntax and sense require *οἰκοῦντι*, as I have translated.

[8] Such seems to be here the meaning of *ὀλίγου ἀξία*, which elsewhere signify "of little value."

[9] Instead of *σμικρὰ*, one would have expected *οὐ σμικρὰ* —

[10] To support the syntax, we must suppose that *ὥστε* has dropt out before *ἢ*—

[11—11] The Greek is *ἢ τούτου μὲν καταφρονεῖν*— I have translated, as if it were *Ἢ τὸ τοῦ μὲν καταφρονεῖν*— where *τοῦ μὲν*, referring to *τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι*, is opposed to *τῆς δὲ κυπαρίττου*; while on the syntax in *τὸ καταφρονεῖν*, it will be sufficient to quote *Τὸ Δία νομίζειν*, in Aristoph. *Νεφ.* 817.

[12] Pentelé was a mountain in Attica famous for its marble.

[13—13] The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced here.

than [1] any one whatever [1] of those [2] of the greatest possessions according to substance? [2] and would not he, who is able to deliberate well both for himself and another, how he might do the best, be able to dispose (of his skill),[3] if he wished to do so?

[7.] (On this) Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and [4] looking with his eyes under,[4] as if he had been injuriously treated,[5] observed—And would you, Socrates, if one must speak the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Callias,[6] the son of Hipponicus? And yet you would acknowledge that you are not less taught (than he is) on matters of the greatest moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this account the wealthier. For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias, said I, that these arguments, which we are now discussing, are a sport, since the facts are not really so; but that they are like pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly [7] brings forward,[8] he will be able to cause the opposite players to be beaten,[9] so as not to have what they can bring forward against those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that matters are thus without any reference to the rich; and that there are certain arguments in no respects either true or

and so thought Clericus and Horreus. Fischer defends them by quoting the translation of Pirckheimer, "aut alius quispiam simili arte præditus," who evidently wished to read *ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων τεχνίτης ὢν*— in lieu of *ἢ τιν' ἄλλην τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων τεχνῶν*—

[1]—[1] This is the proper English translation of *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐκ* in Greek, literally "no one not—"

[2]—[2] Although this may perhaps be understood, yet I should prefer *κεκλημένων* to *κτημάτων*, in English, "of those called the greatest as regards their means—"

[3] I have added "of his skill," to complete the sense.

[4]—[4] In lieu of *ὑποβλέψας* I should prefer the Homeric *ὑπόδρα βλέψας*, where the Schol. explains *ὑπόδρα* by *δεινὸν, ὀργίλον*.

[5] How Eryxias could fancy he had been injuriously treated, I cannot understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote *δακνόμενος*, not *ἀδικούμενος*. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 377.

[6] On the wealth of Callias see Schol. on Aristoph. *Βατρ.*, 431, and Hemsterhuis on Lucian Timon, § 24.

[7] Instead of *φέροιτο*, which could not be thus used in the middle voice, as shown by the subsequent *ἀντιφέρωσι*, the author wrote, I suspect, *φέροι εὖ*, as I have translated.

[8] The description here given of the pebble-game, applies equally well to chess, draughts, and backgammon.

[9] In lieu of *ἡττᾶσθαι*, which seems somewhat too much here, I should prefer *ἱστάσθαι*, "to be at a stand-still—"

false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, [1] and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true.[1] And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma (σ) begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha (α), the argument of the party, who says that alpha (α) begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma (σ) does.

[8.] And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing, [2] as if he had not been present[2] during what had been said before, I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present,[3] nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest? [4] but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary[4] to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honourable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil. Be it so, said I. Henceforth then we will be on our guard; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavour to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy? especially since the previous arguments do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point.

[9.] To myself then for the present[5] it seems that to be

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The author wrote, what might be got at, I think, by a bold conjecture.

[2]—[2] Why Eryxias should blush, in consequence of his being supposed to have been not present at the former part of the discourse, I cannot understand. I could have understood, had the author written, what I suspect he did write, *ὥσπερ ἀπορῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λελεγμένοις*, "as if having been in a difficulty during the preceding conversation—" for that would have been a fair ground for blushing. And similarly one would prefer *ἀπορούντων* for *παρόντων*— just afterwards (3). The error has arisen from § 12.

[4]—[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were originally, *ἐπαῖοι, εἰ δεῖ— ἥδιον*— not as at present, *ἐπειδὴ δεῖν*— which I cannot understand. On the loss or confusion of *ἐπαίειν*, see my note on Legg. ix. p. 127, n. [3], while on *ἡδέως*, or *ἥδιον*, or *ἥδιστα*, united to verbs of hearing or understanding, see Ast's "Lexicon Platonicum," in *Ἡδέως*.

[5] In lieu of *τοίνυν*, the sense requires *τὰ νῦν*, as I have translated.

wealthy is a good. But while he was still desirous to state something, Critias suddenly interrupted him[1] (by saying)—Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy? Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad (if I did not); and I think there is not a single person, who would not say so too. And yet, said the other,[2] I think too that there is not a single person, whom I could not cause[3] to say with myself that to some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a good, it would not have appeared to some to be an evil. Hereupon I said to them that—If ye happened to be at variance about this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the best, and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavoured to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed had I not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance; or if you had been at variance upon any other matter whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless you agreed upon [4]this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now,[4] since you happen to be at variance upon an affair of this kind, of which there must needs be the use through the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to attend to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being a part not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend this as the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at the age for reflecting upon [5]what they ought;[5] and[6] they seem

[1] On this sense of *ὑπο κρούειν* see Aristoph. Ach. 38.

[2] Boeckh would read *ὁ ἑταῖρος*, "his friend," for he says that *ὁ ἕτερος* is scarcely found thus used elsewhere in Plato or his imitators.

[3] The sense and syntax evidently require *ποιήσεια*, the Attic aor. 1, optat., or *ποιῆσας*, in lieu of *ποιῆσαι*, which is without regimen.

[4—4] The Greek is *τουτὶ μᾶλλον—νῦν δὲ*— But first, there is nothing to which *τουτὶ* can be referred; and secondly, *μᾶλλον* could not be thus repeated after the preceding *μᾶλλον*; and lastly, the propositions, laid down after *νῦν δὲ*, want their proper conclusion. I have therefore little doubt but that the author wrote, *εἰ μὴ ὁμολογοῖτε, ἐχθρὼ ἀντὶ φίλων ἀπαλλαγῆναι· νῦν δὲ τοῦτ' ἔτι μᾶλλον σπεύδειν δεῖ, ἐπειδὴ*— for *σπεύδειν δεῖ* might easily have been lost through *ἐπειδὴ*—

[5—5] In *τοῦ ἤδη φρονεῖν*, where *ἤδη* is perfectly unintelligible, evidently lie hid *τοῦ, ἃ δεῖ, φρονεῖν*—

[6] I have translated as if *καὶ*, not *ὡς*, were written here originally. The two words are constantly confounded. See Markland on Eurip. Iph. A. 173.

to consider from whence they shall become wealthy; [1]so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing.[1] [10.] If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition you are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a [2]black colour or white,[2] nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference (in opinion). But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part (in the discussion), as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavour to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.

[11.] I would, said he, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just. By Zeus, said he, and very much so. Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good? To me at least an evil. Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbours' wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it. To me at least he would seem to act unjustly. Consequently, said he, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and [3]both able and willing to expend money,[3] he would go astray; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy,

[1]—[1] Fischer quotes opportunely Horace Sat. i. 1, 62, "Nil satis est, inquit; quia tanti, quantum habeas, sis."

[2]—[2] Here is an allusion to the dark colour of iron, the coin of Sparta, and the white colour of silver, the coin of Athens.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the author had originally written, what is required by the sense, *δυνατὸς καὶ βουλόμενος ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἄδικος ἄνθρωπος*, not as at present, *δυνατὸς ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἀδικός τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βουλόμενος*, which I cannot understand.

since he would the less accomplish what he wished. Now he wished to do what was wrong. And again, would you say that to be ill is an evil or a good? I would say an evil. Well then, do there seem to you to be some men, who are without self-control? Yes, to me at least. If then it were better for a person of this kind for the sake of his health to abstain from food and drink, and the rest of things that are thought to be pleasant, while he is unable (to do so) through his want of self-control, it would be better for that person, that there should not be from whence he could procure those things for himself, rather than have a great superfluity in the necessaries (of life); for thus there would not be the power for him to go astray, not even if he vehemently wished it.

[12.] So well and beautifully was Critias thought to have spoken, that had not Eryxias felt a respect for those, who were present, nothing would have prevented him from getting up and striking Critias; of so great a thing did he deem himself to have been deprived; since it was evident to him, that he had previously formed not a correct opinion on the subject of wealth. Perceiving then that Eryxias was in this state, and careful that abuse and opposition should not proceed too far, I remarked, that Prodicus, the wise man of Ceos, had, when detailing this very argument, seemed to those, who were present, to be such a trifler as to be unable to persuade a single person present that he was speaking what was true; and thereupon a lad very young and a clever talker, who was sitting by, laughed at and jeered him, and put him up, desirous to get at the reasons for what he was saying; and in truth he became in much higher repute amongst the auditors than Prodicus himself. Might you have it in your power, said Erasistratus, to tell us his reasons? Completely so, if indeed I remember it. For it was, I think, something to this effect.

[13.] The lad asked him, in what way he conceived wealth to be an evil, and in what a good? when he taking up the discourse, observed—Just as you do likewise, that to persons beautiful in body and mind it is a good, and to such as know how to use it, to these likewise it is a good; but to the depraved and those who do not know, it is an evil. And all the rest of things, said he, are in this state. For of what kind are some of those, who make use of things, such to them

it is necessary for the things to be; and prettily, said he, appears to have been put into verse the sentiment of Archilochus—

As the actions are men meet with, so the thoughts are, which they frame.

Now then, said the lad, if any one should make me wise in that very wisdom, by which the good become wise men, it is necessary for him to make at the same time the rest of things good for me, without his troubling himself at all about those very things, because he has made me wise instead of being untaught; as if a person should make me now a grammarian, it is necessary for him to make the rest of things grammatical for me; and if a musician, musical; just as when he makes me good, (it is necessary) to have made things good at the same time for me. To the latter assertion Prodicus however did not assent; although he acknowledged the former. [14.] Does it seem to you, said he, that as it is[1] the work of a man to make a dwelling, so it is to make things good? or is it necessary for things to continue to the end to be such, as they may have been at the commencement, whether evil or good? And Prodicus seemed to me to suspect to what point the argument was about to proceed in so[2] very clever a manner; (and),[3] in order that he might not appear before all present to be confuted by the lad—for he thought it would be a thing of indifference for him to suffer this when alone—he said it was the work of a man. Does [4]virtue, said (the lad), seem to you a thing to be taught,[4] or is it innate? To be taught, he replied, at least by[5] me. Would not then, said he, a person appear to be silly, if he thought that, by praying to the gods, he should become a grammarian or a musician, or obtain any other science, which it is necessary for a person to obtain by either learning from another or discovering himself? To

[1] I have with Stephens followed Cornarius, who suggested *ἐστὶν* for *εἶναι*, which is without regimen.

[2] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὕτως σφόδρα πανούργως*, not *αὐτῶν σφόδρα πανούργως*: where Stephens, unable to understand *αὐτῶν*, tacitly changed it into *αὐτῷ*— On *οὕτω σφόδρα* united to another adverb see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 178.

[3] I have added *καὶ*, what might easily have dropt out after *πανούργως*, since *ὡς* and *καὶ* are, as I have observed on § 9, frequently confounded.

[4—4] On this doctrine see the Meno.

[5] I have translated "by" instead of "to—" For Prodicus was probably the promulgator of that doctrine.

this too he assented. Do not you then, Prodicus, said the lad, when you pray to the gods to do well, and for good things to happen, pray at that time for nothing else but to become beautiful in body and mind; since to men beautiful in body and mind things likewise happen to be good, but bad to the depraved. If then virtue happens to be able to be taught, you would appear to be praying for nothing else than to be taught, what you do not know.

[15.] I said then to Prodicus, that he seemed to me to have suffered a thing of not a trifling kind, if he had happened to fail in this; at least if he conceived that, what we pray for from the gods, would take place [1]even at the same time.[1] For should you go in haste on each occasion to a city,[2] and in your prayers ask of the gods to give good things, you nevertheless would not know whether they are able to give you what you happen to ask for, as you would do, if you were to go to the doors of a grammar-master, and beg of him to impart the knowledge of grammar, and to trouble himself about nothing else but the science, which you can receive on the instant, and (by which) you will be able to do the works of the grammar-master. On my saying this, Prodicus directed his course to the lad, as about to defend himself, and to make a display, as you have done just now, and taking it to heart should he appear to have prayed to the gods in vain. And thereupon the ruler of the Gymnasium advancing, bade him take himself away from the Gymnasium, as he was conversing upon subjects not suited to young persons; and if not suited, evidently wrong.

[16.] This account have I detailed for the sake of this, that you may see how situated are the persons engaged in philosophy. For if Prodicus had been present, and spoken thus, he would have appeared to those present to be so mad, [3]as to be ejected even from the Gymnasium.[3] But you seem to have now talked so extremely well, as not only to have persuaded those present,[4] but to cause likewise the speaker on the

[1]—[1] I confess I scarcely understand *καὶ ἅμα*.

[2] This mention of a city seems very strange, where one would have expected that of a temple.

[3]—[3] As the present conversation is feigned to take place in the Portico, and not at the Gymnasium, I suspect the author wrote, *ὥστε καὶ ἐκβλη-θῆναι νῦν, ὡς τότε ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου*, "as to be ejected now, as he was then from the Gymnasium."

[4] Here again I should prefer *ἀποροῦντας*— See § 8, n. [2].

opposite side to agree with you; (and)[1] it is evident that, as in courts of law, if two persons happened to give the same evidence, one seeming to be correct in body and mind, but the other depraved (in both), the judges would, on account of the testimony of the depraved character, be not at all convinced; but, as it might happen, do even the reverse; but if the person, who seemed to be correct in body and mind, had so stated (alone),[2] the statement would have seemed to be vehemently true. Perhaps then the parties are situated in some such manner with respect to yourself and Prodicus; and one they consider a sophist and a vain talker, but yourself a statesman and a man of much worth; and then they imagine that they ought not to look to the speech itself, but to the speakers, of what kind they may be. But nevertheless, said Erasistratus, although you are speaking in ridicule, Socrates, it seems to myself at least, that Critias appears to say something (well). Nay, said I, by Zeus, nothing whatever. But why, since you have conversed upon these matters well and beautifully, do you not finish what remains of your discourse? For there seems to me something still remaining of the inquiry, especially since this appears to be acknowledged, that (wealth) is to some a good, but to others an evil. There remains then to inquire what is wealth in the abstract. For if we do not know this first, we shall not be able to agree as to what portion is an evil, and what a good; and I am prepared, as far as I can, to make the inquiry with you. Let then the person, who asserts that to be wealthy is a good, say on this point how the case happens to be.

[17.] Nay, said he, I do not, Socrates, define wealth in any way more cleverly than the rest of mankind. For this is to be wealthy, to possess much money. And I conceive that Critias here does not think that to be wealthy is any thing else. Even thus, said I, there will be something still left to consider, of what kind is the money, in order that you may not shortly afterwards appear to be at variance on this point again. For instance, you know[3] that the Carthaginians make use of money of this kind. In a small skin there is bound up as much as is

[1] I have inserted *καὶ*, which seems to have dropt out after *σοὶ*—

[2] The antithesis evidently requires *ταῦτα αὐτὸς*— where *αὐτὸς* might easily have been lost through *ταῦτα*, which Orelli would change into *ταὐτὰ*.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἴστε ὅτι*, not *οὗτοι*, which Horreus changed into *οὖν οἱ*, adopted by Boeckh.

the weight of a stater[1] at most. But what is so bound up within, no one knows, except those who make it up. They then deem it a legal tender,[2] when a seal has been put upon it; and he, who possesses the greatest number of these skins, is thought to possess the most money, and to be the wealthiest. But if any one amongst us were in possession of such things to the greatest amount, he would be not a whit more wealthy, than if he possessed many pebbles from the mountain;[3] but at Lacedæmon they deem a weight of iron a legal tender, and this when it is[4] the useless part of iron; and he, who possesses a great weight of such kind of iron, is thought to be wealthy; but elsewhere its possession is worth nothing; while in Æthiopia they make use of engraved stones, of which a man of Laconia would not have the power to make any use. But amongst the nomade Scythians, if a person possessed the residence of Polytion, he would be thought to be not at all more wealthy, than if a person amongst us were the owner of the mountain Lycabettus. [18.] It is plain then that each of these things cannot be property; since some of those, who have possessed them, appear to have been not at all more wealthy on this account. But each of these, said I, exist in reality[5] as property to some persons, and they who possess them are wealthy; but to others they are not property, nor are persons on this account more wealthy; just as the same things[6] are neither honourable nor disgraceful to all, but different to different persons. If then we are willing to inquire why amongst the Scythians houses are not property, but are so with us; or why amongst the Carthaginians skins are so, but not with us; or why amongst the Lacedæmonians iron is property, but not with us, should we not discover [7](the rea-

[1] The Attic stater was a coin of the value of four drachms.

[2] This is the best translation of *νομίζουσι*.

[3] In *τοῦ ὄρους* evidently lies hid the name of some mountain. The author wrote, I suspect, *Πάρνηθος*, a mountain near Athens.

[4] Although *καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι* is found in § 10 and 11, yet here I should prefer *καὶ ταῦτά γ' ὄντι*, as I have translated.

[5] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὄντως*, not *ὄντα*, which cannot be united to *ἔστιν*—

[6] Clericus was the first to suggest *ταὐτὰ* for *τὰ τοιαῦτα*, answering to "eadem," in the versions of Pirckheimer and Corradus.

[7]—[7] In lieu of *μάλιστα*, the sense evidently requires *κάλλιστα*, as I have translated; the words are perpetually confounded, as I have frequently remarked; while *αἰτίας* has as evidently dropt out before *οὐτωσι*—

son) best in this way?[7] For example, should any one at Athens possess a thousand talents-weight of the stones in the Market-place, of which we make no use, is it that he would be deemed to be wealthier on that account? It appears not, at least to me. But if he possessed a thousand talents-weight of the stone called lychnite,[1] we should say that he was very wealthy. Very indeed. [19.] Is it, said I, on this account, because the latter is useful to us, but the former useless? Yes. Especially since amongst the Scythians houses are on this account not property to them, because they have no use for a house; nor would a Scythian put any value upon the most beautiful house for himself rather than a sheep-skin cloak; because the latter is useful to him, but the former useless. [2] Again, on the other hand,[2] we do not consider the money of Carthage as property. For there is not an article of those we are in want of, which we can carry off by it,[3] as we can by silver; so that it would be useless to us. It is likely. Whatever things then happen to be useful to us, these are property; but whatever are useless, are not property. How is this, Socrates? said Eryxias, taking up the discourse. Is there not what we make use of for conversing with each other, and [4] for doing a hurt,[4] and many other things? And would these be a property? And yet they appear to be useful. [5] Not even thus then[5] has it appeared to us what is a property. For that it is necessary that a property, if it is about to exist at all, should be useful, is acknowledged nearly by all. But what is the kind of property, since it is not of every kind. [20.] Come then (say), if we are to pursue the inquiry again in this way, [6] would what we are in search of be discovered still

[1] The lychnite stone was, I suspect, something like crystal, in which, as being transparent, an oil-wick was placed, as is now done in glass tubes or globes.

[2—2] As *αὖθις αὖ* cannot begin a sentence, I suspect that *πάλιν δ'* have dropt out between *ἐστὶν* and *αὖθις*— The three words *αὖθις αὖ πάλιν* are elsewhere united, as remarked by Porson in Supplem. Præf. Hec. p. 49.

[3] I have with Boeckh adopted Fischer's *αὐτῷ* in lieu of *αὐτοῦ*—

[4—4] Although nearly all the editors have justly found fault with *βλάπτειν*, yet none have suggested a satisfactory correction; nor can I.

[5—5] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐκ αὖν οὐδ'*— not *οὐκ αὖ οὐδ'*, where *αὖ* has no meaning.

[6—6] Baiter suggests, what I have adopted, *ἆρ' ἂν μᾶλλον*— who might have supported this insertion of *ἂν*, by quoting § 21, *εἰ—ἔροιτο—ἆρ' ἂν*

better,[6] (by asking)[1] what is that, for which we make use of property, and for what has the possession of property been discovered, as drugs have [2] for causing diseases to go away?[2] for perhaps it would thus become more clear. Since then it seems a thing of necessity, that, whatever happens to be property, must be useful likewise, and that of things useful there is one kind, which we call property, it will still be left to inquire, [3] for what need are the things, which are meet to be called property, useful?[3] For all things are equally useful, of which we make use for any [4] operation, just as all that have life are living things; of which living things one kind we call man. If then a person were to ask us—By what thing being removed out of the way shall we have no need of the physician's art, nor of its instruments? we should be able to say—If diseases were removed from our bodies, and did not exist at all, or if existing, were removed on the instant. Of sciences then the medical is, as it seems, that, which is useful for this purpose, to cause the removal of diseases. [21.] And if a person should again ask us—By the removal of what thing are we in no need of property, should we be able to tell? But if not, let us consider the matter thus. Come (say), if a man could live without food and drink, and were neither hungry nor thirsty, is there a reason why he should want those very things, or silver, or any thing else, in order that he might obtain them? To myself at least it does not seem (he would). In the same manner then are the rest of things. For if we did not want the things, of which we are at present in want, for the care of the body, namely, both of warmth and of cold sometimes, and of the other things,

ἔχοιμεν— and *φέρε, εἰ,—ἔσθ' ὅτι ἂν*—*δέοιτο*— and § 27, *εἰ ὑπάρχοι*—*ἀφ' ἂν τι προσδέοιτο*— He did not however perceive that the author wrote not *μᾶλλόν τι*, but *κἄλλιον ἔτι*— as I have translated.

[1] I have translated as if *ἐρόμενοι* had dropt out after *ζητοῦμεν*—

[2—2] This is a rare use of *ἀπαλλάττειν*.

[3—3] The Greek is *τὰ πρὸς τίνα χρείαν χρήσιμα χρῆσθαι χρήματά ἐστι*: which I cannot understand, nor could Gesner, who thus translates those words quoted by Stobæus, xcv. p. 525, "in quem usum utiliter usurpentur, ut *χρήματα* ab utilitate dici mereantur." From which I have been led to suggest that the author wrote *ἔτι, πρὸς τίνα χρείαν χρήσιμ', ἃ γ' εἰρῆσθαι χρὴ χρήματα, ἐστίν*; for thus *ἔτι* would properly belong to the preceding *λοιπὸν*.

[4] I have translated, as if *τιν'*, not *τὴν*, had been written originally before *ἐργασίαν*.

of which the body [1][being deficient][1] is in want, that, which is called property, would be not used by us; at least if no one wanted at all any one of these things, for the sake of which we should wish to possess property, in order that [2]we may possess what is sufficient[2] for our desires, and the wants of the body, of which we may on each occasion stand in need. If then the possession of property is useful for this purpose, namely, the attention to the wants of the body, should this be taken away from the midst of us, we should not be in want of property, and property would perhaps not exist at all. It appears so. [22.] It appears then, as is likely, that what are useful for this doing of things, are property. That such was property he acknowledged indeed; the reasoning nevertheless troubled him exceedingly. But what are these kind of things? (said he). Shall we say that the same thing can be useful for the same operation at one time, but useless at another? I would not say so; but if we have any want of the same thing[3] for the same operation, it seems to me it would be useful; but if not, not. Hence, if we could work up a brazen image without fire, we should not be in want of fire for such an operation; and if we did not want it, it would not be useful to us. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of things. It appears so. Of such things then as it is possible for a thing to exist without them, not one of them would appear to be useful, at least for that thing. It would not. If then we should appear at any time able, without silver and gold, and the rest of such kind of things, which we do not use for the body, as we do food, and drink, and clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, to cause the wants of the body to cease, [4][so that there is no longer a need of them,][4] neither silver nor gold nor the rest of things would appear to be [5]useful for it,[5] if it were able to exist without them. They would not. Nor would those things appear to be property, unless they were

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἵν' ἐξαρκοίμεθα*— Stobæus offers *ἐξικοίμεθα*. From the two united it is easy to elicit, as I have translated, *ἵν', ἃ ἐξαρκοῖ, κτῴμεθα*—

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, not *τούτου*—

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are perfectly unnecessary.

[5]—[5] I have adopted the reading furnished by Stobæus, xcv. p. 526. *χρήσιμα—πρός γε τοῦτο*— which Fischer was the first to approve of, in lieu of *χρήματα—πρός γε τούτου*—

useful. But those things would be (property), by which we are able to obtain what are useful.

[23.] I could never, Socrates, be able to be persuaded of this, that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not property. For of this I am strongly persuaded, that, as things without use are not property, so of things the most useful [1]property is useful for it.[1] Nevertheless (I am not persuaded) of this, that these things happen to be not useful to us; since by them we obtain the necessaries (of life). Come then (say), how shall we speak of these things? Are there not certain persons, who teach music or letters, or any other science, who in return for such instruction obtain for themselves the necessaries (of life) by bargaining for a remuneration for such things? There are. Would not then these persons by such science obtain for themselves the necessaries (of life), by making an exchange for it, as we now do for gold and silver? I confess it. If then they obtain by this act, what they make use of for living, this act would be useful for their living; for we have said that silver is useful on this account, that we are enabled by it to procure what is necessary for the body. It is so, said he.

[24.] If then the sciences of things useful for it are these, sciences would appear[2] to be property for the very same reason that gold and silver are. [3]It is evident. It is evident too[3] that those, who possess these sciences, are rather wealthy. But we admitted a little before with so much difficulty the reasoning, whether they were the wealthiest. But from what has been just now admitted, this would of necessity happen, that the rather intelligent are rather wealthy. For should a person ask us—Do we think that a horse is a useful thing for every man? [4]Would you not say that,[4] to those who know how to use a horse, it would be a useful thing, but to those

[1]—[1] I have followed Fischer, who suggested *πρὸς τοῦτο χρήματα χρήσιμα*. But as it is not easy to see to what *τοῦτο* applies, instead of *πρὸς τούτων χρήματα τὰ χρήσιμα*, I should prefer *πρὸ πάντων χρήματα, ἄτ' ὄντα χρήσιμα*, i. e. "before all things property, as being useful."

[2] Although *φαίνονται* might stand after *εἰ—εἰσὶ*, yet here I should prefer *φαίνοιντ' ἂν—*

[3]—[3] I have adopted *Δῆλον. Δῆλον δὲ—* furnished by one MS., similar to *Φαίνεται. Φαίνεται ἄρα—* in § 22.

[4]—[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἆρ' οὐ φαίης ἂν ὅτι— not ἆρα φαίης ἢ—*

who do not know, not? I should say so. Then said I, by the same rule a drug is not useful for every man, but only to him, who happens to know how to take it? I say so. Are not then all the rest of things in a similar condition? It is likely. Gold then and silver and the rest of things, which are thought to be property, would be useful to him alone, who happens to know how to use them. Just so. Did it not seem before to be the part of persons superior both in body and mind to know where and how to make use of each of these things? I admit it. [25.] To those men alone then, who are superior in body and mind, these things would be useful; since they (alone)[1] know how to use them. If then they are useful to these alone, to these alone they would appear to be property. [2]Is it so? It is likely.[2] Him too, who is unskilled in horsemanship, yet possesses horses that happen to be useless to him, should a person render skilful, would he not at the same time make him more wealthy, since he makes things to be useful to him which previously happened to be useless? For by imparting skill to the person he at the same time makes him wealthy likewise. It seems so. And yet I think I could swear on behalf of Critias, that he is persuaded by none of these arguments. (And truly so), by Zeus. For I should be mad if I were persuaded. But why have you not completed that part of the argument, how that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not, although they seem to be, property? since I am very much delighted to hear those arguments, which you happen to be just now going through. Thereupon I observed that you appear to me, Critias, to be thus delighted at hearing me, as are such of the rhapsodists, as chaunt the verses of Homer; since not one of these arguments are thought by you to be true. [26.] Come then (and say) nevertheless, how shall we speak upon such matters? Would you not say that there are some[3] things ever useful

[1] I have inserted "only," for *μόνοι* might easily have dropt out after *ἐπιστήμονες*—

[2]—[2] The Greek is at present *ἆραρ ὡς ἔοικε*, where *ἆραρ* is perfectly unintelligible. It was formerly, as I have translated, *ἦ γάρ*; *Ὡς ἔοικε*. The Platonic *ἦ γάρ* used interrogatively at the end of a sentence is found every where.

[3] In lieu of *αὐτὰ*, found in all the MSS., Bekker has edited *ἄττα*— But I do not remember to have met with *ἄττα* thus placed before, and separated from, its adjective. He should have suggested *ἀεί τιν'*— as I have translated.

to house-builders for making a dwelling? So it seems at least to me. Whether then shall we say that those things would be useful, which they[1] make use of for house-building, namely, stones and bricks, and wood, and if there be any thing else of this kind? or that there are tools, with which they make the dwelling, and by which they obtain these things, namely, the wood and the stone, and again, the tools for them? To myself at least it seems, said he, that all these (the tools) are useful for those (the materials). Hence, said I, in the case of the rest of operations, not only are those things[2] (useful), which we make use of for each of the works, but those also, by which we obtain them, and without which they would not exist. It is entirely so. Hence, both for those, who possess these (the tools), and [3]if there be any thing further up,[3] and for those who possess these (the materials) [4]and what is further up,[4] so that at last they come to some infinite multitude, it is necessary for all these to appear useful for their operations. There is nothing, said he, to prevent such from being the case. [27.] Well then, if food and drink, and clothing, and the other things which a person is about to make use of for the body, were in his power, would he want in addition gold and silver, or any thing else, by which he could obtain what was in his power? It appears to me he would not. Would it not then appear to us, that sometimes a person does not want any of those things, which relate to the needs of the body? (Yes.) For he does not want them. Hence if they appeared to be useless for this operation, they could not, on the other hand, be deemed to appear useful. For it has been laid down, that it is not possible for things to be at one time useful, and at another useless, as regards the same operation. In this way at least, said he, the same reasoning would hold good to both you and me. For if these were at any time useful for this purpose, it never would happen for them to be on the other hand useless. [5]But now to some operations of depraved doings,

[1] In lieu of *οἷς αὐτῶν*, where the genitive has no meaning, I should prefer *οἷς αὐτοὶ*— similar to *οἷς αὐτοὶ* in the next clause, and *οἷς αὐτὸς* in the next section Opportunely then two MSS. offer *αὐτοῖς*—

[2] I have adopted, what Horreus suggested, *αὐτὰ* for *αὐτοῖς*, which Fischer calls an hyperbaton.

[3]—[3], and [4]—[4] I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals, even if *ἄνω* be translated "further removed."

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The Latin version has "Nunc vero dixeris aliquas operas esse rerum malarum,

but to others of good.[5] I should say so. [1]Is it not possible then for a depraved act to be useful for the working out of some good?[1] It does not seem so to myself at least. But good acts we should say are those, which a man does through virtue. I admit it. Is it not possible for a person to learn some of the things, which are taught by conversation, although he were deprived of hearing, [2]or any thing else?[2] By Zeus, it does not seem so to me at least. Hence, of the things useful for virtue hearing would appear [3]to be one,[3] if at least virtue is to be taught by hearing, and we make use of it for instruction. It appears so. [28.] Hence, if medical art is able to cure[4] a person diseased, even medical art would sometimes appear to be one[5] of the things useful for virtue, if [6]through it be furnished the power of hearing what relates to the thing to be taught.[6] There is nothing to prevent it. If then again we obtain medical science in return for property, even property would appear to be useful for virtue. Yes, said he; for such it is. Hence, again, in like manner, that (would be useful), by which we could obtain property. Yes, all such by all means. Now does it not seem to you that a person could from acts depraved and disgraceful obtain for himself silver, in return for which he might obtain medical science, or be able to hear, after being unable? and to use that very (hearing) for virtue, or any other things of that kind? To me at least it does seem very much so. Would not then the depraved be useful for virtue? It would. It is not necessary then for those things, by which we can obtain what is useful for each, to be themselves useful for the same. For things depraved would sometimes seem to be useful for a thing that is good. And they

aliquas autem bonarum—" as if the translator wished to read, Νῦν δὲ γ ἐρεῖς τινας—μοχθηρῶν εἶναι— to answer to the following, Ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην.

[1]—[1] This was the doctrine of Rochefoucault, who said that "private vices are public benefits;" and of the Jesuits, who said that "the end sanctifies the means."

[2]—[2] I hardly understand the words between the numerals.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if εἶναι ἓν had dropt out after ἀκούειν—

[4] Although τὸν νοσοῦντα παύειν might perhaps stand, yet τὸν νοσοῦντ ἰατρεύειν, what I have translated, would be far preferable.

[5] Here again ἓν has dropt out, I suspect, after χρησίμων—

[6]—[6] The Greek is at present διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς— But ἰατρικῆς could not be thus repeated after ἡ ἰατρική— Opportunely then does one MS. offer διδακτῆς in lieu of διὰ τῆς, which leads at once to ἢ δι' αὐτης τὰ τῆς διδακτῆς, without ἰατρικῆς: and so I have translated.

would be still more evident in this case. For if these are useful for each (of those), without which they would not exist, unless these had existed previously, come (say), how shall we speak of things of this kind? Is it possible for ignorance to be useful for science, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? I should say, not. [29.] And yet we should agree in this, that it is impossible for science to be produced in him, in whom ignorance had not existed previously; or health, in him in whom disease had not (existed); or virtue, in him in whom vice had not. The fact, said he, is so, as it seems to me. Hence it would not be necessary for those things to be useful, without which a thing is not able to exist. For (otherwise)[1] ignorance would appear to be useful for science; and disease, for health; and vice, for virtue. Of these arguments too he was very hard of belief, [2]unless all these things shall be property.[2] And I, knowing him thoroughly, that it would be an equally hard task to convince him, as, according to the saying, to boil a stone, said—Let us bid a long[3] farewell to these arguments; since we are unable to agree, whether the same things are useful, and a property, or not. But how shall we say on this question? Whether shall we consider a person happier and better, who is in want of the greatest number of things necessary for his body and living, or him, who (is in want) of the fewest and most trifling? Now this question would perhaps be viewed in the best manner,[4] thus. Should one compare a person himself with himself, and consider which of his states is the better, whether, when he happens to be ill, or in health. But this at least, said he, does not require any great consideration. For perhaps, said I, it is easy for every simpleton to know[5] that the state of the person in health is better than that of the person ill. Well then, at what time do we happen to be in want of things more in number and variety? when we are ill, or in

[1] This "otherwise" is due to "alioquin," in the Latin version.

[2]–[2] The words between the numerals I cannot understand, nor could, I think, the Latin translator, whose words are—"Vix etne vix quidem his sermonibus fidem habebat, quod non omnia hæc utilia essent." But *εἰ μὴ* could hardly be rendered "quod non."

[3] In lieu of *ἀλλὰ*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *πολλὰ*—

[4] Here, as in § 18, I have translated, as if the Greek were *κάλλιστα*, in lieu of *μάλιστα*—

[5] Here *ἄνῳ* is not the abbreviation of *ἀνθρώπῳ*, but the word which means 'senseless."

health? When we are ill. When therefore we happen to be lying in the worst condition for ourselves, we then are greatly in the desire, and the want of the greatest number of things that[1] relate to the pleasures of the body. It is so. [30.] According to the same rule then, [2]as a person is in the best condition for himself, when he is in want of the fewest of these things, so on the other hand, if there were two persons, one of whom happened to be greatly in the desire and want of many things, and the other of few things and moderately so, as for example things of this kind, such men as are dice-players, others wine-tipplers, and others of a voracious appetite, for all these happen to be nothing else than desires. Very much so.[2] Now all desires are nothing else than the want of some things. (Nothing).[3] The persons then, who have suffered the most of these, are in a more depraved state than those, who have suffered things of this kind either not at all, or to the least extent. I consider then persons of this kind to be very depraved; and the more they are of this kind, the more depraved. It seems then to us that it is not possible for these things to be useful for this purpose, unless we happen to be in the want of these things for this purpose. I admit it. It is necessary then, if these are about to be useful to us for the care of the wants of the body, that we too should want them for this purpose. So it seems at least to me. He then, to whom the greatest number of things useful for this purpose belongs, would appear to be in want of the greatest number for this purpose, since it is necessary for him to feel a want of all useful things. To me at least it seems to appear in this way. It is necessary therefore, according to this reasoning, for those, to whom there happens to be much property, to be in much want of the things necessary for the care of the body. For the things useful for this purpose have appeared to be property; so that of necessity they, who should appear to us to be the wealthiest, are in the most depraved state, since they are in want of the greatest number of things of this kind.

[1] In lieu of *τὰ* the syntax and sense require *τῶν*—as I have translated.

[2—2] As the apodosis is wanting in this long-winded sentence, I doubt not there is some error here, which I could, perhaps, correct; but not without alterations which would be considered too violent. Suffice it to say for the present, that Stobæus omits *οὕτω πάλιν*, in which a portion of the difficulty lies.

[3] I have with Boeckh adopted the notion of Cornarius, that *Οὐδὲν* has dropt out before *Οἱ οὖν*—

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE DIALOGUE ON VIRTUE.

Of this dialogue, which contains little more than two portions of the Meno, the authorship is attributed to Æschines by Suidas, whom Fischer has followed; but by Boeckh to Simon, the shoemaker, in consequence of his remarking that the follower of Socrates had written two treatises respectively on Justice and Virtue, both of which are found amongst the titles of the spurious dialogues. It is however difficult to believe that any person, who was contemporary with Plato, would condescend to pilfer from a fellow-writer; unless it be said that Simon has given the dialogue as it really took place, with the view of showing that nearly all of what Plato put into the mouth of Socrates was the produce of the writer's own fertile imagination.

Be however the author who he may, it is a curious fact, that the dialogue contains allusions to circumstances not mentioned by Plato, but which could hardly have been known except to a contemporary, as I have remarked in § 7, n. [6]—[6].

No less curious is another fact, that amongst the confessedly spurious dialogues of Plato, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in iii. 62, there is one under the title of Μίδων ἢ Ἱπποστρόφος. But as the Vienna MS. reads there Ἱπποτρόφος, and the Vatican MS. of Plato, marked Ω by Bekker, gives the word Ἱπποτρόφος, as the name of the person conversing with Socrates, and as "Hippotrophus" is found as one of the Interlocutors in the Latin version of this dialogue made by Cincius Romanus, preserved amongst the additional MSS No. 11,760, in the British Museum, it is fair to infer that the

real title was Μίδων ἢ Ἱπποτρόφος. For thus Midon the horse-breeder would be the origin of Menon of Thessaly, a country famous for its breed of horses. And it was from this coincidence in the name furnished by three different sources, that I have been led to examine more attentively than I should otherwise have done, the version of Cincius; where I have discovered, what I little expected, that the translator had, like Ficinus in other parts of Plato, met with a MS. more full than any subsequently collated, as may be seen in my notes.

With regard to the next dialogue "On Justice," I have only to remark, that it was in existence in the time of Thrasyllus, from whom Diogenes Laertius drew the greater part of his information relating to the Platonic and Pseudo-Platonic writings.

ON VIRTUE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

[1.] Is Virtue a thing to be taught, or to be not taught? but [1] do men become good by nature, or by any other means? I cannot, Socrates, state at present. But let us consider the matter in this way. Come then, (say,) if a person wished to become good in the virtue,[2] in which clever cooks are good, from whence would he become so? It is evident, if he learnt from good cooks. Well then, if a person wished to become a good physician, by going to whom would he become a good physician? It is evident, by going to some one of the good physicians. But if he wished to become good in the art, in which clever carpenters (are good)? To (some one) of the (good) carpenters.

[2.] If then he wished to be good in the virtue, in which men are good and clever, whither must he go and learn? I conceive to (some one) of the (good) men (to learn) this, if it is to be learnt; for from whence else? Come then, (say,) who are the men that have become good? in order that we may see whether these are the persons, who make men good, Thucydides,[3] and Themistocles, and Aristides, and Pericles.

[1] This ἀλλά is strangely introduced here. But as it is found in the Meno, § 1, although in a manner perfectly proper there, it would be uncritical perhaps to remove it. Cincius however has what is preferable. "Estne virtus o Hyppotrophe, res quæ doctrina percipi possit? an contra Num viri boni natura efficiuntur, sive alio quodam modo?"

[2] By "virtue," was meant not merely a moral quality, as with us, but "excellence," generally.

[3] This word should evidently follow καὶ Περικλῆς, to preserve the order in which they are taken subsequently, not only in this dialogue, but

Have we it in our power to say who was the teacher of each of these? We have not; for it is not told. Well then, (can we mention) any pupil, either amongst strangers or citizens or any one else, either a free man or a slave, who assigns as the cause of his having become wise and good his intercourse with them? This too is not told. But they did not surely grudge to share their virtue with other persons. Perhaps so. Was it that there might not be rival artists, just as cooks, and physicians, and carpenters feel a jealousy;[1] since it is not to their advantage for many rival artists to exist, nor for them to dwell amongst many similar persons. Is it then in like manner not an advantage for good men to dwell amongst many similar persons? Perhaps so. [3.] Are not the good and the just the same? Yes, they are. Is there the individual, to whom it is an advantage to live not amongst good persons, but amongst bad? I cannot tell. Can you not tell this too, whether it is the work of good men to do a hurt, and of bad men to do a benefit, or the reverse? The reverse. The good then do a benefit, the bad do a hurt. Yes. Is there a person who wishes to be hurt rather than to be benefited? By no means. No one therefore wishes to live amongst bad persons, rather than amongst good. It is so. Not one then of the good is so jealous of another, as (not)[2] to make him a good person and similar to himself. From this[3] reasoning it seems so. [4.] You have heard that Cleophantus was the son of Themistocles. I have heard it. It is evident then that Themistocles was not jealous of his son becoming the best possible; who (was jealous of)[4] no one else, if indeed he was a good man; and (good)[5] they say he was. Yes. You know then that Themistocles caused his son to be taught to be a clever and a good horseman. For instance he used to remain[6] standing upright

in the Meno, § 33, 4, where Sydenham was the first to remark that this Thucydides was not the historian, but a political opponent of Pericles.

[1] Fischer refers to Hesiod Εργ. 25, Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει, καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, Καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ, similar to the homely English proverb, "Two of a trade can never agree."

[2] After ὥστε I have inserted, what has evidently dropt out, μὴ—Cincius however omits ὥστε, and has, "sed bonum—"

[3] I have adopted ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, found in MS. Aug. according to Fischer.

[4, 5] I have inserted "envied," requisite to complete the sense, and similarly "good," just afterwards.

[6] I have adopted ἐπέμενε, the conjecture of Horreus, who got the

upon horses, and upright too hurled a javelin from (the backs of) the horses, and did many other wonderful feats, [1]and taught him, and made him wise in many other things,[1] such as are closely connected with a good education. Or have you not heard so from elderly persons? I have heard it. No one then could find fault with the son's nature as being bad.[2] Not justly so at least from what you have said. [5.] But what is this? that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and wise man in the matters where his father was wise, have you ever heard from any younger or older person? I have not heard it. Do we then conceive that he wished to instruct his own son in these matters; but in the wisdom, in which he was wise himself, not to make him better than any of his neighbours, if virtue were a thing to be taught? It is not likely at least. [6.] Of such a kind then is this your teacher of virtue, to whom you have alluded?[3] Let us then look to another, by name Aristides, who brought up Lysimachus, and instructed him the best of the Athenians on such subjects as are connected with (good)[4] teachers; and yet he made him a man no better than any body; for both you and I have seen and associated with him. It is true. [7.] You know too that Pericles brought up well [5]his sons Paralus and Xanthippus, [6]of the latter of whom you seem to me to have been the lover.[6] These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen inferior to none of the Athenians; and he instructed

reading from Meno, § 32, in lieu of *ἐπέβαινε*, although in both places the author probably wrote something more fit to be read than what is found here at present.

[1]—[1] The Greek is here *καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐδίδαξε καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν*—But *ἐδίδαξε* wants its subject, supplied in the Meno, § 32, *ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐδιδάξατο*. Hence one would read here *καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ, ἃ ἐδιδάξατο ἐκεῖνος, ἐποίησε σοφον*—where *ἐποίησε* would be united as frequently with two accusatives.

[2] Cincius adds, "Quandoquidem eum ad percipiendas disciplinas adipiscendasque aptum idoneumque esse cognoscit—"

[3] In lieu of *ὃν ὑπεῖπες*, Cincius has—"quem majorum esse profitebaris," as if his MS. had here something similar to what is found in Meno, § 33, *ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεις ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων*.

[4] Both here and in Meno, § 33, I suspect that *καλῶν* has been lost after *διδασκάλων*—

[5] In lieu of *αὖ* I have translated, as if the Greek were *εὖ*, similar to *μεγαλοπρεπῶς* in the Meno.

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals have dropt out in Meno, § 33, after *Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον*.

them to be inferior to no one in the rest of contests, and all the other things that are learnt by art. But did he not wish to make them good men? But perhaps, Socrates, they would have become so, had they not died young. [1]You reasonably come to the aid of your beloved.[1] But Pericles would have much rather made them clever in his own wisdom, than in music and contests, had virtue been a thing to be taught, and had he been able to make them good men. [8.] But (I fear) that it is a thing not to be taught; since Thucydides brought up well[2] his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, [3]in behalf of whom you will not have it in your power to say, what you have done in behalf of the sons of Pericles; for one of these you surely know lived to old age, and the other much beyond.[3] And yet their father taught them well other pursuits, and they wrestled the best of the Athenians. For he put one under Xanthias, and the other under Eudorus; and these were surely thought to wrestle the best of those of that period. Yes, they were. [9.] Is it not evident then, that he would not have taught his sons these things, where[4] it was requisite to instruct them at an expense to himself, but those where[5] without expending any thing it was requisite to make them good men. Now would he not have taught them this, if it were to be taught? It is likely at least. But perhaps Thucydides was a man of small means, and had not very many friends amongst the Athenians or their allies; and[6] he was of a great family, and of great power in the state, and amongst the rest of the Greeks, so that if this had been a

[1]—[1] Here again has been preserved another supplement of the Meno. For in § 30, Plato wrote, AN. *δοκῶ μέν, ἐβουλετο· ἴσως δ' ἂν ἐγένοντο, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ νέοι ὄντες ἐτελεύτησαν.* ΣΩ. *σὺ μὲν εἰκότως βοηθεῖς τοῖς παιδικοῖς· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν.* For it seems unreasonable to suppose that the writer of this dialogue was cognizant of facts, which Plato either did not know, or was unwilling to mention.

[2] Here again I have substituted *εὖ* for *αὖ* —and so I would in Meno, § 33.

[3]—[3] Here too is another supplement of the Meno; for all the words between the numerals ought to be inserted in § 33, after *Στέφανον*, and *γὰρ* between *καὶ* and *τούτους*—

[4, 5] I have adopted *οὑ*, "where," found in Meno, § 34, in lieu of *οἵ*, "whither;" and similarly in (5), to which *ὅπου* in 3 MSS. plainly leads.

[6] Although *καὶ* is found both here and in the Meno, in neither place is it what the sense requires, as remarked there by Struve. Opportunely then has Cincius here, "Thucydidem abjectum et obscurum fuisse hominem. *At longe secus erat;* multitudine enim amicorum et civium et sociorum populi Atheniensis affluebat—"

thing to be taught, he would have discovered a person amongst those of the country, or foreigners, who would have made his son a good man, if he himself had, through his attention to state affairs, no leisure. But (I fear) that virtue is a thing not to be taught. Perhaps not. [10.] But if it is not to be taught, are the good naturally so from their birth? But this perhaps we shall discover by considering the matter in this way. Come then, (say,) do there exist the natures of good horses? They do exist. Are there not men, who possess an art, by which they know the natures of good horses, both as regards their body, with reference to running, and their feelings, which of them are full of spirit or devoid of it. Yes. What is this art, and what its name? Equestrian. Is there not in like manner an art relating to dogs, by which persons discriminate between the good and bad natures of dogs? There is. What is it? The hunter's art. There are too assayers amongst us of gold and silver, who, by looking, decide upon both the better and the worse (metal). There are. And what do you call them? Silver assayers. [11.] The boy-drillers[1] moreover know, by examining the natures of the bodies of men, which of them are useful and which not, for each of their labours, and which of the bodies of persons older and young, are about to be worthy of note, and in which there is much hope of their executing works connected with the body. It is so. [12.] Whether then are good horses and dogs, and other things of such a kind, of more importance in states, or good men? Good men. Well then, do you conceive that, if the natures of men were good for virtue, that mankind would not have planned in every way to discover those natures? It is likely at least. Can you then mention any art, which has been exhibited and applied to the natures of good men, so as to enable persons to decide upon them? I cannot. And yet the art would be worth much, and so too the parties possessing it. For they would have pointed out the young men, who, when they were still boys, were about to be good; and whom we should have taken and kept in the Acropolis for the public use, as if it were silver, and something more beautiful,[2] in order that they might not suffer any mischief, either in a fight or in any other danger, but be

[1] On the *παιδοτρίβαι*, see my remarks on Crito, § 7, n. [5].

[2] As in Meno. § 25, the expression in a similar passage is *ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἀκροπόλει—πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον—* I have translated here, as

laid up as the saviours and benefactors of the state, since[1] they should have arrived at a proper age. But it seems almost that virtue does not exist to mankind either by nature or instruction. [13.] How then, Socrates, would persons seem to become (good),[2] if they do not become so by nature or instruction? By what other means could the good exist? This, I think, could not be shown easily; but I conjecture that the property (of goodness) is something especially divine, and that good men exist, as prophets do and oracle chaunters. For these exist neither by nature nor by art, but become such by the inspiration of the gods. And so too good men point out to states what is about on each occasion to happen, and what is about to be, from the inspiration[3] of a god, much more, and more clearly, than oracle chaunters do: and even women[4] somehow say that such a person is a divine man; and the Lacedæmonians too, when they praise in a very handsome manner, say that a man is divine,[5] and often does Homer make use of the same expression, and the rest of poets likewise. When therefore a god wishes a state to do well, he causes some men in it to be good; but when a state is about to do ill, the god takes away the good men from it. Thus then it is likely that virtue is a thing not to be taught nor (derived) from nature, but exists by a divine allotment to those who possess it.

if the Greek were *κάλλιον*, not *μᾶλλον*— The two words are constantly confounded. Cincius however has, "multo quoque hercle magis—"

[1] Instead of *ἐπειδή*, which is unintelligible, Cincius seems to have found in his MS. *ἕως δή*—for his version is "quousque—"

[2] I have translated, as if *ἀγαθοί*, absolutely requisite for the sense, had dropt out after *γίγνεσθαι*.

[3] Cincius, here and just below, renders *επίπνοια* by "providentia."

[4] Cincius exhibits here a remarkable supplement in his version—"Atqui mulieres etiam, *quæ maxime linguam antiquam observant*"—not found in Meno, § 41.

[5] On the Laconian *θεῖος*, or rather *σεῖος ἀνήρ*, see Meno, § 41, n. 95.

ON JUSTICE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

[1.] CAN you tell us what is justice? or does it seem to you not worth entering into a discourse about it? To me at least (it seems) very much so. What is it then? What else than the things considered just. Do not (speak)[1] to me in this way; but, as if you had asked me—What is the eye? I should have said to you—It is that, by which we see; and if you should bid me to prove it, I would prove it. And if you should ask—To what is given the name of soul? I would say—To that, by which we know (something).[2] And if again—What is the voice? I would answer—That, by which we converse. In this way then do you tell me that justice is that, which we use for something, as are the things, of which I was just now asking. I have it not in my power to reply in this way at all. But, since such is the case, perhaps we shall discover it more easily in this way. Come then, (say,) by what do we, on consideration, distinguish the greater and the less? Is it not by a measure? Yes. And together with a measure by what art? Is it not by that of measurement? Yes. And how things light and heavy? Is it not by weight? Yes. And together with a weight by what art? Is it not that of weighing? Certainly.[3] Well then, by what instrument do

[1] On the ellipse of λέγε after μή μοι, see my note on Æsch. Suppl. 284.

[2] I have translated, as if τι had dropt out before γιγνώσκομεν, which can hardly dispense with its object.

[3] After πάνυ γε, Boeckh proposes to insert, ΣΩ. τί δὲ -λ πολλὰ κα.

we, on consideration, distinguish what is just and unjust? and together with the instrument, by what art previously? Is it not somehow manifest to you thus? No. [2.] But [1](let us consider it)[1] again in this way. When we are disputing about things greater and less, who decides between us? Is it not the measurers? Yes. And when about things many and few, who are the persons to decide? Is it not the numberers? But what, when we are disputing with each other about things just and unjust, to whom do we come? and who are the persons to decide on each occasion between us? Say. Do you not, Socrates, mean the judges? You have correctly made the discovery. Come then and try to tell this likewise. By doing what do the measurers decide respecting things large and small? Is it not by measuring? Yes. And respecting things heavy and light? Is it not by weighing? Yes. And respecting things many and few? Is it not by numbering? Yes. But how, respecting things just and unjust? Answer me. I cannot say. Say, by speaking. Yes. By speaking then do judges decide between us, when they are forming a judgment respecting things just and unjust. Yes. And by measuring, those skilled in measuring things small and great? for a measure is that, by which these things are judged. It is so. And by weighing, those skilled in weighing things heavy and light? for a weight is that, by which these things are judged. Yes, it is. And again by numbering, those skilled in numbering things many and few? for number is that by which these things are judged. It is so. But by speaking, as we just now agreed, the judges decide respecting things just and unjust. You speak correctly, Socrates. [3.] It is true then; and speech is that, it seems, by which things just and unjust are judged. What then are things just and unjust? As if a person had asked us—Since a measure, and the measuring art, and the person skilled in measuring, decide which is the greater and the less, what is the greater and the less? Shall we say to him that the greater exceeds, and the

ὀλίγα; *ἆρ' οὐκ ἀριθμῷ*; 'ET. *Ναί.* ΣΩ. *μετὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τίνι τέχνῃ*; *οὐ τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ*; 'ET. *πάνυ γε.* For not only might these words have been lost through *τὸ ὁμοιοτέλευτον*, but they are requisite likewise for the train of thought; since the subject of number is touched upon in § 2, just as all the others are.

[1]—[1] I have introduced what is requisite for the sense.

less is exceeded? and since a weight and the weighing art and the person skilled in weighing decide the heavy and the light, shall we say to him, that the thing going downwards in the scales is heavy, but the thing (going) upwards is light? In like manner if he should ask us—Since speech and the art of judging and the judge is the party who decides what is just and unjust, what is the just and unjust? What answer shall we have to give him? [1]Or have we not a single word to say?[1] We have not. Whether willingly or unwillingly do men, think you, have this injustice? I mean in this way. Think you that they do injustice [2][and are unjust][2] willingly or unwillingly? Willingly, I imagine, Socrates; for they are wicked. [4.] You conceive then that men are willingly wicked and unjust. I do; and do not you? No; at least if we are to be persuaded by the poet.[3] What kind of poet? He who said—

> Not one is wicked willingly, nor blest
> Unwillingly.

But still on the other hand,[4] Socrates, well is the old proverb,[5] that

> Poets do many falsehoods sing.

But I should marvel, if this poet has told a falsehood. Come then,[6] if you are at leisure, let us consider, whether he is saying what is false or true. Nay, I am at leisure. Come then, (say,) do you deem it just to tell a falsehood, or to tell the truth? To tell the truth. To tell a falsehood then is unjust? Yes. But whether to deceive or to not deceive? To not deceive, assuredly. To deceive then is unjust? Yes. But what, is it just to hurt, or to benefit? To benefit. To hurt then is unjust? Yes. [5.] It is just then to tell the truth, and to not deceive, and to benefit; but to tell a falsehood, and to hurt,

[1]—[1] The Greek is at present, *ἢ οὐδέ πω ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν*— But one MS. reads *ἢ οὐδέ ποτε*— which evidently leads to *ἢ οὐδ' ἕν τι ἔπος*— as I have translated. On the loss of *ἔπος* see myself on Prom. 766.

[2]—[2] The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[3] Who is the author of the Iambic verse, *Οὐδ' εἷς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ*, is to be still discovered. It is quoted by Aristotle in Nicomach. Eth. iii. 5.

[4] As *τοι* does not, I believe, elsewhere follow *τοι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ἀλλ' ἔτ' αὖ*—

[5] The words *πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί*, are the end of an hexameter of some unknown poet.

[6] In lieu of *ἐπεὶ* I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄγ' οὖν*—

and to deceive, unjust. Yes, by Zeus, and greatly so. What, to do so to enemies? By no means. But it is just to do a hurt to enemies, but to do a benefit, unjust. Yes. It is then just by deceiving enemies to do them a hurt? How not? Well then, to tell a falsehood in order that we may deceive and do a hurt to enemies, is it not just? It is. But what, do you not say that it is just to do a benefit to friends? I do. Whether by not deceiving or by deceiving for their benefit? By deceiving even, by Zeus. But is it just to do a benefit by deceiving, and yet not by telling a falsehood? or by telling a falsehood? It is just by telling even a falsehood. To tell a falsehood and to tell the truth is, as it seems, both just and unjust. Yes. And to not deceive and to deceive is both just and unjust. So it seems. And to do a hurt and to do a benefit is just and unjust. Yes. All things of this kind are it seems the same, both just and unjust. To me at least they appear so. [6.] Hear then. I have, like other men, a right eye and a left. Yes. And a right nostril and a left. Certainly. And a right hand and a left. Yes. Hence, since after giving the same name, you say that some of my (members) are on the right side, and others on the left, would you not be able to say, if I asked you, on which side they were, that some on one side are the right, and others on the other side the left? Yes. Come then, likewise, to that point,[1] since after giving the same name, you say that some acts are just, and some unjust, can you tell which are the just, and which the unjust? To me then it now appears that each of these acts, taking place at a proper time,[2] are just; but at not a proper one, unjust. And correctly does it appear to you. He then, who does each of these acts at a proper time, does what is just; but he, who does not at a proper time,[3] (does) what is unjust. Yes. He then, who does what is just, is just; but he who does what is unjust, is unjust. It is so. [7.] Who then at a proper time[4] is able to cut and burn and to make lean? The medical man. Because he knows, or for

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the language requires, ἐκεῖσε, not ἐκεῖ—

[2, 3, 4] I have here omitted ἐν τῷ καιρῷ, which is evidently an interpretation of ἐν τῷ δέοντι, as shown by (3) ἐν τῷ δέοντι καιρῷ, and similarly in (4). Boeckh in all the three places would read ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καιρῷ.

some other reason? Because he knows. And who (is able) at a proper time to dig, and to plough, and to plant? The land-tiller. Because he knows, or because he does not? Because he knows. And in this way as regards other matters, he who knows, is able to do what is proper at a proper time;[1] but he who does not know, is not. Thus it is. And he who knows how to tell falsehoods, and to deceive, and to do a benefit, is able to do each of these things at a proper time;[2] but he who does not know, is not. You say what is true. And he who does these acts at a fitting time is just. Yes. He does them then through knowledge. How not? The just man then is just through knowledge. Yes. The unjust man then is unjust through what is opposite to what is just. It appears so. Now the just man is just through wisdom. Yes. And the unjust man is unjust through the want of instruction. It seems so. [8.] That, which our ancestors left us, as wisdom, seems near to being justice; but that, which (they left) as want of instruction, to be injustice. It is likely. Are men uninstructed willingly, or unwillingly? Unwillingly. Unwillingly then they are unjust. It appears so. But the unjust are wicked. Yes. Unwillingly then persons are wicked and unjust. By all means. But they act unjustly through there being the unjust. Yes. Through an act of unwillingness. Certainly. But that, which is willing, does not take place through what is unwilling. It does not. But the doing of injustice takes place through the existence of injustice. Yes. Now injustice is an involuntary act. Involuntary. Unwillingly then persons do an injustice, and are unjust and wicked. Unwillingly, as it appears. The poet then did not in this case tell a falsehood. It seems not.

[1, 2] I have twice omitted *καὶ τῷ καιρῷ* after *ἐν τῷ ἐόντι*. See just above.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SISYPHUS

AND

DEMODOCUS.

Of these dialogues, the former is said by Diogenes Laert., iii. 62, to be decidedly not written by Plato, and was one of those entitled Ἀκέφαλοι, and attributed to Æschines, son of Charinus, the sausage-maker; of whom Socrates remarked, as we learn from Diog. L. ii. 60, that he was the only person who knew how to honour him properly. Now though no reason is there assigned for the remark, it is not difficult to conceive, by comparing what we know of the conduct of some other pupils of Socrates, such as Critias and Alcibiades, and even Plato, that Æschines not only put in practice the precepts of his master, but gave a true representation of his sentiments, without altering them to suit, as Plato did, his own peculiar notions.

With regard to the subject matter of the dialogue, it may be expressed in the words of Xenophon in Cyrop. i. 6, 46, that "the wisdom of man no more knows how to choose what is best, than if a person were to do whatever might arise from the throw of a die;" a passage quoted opportunely by Davies on Cicero de Nat. Deor. i. 35, "Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare." And it was doubtless from the similarity of subject that Boeckh was led to attribute the Demodocus to the author of the Sisyphus; of which the only separate edition is to be found in my "Plato's Four Dialogues, the Crito, Hippias, Alcibiades, and Sisyphus," published by Valpy in 1831; while the Demodocus is one of the small portions of the Platonic and Pseudo-Platonic writings, that have never appeared in a separate form.

SISYPHUS;

OR,

UPON TAKING COUNSEL.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND SISYPHUS.

[1.] *Soc.* And [1] we too waited a long time for you yesterday, Sisyphus, at the display made by Stratonicus, in order that you might, together with us, hear a clever man, who both by word and deed exhibited many and beautiful things; [2] and [3] when we thought you would no longer be present, we were by ourselves the hearers of the man.

Sis. [4] Truly by Zeus.[4] For a want of leisure of rather a compulsory kind occurred to me, so that I neglected [5] the display. For our rulers had a consultation yesterday, and they compelled me to consult with them. Now with us Pharsalians [6] it is a law to obey the rulers, should they order any of us to consult with them.

Soc. And honourable it is to obey the law and to be reputed by fellow-citizens to be a good counsellor, as you are

[1] As this dialogue is one of those called *Ἀκέφαλοι*, "headless," we need not wonder at the appearance of *δὲ καί*, here.

[2] With the mention of *πράγματα* here, may be compared that of *ἔργα* in another Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, called Hipparchus, p. 228, B. *ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο.*

[3] In lieu of *καὶ ἐπεί*, one would have expected *ἐπεὶ δὲ*—

[4]—[4] Although *Ναὶ μὰ* are found thus united in Hom. Il. A. 235, *Ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον*, and elsewhere, yet here the sentence seems rather too abrupt.

[5] I have omitted *μὴ* after *ὥστε*, for it is hardly intelligible in this place.

[6] Instead of *καὶ*, which has no meaning here, the author wrote *γε*, for *γε* is thus found after proper names, as I could show by numerous passages. And *γε* and *καὶ* are frequently confounded, as I have remarked on Eurip. Tro. 520.

[1] [reputed to be a good counsellor as one of the Pharsalians].[1] But, Sisyphus, although I should not be able to enter upon a discussion against you on the subject of consulting correctly, conceiving it to be a work requiring much leisure, and a lengthy argument, still I would endeavour to converse with you first about consulting in the abstract, what it is. Can you then tell me what it is to consult in the abstract? Do not (tell)[2] me what it is to do so well or ill or in any manner,[3] but what kind of thing it is alone by itself. For you could well and easily tell,[4] being so good a counsellor. But (I fear) lest it is a superfluous work for me to make of you the inquiry.

Sis. Is it then unknown to you what it is to consult?

Soc. It is, Sisyphus, to myself at least, if it be any thing else than for a person, who does not know any thing of those matters respecting which it is requisite to do some act, to speak like a diviner and off-handed, whatever may present itself, and to make a guess [5] according to the same things for himself;[5] like persons playing at odd and even,[6] who, knowing nothing about the even and odd, which they hold in their own [7] hands, nevertheless happen by accident to say what is true about the same [8] things. To consult then is oftentimes a thing

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets are an evident interpolation. As regards the matter compare Hipp. Maj. § 2.

[2] On the ellipse of λέγε after *μή μοι* see myself on Æsch. Suppl. 284.

[3] The Greek is at present *ἢ τὸ καλῶς πως*— It was originally *ἢ τό γ ἄλλως πως*— For *καλῶς* would be superfluous after the preceding *εὖ*— On *ἄλλως πως* compare Alcibiad. II. § 13, n; Phædr. p. 272, B.; Protag. p. 333, B.; and on *γ' ἄλλως* and *καλῶς*, see Crito, § 13, n. 5.

[4] The Greek is *ἢ καὶ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸς*— But the sense requires as I have translated, *εὖ γὰρ καὶ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως εἴποις ἂν οὕτως γ'*— Compare Euthyph. p. 14, A. *ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις*. Hipp. Maj. § 15, *καὶ σμικρὸν τί που τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μάθημα, ὧν σύγ' οὕτως πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι*. With regard to *εὖ καὶ ῥᾳδίως*, see Schæfer on Bos. v. *Κίνδυνος*.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ αὐτῷ*— out of which I am unable to make a particle of sense. I could have understood *εἰκάζοντα κατὰ πάντα εὖ πως*, "making a guess on all points somehow successfully," as I suggested twenty years ago.

[6] On this game see the commentators on Lysid. p. 206, F., Aristoph. Plut. 817, and Horace's "Ludere par impar."

[7] This *αὐτῶν* is very strange here, as if the party playing did not know the number in his own hand. Common sense evidently leads to *τῶν ἐναντίων*, "the opposite party," in lieu of *τῶν αὐτῶν*— and to *ἐνῶσιν* in lieu of *ἔχωσιν*—

[8] Here again I am at a loss in *περὶ ὧ αὐτῶν*. For the sense leads at once to *περὶ πάντων*—

of this kind, that a person, although knowing nothing of the matters, about which he is consulting, yet happens by accident to say what is the truth. If then it is a thing of this kind, I know what to consult is; if however it is not a thing of this kind, I should not know it at all.

Sis. It is not of such a kind as not to know in reality any thing at all, but to know partly something of the matter in hand, and partly not to know at all.[1]

[2.] *Soc.* Do you mean that to consult is, by Zeus, a thing of this kind; that, as I seem to myself to divine somewhat your notions relating to the act of consulting well, it is the seeking to discover the best things for a person to employ himself in for his own benefit, but not to know them clearly, [2]but for this to be, as it were, in some form of a thought?[2] Do you not mean somehow in this way.

Sis. I do.

Soc. Whether do men seek such things as they know, or such as they do not know?

Sis. Both.

Soc. Do you mean by this something of this kind, that men seek both what they know and what they do not know? just as if a person should know Callistratus, who he is;[3] but not know to find where he is, [4]not who is Callistratus.[4] Do you mean that to seek both is after this manner.

Sis. I do.

Soc. He then, who knows Callistratus, would not seek that matter, namely, to know him.

Sis. He would not.

Soc. But he would, where he might be.

Sis. It seems so to myself at least.

Soc. Nor would he seek even this, namely, where it was possible to find him, if he knew already; but he would find him forthwith.

[1] On account of the antithesis in *εἰδέναι τι*, I have translated as if the Greek were *μηδὲ πᾶν*, not *μηδέ πω*— Compare Xenoph. M. S. iv. 6, 7, Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; Οὐδὲ μὰ Δί' ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. Of course I am aware that *μηδέπω ἐπίστασθαι* is found just afterwards, but there is not, as here, any antithesis

[2]—[2] Such seems to be the meaning of the words, *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν νοήσει τινι εἶναι τοῦτο*—

[3] In the formula Καλλίστρατον γιγνώσκει ὅς τις ἐστι, the noun is not elsewhere, if I rightly remember, repeated. I have therefore omitted it.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals, I confess, I cannot understand.

Sis. Yes.

Soc. Men then do not seek the things, which they know, but, as it seems, what they do not know. But if this reasoning appears to you to be of a captious kind, and to have been spoken, not for the sake of a practical purpose, but for conversation merely, consider the matter in this way, if the case seems to be such as has been just now stated. Do you not know that this takes place in geometry? that by geometricians the diameter is not unknown, whether it be a diameter or not, —for this I well know[1] is not sought to be discovered by them, —but how great it is in measurement in proportion to the sides of the space which it intersects? Is not this the very thing which is sought respecting it?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. For it is that, which is unknown. Is it not so?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. Know you not that the doubling of the cube is sought to be discovered by geometricians, how great it is by calculation? But the cube itself is not sought for by them, whether it is a cube, or not; for that at least they know well.[2] Is it not so?

Sis. Yes.

Soc. Respecting the air likewise, do you not know that Anaxagoras and Empedocles, and the rest of those, [3] who talk about meteorology,[3] are all seeking whether it is boundless or has a limit?

Sis. Yes I do.

Soc. But not the question, whether it is air. Is it not so?

Sis. It is.[4]

[3.] *Soc.* Will you then agree with me that such is the case with all other things[5] now[6] that to no person is there

[1] Although *οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ* is not an uncommon expression, yet here I should prefer—*οὐδὲ γὰρ, οἶδ' εὖ,* and so I have translated: for the second *οὐδὲ* is omitted in some MSS.

[2] The Greek is *τοῦτό γε.* It was, I think, *τοῦτό γ' εὖ*—

[3—3] The word in Lucian's Icaromenipp. § 5, is *Μετεωρολέσχης*; in Aristophanes *Νεφ.* 359, *Μετεωροσοφιστῶν*; and in 332, *μετεωροφένακας.*

[4] After *ἦ γάρ,* the answer generally expresses an assertion, not a negation; which however is found again towards the end of this §, n. [4].

[5] The Greek is *καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων*—which I cannot understand. I have translated as if it were originally *καὶ τὰ τῶν*—

[6] Instead of *ἤδη* one MS. has *ἃ δὴ* which leads to *καὶ δεῖ*—

any seeking[1] after the things he knows, but rather after those which he does not know?

Sis. I will.

Soc. Did not the consulting appear to us to be this very thing, namely, that a person is seeking after the best things relating to what he would require to employ himself in for his own benefit.

Sis. Yes.

Soc. And the seeking was, like the consulting, about things to be done. Is it not so?

Sis. Entirely.

Soc. Must we not consider then at present, what impediment is in the way of those, who are seeking, to the discovery of the things, about which they are making the search?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. Could we say that any thing else was an impediment to them except a want of knowledge?

(*Sis.* Nothing else).[2]

Soc. Let us, by Zeus, consider the matter very much, letting out,[3] as the saying is, every rope, and sending out every voice.[4] And view thou this point with me. Think you that a man could consult about music, who knows nothing of music; or how he ought to play on the guitar, or to perform any thing according to the musician's art?

Sis. Not I indeed.

Soc. What then, as regards generalship, or piloting? Do you think that the person, who knows neither of those arts,

[1] The syntax requires instead of *ζητεῖν*, either *ζήτημα* or *τὸ ζητεῖν*.

[2] I have introduced, what the sense requires, *Οὐκ ἄλλο*. Bekker indeed assigns *Σκοπῶμεν νὴ Δία* to Sisyphus, on the authority of four MSS. But such an answer could never be given to the question, *Ἆρ' οὖν ἄλλο τι φαίημεν ἄν—*

[3] In lieu of *ἐφέντες*, Bekker would read *ἀφιέντες*— But we meet in Protagor. p. 338, A., with *ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις*: although a little afterwards one MS. reads *οὐρίᾳ ἀφέντα*; where the rest have *ἐφέντα*. Winckelmann prefers *ἐξιέντες*, similar to *ἐξιᾶσι πάντα δὴ κάλων*, in Eurip. Med. 278, and *πάντα δὴ κάλων ἐξιέναι*, in Aristoph. Ιππ. 753, to which he might have added *ἐξιη κάλως* in Tro. 94, and Herc. F. 837. But the play in the words requires here, *κάλων ἐφιέντες* and *φωνὴν ἀφιέντες*— where the latter expression is similar to *φωνὴν ἀφῆκεν*, in Phœn. 1449, and *φθογγὴν ἀφῇ* in Hippol. 418.

[4] On the formula *πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἱέναι* see Heindorf on Euthyd. p. 293, A.

would have it in his power to consult about either of those matters, [1]as to what is to be done by him, and how,[1] who knows not to act the general or pilot?

Sis. I do not.

Soc. Do you think then that the case is so respecting all other matters, of which a person knows nothing; that it is not possible for him even to consult,[2] who knows nothing about them?

Sis. I do.

Soc. But it is (possible) for him to seek (to know).[3] Is it not?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. To seek then would not be the same as to consult.

Sis. How could it?

Soc. Because to seek is surely applied to the matters, which a person does not know; but it seems to be not possible for a person to consult about those matters, of which he is ignorant. Or has not this been said correctly?[4]

Sis. Very much so.

Soc. Ye were then yesterday seeking to discover what was best for the state; but ye did not know it. For if ye had known, ye would not surely have been seeking it, just as we do not seek any thing amongst those which we know. Is it not so?

Sis. It is.[5]

Soc. Whether does it seem to you, Sisyphus, if a person does not know, that he ought to seek or to learn?

Sis. To myself at least it seems, by Zeus, to learn.

Soc. And correctly does it seem so. But does it seem to you that he ought to learn rather than seek on this account, because a person would discover more quickly and easily, if

[1—1] The Greek is ὅ, τι ποιητέον εἴη αὐτῷ ὅπως [ἢ στρατηγητέον ἢ κυβερνητέον ἐκείνῳ αὐτῷ], where the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation of ποιητέον, as I remarked twenty years ago; when I likewise suggested ὅ, τι ἢ ὅπως— similar to ὅ, τι καὶ ὅπη in Sympos. p. 212, B.

[2, 3] The Greek is μὴ εἰδέναι μηδὲ βουλεύεσθαί πω δυνατὸν— where μὴ εἰδέναι is at variance with the train of thought; for the question is about the being able to consult, not about the being able to know. Hence I have omitted μὴ εἰδέναι here, and, after changing those words into ἦν εἰδέναι, inserted them in (3), for there ζητεῖν could hardly stand by itself.

[4] I have translated, as if εὖ had dropt out after ἐλέχθη.

[5] Here, as in (2), the negative assertion is an answer to ἦ γάρ.

he learnt from those, who know, than if he were to seek himself what he did not know? Or is it on some other account?

Sis. [1] On no other than this.[1]

[4.] Why did ye not then yesterday, disregarding the act of consulting about matters, of which ye knew nothing, and of seeking to do the best for the state,[2] learn from some one of those, who did know, how ye might do the best for the state? But ye seem to me to have been sitting the whole of yesterday and speaking off-hand, and prophesying about matters, of which ye were ignorant, and neglecting to learn, both the rulers of the state and you together with them. But perhaps you will say that this has been played off by myself against you for the sake of a conversation merely, and it has not been proved to you seriously. Consider then, by Zeus, this question at least for the present with seriousness. If it were conceded that to consult is something, and not, as now discovered, to be [3]nothing else than a knowledge according to conjecture, and a speaking off-hand,[3] making use of merely a more solemn name,[4] but nothing else,[5] do you think, that as regards the act of consulting well and being good counsellors, persons differ one from another on that point,[6] as persons [7][differ one from another][7] on all the other kinds of knowledge,

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were, *Οὐκ ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦτο*, not *Οὔκ ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο*, although a similar impropriety is found in another Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Hipparch. p. 227, B. *ἢ ἄλλο τι*; *Οὔκ· ἀλλὰ*—

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τῇ πόλει*, not *ἐν τῇ πόλει*, where the preposition is superfluous, as shown by the very next sentence.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *οὐδὲν—ἀλλοῖον ἢ ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ εἰκασία καὶ σχεδιασμὸς*, literally "nothing strange than what is knowledge and guessing, and speaking off-hand." But the idea of any thing strange is here quite out of place; while this union of knowledge and guessing would be a manifest absurdity. I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were what I formerly suggested, *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὂν ἢ ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γε κατ' εἰκασίαν καὶ σχεδιασμόν*.

[4] Compare Lucian in Icaro-Menipp. § 29, *ὄνομα σεμνὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν περιθέμενοι*; and see Valckenaer in Eurip. Diatrib. p. 258, who might have quoted Eustath. Ιλ. i. p. 762, 62, Bas. *σεμνότητος περιπετάσματι τὸ τοῦ πράγματος δυσπρόσωπον συγκαλύπτεται*: and have corrected *παραπετάσματι* by the aid of *ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἰχρήσαντο*, in Protagor. p. 317.

[5] I confess I can scarcely understand *ἄλλῳ δ' οὐδενὶ*— The sense evidently requires *ἀληθεῖ δ' οὐδαμῇ*— "but true not at all."

[6] In lieu of *αὐτῷ* the sense and syntax require *ἐν αὐτῷ*, similar to *ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις*, just afterwards.

[7]—[7] The words between the numerals are a manifest interpolation.

(such as) carpenters from carpenters, physicians from physicians, and hautboy-players from hautboy-players, and all the rest of handicraftsmen differ from each other?[1] As then those engaged in these arts (differ),[2] think you that in the act of consulting persons would differ at all in this manner, one from another?

Sis. Yes I do.

Soc. Now tell me, do not all, both those who consult well, and those who do so ill, consult about matters that are about to be?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. [3]Is the future any thing else than what is not as yet?[3]

Sis. It is not.

Soc. For if it were, it would not surely be still about to be, but it would be already. Is it not so?

Sis. Yes.

Soc. [4]Therefore that, which is not yet, in reality has not been produced.[4]

Sis. It has not.

Soc. [5]Therefore that, which is not and has not been produced, has no existence in reality.[5]

Sis. It has not.

[5.] *Soc.* Do not all, then, who consult well or ill, consult about things which neither are, nor have been, and which have no existence, when they consult respecting things about to be?

Sis. At least they seem so.

Soc. Does it seem to you possible for a person to hit well or ill a thing, that does not exist?

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν*, not *αὐτοί τε αὐτῶν*, where *ἑαυτῶν* is *ἀλλήλων*, as elsewhere.

[2] I have neglected the unintelligible *ἢ* found between *τέχναις* and *οὔπω*—

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ἄλλο τι οὖν ἢ τὰ μέλλοντα οὔπω ἐστίν*. But the sense requires, as I remarked long ago, *ἄλλο τι οὖν τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ ἃ οὔπω ἐστίν*, and so I have translated.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *οὐκοῦν εἰ μή πω ἐστὶν οὕτως οὐδὲ γέγονε τὰ μὴ ὄντα*— literally, "Therefore if it is not yet thus, that which is not has not been ever," which I must leave for others, if they can, to understand. The train of thought requires, *οὐκοῦν, ἃ μή πω ἔστιν, ὄντως οὐδὲ γέγονε.*

[5]—[5] Here again the chain of reasoning leads to *οὐκοῦν, ἃ μή πω ἔστι μηδὲ γέγονεν, οὔπω οὐδὲ φύσιν ἔχει οὐδεμίαν ὄντως*, as I have translated, not *οὐκοῦν εἰ μήπω μηδὲ γέγονεν—αὐτῶν*— where *αὐτῶν* has nothing to which it can be referred.

Sis. How say you this?

Soc. I will explain, what I mean to say. Consider then. How would you distinguish out of many archers, which of them was the good and (which) the bad?

[1] *Sis.* Surely this is not difficult to know.[1]

Soc. For perhaps you would bid them shoot at some mark. Is it not so?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not decide that he is the conqueror, who hits most often the mark in a direct way.[2]

Sis. Yes, I would.

Soc. But [3]if there were no mark laid down[3] for them to shoot at, but each shot where he[4] liked, how could you distinguish between the good and bad archer?

Sis. Not at all.

Soc. Would you then not be at a loss to distinguish between

[1]—[1] I have attributed all between the numerals to Sisyphus, not, as commonly, to Socrates; and altered ἦ into ἦν—

[2] I scarcely understand κατ' ὀρθὸν— The sense evidently requires something like "in the bull's eye," which is in the centre of a target, and would be exprsssed probably in Greek by κατ' ὀμφαλὸν—

[3]—[3] Here is evidently an allusion to an Æsopo-Socratic fable, first published in a latent metrical form by De Furia, from a Vatican MS., but recently in a more complete state from an Athos MS. by Boissonade; who however did not perceive some errors in the Greek, which I corrected in Revue de Philologie, vol. ii. p. 225, and I will therefore present the reader with an English version of it.

> "To the gods Apollo, his long arrows holding,
> Spoke thus—Who knows the arrow to let fly,
> Than the far-darting farther? On the strife
> With Phœbus enter'd Zeus, his weapons handling.
> In Ares' helmet Hermes shook the lots,
> Which Phœbus first obtaining, with his hands
> The bent bow pushing from him, and the string
> Letting go sharply, first his arrow fix'd
> Within the distant gardens of the West.
> When with his stride did Zeus the distance clear,
> And cried—Where shall I shoot? no space have I.
> And no bow drawing, bow-man's glory gained."

To the same fable an allusion is made by Lucretius in i. 968, "si quis procurrat ad oras Ultimus extremas jaciatque volatile telum," quoted by Davies on Cicero de N. D. i. 20, "animus—ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimam videat, in qua possit insistere."

[4] Common sense requires "where," as "how" in Greek ὅπου, not ὅπως, and so I have translated.

those consulting well or ill, if they did not know what they were consulting about?

Sis. Yes, I should.

Soc. Do not those then, who consult respecting things about to be, consult respecting things not in existence?

Sis. Certainly.

Soc. It is not therefore possible for any person to hit the thing not in existence. For how does any one seem to you to be able to hit, what is not in existence?

Sis. Not at all.

Soc. Since then it is not possible to hit, what is not in existence, no one would be able to hit any thing[1] of those not in existence by consulting. For things that are about to be belong to those not in existence. Is it not so?

Sis. So it seems at least to me.

Soc. He then, who does not hit things about to be, would be amongst men neither a good counsellor, nor a bad counsellor.

Sis. It seems he would not.

Soc. Nor is a person (said)[2] to be either a better counsellor, or a worse counsellor, not even if he should be more successful or less successful in hitting, what is not in existence.

Sis. He is not.

Soc. Looking then to what circumstance men call certain persons by the name[3] of good counsellors, or bad counsellors, is it not worthy, Sisyphus, to think again upon this matter?

Sis. (I say so).[4]

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἄν γέ τι*, not *ἀν ἔπ—*

[2] As there is nothing on which *εἶναι* can depend, I suspect the author wrote *Οὐδὲ λέγεται*, not *Οὐδέ γε*—as I have translated.

[3] To avoid the strange expression *ἀποκαλοῦσιν—εἶναι*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀποκαλοῦσιν—ὀνόματι—*

[4] The dialogue is generally thought to be imperfect; but it will be complete, if we suppose that *φημί* has dropt out after *Σίσυφε*—and so I have translated.

DEMODOCUS.

[1.] You are, Demodocus, requesting[1] me to advise you on the matters, about which you are come together to deliberate. But it has come into my mind to consider, what avails this meeting of yours, and the eagerness of those, who think to advise with you, and the vote, which each of you thinks of giving. For, in the first place, unless it be possible to advise correctly and skilfully on the points, respecting which ye are come to deliberate, how is it not ridiculous for you to come together to deliberate on points, respecting which it is not possible to advise correctly? And in the second place, if it be possible to advise correctly and skilfully upon matters of this kind, still the knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on them, is none. How then is it not out of place? But if there be any knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on such matters, is it not necessary that there should be certain persons skilled to advise correctly on matters of this kind? And if there are certain persons, skilled to advise on those points, about which you are come together to deliberate, is it not necessary for you likewise to know how to advise on these matters, or not to know? Or that some persons should know, and some not? If then all of you know, what need is there for you to come together to deliberate? for each of you is competent to advise. But if, on the other hand, all of you do not know, how will you be able to deliberate? Or what advantage would there be to you in this meeting together, if you are not able to deliberate? But if some of you know, and others do not know, but these are in want of counsel, whether it is possible for an intellectual person to advise

[1] On this meaning of καλεῖν see Alcibiad. II. § n. 6.

the unskilled, even a single person is sufficient to advise with those of you, who do know. Or do not all, who know, advise the same thing? so that it is fitting, after you have heard that person, to separate. But now you do not this; but you wish to hear many giving their advice; for you do not take upon yourselves to know those, who are attempting to advise with you on points, on which they are advising. For if you had taken upon yourselves to know those, who were advising with you, it would have been sufficient for you to have heard one person alone. To come together then with the view of hearing those, who do not know, as if you were doing something of importance, how is it not a thing out of place? Respecting then this meeting of yours, I am in this way at a loss.

[2.] And that too is a thing of difficulty relating to the eagerness of those, who think they can advise with you. For if, while advising, they do not give the same advice upon the same points, how can they all advise correctly, when they do not advise what he, who advises correctly, would advise?[1] Or how can the eagerness of those, who are eager to advise on points, in which they are unskilled, not be out of place? for being skilled, they would not choose to advise incorrectly. But if, on the other hand, they advise the same, what need is there for them all to advise? for a single one of them would, if advising the same, be sufficient. To be eager then on such matters, as would be of no importance, how is it not ridiculous? Neither then would the eagerness of the unskilled be not out of place, when it is of such a kind; nor would men of sense feel an eagerness on such matters, knowing that even one of them would do the same thing by advising what was fitting; so that I am unable to discover how the eagerness of those, who fancy they are advising, is not ridiculous.

[3.] But as regards the vote which you are thinking to give, I am the most at a loss, what it can avail. For whether are you giving a judgment upon those, who know how to advise? [2]But more persons will not advise at all any better

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἃ ἂν ξυμβουλεύοι*— not *ἃ ξυμβουλεύει*.

[2—2] The Greek is at present *ἀλλ' οὐ πλείονες ἑνὸς ξυμβουλεύσουσιν, οὐδὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως περὶ τοῦ αὐτου*, which I cannot understand. I have therefore translated, as if it were originally *ἀλλ' οὗ τι πλεῖον πλείονες ἑνὸς ξυμβουλεύσουσ' ἑῦ, οὐδ' εὖ ἄλλοι ἄλλως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*.

than one, nor some one way and others another correctly upon the same matter;[2] so that respecting them there will be no need for you to give a vote. But are you giving a judgment [1] upon some, who are unskilled and who ought not to advise any persons?[1] Surely it is not fitting to intrust to such persons, as if they were madmen, to advise. But if you are to give a judgment upon neither the skilled nor the unskilled, upon whom are you to give it? But what need is there for other persons to advise with you at all, if you are competent to give a judgment upon such matters? But if on the other hand you are not competent, of what avail are your votes? Or how is it not ridiculous for you to come together, as if about to consult, when you yourselves are in want of advice, and are incompetent, and yet fancy that you ought to come together and give a vote, as if competent to form a judgment? For neither by being taken singly are you ignorant, and become sensible by being taken together; nor, on the other hand, are you at a loss individually, but by coming together are no longer at a loss. But do you become competent to see together what things are to be done by you? and this too, when you have neither learnt them from any one, nor discovered them yourselves; which is the most shocking thing of all. For being unable to see together, what is to be done, you will not be competent to give a judgment upon the party, who is advising you correctly upon these matters; [2] nor, if a person, standing alone, as an adviser, should say this, that he himself will teach you what is to be done, is it in your power to form a correct judgment [2] upon those, who are advising you correctly or not. Now this would be a state not less shocking than that. If then neither the meeting nor the (single) [3] adviser is able to make you competent to give a

[1]—[1] In lieu of *καὶ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ξυμβουλεύοντας κρίνετε*, the sense seems to require, as I have translated, *καὶ, οὐς μὴ δεῖ ξυμβουλεύειν τισὶ, κρίνετε*—

[2]—[2] The Greek is at present *οὐδ' αὖ τοῦτό γ' ἐρεῖ εἷς ὧν ὁ ξυμβουλεύων ὑμῖν οὗτος ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ἃ πρακτέον ὑμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ κρίνειν*— where I can discover neither sense nor syntax. Opportunely then do three MSS. offer *διδάξει*, which has led me to *οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτό γ' ἐρεῖ εἷς ὧν ὁ ξυμβουλεύων, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς διδάξει, ἃ πρακτέα ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστὶν, εὖ κρίνειν*— what I have translated.

[3] For the sake of the antithesis I have translated as if the Greek were originally *μηΘΕΙΣΟΣειμ*— not *μηΘΟΣυμ*—

judgment, what need is there to you for voting? Or how is this meeting of yours not opposed to your votes, and the vote to the eagerness of those advising you? For this meeting of yours is that of persons not competent, but in need of advisers; while the votes are given as of persons not wanting advisers, but able to form a judgment, and to advise; and the eagerness of those advising you, is as of persons who know; but the votes are given by you, as if the persons advising did not know. Now if any one were to ask you, who have voted, and the person advising you, respecting the matters on which you have voted—do you know what will that be, for the sake of which you think of doing what you have voted? you would not, I think, be able to say. And even if that should take place, for the sake of which you have it in your thoughts to do every thing,[1] do you know how it will benefit you? I think that neither you nor the party advising you would be able to tell this. But you conceive that some of those with intellect [2] [3] know somehow this. But if a person should ask you who is the party,[3] I do not think you would agree on this point. When therefore both the things, about which you are consulting,[4] are such as not to be manifest, and the persons likewise, who vote and advise, are unskilled, reasonably will you say that it often falls out that persons have no faith in, and repent of, those things, for which they have taken counsel and voted. Now such events it is not becoming to fall out to the sensible. For they know the things, about which they give advice, both of what kind they are, and that they exist firmly to the parties persuaded, for the sake of whom they give the advice, and that neither to themselves nor to the parties persuaded will there be a repentance for any thing senseless.[5] On matters

[1] In lieu of *ἀν*, omitted in two MSS., the author wrote, I suspect, *πᾶν*, as I have translated. On the phrase *πράττειν πᾶν* and its frequent corruption see my note on Æsch. Eum. 995.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔννων*, not *ἀνῶν*. See my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 106.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *εἰδέναι τι τούτων; εἴ τις*— which I cannot understand; to say nothing of the want of connexion in the sentences. To meet both objections, I suspect the author wrote *εἰδέναι τί που· τίνα δ' εἴ τις*— what I have translated.

[4] Correct Greek would require *ξυμβουλεύεσθε*, not *ξυμβουλεύετε*—

[5] From *πεισθεῖσιν αὐτοῖς* it is easy to elicit *πεισθεῖσιν ἄνου τινος*— required by the sense, and to reject the repeated *αὐτοῖς*, which it is impossible to understand.

then of this kind I conceive that those, who possess any sense, should think it fit to give advice; but not about the matters on which you are requesting me to advise; for from their advice the result is good fortune, but from the trifling of these misfortune.

[4.] I was once present with a person while he was admonishing his friend, because the latter had trusted to an accuser, not having heard the other party making an apology for himself, but hearing only the accuser. He said that (the friend) had done a terrible thing, in deciding against the party without having been present himself, or having heard from the friends of the party, to whose statements it was reasonable for him to trust. For,[1] after having heard both, he would not have so hastily trusted to the accuser; but that it was just, before conferring praise or blame, to hear the party make his defence, as well as the accuser. For how could any one decide correctly a suit, or judge in a proper manner between persons, without hearing the opposite parties? for that it is better that assertions, like a purple colour and gold-money, should be judged of by being placed side by side. Or for what purpose has time been allowed to both the opposite parties in a suit? or the judges sworn to hear both sides equally? unless the lawgiver conceived that suits would be decided more justly and better by the judges. But you seem to me to have not even heard of what is said by the multitude. What is it? said (the other).

[2] Decide no suit, till both accounts you've heard.[2]

And yet this would not have been thus circulated, if it had not been well said, and as is fitting. I advise you therefore, said he, for the future not to blame or praise persons so hastily. The other then said that it appeared to him an absurd thing, if it were impossible to know, when one person was speaking, whether he was telling the truth or a falsehood, and yet possible to know, when two persons were speaking; and impossible to

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ γὰρ ἄν*— not *οὐδ' αὖ*--

[2]—[2] On this proverbial verse see my note on Æsch. Eum. 417. Winckelmann refers to Faehse on Muret. Var. Lect. vii. 18, and Stephan. Thes. L. Gr. T. i. p. 190, ed. Par.

learn from a person, when telling the truth, but possible to be taught by that very person and another, when telling a falsehood; and if one by speaking straightforwardly and truly should be unable to show what he is saying clearly, but that two, one of whom should tell a falsehood, and not speak straightforwardly, should be able to show clearly that, which the party speaking straightforwardly was not able to show clearly. And I am at a loss, said he, on this point likewise, how they are to show it clearly; whether by being silent, or speaking. For if they are to show it clearly by being silent, there would be a need of hearing neither, much less both. But if by speaking both are to show it clearly, and both parties speak according to no regular manner and time [1]—for both think they have a right to speak in turn—how is it possible for both to show the matter clearly? For if both are showing the matter clearly at the same time, both will be speaking together at the same time. [2] But this they are not wont to do, nor do the laws permit it; [2] so that if they are to show the matter clearly by speaking, each of them will do so by speaking; and when either party speaks, then either party will show the matter clearly; so that they will speak one before and the other after; and they will show the matter clearly, one before and the other after. Now if each party in turn shows the same matter clearly, what need is there to hear the latter? for the matter will have become clear by the party first speaking. But if both parties show clearly [3] that matter, said he,[3] how will not either of them have done so? for how would both be able to show clearly that, which one of

[1] In lieu of *τρόπον* one MS. affords as a var. lect. *χρόνον*— and hence another has *τροπον*— By the aid of both united I have been led to *τρόπον καὶ χρόνον*, what I have translated. For in a law-suit at Athens both the manner and the time were, in some cases, defined by law.

[2—2] The Greek is at present, *τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐῶσι*— But as there is nothing to which *ἐῶσι* can be united, opportunely does one MS. read *ουκαθῶσιν*, where evidently lies hid *οὐκ εἰώθασι*— while from *ἐῶσιν* it is easy to elicit *ἐῶσ' οἱ νόμοι*— what I have translated; for custom and law are thus perpetually united.

[3—3] The Greek is at present *ἐκεῖνο δ' ἔφη*— But *ἐκεῖνο* could hardly be used for *αὐτὸ*: and if it could, still less would *ἔφη* be here introduced superfluously. Opportunely then do MSS. offer, one *ἄφης*, another *ἔφης*, and a third *φῇς*: for the author wrote, I suspect, *ἐκεῖνο δ', ὃ ἀσαφὲς ἦι*— i. e. "that matter, which was not clear—"

them shall not have done so? But if either shall have shown it clearly, t is evident that the former will have spoken of it, and the former will have shown it clearly; so that how is it not possible for the person hearing him alone to know all correctly?[1] On hearing them I was at a loss, and unable to decide. For the others, who were present, said that the first reasoning was true. If then you can advise me[2] on this matter, whether it is possible, [3]when one person is saying any thing, to know correctly what he is saying, say so;[3] or whether there is need of a speaker on the opposite side, if a person would know which is speaking straightforwardly. Or whether it is not necessary to hear both parties? Or how do you think?

[5.] The day before yesterday a person was finding fault with another, because he was unwilling to lend money or to trust him; and the party, with whom he was finding fault, was defending himself; whereupon another person amongst those, who were present, inquired of the party finding fault—whether he, who had not trusted nor lent the money, had erred? and have not you too, said he, who did not persuade him to lend, erred? In what, said the other party, have I erred? Which of the two, said (the inquirer), seems to you to err? the person, who fails in what he wishes, or he, who does not (fail)? The person who fails, said he. Have you then not failed in wishing to borrow; while he, who did not wish to give up (his money), has not failed in that point Truly so, said he; but in what have I erred, even if he has not given it me? Because, said (the inquirer), if you have begged the things which you ought not, how do you think that you have not erred? while he has acted correctly in not giving them up; but if, on the other hand, you have begged

[1] I have translated as if *πάντ' εὖ* had dropt out between *ἀκούσαντα* and *γνῶναι*.

[2] In lieu of *ξυμβαλέσθαι*, the sense evidently requires *ξυμβουλεύεσθαι*—For the party himself could make a conjecture, but could not give the advice he wanted.

[3—3] Here again I suspect that something has dropt out. The Greek is at present *ἑνὸς λέγοντος γνῶναι τί λέγει*— It was originally *ἑνὸς λέγοντός τι, γνῶναι εὖ, ὅ. τι λέγει, λέγε*— what I have translated."

what you ought, and failed in this point, how have you not of necessity erred? Perhaps so, said he; but how has he not erred, who did not trust me? If you had treated with him, said (the inquirer), as was fitting, you would not have erred at all. Not at all. But now you have not treated with him, as was fitting. I appear so, said he. If then he was not persuaded, when you were treating with him, as was not fitting, how can you justly find fault with him? I am unable to say. Nor can you say that one must not pay attention to those, who conduct themselves ill? This (I can say) very much, said he. Do not then those persons seem to you to conduct themselves ill, who treat with a party in a manner that is not fitting? To me at least (they seem so), said he. In what then did he err, if he paid no attention to you, when conducting yourself ill? It appears, said he, in nothing. Why then, said (the inquirer), do persons find fault on such matters with each other, and blame those, who are not persuaded by them, because they are not persuaded, but do not find fault with themselves at all, because they have not persuaded them? Hereupon another party who was present, observed — When a person has conducted himself well towards any one, and has assisted him, and subsequently requests that party to conduct himself in a similar manner towards him, but does not meet with such conduct, how does he not reasonably find fault? Is not, said (the inquirer), the person whom the party requests to conduct himself in a similar manner, either able to conduct himself well, or unable? (Yes.)[1] And if he is unable, how can he properly make the request, who requests him (to perform)[2] what he cannot? but if he is able, how did he not persuade him (to do so)? or how do persons, who speak in this way, speak correctly? But, said (the other), it is requisite, by Zeus, to find fault with such a person,[3] in order that both he may for the remainder of his life conduct himself better, and the other mean fellows,[4] who hear the party finding fault. Think you, said (the inquirer), that any persons will conduct

[1] I have introduced the answer "Yes," which could hardly be dispensed with.

[2] The Greek is *ἐστὶν*— I have translated as if it were *ἀνύτειν*—

[3] The train of thought evidently leads to *τοιούτῳ* instead of *τοῦτο*—

[4] Instead of *ἄλλοι φίλοι*, the author wrote either *ἄλλοι οὐ φίλοι*, or *ἄλλοι φαῦλοι*, as I have translated

themselves better when they hear a party speaking correctly,[1] or when in error? When speaking correctly, said he. [2]Now the party, who was speaking not correctly, did not seem to you to make a request correctly?[2] Truly so, said he. How then will those, who hear a person finding fault in this way, conduct themselves better. Not at all, said he. For what purpose, then, [3]would a person find fault[3] in this way? He confessed he could not discover

---

[6.] Some one was accusing a person of stupidity, because he had given credence quickly even to parties he happened to meet with,[4] while they were speaking. To fellow-citizens and familiar friends, when speaking, it is reasonable to trust. But to persons of that kind, whom he had never seen nor heard of before, to give credence, and this too when he was not ignorant that the majority of men are braggarts and knaves, was no little proof of silliness. When one of those present observed—For my part I thought that you considered a person of greater value, who could quickly understand even any one he met with, rather than him, who did so slowly. And so I do consider, said the other. Why then, said (the former), do you find fault, if a person gives credence quickly, even to those he meets with, when they speak the truth? But, said (the other), I do not find fault with this, but because he gives credence to those, who tell falsehoods. But, if after a longer period even to those not accidentally met with he had given credence, and suffered annoyance,[5] would you not have found fault with him still more? Yes; I should have done so, said he. Is it, because he gave credence slowly, even to those not acci-

[1] The words *καὶ ἀξιοῦντος*, commonly found here between *λέγοντος* and *ἢ*, were properly omitted originally in one MS.

[2—2] To preserve the chain of reasoning the author evidently wrote, not *Ὁ δὲ γε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν ἐδόκει σοι*— which I cannot understand, but *Ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν ἐδόκει σοι*— what I have translated.

[3—3] Since all the MSS. but one read *ἐγκαλοῖ*, it is evident the author wrote *τοιαῦτ' ἂν*— not *τοιαῦτα*—

[4] So I have translated *τοῖς τυχοῦσιν* all through this section, although *οἱ τυχόντες* generally means "ordinary persons." For *οἱ τυχόντες* are here opposed to *οἱ οἰκεῖοι*, and compared with *οἱ ἀγνῶτες*.

[5] In lieu of the unintelligible *ᾐτιᾶτο*, I have substituted *ἠνιᾶτο*—

dentally met with? No, by Zeus, said he. For I suppose, said the other, you do not conceive that it is right to find fault with a person on this account, but because he gives credence to those, who state what is not credible. I do so, said he. Whether then, said (the other), do you think it is not right to find fault with him for giving credence slowly even to those not accidentally met with, but right (to do so) for giving credence quickly even to those accidentally met with? Not I indeed, said he. Why then do you find fault with him? said (the other). Because he errs in giving credence to persons accidentally met with, previous to making an inquiry. But if he had slowly given credence, previous to making an inquiry, he would not have erred. Not so, by Zeus, said he; but he would have erred even thus not the less; but I think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with. But if, said (the other), you think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with, how is it fitting to give credence quickly to persons unknown? and do you think that it is requisite to make an inquiry, whether they are speaking the truth? I think so,[1] said he. Say then, said (the other), is it not requisite to make inquiry about familiar friends and acquaintances, whether they are speaking the truth? I should say so, said he. For perhaps, said (the other), some of these state what is not credible. And very much so, said he. Why then, said (the other), is it more reasonable to give credence to familiar friends and acquaintances than to persons accidentally met with? I cannot tell, said he. What then, if it is requisite (not)[2] to give more credence to familiar friends than to persons accidentally met with, is it not requisite to consider them less trustworthy than persons accidentally met with? How not? said he. If then there are familiar friends to some persons, and persons unknown to others, how will it not be necessary to consider the same persons more trustworthy than the same? For it is requisite to consider familiar friends and persons unknown, as not

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were Εἰπὲ, περὶ— not Ἐπεὶ— which I cannot understand.

[2] This negative, wanting in all the MSS., is found only in the Latin version of Corradus.

[3] I have adopted *τῶν αὐτῶν*, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of *αὐτῷ*, which is unintelligible.

equally trustworthy, as you say yourself. This does not please me, said he. Equally, said (the former), do some believe what is stated by them, but others disbelieve? And this too is strange, said he. If then, said (the other), both familiar friends and persons accidentally met with state the same things, would not all things stated equally to all be credible or incredible (equally)? Necessarily so, said he. Must we not give credence then equally to those who state the same things?[2] It is probable, said he.

On their conversing in this way, I was at a loss to whom one ought to give credence and to whom not, and whether to the trust-worthy and those who know what they are speaking about, or to familiar friends and acquaintances. Upon these matters then how think you?

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἅπαντα—πᾶσι*, not *ἔπειτα —πῶς*, where *ἔπειτα* seems quite inadmissible.

[2] The Greek is at present *τοῖς λέγουσιν αὐτὰ—λέγουσιν αὐτὰ—* where Stephens was the first to suggest *λέγουσι—ταὐτὰ*, and to reject *λέγουσιν αὐτὰ—* But those words are not to be rejected entirely. They ought to be inserted after *γνωρίμοις* just below, and thus corrected, *λέγουσιν, ἃ οἴωνται εἰδέναι*, i. e. "say, what they think they know—" for thus the parties, who think they know, are properly opposed to those, who really know.

INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFINITIONS.

Of these Definitions, which are appended to all the complete editions of Plato, and found likewise in eleven MSS. collated by Bekker, the authorship is attributed in the Vienna MS. to Speusippus. (Φ.) But since the writing relied upon, as the authority for this statement, is more modern than the rest of the Manuscript, the remark is probably due to Sambucus, once the possessor of it; who, says Menage, on Diogen. L. iv. 5, asserted that the Ὅροι, mentioned in the Life of Speusippus, had been falsely attributed to Plato; and he might have added, that although the Definitions are attributed to Plato by Casaubon, they are distinctly assigned to Speusippus by Ficinus; whose version of them is to be found towards the end of a volume in folio, containing his translation of "Iamblichus de Mysteriis," and other Greek treatises of a similar character, printed by Aldus in 1497. Stobæus, however, found the Definitions at the end of his MS. of Plato; to whom he says they were attributed, in iii. p. 49, 35. But instead of Speusippus being the author of these Definitions, internal evidence would rather lead to the supposition of their being the production of some more recent philosopher of Alexandria. For we find δόμα twice used in the sense of a "gift," a word first met with in Holy Writ, and subsequently in Plutarch, as remarked by H. Stephens; and while its compound πρόδομα is found in Hesych. Ἀῤῥαβών, as duly noticed by Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 249, the simple δόμα is reckoned amongst irregular formations by Herodian, Περὶ Μονηροῦς Λέξεως, p. 30, 5, where Lehr refers to Lobeck's Παραλειπόμενα, p. 424.

But granting even that from this fact no inference could be fairly drawn against the supposed authorship and antiquity of the Definitions, yet the matter of them is such as to disprove their being

written by a disciple of Plato, and suggests rather that they are the production of some philosopher, who concocted them from a faithless representation of the doctrines promulgated in the Socratic, Stoic, Academic, and Peripatetic schools; and this too with so little judgment, as frequently to give an unintelligible definition, when he might have found an intelligible one elsewhere, as I have shown on various occasions in the notes. Socrates, it is true, as remarked by Menage on Diogenes L. vii. 60, is said by Aristotle in Metaphys. i. 6, and xiii. 4, and Theopompus the rhetorician, quoted by Arrian on Epictetus ii. 17, to have paid considerable attention to Definitions; and this may be inferred from some instances furnished by Xenophon in Memorab. iv. 6. But it is to Zeno and his followers that we must refer the practice of laying down Definitions, as the basis of subsequent discussions. For they were accustomed to apply to moral philosophy the principle they had learnt from the Pythagoreans, as the groundwork of physical philosophy, developed by mathematics, as may be inferred from the Life of Pythagoras by Diogenes; who appeals to Phavorinus to prove that "Pythagoras made use of definitions through his 'Mathematical Wood;' and still more so did Socrates and his followers; and so did Aristotle and the Stoics." Menage too, on Diogen. L. vii. 60, remarks that a mass of such definitions are to be found in the Life of Zeno alone.

To the preceding proofs that the author of the Definitions was some philosopher of Alexandria, may be added those which Cousin has adduced. He remarks that Ἀξίωσις, in the sense of "dignity" or "majesty," does not belong to the period of Plato, nor even to any age of good Greek; and neither does Λογισμὸς σεμνότατος. So too Ἀγάπησις is not a word of Plato or his time; while on the unintelligible definition of the word Ὄνομα, "a noun," he observes that "the language used there is altogether of the Alexandrine school, and is better suited to a treatise by Dionysius the Areopagite than to one attributed to Plato."

G. B.

DEFINITIONS.

---

[1] *Eternal*—that which has existed formerly through all time, and is now not destroyed.[1]

God—an immortal living-being,[2] sufficient in itself for happiness; an eternal existence; the cause of the nature of the good.

Generation—a movement towards existence; [3]a sharing through a change[3] in existence; a progression towards existence.

The sun—a fire in heaven, which can alone be seen from morning to evening by the same;[4] [5]the greatest star, visible by day;[5] a perpetually living being, possessing a soul.[6]

Time—[7]a movement of the sun; a measure of progress.[7]

[1]—[1] As the idea of eternity necessarily includes the idea of continuance through the three periods of time, past, present, and future, this definition is evidently defective.

[2] I have translated *ζῶον* "a living being," to avoid the incongruity of considering god as an "animal," the ordinary meaning of *ζῶον*.

[3]—[3] This is the proper version here of *μετάληψις*, not merely "a sharing."

[4] Instead of "by the same," in Greek *τοῖς αὐτοῖς*, one would have expected "the same," in Greek *ὁ αὐτὸς*: for the question is not about the parties seeing, but the thing seen. Hence Corradus has "Sol—idem videri potest."

[5]—[5] I have followed the reading of four MSS., *ἄστρον ἡμεροφανὲς τὸ μέγιστον*, and placed the words *ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἔμψυχον* after *μέγιστον*, not before them, as Bekker has done. Ficinus omits *ἡμεροφανές*. Corradus has correctly, "astrum maximum de die lucens."

[6] On the sun possessing a soul, see Epinomis, p. 982, C. § 6.

[7]—[7] Although this definition coincides in part with that of Eratosthenes, who, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 884, B., described Time as "the journeying of the sun," yet it would be more correctly defined as "the measure of the motion of the sun, or of the progressive movement of

Day—a journeying of the sun from its rising (east) to its setting (west); a light, the opposite to Night.[1]

Morning—the beginning of day; the first light from the sun.

Mid-day—the time when the shadows of substances have the least length.

Evening—the close of day.

Night—darkness, the opposite to Day;[2] a deprivation of the sun.

Chance—a proceeding from uncertainty to uncertainty, and from what is spontaneous;[3] the[4] cause [5]of a fortuitous action.[5]

Old Age—the wasting away of a thing with life, the result of time.

Wind[6]—a movement in the air around the earth.

Air—an element, all of whose movements [7]according to space are according to nature.[7]

Heaven—a substance, surrounding all things perceived by the senses, except the uppermost air.[8]

any thing," in Greek Χρόνος ἡλίου κινήσεως μέτρον ἢ φορᾶς του, not Χρόνος ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον φορᾶς. The Stoics defined it as "the interval during (two) motions of the world." Corradus has, "mensura cœlestis conversionis."

[1] From this definition it would seem as if Night were a light, as well as Day. Hence one would have preferred φῶς, τοὐναντίον νυκτὸς σκότῳ, not simply τοὐναντίον νυκτί, and similarly in [2], Νὺξ σκότος τοὐναντίον ἡμέρας φωτί, not ἡμέρᾳ merely. Corradus makes this a new definition, "Lux, id, quod nocti est contrarium."

[3] So Suidas, Τύχη—ἡ φορὰ ἐξ ἀδήλου εἰς ἄδηλον καὶ αὐτόματον. But Aristotle, according to Plutarch, ii. p. 885, C., made a distinction between Τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον.

[4] The ἡ, which is found before ἐκ in two MSS., and in its place in two, from whence ἐκ is placed over ἡ in two others, belongs in fact to αἰτία.

[5—5] So I have translated δαιμονίας πράξεως. Stephens has, "causa felicis successus;" but as "chance" is the cause of an unsuccessful as well as a successful action, the version in English should be as ambiguous as δαιμονίας is in Greek. Ficinus, too, "felicis actionis causa." Corradus, "et felicis actionis fortuita causa."

[6] Why πνεῦμα is written here, where one would have expected ἄνεμος, I must leave for others to explain. Corradus renders πνεῦμα by "spiritus."

[7—7] Here, again, I must leave for others to explain, what I cannot understand, the meaning of κατὰ φύσιν. Did the author write κατὰ ῥεῦσιν? For the Stoics asserted, as we learn from Plutarch, ii. p. 895, A., that πᾶν πνεῦμα ἀέρος εἶναι ῥεῦσιν.

[8] Here seems to be an allusion to what is called ὑπερουράνιος τόπος in Phædr. p. 247, C. Ficinus omits αἰσθητὰ—

Soul—[1] that which moves itself;[1] the cause of vital motion in living beings.

[2] *Power*—that, which is able by itself to produce an effect.[2]

Vision—[3] the (bodily) habit[3] of distinguishing substances.

Bone—marrow, consolidated by heat.

Element—[4] that, which combines and separates (particles) brought together.[4]

Virtue—[5] a (mental) constitution of the best kind; a habit of a mortal living being; [6] the object of praise on account of itself;[6] a habit, according to which that, which possesses it, is said to be good; [7] a just communion of laws;[7] a disposition, according to which [8] that, which is constituted perfectly,[8] is called steady;[9] a habit, effective of a good state of law.

[1]—[1] On the self-moving power of the soul, see Phædrus, p. 246, D. § 51.

[2]—[2] There is another definition of power given in p. 144.

[3]—[3] Although ἕξις and *διάθεσις* seem to be synonymous in p. 136, yet ἕξις appears to be applied to the body, and *διάθεσις* to the mind; and hence I have introduced between the lunes "bodily" here, and shortly afterwards "mental" in [5].

[4]—[4] A similar definition was given by the Stoics, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 136, *ἐστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεταί τι* (so Suidas correctly in Στοιχεῖον in lieu of *γινόμενα*) *καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται.* Ficinus has "ex quo componuntur, et in quod composita dissolvuntur.

[5] See at [3]—[3].

[6]—[6] So Cleanthes the Stoic, in Diogenes L. vii. 89, defined virtue as *διάθεσιν—δι' αὐτὴν—αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἐξωθεν*: from whence one would prefer here *αἱρετὴ* to *ἐπαινετή.*

[7]—[7] How virtue can be said to be "a just communion of laws" I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; and hence he considered this as a fresh definition. But the two following sentences plainly prove that Virtue is still the subject of the definition. Did the author write *ἕξις ποιητικὴ εὐνομίας καὶ κοινωνίας νόμων δικαίας*? And so perhaps Stephens wished to read; for his version is—"Communio, legum est justa affectio, secundum quam id, quod habet perfecte affectum, honestum dicitur; aut habitus, qui æquitatis et concordiæ faciendæ vim habet:" which he got perhaps partly from Ficinus—"Communio, legum justa constitutio: qua quod præditum est, probum dicitur; habitus concordiam præstans." Corradus too considers this a new definition. His version is—"Communitas, legum justa dispositio, quam quicunque est adeptus, si modo sit optime affectus, honestus appellatur; habitus bonas legum lationem efficiens."

[8]—[8] I have followed Bekker; who says, "libri *τὸ ἔχον*:" where he meant by "libri" printed books, not MSS., where those two words were, it seems, wanting.

[9] I have translated *σπουδαῖος* "steady," i. e. a person who pursues an object in view without swerving and earnestly.

[1] *Discretion*—a power effective by itself of the good fortune of man; a knowledge of things good and evil; [2]a knowledge effective of felicity;[2] a (mental) constitution, by which we determine what is to be done and what is not to be done.[1]

Justice—[3]an agreement of the soul with itself,[3] and [4]a correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;[4] [5]a habit, distributive to each person of that, which is according to worthiness;[5] a habit, according to which he, who possesses it, can select what seems to him to be just; a habit in life,[6] subservient to law; [7]an equality that can share in common;[7] a habit ministering to upright[8] laws.

Temperance—a moderation of soul relating to the desires and pleasures, which exist in it according to nature; a fitness in, and correct ordering of, the soul, as regards its natural pleasures and pains; a harmony in the soul touching the states

[1]—[1] The whole of this definition is found in Stobæus iii. p. 49, with a slight change in the position of the sentences.

[2]—[2] The words *ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ εὐδαιμονίας*, although acknowledged by Stobæus, have been cut out by Bekker from the text on the authority of a single MS.

[3]—[3] How Justice can be said to be "an agreement of the soul with itself," I confess I cannot understand; and still less how, in [4]—[4], it is a "correct arrangement of the parts of the soul towards each other and about each other;" especially as a similar definition is given of Temperance in Stobæus v. p. 78, 1. *Σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν ὁμολογία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα.* Stephens too seems to have been at a loss; for he renders *πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ περὶ ἄλληλα* by merely "inter se," similar to "ad invicem cui mutuus" in Ficinus. Corradus has more closely "inter se et secum ordinis conservatio."

[5]—[5] A similar definition is given from a not-mentioned author by Stobæus, ix. p. 125, 40. *Δικαιοσύνη δέ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴ τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν*—where *ἑκάστῳ* seems to have dropt out between *διανεμητικὴ* and *τῶν*—

[6] Since one MS. offers *βία* for *βίῳ*, perhaps the author wrote *ἄνευ βίας*, not *ἐν βίῳ*, and thus showed that Justice is subservient to law, not by force, but willingly.

[7]—[7] How Justice can be "an equality sharing in common," I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Stephens; whose version is—"socialis æqualitas." I could have understood *ἰσότητος κοινωνία*, or *ἰσότητος κοινωνικὴ ἕξις*—"a habit sharing in equality."

[8] As four MSS. omit *ὀρθῶν*, one would suspect that *ἀγράφων* was written here originally, similar to the *ἀγράφους νόμους* mentioned by Xenophon in Memorab. iv. 4, 19, and by Demosthenes, p. 317 and 343, ed R., and the *ἄγραπτα—νόμιμα* in Soph. Antig. 453, and the "lex non scripta," on which Cicero is so eloquent, Pro Milone, § iii.

of ruling and being ruled; a self-acting according to nature; [1][a well-ordering of the soul;][1] an [2]intercourse of the soul,[2] founded on reason, relating to things honourable and base; a habit according to which he, who has it, can select and be cautious of what he ought.

Fortitude—a habit of the soul, not to be moved by fear; a boldness in war; [3]a knowledge of the things relating to war;[3] a command over the soul relating to things of fear and dread; a boldness subservient to discretion; a bold bearing under the expectation of death; a habit, preservative of right reasoning in dangers; [4]a strength (of mind) balancing (the apprehension) of danger;[4] a strength, bearing up on the side of virtue; a tranquillity of soul with reference to things that appear, according to correct reasoning, to be full of dread and daring; the safe preservation [5]of uncertain determinations[5] relating to things of dread; [6]a skill in war;[6] [7]a habit, that can abide in law.[7]

Continence—a power enduring pain; [8]a following of correct reasoning;[8] [9]a power not exceeded by that which is perceived by correct reasoning.[9]

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolated repetition of the preceding *εὐταξία ψυχῆς*. They are omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] I confess I do not understand how Temperance is *ὁμιλία τῆς ψυχῆς*: nor could Corradus; for his version is—"animi quasi sermo—"

[3]—[3] Most assuredly Fortitude could never be correctly defined as "a knowledge of the things relating to war."

[4]—[4] This, although paraphrastical, is still as close a version as can be well made of the terse original—*ῥώμη πρὸς κίνδυνον ἀντίρροπος*. On the word *ἀντίρροπος*, see Porson's translation of *ἀντίρροπον ἄχθος* in Soph. El. 119, as given by Monk in the Museum Criticum, No. I. Ficinus, apparently unable to understand the clause, has omitted it. Corradus has—"robur periculo par."

[5]—[5] Of the meaning of *δογμάτων ἀδήλων*, I confess myself quite in the dark. I could have understood *οὐ δειλῶν*—"not cowardly." Ficinus has—"observatio eorum, quæ ratio dictat, in rebus pavendis." Corradus, "incertarum opinionum de rebus adversis liberatio."

[6]—[6] Here again Fortitude is said incorrectly to be "a skill in war."

[7]—[7] Instead of *νόμου* one MS. has *λόγου*: which seems to lead to *ψόγου*, "blame:" while in *ἐμμελητικὴ*, found in two MSS. for *ἐμμενητικὴ*, perhaps *ἀμελητικὴ*, "neglectful," lies hid.

[8]—[8] and [9]—[9] These definitions of *Ἐγκράτεια* are quite beyond my comprehension. How much more intelligible is the language of an unknown author, quoted by Stobæus, xvii. p. 157, who defines Continence as "the being able to restrain by reason the desire, that is rushing to the enjoyment of improper pleasures; and the bearing up against and under the

Self-sufficiency—a completion in the possession of good things; [1]a habit, according to which they, who possess it, are the masters of themselves.[1]

Reasonableness—a reduction in what is just and useful; a moderation in compacts; a well-ordering of the soul, founded on reason, as regards things honourable and base.

Endurance—the bearing-up against pain, for the sake of what is honourable; a bearing-up under labour for the sake of what is honourable.

[2]*Boldness*—the non-expectation of an ill; an imperturbability in the presence of an ill.[2]

Non-perception of pain—a habit, according to which we do not fall into sorrows.

The love of labour—a habit, that accomplishes what a person chooses (to do); a voluntary endurance; [3]a habit not to be cavilled at on the subject of labour.[3]

Modesty—a voluntary shrinking from daring on just grounds towards what seems to be the best; a voluntary laying hold of the best; a cautious care of blame on just grounds.

Freedom—the ruling power of life; a power ruling by itself on every occasion; [4]a power over that, which relates to oneself in life;[4] [5]an unsparingness in the use and possession of property.[5]

Liberality—a habit in transacting money matters in a way

want of, and pain from, that, which is a natural desire:" where I have translated as if the Greek were *τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐφέσεως ἐνδείας*—to which I have been led by Gesner's conjecture, *κατὰ φύσεας* in lieu of *κατὰ φύσιν*—See too the definition in Diogen. L. vii. 93, *τὴν δὲ ἐγκράτειαν, διάθεσιν ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατ' ὀρθὸν λόγον ἢ ἕξιν, ἀήττητον ἡδονῶν· τὴν δὲ καρτερίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἕξιν ὧν ἐμμενητέον ἢ μή.* Ficinus has here—"potestas, quæ nunquam dejicitur e rationis proposito," which is intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek.

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are a definition rather of Continence than of Self-sufficiency. Corradus renders Ἐγκράτεια by "Beatitudo"—

[2]—[2] Ficinus has elegantly, but not closely—"Audacia securitas, qua quis malum neque futurum exspectat, neque præsens horrescit."

[3]—[3] Ficinus—"adversus labores inconcussus habitus." Corradus—"habitus laborem nunquam reprehendens."

[4]—[4] Such, I presume, is the meaning of Ἐξουσία τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν βίῳ: Ficinus—"licentia propria vitæ." Corradus—"in uno quoque sita potestas vivendi"—as if he wished to read ἐν ἑκάστῳ—

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are the definition rather of the following Ἐλευθεριότης, than of Ἐλευθερία.

that is fitting; the adding to, and possession of, property, as is meet.

Mildness—the settling down of an excitement arising from passion; a moderated temperament of soul.

Decorum—a voluntary yielding to what appears the best; a well-ordering respecting the movement of the body.

Felicity—a good composed of all good things; a power self-sufficient towards living well; a consummation as regards virtue; an utility self-sufficient for a living being.[1]

Magnificence—the estimation according to correct reason [2]of that which is the most worthy of respect.[2]

Sagacity—a natural ability in the soul, according to which he, who possesses it, makes a conjecture [3]in the quickest (time)[3] relating to what is needful; an acuteness of intellect.

Honesty—a simplicity in moral conduct in union with fair speaking; a steadiness[4] in moral conduct.

Kalokagathia[5]—a habit of selecting things that are the best.

High-mindedness—a gentlemanly[6] use of accidental circumstances; a majesty of soul in union with reason.

[1] Stephens renders "vitæ," as if he wished to read *ζωῆς* in lieu of *ζώου*, or else he got "vitæ" from Ficinus.

[2—2] Instead of *τὸν σεμνότατον*, which could not be applied to *λογισμὸν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοῦ σεμνοτάτου*. One MS has *τὸ* and another *καὶ*, which seem to lead to *καὶ τὸ σεμνότατον*. Ficinus too, "et honorandum." Corradus has, what to myself is unintelligible, "Magnificentia, amplitudo a gravissima mentis agitatione, et propositione profecta."

[3—3] Since one MS. offers *ἐν ἑκάστῳ* in lieu of *ἑκάστῳ*, it is easy to elicit from thence *ἐν ὠκίστῳ*. So the Stoics defined *ἀγχίνοιαν* by *ἕξιν εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα*, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 93, where Casaubon refers to Aristotle, Ethic. vi. 9, who says that *ἀγχίνοια* is *κατὰ ταχύ τι εὐστοχία*. Ficinus however found in his MS. *ἐν ἑκάστῳ*: for his version is "in singulis"—

[4] Here, as before, I have translated *σπουδαιότης* by "steadiness."

[5] As there is no single nor even compound word in English to answer to the Greek *Καλοκαγαθία*, by which was meant the union of bodily and mental accomplishments, I have put the Greek word into English letters, just as Philanthropy is in the next definition but one, where, for a similar reason, Ficinus has left in his Latin version the Greek word *Φιλανθρωπία*; but translated *Καλοκαγαθία* by "bonitas." The whole definition is omitted by Corradus.

[6] By *ἀστεῖος*, literally, "living in a city," was meant also "a person of elegant manners," for such those in the city were, as opposed to those of inelegant manners, who lived in the country and were called *ἀγροῖκοι*. Ficinus has "moderatus"—

Philanthropy—a habit of moral conduct that easily leads to a friendship with man; a habit of acting kindly towards men; [1]the having thanks; a recollection with kind conduct.[1]

Piety—justice relating to the gods; a power[2] paying attention to the gods willingly;[3] a correct perception of the honour due to the gods; a knowledge of the honour due to the gods.

Good—[4]that on account of itself.[4]

Fearlessness—a habit, according to which we do not fall into fear.

Apathy—a habit, according to which we do not fall into sufferings.

Peace—a quietness as regards enmity in war.

Listlessness—an easiness of soul; apathy respecting the objects of anger.

Skilfulness[5]—a habit, according to which he, who pos-

[1]—[1] All the words between the numerals were first edited by Bekker from the text of five MSS., and the margin of two. But what is the meaning of *χάριτος σχέσις*, and how *φιλανθρωπία* can be defined as *μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας*, I cannot understand. I could have understood *χάριτος ἔκχυσις γνώμῃ μετ' εὐεργεσίας*, "a pouring out of favours designedly in combination with beneficence." The words were found in the MS. of Ficinus likewise; for his version is "gratiarum redditio; gratitudo benefica."

[2] Instead of *δύναμις* the sense evidently requires *διάθεσις*, similar to "affectio" in Ficinus.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἑκουσίως*, not *ἑκούσιος*. Ficinus has "voluntaria veneratio dei; recta honoris divini scientia"—Corradus, "voluntaria religionis deorum susceptio; recta cultus deorum scientia;" one or both of whom Stephens has followed in his version, "voluntaria de deorum cultu existimatio; recta cultus deorum scientia," as if he wished to unite *ἑκούσιος* with *ὑπόληψις*, and *ὀρθὴ* with *ἐπιστήμη*, not, as Bekker has done, *ἑκούσιος* with *δύναμις*, and *ὀρθὴ* with *ὑπόληψις*. The definition of piety given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 119, is shorter, if not better, *Εὐσέβεια, ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας*.

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals, in Greek, *Ἀγαθὸν, τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν*, are too few to make either syntax or sense. Stephens' version in English is, "Good is that, which exists for its own sake," a definition scarcely intelligible. Did the author write *Ἀγαθὸν, ταὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας*, which is the very definition given by the Stoics in Diogen. L. vii. 94; for *ὠφελείας* might easily have dropt out before *ἀφοβία*. Ficinus has supplied the word, requisite for the sense, in his version, "Bonum, quod sui ipsius gratia expetendum:" and so too has Corradus, "Bonum, quod sua ipsius causa appetitur."

[5] There is no single word in English to answer to the Greek *δεινότης*,

sesses it, is able to form a conjecture about the peculiar termination (of a thing).

Friendship—a union of sentiment, relating to things honourable and just; the choice of the same kind of life; a union in opinion on questions of sect[1] and practice; a union in sentiment relating to a communion in life in combination with kind feelings; [2]a communion in doing well and in suffering.[2]

[3]*Nobility of birth*—the virtue of a noble moral conduct; an easy leading of the soul to words and deeds.[3]

Selection—a correct approval after examination.

Kind feeling—[4]the selection of a person for the purpose of embracing by a person.[4]

Familiarity—a sharing in the same family.

by which was meant, as explained by Suidas, a power in speaking and a cleverness in acting.

[1] Such seems to be the meaning here of *προαίρεσις*, similar to the simple *αἵρεσις*. Stephens' version is, "consensio de proposito et actione." Ficinus has "in deliberando atque agendo." Corradus, "de eligendo et faciendo opinionum consensus."

[2—2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Stephens' version is "societas beneficiorum mutuorum." Ficinus has "communio in dandis accipiendisque beneficiis."

[3—3] Orelli, unable to understand how *Εὐγένεια* is *ἀρετὴ εὐγενοῦς ἤθους*, proposed to read *συγγενοῦς*, by which he probably meant "cognate." But what is gained by the alteration I confess I cannot discover. The author wrote, I suspect, *Εὐγένεια, ἀρετὴ οὐ γένους, ἤθους δὲ, εὐαγωγικὴ ψυχῆς πρὸς λόγους καὶ πράξεις*, "Nobility is an excellence, not from birth, but moral conduct, leading the soul to words and deeds;" where the definition is best explained by the sentiment of Juvenal in viii.,

> Tota licet veteres exornent undique ceræ
> Atria, nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus—

But even thus the definition is defective. For as words and deeds are of different kinds, it should be stated of what kind they are, to which nobility leads. Ficinus has, "Generositas, virtus ingenui moris; facilitas animi ad dicenda pariter atque agenda." Corradus, "Generositas, generosi moris virtus; animi ad rationes et actiones facilis inductio."

[4—4] Here again Orelli was, as I am, at a loss about the meaning of the definition; and hence he wished to cut out *αἵρεσις*. But to my mind the difficulty lies in *πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀσπασμός*, or as eight MSS. read, *ἀσπασμῷ*. Stephens' version is, "Benevolentia est electio hominis; hominis amplexus et salutatio," as if he wished to omit *πρὸς*— Ficinus has, "Benevolentia, electio hominis ad hominem grata atque accepta." Corradus, "Benevolentia, electio; complexus hominem cum homine copulans."

[1] *Agreement*—a sharing in all things existing; a concordance in thoughts and conceptions.[1]

[2] *Lovingness*—a perfect exhibition.[2]

Statesmanship[3]—the knowledge of what is honourable and advantageous (for a state);[4] a knowledge productive of justice in a state.

Sociality[5]—a friendship arising from an association amongst persons of the same age.[6]

[7] *Good counsel*—the cognate virtue of reasoning.[7]

Belief—the correct conception [8]of a thing being really as it seems to be;[8] [9]a firmness in moral conduct.[9]

[1]—[1] As it is difficult to perceive the difference between *νοημάτων* and *ὑπολημμάτων*, I suspect the words *καὶ ὑπολημμάτων* ought to follow *τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων* in the preceding clause, or be omitted altogether. Ficinus has "cogitationum suspicionumque concordia."

[2]—[2] Of the words between the numerals I am quite content to express my perfect ignorance. Ficinus has "Charitas integra animi declaratio," as if he had found *ψυχῆς* in his MS.

[3] So I have translated Πολιτικὸς in the dialogue of that name.

[4] The words between the lunes have been added for the sense.

[5] By *ἑταιρεία* was meant "a political club," as it would be called in England, not merely domestic sociality.

[6] In lieu of *γεγενημένοις*, which seems superfluous after *καθ' ἡλικίαν*, one would have expected *συνηνωμένοις*, "united." Ficinus has "ex diuturna æqualium consuetudine conflata."

[7]—[7] With this unintelligible definition of Good Counsel, may be contrasted the very intelligible one given by the Stoics, as found in Diogenes Laertius, vii. 93, *τὴν δὲ εὐβουλίαν, ἐπιστήμην τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως*, i. e. "good counsel is the science of considering by doing what, and in what manner, we can act advantageously." Stephens' version is "Consilii præstantia est virtus rationi insita," as if he wished to read *Εὐβουλίας ἀρετὴ ἀρετὴ λογισμῷ ἔμφυτος*. Ficinus, however, translates *Εὐβουλία* by "Sagacitas," evidently for the sense. Corradus, "Consilium bonum, vis cogitationis insita:" as if he wished to read *ἔμφυτος* in lieu of *σύμφυτος*.

[8]—[8] Bekker's text is *τοῦ οὕτως· ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται*, which I cannot understand. Opportunely then does one MS. offer *αὐτὸ*: for the author probably wrote, as I have translated, *τοῦ ὄντως ἔχειν τι, ὡς αὐτὸ φαίνεται*. Stephens' version is "Fides—persuasio, quæ res ita se habet, velut ipsi videtur," which, to myself, is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Ficinus, "Fides, recta presumptio quod res sic se habet, ut sibi videtur." Corradus, "Fides, opinio recta rem ita, ut ipsi videtur, habere: certa veri comprehensio."

[9]—[9] The author has evidently confounded *πίστις*, "belief," with *πιστότης*, "fidelity."

[1] *Truth*—a habit in affirming and denying; a knowledge of things true.[1]

A wishing—a desire with right reason; a reasonable longing; a longing with reason, according to nature.

Counselling—an exhortation to another person, previous to acting, as to what manner it is meet to act.

Fit opportunity—the meeting with the time in which it i requisite to suffer or do something.

Caution—a guard against ill; the care of guarding (oneself`

Order—the working out a similarity in[2] all things existin with a relation to each other; a symmetry of communion the cause of all things existing with a relation to each other; [3]a symmetry towards learning.[3]

Application—a bracing up of the soul for learning.

Natural ability—a quickness in learning; a good production of nature; an excellence from nature.

Docility—a natural ability in the soul towards a quickness in learning.

Judgment—a peremptory decision[4] respecting a disputed matter.

Law—[5]the (process of a) contest[5] respecting the having done an injury or not.

[1]—[1] Here again is another definition, which not even the author of it could have understood. For to say that Truth is a knowledge of things true is to say nothing, without previously defining what true things are. Moreover Truth could never be called a ἕξις, "a habit or state of the mind." For it is the result of a discovery made by science from assertion and denial respecting what has been well said, in Greek, Ἀλήθεια εὕρεσις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει δι' ἐπιστήμην τῶν εὖ λεχθέντων·—which might have been corrupted into Ἀλήθεια ἕξις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν·—but that it was so corrupted, is more than I dare assert. Ficinus, however, renders Ἀλήθεια by "Veracitas," i. e. Truthfulness; which will get rid of a part of the difficulty, but not of all.

[2] I have adopted ἐργασία ὁμοιότητος, found in one MS., in lieu of ἐργασίας ὁμοιότης. Ficinus too has "concentus operationum." But Corradus—"actionis—similitudo."

[3]—[3] I must leave for others to explain the meaning of the words within the numerals as a definition of Order. Ficinus—"contemperatio ad percipiendum idonea."

[4] I have translated as if the Greek were κατάφασις, "assertion," not ἀπόφασις, "denial." Stephens—"sententia rata"—what the sense requires; but such is not the meaning of ἀπόφασις. So too Ficinus—"rata pronunciatio." Corradus—"Judicium, eventus rei, de qua ambigebatur, ratus."

[5]—[5] So I have translated ἀμφισβήτησις, for the sake of the sense.

Good legal conduct—an obedience shown to proper laws.

Cheerfulness—a delight[1] at the acts of a temperate person.

Honour—a gift of good things presented on actions done through virtue; a mark of esteem in return[2] for virtue; [3]the outward bearing of what is an object of reverence;[3] [4]the watching of a mark of esteem.[4]

Alacrity—[5]the exhibition of a practical preference.[5]

Favour—a voluntary act of kindness; the return for a good act; a ministering at a fit time.

Concord—a similarity of opinion between rulers and ruled, how they ought to rule and be ruled.

A polity—the community of a multitude of persons, self-sufficient for a happy state; the community of a multitude according to law.

Forethought—a preparation with respect to things about to be.

Counsel—a consideration respecting future things how they may be advantageous.

Victory—a power having the superiority, as regards contention.

[6]*A ready-way-finding*—a ready discrimination,[6] that possesses a power over what is thought upon.[7]

Ficinus, with a similar view, has—"Lex, norma ad quam quæritur"—Corradus—"Lex, de rebus justis vel injustis disceptatio."

[1] Here *χαρὰ*, like *ἀμφισβήτησις*, has a pregnant sense; for it is not merely "delight," but "the result of delight."

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀντ'*, not *ἀπ'*, which I can hardly understand. Corradus has—"dignitas ex virtute comparata."

[3—3] Such seems to be the meaning of *σχῆμα σεμνότητος*, which will be best understood by turning to the Menexenus, § 2.

[4—4] I hardly understand the words *τήρησις ἀξιώματος* as applied to *τιμή*. Stephens' version is "observatio dignitatum;" that of Ficinus—"conservatio dignitatis;" that of Corradus—"autoritatis conservatio."

[5—5] Stephens has, what the sense requires, "declaratio voluntatis ad agendum:" but that can scarcely be got from the Greek. Ficinus, still more widely—"patens expeditio propositi ad res agendas." Corradus—"voluntatis ad agendum propter se significatio."

[6—6] Instead of defining *Εὐπορία* by *Εὐκρίνεια*, one would have expected to see *Εὐκρινεια* defined by *Εὐπορία*; and so Corradus—"Perspicientia, facultas ejus, quod cogitatur, assequendi." Cousin's version is—"Le succès dans la discussion vient du coup d'œil sur qui domine une question:" and his note—"Peut-être voudrait-il mieux entendre par *εὐκρίνεια* l'art de faire des distinctions; car c'est avec des distinctions qu'on triomphe dans la discussion."

[7] Here *λογιζομένου* is used, contrary to custom, in a passive sense.

Bribe—the exchange for a favour.

Opportunity—the point of time suited to what is advantageous; a time that works for some good.

Memory—a disposition of the soul preservative of the truth that is in it.[1]

The keeping in mind—the having thought on the stretch.

Thinking—the commencement of knowledge.

Holiness—a religious dread of sins against the gods; [2]an attention to the honour due naturally to a deity.[2]

A prophecy—a knowledge, that points out beforehand an action, without a demonstrative proof.

The prophetic art—a science, that speculates upon what is now and will be to a mortal being.

Wisdom—a science not-hypothetical;[3] a knowledge of things as they happen to exist;[4] a science that speculates upon the cause of things existing.

Philosophy—a longing after the knowledge of things as they happen to exist;[5] a habit of speculating upon the truth as to how it is true; a careful study in combination with correct reasoning.

Knowledge—a comprehension by the soul, [6]not to be changed or cast down by reasoning;[6] [7][the power of compre-

Ficinus—"Facundia, perspicacia et facultas obtinendi quod propositum est."

[1] As *ἀλήθεια*, the Greek word for truth, would mean literally "non-forgetfulness," and as memory is "non-forgetfulness," perhaps *ἀλήθεια* ought to be taken here in its literal sense; although such a meaning is not, I believe, given to *ἀλήθεια* elsewhere. The more correct definition of Μνήμη is in Suidas—*ἡ τῶν πάλαι ἐγνωσμένων κατοχή*, i. e. "the retention of what have been known of old."

[2]—[2] Since six MSS. read *θεραπείας*, and one *τε μνημης*, perhaps the author wrote *τῆς θεοῦ τημέλεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν θεραπείας*—i. e. the natural care of the attention due to a deity.

[3] By "not-hypothetical" is meant that which is founded on facts. Stephens' version is, "nullius certi argumenti," which would be strangely applied to a definition of wisdom. Ficinus more correctly—"scientia, quæ nihil penitus præsupponit." Corradus too—"scientia non supposita."

[4], [5] I have translated, as if the Greek were not *τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ*, but *τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων*, as in the preceding definition. In both places Corradus has —"rerum divinarum."

[6]—[6] So I have translated *ἀμετάπτωτος*, to preserve the idea of change conveyed by *μετὰ*—

[7]—[7] The words between the brackets are properly omitted in the three best MSS., for they are merely an explanation of the preceding sentence. They are, however, acknowledged by Ficinus and Corradus.

bending a thing or things, not to be changed or thrown down by reasoning;][7] a true reasoning not to be changed or cast down upon[1] reflection.

Opinion—a conception [2]to be changed by the persuasion of reason;[2] a rational[3] impetus; a notion falling upon falsehood and truth by (not-)reason.[4]

Sensation—an impetus of the soul; a movement of mind; a heralding of the soul through the body to [5]the seasons of man;[5] from which there results a power of the soul devoid of reason, [6]having a cognizance through the body.[6]

Habit—a disposition of the soul, according to which we are said to be with certain qualities.

[1] So I have translated ἐπὶ, although I have some doubts about the reading. Stephens' version is—"in mente," similar to "in cogitatione," in Ficinus and Corradus.

[2—2] As in the case of ἀμετάπτωτος, so here in that of μεταπειστὸς, I have introduced the idea of a change to answer to μετα—

[3] How Opinion can be called "a rational impetus" I cannot understand. One would have expected οὐ λογιστικὴ, for οὐ might have been easily lost after λόγου. Ficinus has—"Opinio, cum fide per ratiocinationem rationis discursus," from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS., except μετὰ πίστεως in lieu of μεταπειστός. Corradus avoids the difficulty by his version—"ratiocinandi impetus."

[4] Here again οὐ seems to have dropt out after ὑπὸ— On the similar loss of οὐ, I have written not a little in the Specimens of Notes, appended to my translation of the Midian Oration of Demosthenes; and to the passages of Sophocles emended there I could now add not a few more.

[5—5] Such is the literal translation of εἰς ὥρας ἀνθρώπων, by which was meant perhaps what we call in English, "the periods of man's life." Stephens' version is—"ad opportunitates hominum;" that of Ficinus—"in formas hominum." Corradus—"ad extremas hominum partes." Cousin—"vers le monde exterieure;" and he adds in a note—"Il faut convenir que ὥρας ἀνθρώπων est une expression bien extraordinaire, et dont il est bien difficile de determiner le sens."

[6—6] I confess my inability to understand the words between the brackets. For after γνωριστικὴ there is wanting something, to which that word may be referred. Hence as one MS. has δι' ἀνθρώπων, expressed by δι' ἀνῶν, in lieu of διὰ σώματος, perhaps the author wrote—γνωριστικὴ τῶν διὰ σώματος ἰόντων—"having a cognizance of what is passing through the body:" with which may be compared the expression in the Phædrus, p. 250, D., τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων: or else in ἀνθρώπων lies hid αἰσθητηρίων. Compare Diogenes L. vii. 52, αἴσθησις λέγεται—ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευὴ, καθ' ἣν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται: where one would have expected to find πόροι, Anglice "pores," as in Plutarch, quoted by Stephens in Thesaur. Gr., τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων. Corradus avoids the difficulty by translating γνωριστικὴ "cognitionis particeps."

[1] *Voice*—a flowing through the mouth from a thought.[1]

[2] *Speech*—voice expressed by letters descriptive of each of things existing;[2] a form of language, compounded of nouns and verbs, without melody.[3]

Noun—a form of language uncompounded, the interpreter of that which is predicated [4]against being, and of every thing which is not spoken of against itself.[4]

Language[5]—the voice of a man, expressed by letters, and some common symbol, acting as an interpreter, without melody.

Syllable—an articulation[6] of the human voice, expressed by letters.

Definition—a sentence[7] composed [8]of difference and genus.[8]

[1]—[1] A similar definition is in The Sophist, § 106, p. 263, E., and in Diogenes L. vii. 55, *φωνὴ—ἀνθρώπου ἔστιν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη.*

[2]—[2] Something similar is given as a definition in Diogenes L. vii. 56, *Λέξις—φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος—λόγος δὲ φωνὴ σημαντική.*

[3] Ficinus has "sine harmonia cantus," and so he renders shortly afterwards *ἄνευ μέλους.*

[4]—[4] This is the literal translation of *κατὰ* with a genitive. What the sense requires is in the former sentence, *περὶ*: but what in the latter, I confess I do not know; for I cannot perceive what the author meant by *παντὸς τοῦ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένου*, unless it be something similar to what Aristotle says in Poetic, § 34, *Ὄνομα ἐστὶ φωνὴ συνθετὴ, σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν.* Ficinus has "Nomen, dictio simplex, significativa ejus, quod secundum essentiam prædicatur, et omnis quod secundum ipsum minime dicitur:" from which it would seem that he found in his MS. *κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν* and *καθ' ἑαυτὸ*: which last is read in one MS. collated by Bekker. Corradus has "Nomen dictio simplex, quæ, cum id, quod de vi dicitur ea, quam *οὐσίαν* vocant, tum omne, quod non per se dicitur, significat."

[5] Although I have just above translated *διάλεκτος* "a form of language," for the sake of the sense, yet here I have rendered it merely by "language," for a similar reason.

[6] How a syllable can be said to be an articulation of the human voice I cannot understand. It ought to have been defined, "a combination of letters expressed or not by the human voice." But as Aristotle has defined it in Poetic, § 34, by *φωνὴ ἄσημος, συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνὴν ἔχοντος*, one would have expected here, *Συλλαβὴ ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς ἄσημος ἀρθμὸς ἐγγραμμάτου*, i. e. "a syllable is a combination without meaning of sounds of the human voice expressed by letters."

[7] I have followed Twining on Aristotle's Poetics, § 34, in translating *λόγος* "a sentence."

[8]—[8] To avoid the *ὕστερον πρότερον* in *διαφορᾶς* and *γένους*—for the genus should be mentioned before that which differs from it—Stephens has, after Ficinus, rendered, "ex genere et differentia." There is a better definition in Diogenes L. vii. 60.

Proof—the showing forth of a thing not evident.

Demonstration—true reasoning [1]founded on syllogisms;[1] a reasoning, that makes a matter plain by what is previously known.

Element (*of voice*)[2]—[3]a vocal sound uncompounded; the cause to the rest of vocal sounds of their being vocal sounds.[3]

Useful—the cause of doing well; the cause of good.

Advantageous—that which conduces to good.

[4]*Honourable*—that which is good.[4]

[5]*Good*—the cause of safety to things existing; the cause of all that relates to itself; from which it happens to choose what is meet.[5]

Temperate—the orderly conduct of the soul.

Just—an ordonnance of law, productive of justice.

Voluntary—that which is drawn on by itself;[6] that which is selected with reference to itself, [7](and) completed according to design.[7]

[1]—[1] Ficinus omits *συλλογιστικὸς*—

[2] Since *στοιχεῖον* by itself frequently means "a letter," the word *φωνῆς* has been added to show what kind of element is here intended by the word, which generally means an "element" in physical philosophy. Corradus too, "Elementum vocis, vox simplex."

[3]—[3] Here, again, I am quite ignorant of the meaning of the words between the numerals; where I have designedly translated *φωνὴ* by "a vocal sound," not merely "a voice."

[4]—[4] Instead of *καλὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν*, Stephens would seem to have wished to read *Καλοκἀγαθὸν, τὸ ἀγαθόν*, for his version is "Honestum et pulchrum est bonum."

[5]—[5] Here too I am at a loss; and so too, I think, was Stephens; whose version is, "Bonum est causa salutis his, quæ sunt causa cujusvis, quod ad ipsum refertur; a quo contingit electio eorum, quæ conveniunt." Ficinus more closely, but not more intelligibly, "Bonum, quod in omnibus, quæ sunt, salutis est causa; causa omnis, quod ad ipsum tendit id, a quo veniunt quæcunque sunt eligenda." Corradus, "Bonum, causa ut ea, quæ sunt, serventur; causa rei omnis quæ spectat ad ipsum, a quo proficiscuntur omnia, quæ sunt eligenda."

[6] As Bekker has edited *αὐτοῦ* from one MS. in lieu of *αὐτὸ*, he should have inserted from conjecture, *δι'* before *αὐτοῦ*, for the sake of the syntax and sense. Stephens' version is, "Voluntarium idem est quod blandum et illectans:" where *προσαγωγὸν* is taken in an active sense; and so it is in the version of Ficinus, "Voluntarium quod se ipsum ducit;" and of Corradus, "quod se ipsum insinuat."

[7]—[7] I have translated as if the Greek were not *κατὰ*, but *καὶ τὸ κατὰ*, to which *τὸ καὶ* in five MSS. and *τὸ κατὰ* in two manifestly lead. Ficinus has "quod cogitationem perficit," as if his MS. read *τὸ διάνοιαν διατελοῦν*.

Free—that which rules itself.

Moderate—a mean between excess and deficiency; and sufficient according to art.[1]

Moderation—a mean between excess and deficiency.

Prize—the reward of excellence, that is chosen for its own sake.

Immortality—[2]an existence endowed with soul[2] and a remaining for ever.

A holy thing—service paid to a god, acceptable to a god.

Festival—a holy time according to law.

[3]*Man*—an animal, wingless, biped, with wide nails;[3] the only one of beings that is a recipient of knowledge founded on reason.

Sacrifice—the gift[4] of a victim[5] to a god.

Prayer—an asking for good things, or that seem so, [6]by man from gods.[6]

King—a ruler according to laws; [7]not subject to the audit-

[1] I must leave for others to explain this reference to art in a definition of Moderation.

[2—2] Corradus—"natura, quæ *οὐσία* dicitur, animata." But as four MSS. offer *ἐμψύχου* in lieu of *ἔμψυχος*, perhaps the true reading is *Ἀθανασία, οὐσίας ἐμψύχου ἡ ἀΐδιος μονή*, "*Immortality*, the remaining for ever of an existence endowed with soul:" where *ἡ* has been corrupted into *καὶ* by a very common confusion.

[3—3] This is the celebrated definition of Plato; who, after he had described man as a wingless and biped animal, was induced to add another word, *πλατυώνυχον*, "with wide nails," after Diogenes the Cynic had taken a cock, and stripping it of its feathers, cried out—"Behold Plato's Man." The story is told by Diogenes Laertius, vi. 40. In lieu, however, of *πλατυώνυχος*, which would be more applicable to an elephant or an aquatic bird, one would have expected to hear that Plato's word was *πολυώνυχος*, in allusion to the twenty nails found on the feet and hands of a man.

[4] Here is the Alexandrine word *δόμα*, to which I have alluded in the Introduction, as furnishing internal evidence that these Definitions were written long after the time of Speusippus.

[5] To avoid the absurdity of saying that a sacrifice is the gift of a sacrifice—for such is the ordinary meaning of *θῦμα*—I have translated *θῦμα* by "victim." Some would, however, prefer perhaps to read *Θυσία, θνητοῦ δόμα ἀθανάτοις* in lieu of *Θυσία, θεῷ δόμα θύματος*. Corradus has—"Sacrificium, donum ad rem sacram deo dicatum."

[6—6] I have translated as if the Greek were not *αἴτησις ἀνθρώποις—παρὰ θεοῖς*, where both the datives are without regimen, but *αἴτησις ἀπ ἀνθρώπου—παρὰ θεῶν*—where *θεῶν* is due to one MS.

[7—7] A similar definition in Diogenes L. vii. 122.

ing of his accounts;[7] the chief magistrate in a political constitution.

Government—the care of the whole.

[1] *Licence*—a superintendence of law.[1]

Law-giver—a maker of laws according to which it is meet for a polity to exist.

Law—a decree, relating to the state, made by the multitude, not limited to any time.

Hypothesis—a principle not demonstrated; the summary of a discourse.

A vote—a decree of the state limited to a certain time.

Statesman—a person skilled in the constitution of a state.

A state—the residence of a multitude of persons making use of decrees in common; a multitude of persons existing under the same law.

The excellence of a state—a constitution of a correct polity.

The science of war—skill in war.

Alliance—a communion in war.

Safety—a protection from injury.[2]

Tyrant—a person ruling a state according to his own notion.

[4] *Sophist*—a mercenary hunter after the young, rich, (and) in high repute.[3]

Wealth—a possession suited for happiness; an abundance of means tending to happiness.

Deposit—a thing given[4] with faith.[5]

Purgation—a separation of the worse from the better.

[1]—[1] This definition I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has—"Licentia, legis concessio," a meaning that ἐπιτροπὴ would hardly bear. Corradus—"Potestas, legis procuratio." Perhaps the correct reading is ἀποτροπὴ, "a turning aside from law."

[2] Such seems to be the meaning intended by περιποίησις ἀβλαβής: where, however, one would prefer ἀβλαβείας; and so perhaps Ficinus found in his MS.; for his version is—"Salus, munitio ab omni damno secura." Corradus—"Salus, securi status comparatio."

[3]—[3] This very definition of a Sophist is found in Sophist, § 17, p. 223, B., and § 36, p. 231, D. From the first passage I have introduced καὶ before ἐνδόξων. So too Ficinus—"nobilium atque divitum;" and Corradus—"et gloriosos."

[4] Here again we meet with δόμα, where Attic Greek would require δόσις.

[5] The expression—"a gift with faith," is strangely applied as the definition of a deposit. One would have expected διὰ πίστεως—"through faith," in the honesty of the party receiving the deposit.

To conquer—to possess the power, when having a difference.[1]

A good man—such a one as is able to effect good for a person.

A temperate man—one who has moderate desires.

A continent man—one who has a power over the portions of the soul contending against right reason.

A steady[2] *man*—one who is perfectly good; one who preserves his virtue.

[3] *Conscience*—a reflection with pain without reason.[3]

Indocility—a slowness in learning.

Lordship[4]—a just government, not subject to the auditing of accounts.

Dislike of wisdom—a habit, according to which he, who has it, dislikes reasoning.[5]

[6] *Fear*—a consternation of the soul on the expectation of ill.[6]

Passion—a violent impetus without reason; [7]mind of regulation of soul without reason.[7]

[8] *Consternation*—a fear on the expectation of ill.[8]

[1] Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *τὸν διαφερόμενον*: for his version is "adversarium."

[2] Here, as before, I have translated *σπουδαῖος* by "steady."

[3—3] Stephens, not perceiving that *Σύννοια* means here "Conscience," thus renders incorrectly the whole definition—"Meditatio est cogitatio cum dolore, absque ratione." Ficinus has—"Conscientia, cogitatio tristis absque ratiocinatione." But the sense evidently requires—"not without reason"—in Greek *οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου*, or else "without speaking;" for Conscience has a still voice; so Corradus—"Conscientia, tacita cum mœrore cogitatio."

[4] This seems the exact rendering of *δεσποτεία*, not "despotism."

[5] Here again Stephens has missed the meaning of *μισολόγος*, as shown by his version—"eruditionis et doctrinæ osor est." Ficinus correctly—"rationes odit." Corradus, too, "rationem odit."

[6—6] A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 5, 1.

[7—7] Such is the unintelligible English of the unintelligible Greek—*νοῦς τάξεως ψυχῆς ἀλογίστου*. Stephens' version is—"Animi concitatio est impetus violentus animæ irrationalis, absque ratione et ordine mentis," as if he wished to read the whole definition thus—*Θυμὸς, ὁρμὴ βίαιος ψυχῆς ἀλογίστου ἄνευ λογισμοῦ νοῦ τε τάξεως*: at least Ficinus found this in this MS., as is evident from his version—"Animositas, impetus violentus irrationalis animæ absque ratione et ordine mentis." Corradus has—"Iracundia, appetitio sine cogitatione vehemens et violenta: significatio ordinis in animo perturbati."

[8—8] By comparing the definitions of Fear and Consternation it would seem the two words were synonymous. The Stoics, however, made a distinction, as we learn from Diogenes L. vii. 112, by whom *Φόβος* was

Flattery—a conversation tc gratify [1]without the best;[1] a habit of conversing to gratify, exceeding moderation.

[2]*Anger*—an exhortation by passion to revenge.[2]

Insult—an injury leading to dishonour.

Intemperance—a habit forcing a person, contrary tc right reason, towards what seem to be pleasant.

[3]*Hesitation*—a flight from the commencement of labours.[3]

Cowardice—that which lays hold of (and detains)[4] a rushing on; [5]the cause of a (mental) contraction.[5]

(*A beginning*)[6]—the first cause of existence.

[7]*Calumny*—the setting friends apart by a word.[7]

Opportunity—that in which it is fitting to do and suffer each thing.

Injustice—a habit disregardful of laws.

Want—a diminution of good things.

defined προσδοκία κακοῦ: but Ἔκπληξις, φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος, i. e. "Consternation, a fear from the appearance of an unusual event."

[1—1] I am completely at a loss in the words between the numerals. I could have understood οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ, the very phrase used by Theophrastus, where he defines τὴν ἀρέσκειαν, "obsequiousness," by saying that ἔστιν, ὡς ὅρῳ περιλαβεῖν, ἕντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική. But "without the best" is not the same as "for not the best." Ficinus fills out the sense by his "absque ratione boni."—Corradus evades the difficulty by his "colloquium—fallax et improbum."

[2—2] A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 2.

[3—3] A similar definition in Diogenes L. vii. 112, Ὄκνος, φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας.

[4] I have introduced the words between the lunes to complete the sense. Stephens' version is—"Timiditas est affectio, quæ percipit impetum." But such a definition is applicable to Forethought as well as Cowardice. Ficinus has—"Pigritia, fuga laborum, qui ex gubernando proveniunt;" where he took ἀρχὴ in the sense of "government," not "commencement."

[5—5] For this part of the definition we are indebted to a solitary MS. that offers αἰτία συστολῆς: where συστολὴ is used as in Diogenes L. vii. 111, λυπὴν εἶναι συστολὴν ἄλογον.

[6] On the word ἀρχὴ, found, it would seem, in none of the MSS. examined by Bekker, Stephens remarks that he has translated as if ἀρχὴ had dropt out. He got the idea from Ficinus, who has—"Timiditas, prima causa subcurrentis impetus," as if he had found in his MS., Δειλία, ὁρμὴν πρώτη τοῦ εἶναι αἰτία, without ἀντιληπτική. Corradus—"Ignavia, causa prima rei alicujus appetitionem faciendæ reprimens."

[7—7] Corradus has rather strangely—"Disputatio, amicorum in sermone dissensio."

[1] *Shame*—a fear on the expectation of dishonour.[1]

Vain-gloriousness—a habit of laying claim to a good or good things, not belonging to a person.

Sinning—acting contrary to right reason.

Envy—a pain at the good things of friends,[2] which either are or have been.

Shamelessness—a habit of the soul, that endures dishonour for the sake of gain.

Rashness—the excess of boldness in the case of dangers, [3]which it ought not.[3]

A love of honour—a habit of the soul, lavish of every expense without consideration.

Natural depravity—a badness by nature, and a sinning in that, which is according to nature; [4]a disease of that, which is according to nature.[4]

Hope—the expectation of a good.

Madness—a habit destructive of a correct perception.

Talkativeness—intemperance in speech, devoid of reason.

Contrariety—the greatest standing apart of things, that according to a certain difference fall under the same genus.

Involuntary—that which is brought to an end contrary to intention.

Instruction—a power that has the cure of the soul.

Instructing—the delivering of instruction.

Legislation—the science that renders a state [5]firmly fixed (and without suffering.)[5]

[1]—[1] A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 6, and Diogenes L. vii. 112.

[2] Although *φίλων* seems to be defended by Aristotle in Rhetor. ii. 10, yet one would have preferred *ἄλλων*, similar to the definition in Diogenes L. vii. 111, *φθόνον, λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς*. Proclus, ii. p. 110, *φθόνος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς λυπή*. Corradus seems to have wished to read *ποτε γενησομένοις* in lieu of *ποτε γεγενημένοις*. For his version is, "vel olim futura sint."

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of *οὓς μὴ δεῖ*, which I cannot understand; nor could Stephens, whose version is "ubi non est opus," as if he wished to read *οὗ*—Ficinus has 'quæ metuenda sunt," which seems to lead to *οἷς ᾗ δεῖμα*.

[4]—[4] Such is the version of *νόσος τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν*, which is equally unintelligible in Greek, and in English, and in the Latin of Ficinus and Stephens, "morbus ejus quod est secundum naturam," and of Corradus, "morbus in natura insitus."

[5]—[5] In lieu of *εὐπαγὴς* three MSS. offer *ἀπαθὴς*, one *ἀγαθοῦ*, and one *ἀγαθῆς*. By selecting from all what seems to be the best suited to the

Admonition—a speech that finds fault from design; a speech for the sake of turning aside from error.

Assistance—the hindering an ill either existing or in the way of existing.

Punishment—a curing of the soul for an error committed.

[1] *Power*—a superiority in doing or speaking; a habit according to which that, which possesses it, is powerful; a strength according to nature.

To preserve—to protect from hurt.[1]

[2] (*Science*—is a knowledge without stumbling.)[2]

sense, I have elicited, *εὐπαγοῦς καὶ ἀπαθοῦς*, what I have translated. Ficinus has "tumultu vacuam," answering to *εὐπαθοῦς*.

[1]—[1] These two definitions are thus separated in the version of Ficinus, "Potestas, excellentia in agendis seu dicendis; habitus, quo potentes efficimur. Robur, vis unum quidque in natura servans eo, quod detrimenta devitat;" but united in that of Corradus, "Potentia, in actione vel in sermone præstantia; habitus, quem qui habet, potens est; vis hominem naturaliter servans vel tutum efficiens."

[2]—[2] This last definition, omitted by Bekker, is found in one MS. alone.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE TREATISE OF TIMÆUS.

Of this short treatise, relating to a Cosmogony according to the Pythagorean theory, the authorship used to be attributed to Timæus the Locrian, until Meiners adduced arguments to show that the work was the production of a more modern writer. The genuine writings of the Locrian philosopher had so completely disappeared before the time of Aristotle, that he seems to have known nothing about them, as may be inferred from what he says in Metaphysic. i. 6, p. 649, B.

In confirmation of this decision, which has been adopted by nearly all subsequent writers on the subject, De Gelder has been led to express his belief that the work was written by some philosopher, who lived in the second century of the Christian era, and amused himself with drawing up an abridgment of the Timæus of Plato, adopting what he conceived to be the Doric dialect, with the view of enabling him to palm it off as a genuine production of the Locrian philosopher. But though we know that similar deceptions have been practised at different times, yet even De Gelder himself confesses his inability to discover the motives that could lead the unknown author to commit the forgery. Hence we may fairly imagine that it was done at an earlier period, when the Ptolemies were collecting the works of older writers to adorn their library at Alexandria. And this deception the writer was enabled to carry on with the greater success, as he has been careful to introduce, doubtless from the work of a Pythagorean, some marked discrepancies, duly noticed by De Gelder in Præf. p. xi., from the Timæus of Plato, of whose treatise his own is in other respects little more than an abridgment.

At the present day the treatise is held in so little honour, that

De Gelder offered an apology for publishing it at Leyden in 1836. But the time has been, when it was highly esteemed as the genuine production of that very philosopher, whose ideas Plato was thought to have developed in his Timæus; and it was accordingly translated into Latin by Georgius Valla, Simon Passiensis, called likewise Bevilaqua, and Nogarola, whose versions were printed respectively at Venice in 1488, 1498, and 1555, and subsequently by Cornarius, fol. Bas. 1561. Of versions of it in modern languages, a French one appeared at Berlin, 1763, by the Marquis d' Argens, and another at Paris in 1768, by the Abbé Batteux, the former accompanied with an elaborate Preface and Commentary, and the latter with some sensible notes and a few various readings from three Paris MSS. There is likewise a German translation by Schulthes, first published at Zurich in 1779, and again in 1842. It is said by Fabricius to have been translated into English by T. Stanley, in his "History of Philosophy;" but such is not the fact; and equally incorrect is the Bipont editor of Plato, by whom De Gelder has been misled, in attributing a Latin translation of the treatise to Ficinus.

THE TREATISE

OF

TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN

ON

THE SOUL OF THE WORLD AND NATURE.

[1.] Timæus the Locrian asserted this—that of all the things in the Universe there are two causes, (one) [1] Mind, (the cause) of things existing according to reason; (the other) Necessity,[1] (the cause) of things (existing) by (some) force, according to the powers of bodies; and that the former of these is of the nature of the good, and is called god, and the principle of things that are the best; but what come after this and are co-causes, are referred to Necessity; but that, as regards the things in the Universe, there are Form, Matter, and the Perceptible, which is, as it were, a production from the two (others); and that the former (namely, Form)[2] is unproduced, and unmoved, and stationary,[3] and of the nature of the same, and perceptible by the mind, and a pattern of such things produced, as exist by a state of change; for that some such thing as this is Form spoken of and conceived to

[1]—[1] What the author here, and Plato in Tim. p. 48, A., and 68, E., consider as the two distinct powers of Mind and Necessity are said by Euripides in Tro. 890, to be singly another name for Ζεύς.

[2] As there are three things mentioned, Valck. wished, to prevent all uncertainty, to read τὸ μὲν εἶδος in lieu of τὸ μὲν εἶμεν, referring to Tim. p. 51, A. Had he lived to know that five MSS. offer τὰν for τὸ, and eight add ἀεὶ after εἶμεν, he would perhaps have suggested τὰν μὲν εἶμεν ἰδέαν.

[3] Since μένον is the same as ἀκίνατον, Valck. suggested μόνον. But one would prefer μονὰς, for the "monad" was of the nature of the same; while to avoid the repetition in μονὰς τε καὶ τᾶς ταὐτῶ φύσιος, it is easy to read μονὰς, ἐκ τᾶς ταὐτῶ φύσιος ἰοῦσα—"proceeding from the nature of the same."

be; but Matter is a mould,[1] and a mother and a nurse, and procreative of the third kind of being; for receiving the resemblances upon itself, and as it were remoulding them, it perfects these productions. He asserted moreover that Matter is eternal, not however unmoved; and although it is of itself without form and shapeless, yet it receives every kind of form, and that what is around bodies, is divisible and partakes of the nature[2] of the different; (and that) persons call moreover Matter by the name of Place and Space. These two principles, then, are opposite to each other; [of which][3] Form has a relation to a male (power) and a father; but Matter to a female and a mother; and being three they are recognisable by three marks; Form by mind, according to knowledge; Matter by a spurious kind of reasoning, through its not being perceived mentally by a direct course, but by analogy; and their productions by sensation and opinion.

[2.] Before, then, heaven existed, there were, through reason, Form and Matter, and the god, who is the worker-out of the better. But since what is older[5] is superior to what is younger, and what is put in order before what is without order, the deity, being good, did, on seeing that Matter receives Form, and is altered in every way, but without order, [6]feel the necessity[6] of bringing it into order, and to establish a change from the undefined to the defined, in order that the differences between bodies might have a similar relation, and not receive various turns at hap-hazard. He made, therefore, this world out of the whole of Matter, laying it down as a limit to the nature of being, through its containing all the rest of things in itself, (and being) one, only-begotten, perfect, endued with

[1] By *ἐκμαγεῖον* was meant, 1. that which receives an impression, 2. the impression itself. See Tim. p. 50, B.

[2] Instead of *φῦσιος*, Valck. would read *οὐσίας*. For the expression *τᾶς μεριστᾶς οὐσίας* is found shortly afterwards, p. 96, A. § 3.

[3] As *ἂν* could not precede here *τὸ μὲν εἶδος*, it is properly omitted in four MSS.; unless it be said that the author wrote *ἵνα*, "where," to which *ἂν* in one MS., and *ἀν* in another, seem to lead.

[4] By *δημιουργὸς* is meant elsewhere the power that made something out of nothing; but here it is merely the worker-out.

[5] By *πρεσβύτερον* De Gelder understands "the more intelligent," referring to Hesych., *Πρεσβύτερος· . . . φρονιμώτερος*.

[6—6] So we must render *ἐδήϊτο*—unless, what is preferable, we adopt *ἐδήλετο*, "wished," as suggested by Valckenaer on Theocrit. p. 259, A. Compare Tim. p. 29, E.

soul and with reason—for these (qualities) are superior to the soulless and the irrational—and of a sphere-like body ; for this is more perfect than the rest of forms. Desirous, then, of making a very good production, he made it a deity, created, (and) never to be destroyed by any other cause than the god, who had put it into order, if indeed he should ever wish to dissolve it. But on the part of the good there is no rushing forward to the destruction of a very beautiful production. (The world) therefore, being such, continues without corruption and destruction and blessed. And it is the best of things created; since it has been produced by the best cause, that looks not to patterns made by hand, but to Form (in the abstract) and to Existence, perceived by the mind; to which the created thing, having been carefully adjusted, has become the most beautiful, and [1]to be not wrongly taken in hand.[1] And it is ever perfect according to the things perceived by sense; because the pattern perceived by mind[2] contains in itself[3] all the living things perceived by mind, and has left nothing else out of itself, as being the limit of things perceived by mind, as this world is of those perceived by sense. And as being solid, and perceptible by touch and sight, it has a share of earth and fire, and of the things between them, air and water; and it is composed of bodies all perfect, which are in it as wholes, so that no part might ever be left out of it, in order that the body of the Universe might be altogether self-sufficient, uninjured by corruptions from without and within; [4]for apart from these there is nothing else:[4] for the things that are put together according to the best proportions, (and) with equal powers, neither rule over, nor are ruled by, each other in turn, so that some receive an increase, others a de-

[1]—[1] Such would, I presume, be the literal meaning of *ἀπαρεγχείρητον*—a word that seems not be found elsewhere. Batteux's version, based on the Latin, "ut nova quadam opera emendari minime debeant," which is adopted likewise by De Gelder, is "qu'il n'aura jamais besoin d'être réparé"—a meaning evidently suggested rather by what the connexion of ideas appears to require, than by the actual derivation of the word.

[2] I have adopted *νοητὸν*, found in the best MS. 1, in lieu of *τῆνο*: for *τῆνο*, in common Greek *κεῖνο* or *ἐκεῖνο*, could not thus follow *τὸ παράδειγμα*.

[3] By comparing the expression *ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεν* a little above, it is evident that we must read here *ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχον* instead of *αὐτῶ περιέχον*.

[4]—[4] I have translated as if the reading were *ἄλλο*, not *ἀλλὰ*—

crease, but they remain in a bond of union indissoluble according to a proportion the very best.

[3.] For when there are three terms whatever, and their intervals are fixed according to the same proportion as regards each other, we then perceive that, after the manner of an extended string,[1] the middle term is to the first, what the third is to it; and (taking) also [2]inversely and by alternation[2]—according to the fitting of their places and order; and it is impossible for every one to arrange numerically[3] these, so as not to have an equality of force. (The world too) is in a good state, as regards its shape and movement; as regards the former, in being a sphere, so that it is similar to itself on all sides, and is able to contain all the rest of shapes of the same kind as itself;[4] as regards the latter, in exhibiting for ever the change dependent on a circle. Now the sphere alone is able in a state of quietness and of motion to preserve a fitness in the same place, so as neither to leave it, nor to receive another place, through its being on every side equally distant from the centre; and, being very smooth to exactness, as regards its external appearance, it has no need of mortal organs, which are fitted to, and carried through, the rest of animals for the sake of their wants. But the soul of the world has (the deity)[5] united with the centre and led it outwards, investing the world wholly with it, and making it a mixture of Form undivided, and of Substance divided, so as to become one mixture from those two; for which (world) he mixed up two forces, the origin of motion, one connected with the

[1] So I have translated *ὁυσμω*, remembering the well-known story of the manner in which Pythagoras discovered harmonical proportions by stretching strings of different lengths; on which see more at length in the Supplementary Note.

[2]—[2] I have followed the reading suggested by De Gelder, *ἀνάπαλιν καὶ ἐναλλάξ*, and confirmed by *κατ' ἐναλλαγὰν—καὶ ἀνάπαλιν* in p. 99, B.

[3] In lieu of *ἀριθμήμεναι*, the best MS. has *ἀριθμῶμενα*: which evidently leads to *ἀριθμῷ θεμέναι*, as I have translated. De Gelder takes *ἀριθμήμεναι* in the sense of *εἰς φιλίαν ἐλθεῖν*, as explained by Hesychius, while referring to Hom. Il. B. 124. But there the sense is "to number;" while, as Soping remarked, the words *εἰς φιλίαν ἐλθεῖν* are the explanation of *'Αρθμήμεναι*.

[4] By *ὁμογενέα* De Gelder understands, with D'Argens, "regular-shaped bodies." Batteux renders more correctly—"les figures du même genre qu'elle."

[5] I have translated, as if *ὁ θεὸς* had dropt out after *μεσόθεν*—

same, the other with the different; which (soul), [1]being mixed with difficulty, was mixed not in the easiest way.[1] Now all these proportions are combined harmonically according to numbers; which proportions he has divided according to a scale scientifically, so that a person is not ignorant of what things and by what means the soul is combined; which the deity has not ranked after the substance of the body,—[2]for, as we say, that which is before is in greater honour as regards both power and time,[2]—but he made it older by taking the first of unities, which is 384.[3] Now of these, the

—[1] To conceal the tautology in *δύσμικτος* and *οὐκ ἐκ τῶ ῥᾴστω συνεκίρνατο*, Batteux translates—"Le mêlange de deux essences étoit difficile, et ne se fit pas sans beaucoup d'art et d'efforts." Perhaps, however, the author wrote, not *συνεκίρνατο*, but *συνεκραίνετο*, to which *συνεκίνατο* in one MS. seems to lead; or else there is some error in *ἐκ τῶ ῥαστῶ*, which are properly omitted in the similar passage of the Tim. p. 35, B., *καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ*.

[2]—[2] So I have translated, by placing *γὰρ*, which is found at present after *πρότερον*, where it is however omitted by the best MS. 1, between *ὥσπερ* and *λέγομες*: for the author alludes to what he had said in p. 94, B. § 2, *τὸ πρεσβύτερον κάρρον ἐστὶ τῶ νεωτέρω*. Vainly, then, does De Gelder produce this passage in proof of an imitation of Plato's language in Tim. p. 34, B. § 12, *τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ, ὡς νῦν, ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν*: for there the author probably wrote—*οὐχ, ὡς οἱ νῦν*—i. e. "like persons of the present day,"—and shortly afterwards—*ἀλλὰ παῖς ἄνους ὥς—ταύτῃ πη καὶ λέγομεν*—i. e. "but we too perhaps speak in this way, like a senseless child,"—in lieu of *ἀλλὰ πως ἡμεῖς—καὶ λέγομεν*— For *πως* could not thus follow *ἀλλὰ*—while the allusion to the child will be best understood by remembering that an Egyptian priest is feigned in Tim. p. 22, B., to have said even to Solon, one of the wise men of Greece, *Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε*.

[3] Why this number should have been fixed upon as the first term, may perhaps be guessed at, from knowing, what is stated by Plutarch, De Anim. Procreat. p. 1020, C., that Plato's first term was 192, the half of 384, which last was adopted by Eudorus, a disciple of Crantor; and hence too we can obtain perhaps a clue, if not to the author of this treatise, at least to the time, when it was probably compiled. With regard to Plato's first term of 192, Plutarch must have learnt the fact from some other source than the Timæus itself, where there is not the most distant allusion to it; unless it be said that in his copy of that treatise there was found the identical number 192, in Greek letters ρ ϟ β, written after *μίαν ἀφεῖλε τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν* in p. 35, B. Be this, however, as it may —for Macrobius, in Somn. Scipion. ii. 2, has translated the passage as it is found at present, without any allusion to a specific number, while Stalbaum, after Boeckh, makes the first term of the series 384, without alluding even to Plutarch—we may perhaps arrive at the reason for the selection of this term, by bearing in mind that 192 is the product of

first being assumed, it is easy to reckon the double and triple; and all the terms, together with their complements and eighths,

16 into 12; where 12 would represent the twelve signs of the Zodiac, or the twelve months of the year, made up of 4 quarters, each consisting of 3 months; while 16 would represent the square of 4; which last number was, as I learn from the erudite treatise of Meursius, "De Denario Pythagorico," who, collecting, as usual, all that can be found in ancient authors on this subject, refers to Hierocles on "The Golden Verses," connected with the four elements of matter, and the four seasons of the year; and probably, I may add, with the four first digits, whose sum made up the Pythagorean Tetractys, or Tetras, according to Procopius Gazæus in Genesin—"Unitas, binarius, ternarius, et quaternarius, inter se additi, denarium constituunt." Nicomachus, however, in Harmonic., says that four represented harmony; and so too does Joannes Protospath. on Hesiod, *ἡ τετρὰς λέγεται Ἁρμονία· ἔχει γὰρ τὸν ἐπίτριτον*: where, from the mention of the musical term *τὸν ἐπίτριτον*, there is an evident allusion to the story about the hammers, which will be discussed more at length in the Supplementary Note, or because it is the common difference between the odd numbers, 3, 7, 11, 15, taken in an arithmetical progression, whose sum makes 36, one $\frac{1}{10}$ of the 360 degrees into which the supposed orbit of the sun was divided, when the months were 10, not, as subsequently, 12. But why the square of 4 was taken instead of 4 itself, may perhaps be explained by supposing that, as the square would be the emblem of the surface of matter at rest, and the circle that of the surface of matter in motion, without which musical sounds cannot exist, the square may be considered as surrounding the circle of musical sounds, and the difference between the semidiagonal of the circumscribing square and the semidiameter of the circumscribed circle, may be taken as the first term of an harmonical scale. For other explanations of the reason, which led to the selection of 384, as the first term of the harmonical series, the reader is referred to Boeckh's "Philolaus," and to Schneider's "Dissertatio de Numero Platonico," quoted by Lindau on Tim. p. 45, who conceives with Plutarch that 384 was selected, as being the lowest number on which it was possible to operate for the eighths continually without the introduction of fractions; while, to understand the whole passage thoroughly, De Gelder says we must adopt, as already remarked by Batteux, *λήμμασι*, found in a Par. MS., in lieu of *συμπληρώμασι*; and that we must add likewise *καὶ ταῖς ἀποτομαῖς* after *καὶ τοῖς ἐπογδόοις*: for otherwise there would be two terms, namely, 2187 and 6561, wanting to complete the series of 36 terms. The proper word, however, was *λεῖμμα*, by which was meant the lesser of two unequal sections, into which a number was divided; as in the case of 7; which, divided into two unequal sections, gives 3 and 4, of which 3 would be called *λεῖμμα*. So too, if between any two notes, taken as extremes, two semitones are introduced, not having the same ratio to their contiguous notes, but represented, for example, respectively by $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{5}$, the semitone represented by the greater number $(\frac{1}{3})$ was called *ἀποτομή*, that by the less $(\frac{1}{5})$ *δίεσις*.

To return, however, to the question about the *τετρακτύς*, I have said that it meant the number 10; which, as it is made up of the four odd numbers, taken in pairs, 1, 9; 3, 7; and of the four even numbers, taken

must amount to 114695; [1]and the divisions likewise are 114695.[1]

similarly, 2, 8; 4, 6, the former of which were the symbols of male powers, and the latter of female, contained in itself all the four powers of each sex to be found in the four quarters of the Universe. Plutarch, however, De Isid. et Osirid. ii. p. 381, F., and again, De Anim. Procreat. ii. p. 1027, E., says that the Tetractys was 36, as being the sum of the four first odd and the four first even numbers. But what could lead Pythagoras to select those numbers, or how, when selected, they would be called *τετρακτὺς*, Plutarch has not told us, nor probably could he have told. Much more reasonable then is the statement of Athenagoras in Apolog., that the Tetractys meant 10; for he had perhaps found in some older writer that it was compounded of *τετρὰς* (4) and *ἑκτὰς* (6), whose sum is 10, and not merely the sum of the first four digits, as stated by Sext. Empiric. iv. p. 332. Hence, since the names for 10 were Κόσμος, Order, Οὐρανὸς, Heaven, Εἱμαρμένη, Destiny. Αἰὼν, Eternity, Πίστις, Confident Belief, Κράτος, Power, Ἀνάγκη, Necessity, and Ἄτλας, the Supporter of Heaven and Earth, as enumerated by one writer, quoted by Meursius De Denario Pythagorico, ch. 12, and by another Θεὸς, God, and Σφαῖρα, a Sphere, we can easily understand the oath of Pythagoras—

> Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν, ἀενάου φωτὸς ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν—

> By my Tetractys, which has given to Soul
> The fount, that feeds of ever-flowing Nature
> The roots—

And hence too we can understand that, when Sextus Empiricus says, Advers. Mathemat. iv. p. 333, *ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρῆσθαι πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεος ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν*, he is drawing an inference, as regards a reason, not stating a simple matter of fact. So too Hierocles in Aur. Carmin, where he identifies the *τετρακτὺς* with *τετρὰς* in the words—*τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἡ τετρὰς ἀνεδήσατο στοιχείων—οὔκ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥίζης καὶ ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται· ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν πάντων καὶ αἰτία ἡ τετράς*—they indulged merely in a conjecture as to the real meaning of *τετρακτὺς*, and in the closing words has improperly attributed to the number (4), what really belonged to the number (10); and so too has Macrobius in Somn. Scipion. i. 6. Stalbaum, however, on Tim. p. 35, B., says that "Tetractys est quatuor membrorum geometricorum complexio;" by which he means, I presume, the combination of the four terms of a geometrical progression. But as he thus loses sight of the letters *-κτυς*, we may dismiss his interpretation without further notice; unless it be said that as *τριακτὸς* is derived from *τριάζω*, so *τετρακτὸς* might come from *τετράζω*, while the verbal termination *-τυς* is similarly found in *φρασ-τὺς* from *φράζ-ω*.

[1]—[1] To meet the objection raised by D'Argens against the repetition of this clause, De Gelder says that the series of numerals, explanatory of the harmonical progressions alluded to, has been omitted by some MSS., although it was duly found in the one used by Aldus, and in that possessed by Proclus, as shown by his Commentary on the Timæus, iii. p. 197.

[4.] God the eternal, the chief ruler of the universe, and its creator, the mind alone beholds; but that which is produced we behold by the sight, both this world and its parts, how many soever they are in heaven; which, as being ethereal, must be divided into kinds; so that[1] some may be of the nature relating to the same, and some to the different. Of which the former lead from without all that are within them, along the general movement from the rising (east) to the setting (west). But the latter, relating to (the nature of) the different (lead) from within[2] the portions, that are carried along from west to east, and are self-moved, and they are whirled round and along, according as it may happen, by the movement of the same, which possesses in the world a superior power. Now the movement of the different, being divided according to an harmonical proportion, assumes the order of seven circles. The Moon, then, as being the nearest to the Earth, exhibits its monthly revolution; but the Sun after her completes his orbit in the period of a year. But there are two [3]that run an equal course[3] with the Sun; namely, (the stars) of Mercury and [4]Juno, which the many call (the star of) Venus[4] and Lucifer. For shepherds and the masses of

But this does not get rid of the objection, touching the word *διαιρέσεις*, "divisions." For though the sum of the series is 114695, the divisions or terms of the series are only 36, as will be seen by the Supplementary Note, taken for the most part from the annotations of Batteux.

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὥστε τὰ*— not *ὡς τὰ*—

[2] To preserve the balance of the sentences, the author probably wrote *ἐντόσθεν τὰ ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας*, to answer to *ἔξωθεν—τὰ ἀπ' ἀνατολᾶς*—not *ἐντὸς ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας τὰ*—

[3—3] De Gelder says that Mercury and Venus are called *ἰσόδρομοι*, because the former was supposed to be distant from the Sun by only one sign of the Zodiac, equal to 30°, and the latter by not more than two; and he refers to Cicero N. D. ii. 20, "Mercurius—a Sole longius nunquam unius signi intervallo discedit—stella Veneris—nunquam a Sole duorum signorum intervallo longius discedit." But he should have referred to Pliny, H. N. ii. 8, who says that Venus performs her annual revolution in 348 days; and as the Earth, or, on the supposition that the Earth is at rest, the Sun completes its revolution in 365 days, Venus and the Sun might be said to be *ἰσόδρομοι*. It must, however, be confessed that a similar solution is not applicable to Mercury. Cicero, in Somn. Scipion., is content to translate *ἰσόδρομοι* by "comites."

[4—4] On these two names, assigned to the same star, De Gelder refers to Pliny N. H. ii. 8, where, speaking of Venus, he says—"in magno nominum ambitu est; alii enim Junonis, alii Isidis, alii Matris Deûm appellavere." and to Pseud.-Aristotle, *περὶ Κόσμου*, § 2, *ὁ τοῦ φωσφόρου*,

mankind are not wise in sacred astronomy, nor skilled in the risings that take place in the west and east. For the same (star) becomes at one time (visible) in the west, when it follows the Sun so far, as not to be hidden by its light; and at another time in the east, when it leads on the Sun and rises before it, and is the herald of day. Hence the star of Venus becomes, through its running together with the Sun, frequently Lucifer, [1]but not always; since[1] there are many (that become so), both of those that are planets and are not; since every star of any magnitude that is seen above the horizon, before the Sun rises, heralds the day. But the three other stars, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, have their peculiar velocities, and[2] unequal years; and they complete their course while making their periods of effulgence,[3] and of being visible, and of obscuration and eclipse, and giving birth to accurate risings and settings. Moreover, they complete their appearances conspicuously in the east or west according to their position as regards the Sun; who during the day exhibits its course from rising (in the east) to setting (in the west); but during the night it makes a movement in another direction from west to east, while it is carried on by the motion of the same; whereas, during the year (it is carried) according to its own inherent motion. From these two kinds of motion it rolls out a spiral, creeping, according to one portion, in the time of a day, but, whirled round under the sphere of the fixed stars, according to each revolution of darkness and day. Now these revolutions men call the portions of time,

ὃν Ἀφροδίτης, οἱ δὲ Ἥρας προσαγορεύουσιν, translated by Apuleius de Mund., "Quintus Phosphorus, Junonia, immo Veneris, stella censetur:" and to Augustine De Civitat. Dei vii. 15, "Luciferum quidam Veneris, quidam dicunt esse Junonis." Hence De Gelder proposes to read Ἑρμᾶ τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτας, τὸν Ἥρας—καλέοντι.

[1]—[1] So we must translate, or else adopt the conjecture of Stephens—οὐκ εἰς δὲ, of which De Gelder approves, in lieu of οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ—

[2] Instead of καὶ ἐνιαυτὼς— Vl. would read κατ' ἐνιαυτὼς—

[3] Here Bekker has edited περικαταλάμψιας with four MSS. But Bateux, Valck., and De Gelder prefer περικαταλάψιας, furnished by a Paris one; by which they understand "over-takings"—referring to Tim. p. 38, D., καταλαμβάνουσί τε καὶ καταλαμβάνονται κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων Ἡλιός τε καὶ ὁ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἑωσφόρος. But as περι would thus in composition seem scarcely intelligible, one would prefer—τὸν δρόμον περὶξ καταλάψιας— and thus the sense would be—"they complete their course around, while making their overtakings."

which the deity has arranged together with the world. For the stars did not exist before in the world; and hence there was neither a year, nor periods of seasons, by which this generated time is measured, and which is the representation of the time not generated, which we call eternity. For as this heaven has been produced according to an eternal pattern, (namely,) the idea-like world, so,[1] according to a pattern, (namely,) eternity, has this time been made together with the world.

[5.] The Earth, fixed at the centre, becomes the hearth[2] of the gods, and the boundary[3] of darkness and day,[4] producing both settings and risings, according to the cuttings off (made by) the things that form the boundary, [5]as we circumscribe by a cutting off the things of earth, sufficient for sight.[5] And it is the oldest of bodies within (the circle of) heaven. And neither has Water at any time been produced without Earth, nor Air without moisture; nor could Fire continue without moisture and the materials which it burns; so that (the Earth) is fixed, as the root and base of all other substances,

[1] All the MSS. but one read *οὕτως ὡς*— But Bekker, on the authority of the best one, 1, has omitted *οὕτως*— He should have read *οὕτως καὶ*— for *ὡς* never thus answers to *ὡς*, only to *οὕτως*; while *καὶ* is thus properly united to the repeated *παράδειγμα*, as I have shown by numerous examples in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 307, and to the passages there quoted I could now add as many more. Further, since we meet with *πρὸς παράδειγμα* in the latter clause, but *ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα* in the former, it is evident that in both the author wrote *ποτὶ*—

[2] De Gelder refers to Ovid, Fast. vi. 299, "Stat vi terra sua; vi stando Vesta vocatur."

[3] In lieu of *ὅρος* Vl. would read *ὦρος*, i. e. *ὁ οὖρος*— referring to Tim. p. 40, C., *γῆν—φύλακα—νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας*· and to Hesych. *Οὖρος— φύλαξ*.

[4] Instead of *ἀμέρας*, four MSS. read *ἄγος*, and so does Simplicius de Cœlo, quoted by Gaisford in Poet. Minor. Græc. I. ii. p. xlvii., which leads to *αὐγῆς*— and if this be the correct reading here, we must alter a little above *ἀμέρας* into *αὐγῆς*.

[5—5] So I have translated, as if the Greek were—*ὡς τᾷ ὄψει ἱκανὰ τᾷ ἀποτομᾷ τὰ τᾶς γᾶς περιγραφόμεθα*, where *περιγραφόμεθα* has been happily found in seven MSS. The author alludes to the custom of persons cutting off the rays of light by placing the fingers of the hand so as to form a kind of tube, when they want to examine a thing correctly. The common text is—*ὡς τᾷ ὄψει και τᾷ ἀποτομᾷ τᾶς γᾶς περιγραφομένα*: which I must leave for those to understand, who can; amongst whom De Gelder is not one; for he proposes to read *περιγραφωέναν*; where I confess myself equally in the dark.

[1]upon its own balance.[1] The principles of things produced are Matter, as the substratum, and Form (in the abstract), as the reason of (each) shape; and the result from these (two) are Earth and Water, and Air and Fire; the creation of which is of this kind. [2](Now) every body is composed of surfaces;[2] and this is (composed) of triangles; of which one is rectangular, the half of a square, with two equal sides; the other, whose sides are all unequal, [3]having the greater angle thrice the size of the lesser; while the least angle in it is the third of a right angle, and the middle one is the double of the least; for it is two parts out of three; but the greatest is a right angle, being one and a half greater than the middle one and the triple of the least.[3] Now this triangle (with all its sides unequal) is the half of an equilateral triangle, cut into two equal parts by a line let down from the apex to the base. Now in each of these triangles there is a right angle; but in one the two sides about the right angle are equal; in the other all the sides are unequal. Now let this be called a scalene (triangle); but the other, the half of a square, (be considered) the principle of the constitution of the Earth. For the square (produced) from this (scalene triangle) is composed of four half-squares; and from such a square is produced the cube, a body the most stationary and steady in every way, having six sides and eight angles; and on this account the Earth is a body the heaviest and most difficult to be moved, and its substance not to be changed into any thing else,[4] through its not having a communion with a triangle of another kind. For the Earth alone has the half-square, as its peculiar element; and this is the element of the (three)[5] other substances, Fire, Air, and Water. For on the half-triangle being put together six times, there is generated

— I have adopted *ἐπὶ τᾷ αὐτᾶς ῥοπᾷ*, as suggested by Toussaint on Cornutus, p. 31, in lieu of *ἐπὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς ῥοπᾶς*, as I learn from De Gelder, who has supported the correction by Phædon, p. 189, A.

[2]—[2] Aristotle, De Cœlo, iii. 1, p. 369, B., quoted by De Gelder, denies that bodies can be formed of plane surfaces merely; an observation that does not apply to Tim. p. 53, C., *τὸ δὲ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος πᾶν καὶ βάθος ἔχει.*

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals Batteux would reject as an interpolation; but they are defended by De Gelder.

[4] I have adopted *ἄλλο*, furnished by three MSS., in lieu of *ἀλλα.*

[5] Batteux, "trois autres elemens—" as if he wished to read *τῶν τριων ἀλλων σωμάτων*— in lieu of *τῶν ἀλλων*—

from it an equilateral (solid) triangle; of which is formed the pyramid, having four faces, and their angles[1] equal, the form of Fire, which is the most easy to be moved, and made up of the finest particles. After this is the octohedron, with eight faces and six angles, the element of Air; and the third is the eikosihedron, with twenty faces and twelve angles, the element of Water, made up of particles the most numerous and heaviest. These then, as being composed of the same element, are changed into each other. But (the deity) has made the dodecahedron, the image of the Universe, as being the nearest to the Sphere. Fire then, by the fineness of its particles, passes through all things; and Air through the rest of things, with the exception of Fire; and Water through Earth. All things are therefore full, and leave no vacuum.[2] But they are brought together by the revolving movement of the Universe, and are pressed against, and rubbed by, each other in turn, and produce the never-failing change from production to destruction.

[6.] By making use of these the deity put together this world, sensible to touch through (the particles of) Earth, and to sight through (those of) Fire; which two are the extremes; but through (the particles of) Air and Water he has bound (the world) together by the strongest chain, namely, proportion; which is able to hold together both itself, and the things kept in subjection through it. Now if the thing bound together is a plane surface, one middle (term) is sufficient; but if a solid, there will be need of two. With two middle terms then he combined two extremes, so that as Fire is to Air, Air might be to Water, and Water to Earth; and by alternation, as Fire is to Water, Air (might be) to Earth; and by inversion, as Earth is to Water, Water (might be) to Air, and Air to Fire; and by alternation, as Earth is to Air, so Water (might be) to Fire. Now since all are equal in power, their ratios are in a state of equality. This world then is one, through the bond of the deity, made according to proportion. Now each of these four substances possesses

[1] Since two MSS. read *τὰς τούτων γωνίας* in lieu of *τὰς ἴσας γωνίας*, the author probably wrote *τὰς τούτων γωνίας ἴσας*— for *ἴσας* might easily have dropt out after *γωνίας*—

[2] This was contrary to the doctrine of Epicurus; for Lucretius says, in i. 30, "est in rebus inane"—quoted by De Gelder.

many forms; Fire, those of Flame, and Burning, and Luminousness, through the inequality of the triangles in each of them. In the same manner, Air is partly clear and dry, and partly turbid[1] and foggy; and Water partly flowing and partly congealed, according as it is Snow, Hoar-frost, Hail, Ice: and that, which is Moist, is, in one respect, flowing, as honey, oil; but in another, is compact, as pitch, wax; and of the forms of what is compact there is a portion fusible, as gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, and purified iron;[2] and a portion friable, as sulphur, pitch, nitre, salt, alum, (and)[3] stones of a similar kind.

[7.] After putting together the world, (the deity) planned the creation of living beings, subject to death, in order that, being perfect himself, he might work it out perfectly according to his image. He mixed up therefore the soul of man out of the same proportions and powers; and, after taking the particles and distributing them, he delivered them over to Nature the alterative. And she, succeeding him in working out living beings both mortal and ephemeral, the soul of whom she [4]brought in flowingly,[4] some from the Moon, others from the Sun, and some too from the other bodies, that wander in the portion of the different, with the exception of one power belonging to the same, which she mixed up in the rational

[1] I have adopted *θολερὸν*, in lieu of *νοτερὸν*, as suggested by Vl., who refers to Tim. p. 58, D., *ἀέρος—ὁ θολερώτατος ὁμίχλη*.

[2] Such is the meaning commonly assigned to *σταγών*, according to Hesych., *Σταγών· ἐν τοῖς μεταλλικοῖς τὸ καθαρὸν σιδήριον*. But De Gelder says that by *σταγὼν* must be meant some metal in a natural state, not one purified artificially. He considers it therefore the same as what Aristotle, De Admirand. Narrat. p. 877, B., calls *κασσίτερος Κελτικὸς*, which the philosopher says is reported to melt quicker than lead. But as the metal, called by itself *κασσίτερος* in ancient times, is supposed to be the tin of Cornwall, in Aristotle's language *κασσίτερος Κελτικὸς*, there would be two words here descriptive of the same metal; unless indeed De Gelder intended, of which he says nothing, to reject *κασσίτερος* as the explanation of *σταγών*. I would rather understand by that word "quick-silver," which generally assumes the form of globular drops.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *λίθοι τε*— not *λίθοι τοι*—

[4—4] Such is the literal version of *ἐπιρρύτως ἐνάγαγε*: which Cornarius, unable, as I confess I am myself, to understand, wished to alter into *ἐπιρρύτως ἐνέσταγε*. But, as *στάζω* and its compounds have no aor. 2, act., had he remembered the expression in Tim. p. 43, A., *τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον*, he would perhaps have suggested, *ὧν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμ' ἄγαγε*, i. e. "whose souls she brought to a body flowed upon."

portion (of the soul), as the image of wisdom in those of a happy fate. [1] Now of the soul of man a portion is rational and intellectual, and a portion irrational and unintellectual; but of the logical the better portion is from the nature of the same, but the worse is from that of the different; and each is seated around the head, so that the other portions of the soul and body may minister to it, as being the uppermost of the whole tabernacle.[2] But of the irrational portion, that which represents passion is around the heart, and that (which represents) desire is around the liver. But the principle of the body and the root of the marrow is the brain, in which is the leadership; and from this, like an effusion,[3] flows through the back-bone[4] what remains, from which are separated the particles for seed and reason:[5] but of the marrow[6] the surrounding defences are the bones; of which the flesh is the covering and concealment. And to the nerves he united joints by ligatures, suited for their movement. And of the internal (members there are) some for the sake of nourishment, and some for safety; and of the movements, some of those from without are conveyed to the intelligent place of perception; but others, not falling under the power of apprehension,[7] are unperceived, either through the bodies affected being too earth-like, or through the movements being too feeble; and

[1] Since Tennemann confesses, as stated by De Gelder, that the origin of the human soul is more clearly explained in this treatise than in the Timæus of Plato, it is hard to understand how the former could be an abridgment of the latter.

[2] On the word *σκῆνος*, as applied to the body, the tabernacle of the soul, see Axioch. p. 366, A. § 5.

[3] Batteux, with the approbation of De Gelder, renders *ἀπόχυμα*, "une espece de liqueur dense."

[4] Instead of *νωτίων*, four MSS. *νωτείων*: which confirms *νωτιαίων*, suggested by Vl., who refers to *νωτιαῖον μυελὸν* in Tim. p. 74, A.

[5] In lieu of the unintelligible *λόγον*, Cornarius suggested *γόνον*, which seems to have been subsequently found in a solitary MS. Φ. To avoid however the tautology in *σπέρμα* and *γόνον*, De Gelder would read *σπερματίδα* (i. e. *φλέβα*) *καὶ γονὴν*, referring *σπερματίδα* to the male, and *γονὴν* to the female; and quoting Galen de Uteri Dissect. t. i. p 210, ed. Bas., *γονὴν δὲ λέγει—αὐτὴν τὴν μήτραν*.

[6] As the marrow is always spoken of in the Timæus in the singular number, Valckenaer on Phœniss. 1085, corrected *μυελῶν* here into *μυελῶ*.

[7] Such seems to be the meaning of *ἀντίλαψιν*: for which however De Gelder would read *ἀνάλαψιν*, forgetting that *ἀντιλαπτικὰν* is used a little below as it is here.

as many, as cause nature to start from itself, are painful; but such as cause it to remain in itself, are called pleasures.

[8.] But amongst the senses the deity has lit up in us the sight for viewing objects in the[1] heavens, and for [2]the reception of knowledge;[2] while as the recipient of speech and melody, he has implanted in us hearing, [3]of which he who is deprived from his birth will become dumb, nor be[3] able to give vent to any portion[4] of speech; and hence persons say that this sense is related the nearest to speech. But as many of the affections of the body, as have a name, are so called with reference to the touch; and some too from their tendency to its seat. For the touch judges of the properties connected with life,[5] (such as) warmth, coldness, dryness, moisture, smoothness, roughness, (and) of things, yielding, opposing, soft, hard. The touch too decides upon what is heavy and light. [6]But reason defines them by their inclination to the middle (of the world) and from the middle.[6] Now men mean the same thing by below and middle. For the centre of a sphere is the below; but that, which is above it to the circumference, is the up. Now what is warm appears to consist of fine particles, and such as cause bodies to separate; but what is cold (consists) of gross particles, and such as cause bodies to condense. The circumstances relating to taste are similar to those (relating) to touch. For by concretion and secretion, and further, by entering the pores and by (assuming) shapes, substances are either rough or smooth. For those that cause the tongue to

[1] With this expression may be compared Ovid's, "Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri Jussit."

[2—2] Hence Milton, in allusion to his blindness, complains of "knowledge at one entrance quite shut out."

[3—3] So I have translated, as if the Greek were, *ἅς ὁ στερισκόμενος ἐκγενέσιος ἐνεὸς ἔσται, οὔτε*—not *ἅς στερισκόμενος ὁ ἄνος οὐδὲ*, where *ὁ* is omitted in one MS., and *οὔτε*, it would seem, read in all. And hence, not only might *ἔσται* have been easily lost before it, but *ἐνεὸς* as easily corrupted into *ἄνος*, i. e. *ἄνθρωπος*. On the loss of *ἐνεὸς* it will be sufficient to refer to Ruhnken's Epist. Crit. p. 212.

[4] The sense evidently requires *λόγου γέ τι*, as I have translated, not *λόγον ἔτι*, where *ἔτι* is without any definite meaning.

[5] Such is the natural translation of *τὰς ζωτικὰς δυνάμιας*. Batteux has, "qualites sensibles:" of which De Gelder approves, and refers to Hesych., *Ζωτικός· οἷος τηρεῖν*. But there *ζωὴν* has evidently dropt out after *τηρεῖν*.

[6—6] In these words there is evidently an allusion to a centripetal and centrifugal force.

melt away or that scrape it, appear to be rough; but those that act moderately in scraping (appear) brackish; but those that inflame or separate the skin, acrid; but their opposites, the smooth and sweet, are reduced to a juicy state.[1] Of smelling the kinds have not been defined; for, from their percolating through narrow pores, that are too stiff to be either brought together or separated, things (seem) to be sweet-smelling or bad-smelling from the putrefaction or concoction[2] of the earth and substances like the earth. But a vocal sound is a percussion in the air, arriving at the soul through the ears; the pores of which proceed, until they reach the liver; and amongst them there is breath, by the movement of which hearing exists. Now of the voice and hearing that portion which is quick, is acute; but that which is slow, is grave; but the medium is the most in harmony. And that which is much and diffused, is great; but that which is little and compressed, is small; and that which is arranged according to musical proportions, is in tune; but that which is unarranged and out of those proportions, is out of tune, and not to be properly adjusted. The fourth kind of things relating to the senses is the most multiform and various, and they are called objects of sight, in which are all kinds of colours, and an infinity of coloured substances; but the principal are four, white, black, brilliant,[3] and red; for all the others are produced from a mix-

[1] Such is the literal meaning of *κεχύλωται*: with which word however De Gelder is so dissatisfied as to propose its rejection. But by comparing Tim. p. 66, C., it would seem rather that something is wanting here.

[2] In lieu of *πέψεσι*, Vl. proposes *τήξεσι*. But that would be a mere tautology after *σάψεσι*.

[3] Batteux renders *λαμπρὸν* "jaune." But such is not the meaning of *λαμπρὸς* elsewhere. That some specific colour is however intended, is evident from the whole tenor of the passage. By comparing then Tim. p. 68, B., *λαμπρόν τε ἐρυθρῷ λευκῷ τε μιγνύμενον ξανθὸν γέγονε*, it would seem that by *λαμπρὸν* was meant a light-blue; for that colour mixed with red and white would make what is now called gambouge, in Greek *ξανθός*. And hence we can understand *λαμπρὸς καὶ φοινικοῦς* quoted from Plutarch by H. Steph. in Thes. *Λαμπρός*. Rudolph indeed on Ocellus Lucanus, p. 20, *πρός τε τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ξανθὸν καὶ λευκὸν*, explains *λαμπρὸν* by *λευκὸν*; and would reject therefore *λευκὸν* as a gl. One would prefer however *γλαυκὸν*, if *λαμπρὸν* means there "white;" but if light-blue, as here, *λευκὸν* must be retained. With regard to the whole tenor of the passage, it is worth while quoting the words of Apuleius de Mundo, "Pictura ex discordibus pigmentorum coloribus, atris,

ture of these. Now what is white causes the vision to expand, but what is black to contract; just as what is warm is able to expand the touching, but what is cold to contract it; and what is rough naturally contracts the tasting, but what is sharp dilates it.

[9.] And (it is natural) for the covering of animals, that live in the air, to be nourished and kept together by the food being distributed by the veins through the whole mass, in the manner of a stream, conveyed as it were by channels, and moistened by the breath,[1] which diffuses it, and carries it to the extremities. And respiration is produced through there being no vacuum in nature, while the air, as it flows in, is inhaled in the place of that which is exhaled, through unseen mouths, through which the drops (of sweat) are visible on the surface; but a portion is got rid of by the natural warmth (of the body). It is necessary then for a portion, equal to what has been got rid of, to be introduced in its place; for, if not, there would be a vacuum; which is impossible: for the animal would no longer be flowing together[2] and one, when the covering had been separated by the vacuum. Now the same organization takes place in the case of lifeless substances, according to the analogy of respiration. For the gourd and amber are the likenesses of respiration. Now the breath flows through the body to an orifice outwards,[3] and is introduced in turn through respiration by the mouth and nostrils, and again, after the manner of the Euripus, is carried

albis, luteis, et puniceis, confusione modica temperatis, imagines iis, quos imitatur, similes facit."

[1] The Greek is *ἀρδομένας ὑπὸ τῶ πνεύματος*: which appears a rather strange collocation of words; and the more so, as Plato in Tim. p. 77, C., has *ἴν' ὥσπερ ἐκ νάματος ἐπιόντος ἄρδοιτο*: by the aid of which passage we may read here *νάματος* for *πνεύματος*—

[2] De Gelder observes that *σύρροον* means here, that "which flows together and coheres," but, in p. 104, A., § 11, *σύρροον*, applied to *πνεῦμα*, means only that "which flows together," without any idea of coherence. But how *τὸ ζῶον* could be said to be *σύρροον*, I confess I cannot understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote—*οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴη κα, κατ σύρροόν γέ τι, ἓν τὸ ζῶον*, i. e. "for the animal would be no longer one, like something that has flowed together,"—instead of *εἴη κα σύρροον καὶ ἓν τὸ ζῶον*.

[3] De Gelder proposes to omit *θύραζε*, as being superfluous after *ἔξω*. He should have rejected rather *ἔξω*, and suggested *θύραθε*, of which *ἔξω* would be the explanation.

in turn to the body, which is extended according to the flowing out. [1]The gourd (too), when the air within it is got rid of by fire, attracts to itself moisture: and amber, when the air is separated from it, receives an equal substance.[1] Now all nourishment is from the heart, as the root, and from the stomach, as a fountain, and is conveyed to the body, to which, if it be moistened by more[2] than what flows out, there is said to be an increase; but if by less, a decay; but the point of perfection is the boundary between those (two), and is considered (to exist) in an equality of efflux and influx; but when the joints of the system are broken, should there be no longer any passage for the breath, or the nourishment be not distributed, the animal dies.

[10.] Now there are many things hurtful to life and the causes of death. One kind is called disease. And of diseases the commencement is the want of harmony between the principal powers, when the simple powers, such as heat, or cold, or moisture, or dryness, are too much or deficient; and after these the turns and alterations of the blood from corruption, and the deterioration of the flesh, when wasting away, should the turns take place according to the changes to what is acid, or brackish, or bitter, in the blood, or wastings away of the flesh. For from hence arises the generation of bile and of phlegm, (and) diseased juices, and the rottenness of liquids, weak indeed, unless deeply seated,[3] but difficult (to cure), when their commencement is generated from the bones, and painful, if in a state of inflammation from the marrow. The last of disorders is (those of) the breath, bile, and phlegm, when they increase and flow into situations foreign to them, or into places inappropriate;[4] for then by laying hold of the situation, belonging to what are better, and by driving away what are congenial, they fix

[1]—[1] There is an allusion to the gourd and amber in Tim. p. 79, E. But in neither passage is it very easy to see what the allusion to either substance is intended to illustrate.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were πλείονι, to which πλεῖον in the best MS. I leads, in lieu of πλείω: and similarly, as if the Greek were not μείω, but μείονι, to which μείων in one MS., and μειῶν in another, seem to lead.

[3] On the phrase ἐν βάθει De Gelder refers to Ælian, V. H. ii. 14, and Clemens Alexandr. Pædag. iii. p. 219, B.

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were ἀποκαιρίως, not ἐπικαιρίως: for which De Gelder would substitute ἐπικηρίως, i. e. "exposed to fatal disorders."

themselves there, injuring the bodies and resolving [1](them) into those very things.[1] These then are the sufferings of the body; and from these are many diseases of the soul, some from one faculty, others from others; of the perceptive (soul the disease is) a difficulty of perception; of the recollecting, a forgetfulness; of the forward, a want of desire and of eagerness;[2] of that subject to affections, a violent suffering and excited madness; of the rational, an indisposition to learn and think. But of wickedness, the commencements are pleasures and pains, desires and fears, inflamed by the body and mixed up with the mind, and are called by various names. For there are loves, and regrets, and desires let loose, and passions on the stretch, and heavy resentments, and appetites of various kinds, and pleasures without measure. [3]In all simplicity, to be unreasonably disposed towards affections and to be under their rule[3] is the limit of virtue and vice; for to abound in them or to be superior to them places us in a good or bad position. Against such impulses the temperament of our bodies is able to co-operate greatly, whether quick or hot, or varied in various ways, by leading us to melancholy and violent lewdness; and certain parts, when affected by a flowing, produce itchings and forms of bodies more like a state of inflammation than of health; through which a sinking of the spirits,[4] and a forgetfulness, and a silliness, and a fearfulness, are worked out.

[11.] Sufficient too are the habits, in which persons are brought up in the city or at home, and their daily food, enervating by luxury the soul or fortifying it for strength. For

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of *ἐς αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλύοντα*. But perspicuity would require rather *ἐς ἀνιάτα*, or something similar.

[2] In lieu of *ἀπροπετία* De Gelder would read *ἀποσιτία*, referring to Galen's Exeges. Hippocrat., *ἀποσιτίας καὶ ἀνορεξίας ποιητικὰ*, and rendering *ἀποσιτία* "cibi fastidium." But that would be rather a bodily than mental affection.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal translation of *ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀτόπως ἔχειν ποτὶ τὰ πάθεα καὶ ἄρχεσθαι*— But as it is no part of virtue "to be unreasonably disposed towards affections," it is evident that no sensible writer could have penned these words, although he might have written, and probably did write, something to this effect—*ἁπλῶς δὲ ἢ ἀτόπως ἔχειν ποτὶ τὰ πάθεα καὶ ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι*— for thus *ἁπλῶς ἔχειν* and *ἄρχειν* would belong to virtue, and *ἀτόπως ἔχειν* and *ἄρχεσθαι* to vice.

[4] In lieu of *δυσθυμίαι* De Gelder would read *δυσμαθίαι*, referring to Tim. p. 87, A., *λήθης ἅμα καὶ δυσμαθίας*.

the living out of doors, and simple[1] fare, and gymnastic exercises, and the morals of companions, produce the greatest effect in the way of virtue and of vice. And these causes are derived from parents and the elements rather than from ourselves, provided there be no remissness on our part in keeping aloof from acts of duty. And for the animal to be in a good condition, it is requisite for the body to possess the better properties under its control, (namely,) health and correct perception, and strength and beauty. Now the principles of beauty are, a symmetry as regards its parts, and as regards the soul. For nature has arranged, like an instrument, the body to be subservient to, and in harmony with, the subjects of life. And it is requisite for the soul likewise to be brought into harmony with its analogous good qualities, (namely,) in the case of temperance, as the body is in the case of health; and in that of prudence, as in the case of correct perception; and in that of fortitude, as in the case of vigour and strength;[2] and in that of justice, as in the case of beauty.[3] Of these the beginning is from nature; but their middle portions and end are from carefulness; those relating to the body, through the gymnastic and medical arts; those to the soul, through instruction and philosophy. For these are the powers that nourish, and give a tone to, the body and soul by means of labour and gymnastic exercise, and a pureness[4] of diet; some through druggings (applied to the body),[5] and others through discipline applied to the soul by means of punishments and reproaches; for by encouragement they give strength and excite to an onward movement, and exhort to advantageous works. The art of the gymnastic trainer,[6] and its nearest

[1] Instead of *ἁπλαῖ* Vl. has suggested *ἀφελεῖς*— If any change is requisite, I should prefer *λιταὶ*—"slight"—which may be supported by the passages quoted by Jacobs in Lection. Stob. p. 24, where *λιτὴ* is united to *δίαιτα*.

[2] To preserve the uniformity of the periods, and to prevent a tautology, we must omit either *ῥώμαν καὶ* or *καὶ ἰσχὺν*—

[3] Here too the balance of the sentences requires the omission of *τὸ σῶμα*, as done in the translation.

[4] Batteux has "purgations"—as if he wished to read *καθαρίσματος*—

[5] Here again the balance of the sentences shows that *τῶν σωμάτων* is required to answer to *τᾶν ψυχᾶν*—

[6] Respecting the business of the *ἀλείπτης*, see my note on Plato Criton. p. 15.

relative, that of the medical man, do, on being ordered to attend upon bodies, bring their powers to the greatest symmetry, and cause the blood to be pure and the breath to flow equably,[1] in order that, if there be any diseased virulence there, the powers of the blood and breath may be in a state of strength; but music, and its leader, philosophy, that have been ordained by the gods[2] and laws for the regulation of the soul, [3]accustom, and persuade, and partly compel,[3] the irrational to obey reason, and the two irrational, passion and desire, to become, the one mild, the other quiet, so as not to be moved without reason, nor to be unmoved when the mind incites either to desire or enjoy something; for this is the definition of temperance, (namely,) docility[4] and firmness. And intelligence and philosophy, the highest in honour, after cleansing (the soul) of false opinions, have introduced knowledge, recalling the mind from excessive ignorance, and setting it free for the contemplation of divine things; in which to occupy oneself with a self-sufficiency, as regards the affairs of man, and with an abundance, for the commensurate period of life, is a happy state.

[12.] Now he, to whom [5]the deity has happened to assign something of a good fate,[5] is led through opinion the most true to the happiest life. But if he be morose and indocile, let the punishment that comes from law and reason, follow him, bringing with it the fears ever on the stretch, both those that proceed from heaven and those from Hades, how that punishments, not to be begged off, are laid up for the unhappy below, and the rest

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πνεῦμ' ἰσόρροον*, not *πνεῦμα σύρροον*.

[2] In lieu of *θεῶν* Vl. has suggested *ἐθῶν*—

[3—3] Such is the literal translation of the Greek—*ἰθίζοντι καὶ πείθοντι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ποταναγκάζοντι*— But as one MS. offers *ἐρίζοντι*, and another *ἐρείζοντι*, and one omits *καὶ πείθοντι*, and four omit *τὰ δὲ*, and two *πείθοντι τὰ δὲ καί*, it is evident that the text has been terribly tampered with; and hence it is not without some hesitation that I am led to believe the author wrote *εἰς ἔριν ζέοντά τινα πείθοντι, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ποταναγκάζοντι*— i. e. "they persuade a person when boiling for a quarrel, or still further compel—" where *εἰς ἔριν ζέοντα* may be compared with *θυμὸν ζέοντι* in Eurip. Hec. 1046.

[4] In lieu of *εὐπείθεια* Vl. proposed to read *εὐπάθεια*— But that would differ only a little from *καρτερία*.

[5—5] So I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὁ δαίμων εὐμοιρίας ἱστάς τι ἔτυχε*, not *ὁ δαίμων μοίρας τᾶσδ' ἔλαχε*: where the deity is said absurdly "to have a share of this fate."

of the things, which I praise the Ionic poet of old for making [1]the crime-defiled (to suffer) for their wickedness.[1] For as we sometimes render bodies sound by means of diseased substances, if they will not yield to the more healthy, so we restrain the soul by false reasoning, if it will not be led by true. And they would be called of necessity strange[2] punishments; since the souls of cowards enter by a change into the bodies of women, [3]who are given to insulting conduct;[3] and those of the blood-stained into the bodies of wild beasts for punishment; and of the lascivious into the forms of sows[4] and boars; and of the light-minded and elated into the shapes of air-traversing birds; and of those who do nothing, learn nothing, and think of nothing, into that of aquatic animals who do nothing. But on all these matters has Nemesis given a judgment at a second period, together with the deities who preside over murderers, and those under the earth, the inspectors of human affairs, to whom god, the leader of all, has intrusted the administration of the world, filled with gods and men, and the rest of living beings, as many as have been made by the demiurgus according to the best image of a form not begotten, and eternal, and to be perceived by the mind.

[1]—[1] The Greek is at present ἐκ παλαιᾶς ποιεῦντα τὼς ἐναγέας: where, since ἐκ παλαιᾶς is perfectly unintelligible, Wyttenbach suggested, what De Gelder has adopted, ἐκπλᾶσαι— But that would be superfluous, thus united to ποιεῦντα— I have therefore translated, as if the text were originally—ἐν ἁπλακίαις ποιεῦντα τῖσαι ἐναγέας. The passage of Homer alluded to is in Οδ. Μ. 571—599.

[2] Wyttenbach, says De Gelder, understood by ξέναι, "new." But such a meaning that word could not bear. In The Church of England Quarterly Review, No. 1, p. 116, I proposed to read 'Ιξιόνειαι—"after the manner of Ixion"—and hence I should have read likewise κατὰ κύκλωσιν, in lieu of ποτὶ κόλασιν shortly afterwards, and have inserted those words between ὡς and μετενδυομέναν: and instead of οὐκ εἰκαίως, I should have proposed εἰκότως. For the allusion is to the revolutions of the wheel, to which Ixion was feigned to be eternally bound; and with which are compared those which the soul in its transmigrations is destined to undergo.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals should be inserted after λάγνων δὲ—for ὕβριν means here not "insolence," but "intemperance in lusts."

[4] To avoid the tautology in συῶν ἢ κάπρων, one would prefer κυνῶν ἢ κάπρων: to which δὲ ὑῶν in one MS. seems to lead; or else συῶν ἢ τράγων. So in Phileb. p. 67, C. § 160. Porphyry seems to have found in his MS. not βόες καὶ ἵπποι, but σύες τε καὶ τράγοι, as Sydenham was the first to remark. We meet indeed with συσὶ κάπροισιν in Ιλ. Ε. 783. But there one would prefer συσὶ καπυροῖσι— Hesych. Καπιρός—ἱερεῖον.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

As the Notes of Batteux, to which reference is made in p. 153, n. —[1], would scarcely furnish all the information requisite for the complete elucidation of this passage, I have introduced some preliminary matter, which, it is hoped, will afford clear notions on a rather difficult subject.

When Pythagoras was endeavouring to discover in respect to sounds a test for the ear, similar to that for the eye in respect to colours, as furnished by a lens, and to that for the hand, in respect to different substances, solid and liquid, by means of measures and weights, he happened to pass by the workshop of a coppersmith, where he heard a variety of sounds, produced by different hammers, as they came in contact with the metal; and after making various experiments, he discovered that the difference in the sounds was according to the weight of the hammers, and not according to the force with which the metal was struck. For the sounds were really the same, though differing in intensity, whether the hammers were wielded by hands more or less powerful; just as a key on the pianoforte gives the same note, but differing only in loudness, whether it be struck by a grown person or a child.

Perceiving thus that certain vibrations were produced in a bar of metal, when struck by different hammers, and suspecting probably that the sound was connected in some measure with such vibrations, he is reported to have noted down the weights of the different hammers, and on his return home to have suspended from a beam, stretched diagonally from two corners of a room, four strings of the same substance, length, and twist; to each of which he attached four weights of 12, 9, 8, and 6 pounds, respectively, which were fastened to the ground. He then struck the strings first singly, and found that the sounds were more or less acute, according as the strings were attached to the less or greater weight; he then struck the two extreme strings, and found that the sound proceeding from the string connected with the greatest weight, was, as compared with the sound proceeding from that connected with the least weight, in the proportion of 2 to 1: and by ringing the changes on the other strings, he found the sounds to be always in proportion to the weights attached to the strings.

His next step, it is said, was to transfer the strings, now called cat-gut, a corruption of cut-gut, to the bridge of a musical instrument, where the bridge answered the purpose of the beam previously used; while, in the place of the weights originally attached to the strings, he invented pegs, around which the strings were wound, and by which they were extended or contracted to the proper pitch, as they are at present in all stringed instruments; and the names assigned to the four strings were, *ὑπάτη*, the highest, *μέση*, the middle, *παραμέση*, near to, but lower than, the middle, and *νεάτη*, the lowest; with which may be compared the four strings that produce the four notes, E, A, D, and G, on the modern violin.

According, however, to Boethius, De Musica, i. 20, this four-stringed lyre was invented even before the time of Orpheus. His words are—"Simplicem principio fuisse musicam refert Nicomachus, adeo ut quatuor nervis tota constaret; idque usque ad Orpheum duravit, ut primus qui-

dem et quartus *diapason* harmoniam (nervi) resonarent—ad imitationem musicæ mundanæ, quæ ex quatuor constat elementis." While Manuel Bryenus in Harmonic. § i. p. 362, carries the invention still higher. For he says that "before the time of Mercury there was a four-stringed lyre, *κατὰ μίμησιν τῆς τῶν στοιχείων τετρακτύος*—where, be it remarked, *τετρακτύος* is used for *τετράδος*—but that Mercury, having joined two systems, formed a seven-stringed lyre;" where, as he says nothing of the other system, one may hazard a conjecture that he had heard of the tradition, mentioned by Diodorus Sic. i. 16, that the first lyre was with only three strings, to answer to the three seasons, called in Greece Ὧραι—

Be, however, the inventors of the four and seven-stringed lyres who they may, it is evident that the latter could not have been applied to any scientific purpose, until the three intermediate notes had been discovered requisite to make up the scale of seven notes; which were called respectively *παρυπάτη*, near to, but under, the highest; *ὑπερμέση*, near to, but above, the middle; and *παρανεάτη*, near to, but above, the lowest; thus making two semitones between the middle and highest. But instead of these semitones having the same ratio to their contiguous primary tones, Pythagoras discovered that they might be represented by a string divided into two unequal parts, bearing the ratio to each other of 243 to 256, (or of 3^4 to 4^4.) And these seven names, invented originally for the seven strings of the lyre, were subsequently applied to the seven planets, when they were considered as giving what was called the music of the spheres.

By what means Pythagoras was enabled to arrive at the proportions, which two unequal semitones bear to each other, has not, as far as I know, been handed down. But he probably got at the fact by carrying out the experiments which led him to discover that, when a string is stretched so as to produce a certain sound, a string of the same thickness and twist, but of half that length, will give an octave higher; the third of that length, a fifth higher; and the eighth, the next note higher. So too if a string of a certain length gives a sound represented by *a*, the next note lower (*b*) will be represented by $a+\frac{1}{8}$, and (*c*) the next lower by $b+\frac{1}{8}$, and so on, except when the series is interrupted by one or more semitones, when instead of $\frac{1}{8}$ another quantity must be substituted, dependent on the ratio which 243 bears to 256.

With these preliminary observations we may turn to the Remarks of Batteux, who has drawn out the series of 36 terms and adjusted them to a musical scale—where the letters in Italics refer to the vocal gamut, and the Roman capitals to the instrumental—after prefacing the series with some observations, from which I will make such extracts as bear directly upon the matter in hand, and this with the greater willingness, as Batteux's little volume is not easily to be met with.

"By an harmonic proportion Timæus understands that of the numbers, which represent the concords in a musical scale. These were amongst the ancients only three. The octave, called diapason,[1] where the lowest note was to the highest as 4 to 2; the fifth, called diapente,[2] in the ratio of 3 to 2; and the fourth, called diatessaron,[3] in the ratio of 4 to 3. To these were added, to complete the intervals of the concords, the single

[1, 2, 3] The word *χορδῶν* is to be supplied after *διὰ πασῶν*, and *διὰ πέντε*, and *διὰ τεσσαρ*

notes, which are in the ratio of 9 to 8, and the semitones in that of 243 to 256.

'Now as the ancients identified the Soul of the world with its movement, the quantity of the movement became in their eyes the measure of the quantity of the Soul; and as the movement appeared to them to be the greatest at the circumference of the Universe, but nothing at the centre, the quantity of the Soul was considered to be the minimum at the centre, but the maximum at the circumference. Hence if the Soul were fixed, like a radius at one end, at the centre, it would, when turned along its whole length through all parts of the Universe, move with greater or less velocity, according as those were nearer to the circumference or centre.

"To understand then how the degrees of velocity were calculated, let us conceive this radius to be divided according to a musical scale; when such a division will represent the degrees, considered harmonically, of the Soul of the world.

"Let then 1 be assumed as the first term of the radius, fixed at the centre, or, to avoid fractions, that would otherwise occur in the calculations connected with the series following, let it be 384.[1] The second, which will be the distance of the next note, will be $384+\frac{1}{8}=432$. The third, $432+\frac{1}{8}=486$. The fourth, being a semitone, will be 512; for as 243 is to 256, so is 486 to 512. The eighth will be 768, the double of 384, or the first octave; and the 36th will be 114695, as shown by the table following:

Mi	E	384 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 432	
Re	D	432 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 486	
Ut	C	486 : 512 :: 243 : 256	
Si	B	512 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 576	
La	A	576 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 648	
Sol	G	648 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 729	
Fa	F	729 : 768 :: 243 : 256	
Mi	E	768 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 864	
Re	D	864 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 972	
Ut	C	972 : 1024 :: 243 : 256	
Si	B	1024 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 1152	
La	A	1152 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 1296	
Sol	G	1296 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 1458	
Fa	F	1458 : 1536 :: 243 : 256	
Mi	E	1536 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 1728	
Re	D	1728 + $\frac{1}{8}$ = 1944	

[1] As this number is the product of $4\times8\times12$, which, taken by themselves, represent an arithmetical progression, whose common difference is 4, it was probably suggested by some circumstances connected with the properties of numbers, taken as the symbols of the phænomena of matter, which only a second Pythagoras would be able to unfold; and a similar observation is applicable to the fact that the ratio of 243 to 256 is that of 3^5 to 4^4; especially if we bear in mind what is stated by Plutarch, De Anim. Procreat. ii. p. 1028, B., respecting Lucifer being represented by 243, and the Sun by 729

Ut	C	[1]1944	: 2048 :: 243 :	256
Si	B	2048	+ 139 = 2187[1]	
[2]*Si*^{b}	B^{b}	2187	: 2304 :: 243 :	256[2]
La	A	2304	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 2592	
Sol	G	2592	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 2916	
Fa	F	2916	: 3072 :: 243 :	256
Mi	E	3072	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 3456	
Re	D	3456	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 3888	
Ut	C	3888	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 4374	
Si^{b}	B^{b}	4374	: 4608 :: 243 :	256
La	A	4608	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 5184	
Sol	G	5184	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 5832	
Fa	F	[3]5832	: 6144 :: 243 :	256
Mi	E	6144	+ 417 = 6561	
Mi^{b}	E^{b}	6561	: 6912[3] :: 243 :	256
Re	D	6912	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 7776	
Ut	C	7776	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 8748	
Si^{b}	B^{b}	8748	: 9216 :: 243 :	256
La	A	9216	+ $\frac{1}{8}$ = 10368	
Sol	G	10368	+ 384 = 27	
	Total	114695		

"That these 36 numbers are those which Timæus had in view, there can be but little doubt; since they fulfil all the conditions he has laid down. For we find there a progression of tones and semitones; of tones, which increase by adding to the number that precedes its eighth to make up the number that is to follow; and of semitones, by finding a number that is to follow, which shall bear to the preceding one the same ratio that 243 does to 256.

"It is requisite however to pay attention to the four numbers, 1944, 2048, 2187, and 2304, where the difference between the first and second is that of a semitone minor (104); and between the second and third of a semitone major (139); while these two semitones united make up 243, the difference between 2187 and 1944, or the equivalent of one tone. But between 2187 (*Si*^{b}) and 2304 (*La*) there is not more than a semitone minor, or the ratio of 243 to 256. And a similar arrangement in the four numbers, 5832, 6144, 6561, and 6912.

"But why were these terms fixed at 36? The reason is to be found in the mysteries of the school of Pythagoras, where it was thought proper

---

[1]—[1] On these two terms Batteux observes—"The difference between 1944 and 2187, is 243. Take away then 139, which the Greeks called an apotomé, from 243, there will remain 104, which they called a lemme. Now 1944+104=2048; and 2048+139=2187:" and why 243 is thus divided into 139 and 104, he has explained shortly afterwards.

[2]—[2] Here again there is something arbitrary in this introduction of a semitone, marked by the same letters of the gamut as the tone itself.

[3]—[3] Batteux's note is, "5832+(the lemme) 312=6144, and 6144+(the apotomé) 417=6912."

to multiply 384, the first assumed term, by 27. But why by 27? Because that number is the sum of the first numbers, which represent lines, surfaces, solids, squares, and cubes, added to unity. Thus, 1 is unity; 2 and 3, the first numbers representing lines; 4 and 9, the first surfaces, and both squares, the former of an even number (2), and the latter of an odd number (3); and lastly, 8 and 27, both representing solids and cubes, the former of an even number (2), and the latter of an odd number (3). Taking then the number 27 as the symbol of the world, and the numbers which it contains as the symbols of the elements and their combinations, it was only reasonable for the Soul of the world, which is the very basis of order and of the combinations, which constitute the world, to be composed of the same elements (of order) as the number 27 is itself."

THE

LIFE OF PLATO,

ACCORDING TO

DIOGENES LAERTIUS.

[1.] PLATO, an Athenian, was the son of Ariston and Perictioné, or Potoné,[1] who carried up her family to Solon. For Solon's brother was Dropides; whose son was Critias, the father of Calæschrus, whose children were Critias, one of the thirty,[2] and Glaucon, from whom were sprung Charmides and Perictioné, of whom and of Ariston Plato was the son, the sixth in descent from Solon, who carried up his genealogy to Neleus and Poseidon. They say that his father likewise carried his family up to Codrus, the son of Melanthus, who, according to Thrasyllus, were historically descended from Poseidon. [2.] But Speusippus, in his work entitled "Plato's Funeral Supper,"[3] and Clearchus, in his "Praise of Plato," and Anaxilides, in the second book "About Philosophers,"

[1] Since the mother of Plato is not called elsewhere Potoné, it would seem, that the name of the daughter (in § 4) has been by some mistake attributed to the parent, contrary to the usual custom of Greece, where girls were never, I believe, called after their mothers, although they were, perhaps, after their grandmothers, just as boys were after their grandfathers. Hence for ἡ Ποτώνης one might read ἐκ or ἀπὸ Ποτώνης—

[2] By "the thirty" are meant "the thirty tyrants," as they were called, who were appointed by Lysander to be the Board of Directors at Athens, after the city had fallen into the power of the Lacedæmonians.

[3] In lieu of περὶ δείπνου, I have adopted περιδείπνῳ, as recommended by Menage. For περίδειπνον, as we learn from Suidas, was a supper in honour of the dead, and one at which it was customary to speak an eulogy on the deceased. Now as Plato died at a marriage feast, according to the account given just afterwards, and alluded to in § 45, it is not difficult to see what was probably the subject of the Περὶ δείπνου written by Speusippus, the nephew of Plato.

state that there was a story at Athens, how that Ariston attempted to violate Perictioné, then in her prime, and not succeeding, beheld, on ceasing from his violence, a vision of Apollo, [1] from which time he kept her undefiled by the rights of marriage until her delivery ;[1] when Plato, says Apollodorus, in his "Chronicles," was born in Ol. 88, on the seventh of Thargelion, (i. e. April,) the day on which the Delians say Apollo was born ; and he died, as Hermippus states, while supping at a marriage feast,[2] in the first year of Ol. 108, having lived 81 years.[3] [3.] But Neanthes says he died in his 84th year. He was therefore younger than Isocrates by 6 years ;[4] who was born in the archonship of Lysimachus ; but Plato in that of Ameinias,[5] during which Pericles died. He was of the ward of Colyttus, as Antileon states in the second book "On Chronology ;" but according to some he was born at Ægina, in the house of Phidiades, the son of Thales, as Phavorinus says in his "Various History," through his father having been sent (thither), together with some others, as an allotment-holder,[6] but who returned to Athens, when those parties were driven out by the Lacedæmonians, who assisted the people of Ægina. He acted moreover as a Choregus, the means being furnished by Dion,[7] as Athenodorus

[1]—[1] The story, told here rather indistinctly by Diogenes, is given more clearly by Plutarch in Sympos. viii. 1, and the other authors quoted by Casaubon and Menage ; from whom it appears, that Plato was said to have been the son of Apollo, and not of Aristo, who married Perictioné, not knowing that she was already pregnant by the god.

[2] But Cicero, de Senect. § 5, says that Plato died while in the act of writing. Here, instead of γάμοις, Clinton in Fast. Hellenic. p. 139, = 149, ed. Krueger, would read γενεθλίοις, "his birthday."

[3] But Athenæus, in v. c. 18, says that Plato died in his 82nd year. The discrepancy in the account of Neanthes is owing, perhaps, to the error of Δ (4) for Α (1) found in the MS. of that author, which Diogenes made use of.

[4] Meursius, De Archont. Athen. iii. 2, would read ζ (7) for ϛ (6), on the authority of Pseudo-Plutarch's Life of Isocrates.

[5] Instead of "Ameinias," Salmasius proposed to read "Ameinon." The word in Diodorus is Epameinondas. But no Athenian, eligible for the Archonship, would have been called by a name with the Doric termination in "das," instead of the Attic in "des." Athenæus has Epameinon. In such a variety of readings, who, asks Menage, can detect the true one ?

[6] On the allotment-holders sent to Ægina, see Thucyd. ii. 27.

[7] The same fact is mentioned by Plutarch likewise, in Dion. p. 964, F., quoted by Casaubon.

states in the eighth book of his "Peripatetics." [4.] He had two brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, and a sister, Potoné, of whom Speusippus was the son. [1]He received his boyhood's education[1] under Dionysius, of whom he makes mention in "The Rivals;" but became a gymnast under the wrestler Ariston of Argos; by whom he was called Plato on account of his fine habit of body, having borne previously the name of Aristocles after his grandfather,[2] as Alexander states in his "Successions;"[3] but some (say) he was called so from [4]the breadth of his interpretation,[4] [5]or because he was of a broad face, as Neanthes asserts.[5] There are also those who state that he wrestled at the Isthmus,[6] as Dicæarchus does in his first book "On Lives;"[7] [5.] and that he paid some attention to painting; and wrote poetry, at first dithyrambs,[8] and subsequently songs and tragedies; and they say[9] he had a thin voice,[10] as Timotheus of Athens states in his work "On Lives." It is said moreover that Socrates saw in a dream

[1]—[1] Such is the proper translation of *ἐπαιδεύθη γράμματα*. For by *γράμματα*, literally "letters," was meant every thing that a boy was taught in his earliest years.

[2] As the name of Aristocles does not appear in the genealogy on the mother's side, the person alluded to was of course the father of Ariston.

[3] By the word "Successions" are to be understood those that occurred in the different schools of philosophy.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of *τὴν πλατύτητα τῆς ἑρμηνείας*, which Menage renders "orationis ubertatem." But such neither is, nor could be, the meaning of *ἑρμηνείας*. Diogenes probably wrote *εἰρωνείας*. For "irony" is the figure of speech constantly adopted by Socrates. Compare Sympos. p. 218, D. *μᾶλα εἰρωνικῶς*. Rep. i. p. 337, A., *ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους*. And thus the expression *ἡ πλατύτης τῆς εἰρωνείας* may be compared with *πλατὺς γέλως*, which Herodian, at the end of Phrynichus, p. 471, ed. Lobeck, says is more elegant than *γέλως πολύς*.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals ought to be placed after *μετωνομάσθη* a little above—for thus the three different reasons, why Plato's name was changed from Aristocles, will be properly assigned to three different authorities.

[6] Where the Isthmian games were celebrated.

[7] Of these Lives by Dicæarchus, a fragment of one has come down to us, under the title of *Βίος Ἑλλάδος*—

[8] Ælian, in V. H. ii. 30, says that Plato first wrote Heroic verses, not Dithyrambs.

[9] Instead of *φάσιν*, "they say," one would prefer *φύσιν*, "by nature." The two words are constantly confounded.

[10] So Menage rightly understands *ἰσχνόφωνος*: although he did not see that in Hesych. *Ἰσχνόφωνος· λεπτόφωνος, ἀπεχόμενος τὴν φώνην*, the correct reading is *κατισχόμενος*—the explanation of *ἰσχόφωνος*.

[1]that he was holding on his knees a cygnet, which became on the instant full-fledged and flew up, singing sweetly;[1] and that the (next) day Plato [2]was placed with him (as a pupil);[2] when he said, "This is the bird."[3] He began his philosophical career in Academia; afterwards in the Garden near Colonus, as Alexander says in his "Successions," on the authority of Heracleitus. Subsequently, however, when about to engage in the contest with a tragedy, he did, after hearing Socrates, commit before the temple of Dionysus,[4] his poems to the flames, saying,

Come hither, Vulcan, Plato has need of thee.[5]

[6.] And from that period they say, being now twenty years old, he became a hearer of Socrates; and when the latter departed (from life),[6] Plato attached himself to Cratylus, the follower of Heracleitus, and to Hermogenes, who adopted the philosophy of Parmenides. Afterwards, when he was 28 years old, as Hermodorus says, he retired to Megara with some other disciples of Socrates to Euclid. Subsequently he went to Cyrené to Theodorus the mathematician; and from thence to Italy to the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus; and from thence to Egypt to the prophets;[7] whither they say that Euripides[8] also followed him, and falling sick there he was cured by the priests with the salt-water cure; from whence he said,[9]

The sea doth wash out all the ills of man.

[7.] And in truth, according to Homer,[10] persons say that all

[1]—[1] This story is told more fully by Apuleius, who says that the cygnet appeared to fly up from the altar of Love, that was in the Academia, before it settled in the bosom of Socrates.

[2]—[2] Such seems to be the meaning of *αὐτῷ συστῆναι*.

[3] The sense seems to require *τὸν ἐν ὀνείρῳ ὄρνιν*, "the bird in the dream:" where *ἐν ὀνείρῳ* might easily have dropt out between *τὸν* and *ὄρνιν*.

[4] I have followed Menage in adopting *Διονυσιακοῦ*, found in MS. Par. and ed. Steph., in lieu of *Ὀλυμπιακοῦ*.

[5] This is a parody of Hom. Ιλ. Σ. 392, where *Θέτις* is the word in the place of *Πλάτων*.

[6] The Greek is merely *ἀπελθόντος*, by an euphemism, similar to that in Soph. Phil. 494, *δέδοικ' ἐγὼ Μή μοι βεβήκοι*, quoted by Casaubon.

[7] These are called "priests" by Cicero, de Finib. v.

[8] This, says Stanley, is an anachronism. For Euripides died before Socrates, after whose death Plato is here said to have visited Egypt.

[9] In Iph. T. 1193. [10] Οδ. Δ. 230.

the Egyptians are physicians. Plato had determined moreover to mingle with the Magi; but on account of the wars then raging in Asia, he swerved from his purpose, and, returning to Athens, passed his time in Academia. Now this was a grove-like gymnasium in the suburbs, so called from a certain hero Academus, as Eupolis says in his "Noncampaigners,"

> In the well-shaded courses[1] of the god,
> (Call'd) Academus.

But Timon likewise, speaking against Plato, says—

> The broadest[2] man led all; but with sweet voice
> He talk'd, [3]the picture of the tettix kind,[3]
> That settling on the trees of Hecademus,
> Their pleasant note pour forth—

for previously it was called, with an E, Hecademia. [8.] The philosopher was likewise a friend of Isocrates; and a disputation, that took place between them on the subject of poets, which occurred in the country, when Isocrates was a guest of Plato, Praxiphanes has put into writing. [4]Aristoxenus moreover states that he served thrice in the army; once at Tanagra; a second time at Corinth; and the third time at Delium, where he obtained a prize for good conduct.[4] In his discourses he has made a mixture of the doctrines of Heracleitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates. For as regards what are perceptible by a sense, he philosophized according to Heracleitus; in what are perceptible by the mind, according to Pythagoras; but in what relates to politics, according to Socrates. [9.] And some, amongst whom is Satyrus, assert

[1] In lieu of *ἐρόμοισι*, Meursius in Exercitat. Critic. ii. 12, would read *δρύμοισι*, answering to "silvas Academi" in Horace.

[2] Instead of *πλατύστατος*, some MSS. read *πλατίστακος*, which seems to lead to *πλατύσκυτος*—where *κύτος* (body) would answer to *μέτωπον* mentioned in § 4, or *τὰ στέρνα* in Hesych. Miles., similar to "latitudo pectoris" in Senec. Epist. 69.

[3]—[3] Such seems to be the meaning of *τέττιξιν ἰσόγραφος*—

[4]—[4] In this account of Plato's serving in the army, it has been shown that either Aristoxenus has been guilty of anachronisms, or else that Diogenes has applied to Plato, what Aristoxenus had probably done to Socrates. For the first battle at Tanagra took place in Ol. 80, 4, seventeen years before Plato was born; that at Delium in Ol. 89, 1, when he was only four years old. He might indeed have been present at the battle near Corinth, if it be the one, to which there seems to be an allusion in Menexen. § 17, compared with Xenophon, Hell. iv. 2, and Demosth. in Leptin. § 41.

that he sent to Dion in Sicily to purchase three Pythagorean treatises from Philolaus for 100 minæ. For they say he was in good circumstances, through having received from Dionysius above 80 talents, as Onestor states in his work entitled, "Whether shall the wise man engage in a money-making business?" To Epicharmus, the comic writer, he was much indebted, and had transcribed very many[2] things (from him), as Alcimus states in his treatises, which are four, addressed to Amyntas; where he says thus in the first—"Plato appears to have spoken[3] much from the writings of Epicharmus. For let us look into the matter. Plato asserts [4]that what is perceptible by a sense, is never permanent either as regards quality or quantity, but is ever in a state of flux and change.[4] [10.] [5]So that from which things should a person take away, these being neither equal, nor of a certain kind, nor possessing quantity nor quality:[5] and these are they, of which there is a generation always, but never a substance; but that is perceptible by mind, from which nothing is taken away or added. Now this of things eternal the nature, which happens to be similar and the same for ever." And in fact Epicharmus has spoken very clearly about things perceptible by a sense and mind.

A. Gods have ever present been, nor ever have they fail'd (to be);
Similar too things present round us,[6] and for ever through the same.
B. Still before the gods 'tis said[7] that Chaos did exist the first.

---

[1] To this purchase Timon alludes in a tristich, preserved by A. Gellius, iii. 17, and thus translated partly by Stanley,

You Plato, with the love of learning caught,
With a great sum a little treatise bought,
Where all, that you have written, you were taught.

[2] So we may translate *τὰ πλεῖστα*, which generally means "the most;" unless it be said that the true reading is *τὰ κάλλιστα*—

[3] In lieu of *λέγων* one would prefer *λαβών*, "to have taken—"

[4—4] Compare Parmenid. § 13.

[5—5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which, I confess, I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Stanley, whose translation is, "as if we should substract number from them, which are neither equal, nor certain, nor quantitive, nor qualitative."

[6] By *τάδε* is meant "the Universe." Compare Plato, Politic. p. 269, B., and Timæus, p. 41, A., *τὸ πᾶν τόδε*.

[7] In Aristoph. *Ὄρν.* 693, and Ovid Met. i. "Ante mare et tellus et, quod tegit omnia cœlum, Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe, Quem dixere Chaos."

A. How? It cannot be that aught should from what's nothing[1] come the first.
B. Nothing came by Zeus, the first; nor second (came) of things that here
We are talking of.
A. And, as they now are, they will aye remain.[2]

[11.]

[3]* * * * * * * * *[3]

A. Should a person[4] to an even number[4] wish to add an odd,
Or to take a sum in pebbles,[5] that is ready to his hand,
[6]Would the number wholly seem to you the same?[6]
B. To me not so.
A. Or if one to a cubit-measure[7] wish'd another length to add,[7]
Or to cut off from the former, would the measure still remain?
B. Not so. A. Well then, cast your eyes thus on mankind; one shows increase;
And decrease one; all through all time are to changes subject found.
But that, which by nature changes never, in the same remains;
But will something different from its form[8] already past become,
And both you and I now flourish different from yesterday;
And again, we by this reason different, not the same, (shall be).[9]

---

[1] By "nothing" is here meant "Chaos," in the language of Ovid, "rudis indigestaque moles."

[2] To get at the sense of this fragment, which has hitherto baffled preceding Scholars, it has been found requisite to change Πῶς δὲ κ' ἀμήχανόν γ' ἀπό τινος μηδὲν ὅττι πρᾶτον μόλοι into Πῶς; ἀμήχανόν γ' ἀπ' οὐδενός τι πρᾶτον ἦν μολόν: and Τῶνδέ γ' ὧν ἄμμες νῦν ὧδε λέγωμεν μέλλει τάδ' εἶναι into Ὧν γε λέγομες· ὡς δὲ νῦν, μέλλει τάδ' αἰὲν ἐμμέναι. Hermann's reading, adopted by Huebner and Ahrens, De Dialect. p. 451, is, Πῶς δ'; ἀμάχανόν γ' ἀπό τινος εἶμεν, ὅττι πρᾶτον μόλοι, and Τῶν δέ γ', ὧν ἄμμες νῦν ὧδε λέγομες, ἀλλὰ τᾷδ' ἔχει, i. e. "How so? It is impossible for what has come first, to be from any thing;" and, "Of these, which we are now speaking of; but they are in this way."

[3]—[3] The asterisks indicate the loss of something, as pointed out by the want of connexion in the ideas.

[4]—[4] In the letters αἱ δὲ λῇς τὸν ἄρτιον, where λῇς is not only superfluous, but at variance with λῇ in the next verse, there seem to lie hid ὧδε γ' εἴς τιν' ἄρτιον: where τιν' is due to Hermann.

[5] Such, I presume, is the meaning of ὑπάρχουσαν.

[6]—[6] In the Greek letters, κατοι και ὁ αυτος, there seem to lie hid πας τοι ποχ αὐτος, as I have translated.

[7]—[7] In lieu of παχὺ ἐὸν, I have adopted Scaliger's splendid restoration παχυαῖον, and rejected with Casaubon στερρὸν before ἕτερον: confirmed by MS. Monac. that omits στερρόν.

[8] I have translated, as if the Greek were, not κ' αὐτὸ δῇ, in some MSS., nor κ' ἀπὸ δῇ, in others, but κ' ἀπ' εἴδους— Hermann's αὐτὸ δῆτα, adopted by Huebner and Ahrens, I cannot understand.

[9] Both the sense and metre prove that the author wrote something

[12.] Alcimus states likewise this too — The wise assert that the soul perceives some things through the body, when, as it were, [1]it hears (or) sees;[1] but on other things it reflects through itself, and makes no use of the body. Hence of things existing, some are perceptible by sense, and some by mind. On which account Plato likewise has said that it is requisite for those, who are desirous of understanding the principles of the Universe, in the first place to preserve ideas separate by themselves, such as similitude, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and rest, and motion; and, secondly, beauty, and goodness, and justice, each taken abstractedly, and to lay down points like these, as the basis (of philosophy). [13.] Thirdly, to take a combined view of ideas, how they exist in relation to each other, such as [2]science, or magnitude, or power,[2] while bearing in mind that [3]what exist with us have, through sharing with them, the same name with them;[3] I mean, for instance, that things are just, inasmuch as they (share) in abstract justice; and things beautiful, inasmuch as they (share) in abstract beauty.[4] Now one of every species is eternal, perceptible by the mind,[5] and moreover insensible to suffering; and hence he asserts that ideas exist, like models in nature; and that the rest of things are assimilated to them, and exist as their resemblances.[6] Now Epicharmus discourses about the good and ideas in this manner.

like Καὖθις ἄλλοι, κοὖ ποχ' αὐτοὶ *μενέομεν* καττὸν λόγον, where *μενέομεν* has been lost accidentally. Hermann and Meineke would insert *τελέθομες*. But a future is required.

[1]—[1] On the power of the soul to see, and hear, and speak, see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 38. With regard to the sense, *ἢ* has evidently dropt out between *ἀκούουσαν* and *βλέπουσαν*.

[2]—[2] I confess I cannot understand what relation can be said to exist between each other in the case of science, magnitude, and dominion. Hence I suspect some words have been lost here; or else that Diogenes has carelessly made the extract from Alcimus; unless it be said that the relation intended is of one science, one magnitude, and one power with another science, magnitude, and power.

[3]—[3] Here again I am at a loss in comprehending all between the numerals.

[4] Had Alcimus read the Hippias Major, he would have seen that there is no such thing as beauty in the abstract, although Hippias pretended to prove the contrary.

[5] I have adopted *νοητὸν*, the correction of Menage, in lieu of *νόημα*.

[6] Stephens says he found somewhere *ὁμοιώματα*, instead of *ὁμοιότατα* which is in three MSS., and *ὁμοιότητες* in MS. Cant.

[14.]

A. Is piping then a thing? B. It is. A. Is man
A piping then? B. By no means. A. Come, then, say
What is a piper? What to you does he seem?
A man? or not? B. Assuredly a man.
A. Seems not the case then to be thus about
The good? that of itself it is a thing;
And he, who learning knows it, good becomes;
Just as a piper, who has learnt to pipe,
Or to dance has a dancer learnt, or some
Weaver to weave, or what you will of trades
Like these, himself's the artist, not the art.

[15.] Now Plato, in the view he takes of ideas, says,[1] that "since there is recollection, ideas exist amongst the things that are, through the recollection being of something, that is in a quiet and permanent state. Now nothing is permanent but ideas. For in what manner, says he, would animals be preserved,[2] that have no connexion with ideas, and which, on this account, have received a mind from nature? and, moreover,[3] they call to recollection their similitude and nourishment, of what kind it is for them, and they show why there is implanted in all animals the contemplation of similitude; from whence they perceive those of a similar kind. How then says Epicharmus?

[16.]

Wisdom, Eumæus,[4] does not with one [5]race
Alone exist.[5] But all that live have mind.[6]
The female race of fowls,[7] if to observe

---

[1] Since Plato, as remarked by Stanley, has no where stated, what Alcimus attributes to him, it is evident that he is merely giving here the substance of what he conceived to be the sentiments of Plato about ideas.

[2] Instead of "be preserved," the sequence of ideas seems to require "preserve any thing in memory;" in Greek, *διεσώζετό τι*, not *διεσώζετο*—

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were not *νῦν*, but *ἅμα*—

[4] From this mention of the Homeric Eumæus Kruseman conceives the fragment to belong to some play, where Ulysses was the hero.

[5]—[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *καθ' ἓν γένος Μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσαπερ*, not *καθ' ἓν μόνον 'Αλλ ὅσσαπερ*—

[6] As one MS. reads *πάντα γνώμαν ἔχει*, it is evident that the author wrote *πάντα τὰν γνώμαν ἔχει*, not *πάντα καὶ*— for the article cannot be dispensed with, and *καὶ* is unintelligible.

[7] With this passage Scaliger aptly compares the fragment of the work of Ennius, called Epicharmus, preserved by Varro de Ling. Latin. iv., "Ova parire solet genu' pennis condecoratum Non animas;" and shortly afterwards, "Inde venit divinitu' pullis insinuans se Ipsa anima."

Attentively you are willing, brings not forth
Its young alive; but, sitting on its eggs,
Makes them a soul possess; and Nature knows
Alone how it gets wisdom, and is taught
[1] The best by her.[1]

And again—

It is no wonder that I speak these words,
And say that [2]*shes* to *hes*[2] are pleasing, and
Seem to be lovely born. For seems not[3] bitch
To dog most lovely? cow to bull? and ass
Female to male? and lovely sow to boar?[4]

[17.] And these or[5] such like statement does Alcimus tack together through his four books, and [6]stamp with the mark of spurious coin[6] the assistance Plato had got from Epicharmus. Now that Epicharmus was not ignorant himself of his own wisdom, may be learnt from those verses in which he foretells the person, who would emulate him—

And I think—[7]for clear to me this thought is[7]—that the memory
Still shall live of these my sayings; and that some one taking them
Shall the measures, which they now have, strip off all; and dressing give
Dyed with purple and hues many, and in language fine invest,
And, himself[8] unconquered, show forth others conquered easily.

[18.] The book of Sophron likewise, the mime-writer, which had been neglected, Plato appears to have brought first to

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πεπαίδευται δ' ἄριστ' αὐτᾶς ὕπο*, not *πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐ ταύτας ὕπο*. Porson, in Miscellan. Critic. p. 277, suggests *αὐταύτας*, i. e. *αὐτὴ αὐτᾶς*. But *πεπαίδευται* is to be referred to *τὸ θῆλυ*, not to *φύσις*.

[2]—[2] From the following examples, where a female animal is said to be pleasing to a male one, it is evident that the author wrote here *αὐτοῖσιν αὐτάς*— not *αὐτοῖσιν αὐτοὺς*— which is perfectly unintelligible.

[3] Since the article is omitted before *βοῦς, ὄνος*, and *ὗς*, so it ought to be before *κύων*. Hence I have translated, as if the word were *οὐ*— and the sentence taken interrogatively.

[4] To complete the verse, we must insert *εἶμεν* after *κάλλιστον*—

[5] Instead of *ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα*, the correct phrase is *ταῦτα ἢ καὶ τοιαῦτα*— as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 114.

[6]—[6] Such is the exact meaning of *παρασημαίνων*.

[7]—[7] I have translated, as if *ὄν*, required by the metre, had dropt out before *ἄμμι*. Hermann's suggestion, *δοκεώ γὰρ ὃ σαφὲς ἀμῖν*, is adopted by Huebner. Clinton in Fast. Hellen. p. xxxvii. ed. 2, would read *δοκεῖ γε μὰν σάφ' ἄμμι τοῦθ', ὅτι*—

[8] I have adopted *δ' αὐτὸς ἄλλους*, as suggested by Toup on Longin § 34.

Athens, and to have modelled the manner [1](of the speakers in his dialogues)[1] after them, which (were said) to have been found under his head. He thrice made a voyage to Sicily; the first time to see the island and the craters (of Ætna),[2] when the tyrant Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates, compelled him to form an acquaintance with himself. But he, after conversing on the subject of tyranny, and asserting that, what was advantageous to him (Dionysius) alone,[3] was not the better thing, unless he excelled in virtue likewise, gave offence to Dionysius; who becoming enraged said (to Plato)—Thy language is that of an old (dotard); and Thine, replied the other, is that of a tyrant. [19.] From whence the tyrant, being much annoyed, was at first eager to destroy him; but, on being subsequently dissuaded by Dion and Aristomenes, he did no such thing; but handed him over to Pollis the Lacedæmonian—who had opportunely come upon an embassy—for the purpose of selling him; who, after carrying Plato to Ægina, was going to sell him; when Charmandrus, the son of Charmandrides, indicted Plato on a capital charge, according to a law laid down amongst the Æginetans,[4] that the first Athenian, who should come upon the island, should perish without the form of a trial. Now it was Charmandrus himself who introduced the law, as Phavorinus states in his "Various History." But on some one saying, in mere joke, that the person, who had landed, was a philosopher, they let him go free; while some say that he was brought before the Ecclesia; and that, guarding himself against saying a word, he was ready to endure whatever might happen; and that they determined not to kill him, but to sell him[5] after the manner of prisoners of war; [20.] when Anniceris of Cyrené, who was accidentally present, ransomed him for 20 minæ,—but some say for 30,—and sent him back to Athens to his friends; who immediately sent out the silver money, which Anniceris declined,

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals have been added for the sake of perspicuity.

[2] In *καὶ τῶν κρατήρων* lie hid either *καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ κρατήρων*, or else *καὶ τῶν Αἰτναίων κρατήρων*—

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτῷ μόνῳ*, not *αὐτῷ μόνον*—

[4] As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῖς* can be directly referred, it is probable that Diogenes wrote *Αἰγινήταις*—

[5] After *πωλεῖν* I have omitted *ἔκριναν*, evidently unnecessary after *δίγνωσαν*.

remarking that "Not they alone were worthy to take care of Plato." But some say that Dion sent the money, which Plato did not accept, (for that purpose,) but to purchase a small garden for himself in Academia. And there is a story that Pollis was defeated by Chabrias, and subsequently [1]swallowed up by the sea at Helicé,[1] through the divine power being angry for his conduct towards the philosopher, as Phavorinus states in the first book of his "Memoirs." [21.] Dionysius did not however remain quiet; but, on learning (his escape), sent to Plato an order not to speak ill of him; who sent word in return, that his leisure was not such as to enable him to recollect even Dionysius. His second trip was to the younger Dionysius, to ask him for some land and persons, who were to live according to his notion of a polity. But Dionysius, although he made a promise to that effect, did not act up to it; and some say that Plato was imperilled, as having persuaded Dion and Theotas[2] to effect the freedom of the island; on which occasion the Pythagorean Archytas begged him off, by writing a letter to Dionysius, and sent him in safety to Athens. And this was the letter.

[22.] ARCHYTAS TO DIONYSIUS—HEALTH.

We all, the friends of Plato, have sent Lamescus and Photidas to receive the man, according to the agreement made by thyself; and [3]thou wouldest do well[3] in remembering that anxiety of thine, when thou didst entreat all of us touching the coming of Plato, and didst beg us to solicit him and to undertake all other matters, and those especially relating to his safety, while remaining and quitting again the port. Remember too how that thou didst set much store by his coming, and that thou didst from that time love him, as thou didst never any one of those near thee. But if any asperity has been produced, it is requisite to act with human feelings, and to restore to us the man unhurt. For by so acting thou wilt do what is just, and gratify us.

[1]—[1] This event took place probably when Helicé itself was swallowed up by the sea, as we learn from Strabo, and Steph. Byz. in Ἑλίκη.

[2] Instead of Θεώταν, Wesseling would read Θεοδότην, referring to Epistol. 3, p. 318, C. and p. 348, and Plutarch in Dion. p. 963. A.

[3]—[3] I have adopted κα ποιοῖς, the suggestion of Emper, instead of καὶ ποιεῖς: where, however, ποιοῖς is due to Menage.

[23.] The third time he came, was to reconcile Dion to Dionysius; but not being successful, he returned to his country, having accomplished nothing. There he meddled not with state affairs, although he was, from what he wrote, a politician; and the reason was, that the people were already habituated to other forms of polity. And Pamphila states in the 25th book of her "Memoirs," that [1]the Arcadians and Thebans, when they were building Megalopolis, called upon him to be their law-giver; but on his learning that they were unwilling to have an equality, he did not go. [24.] (There is a report too) that he accompanied[1] Chabrias the general, when he was put on his trial on a capital charge, and not one of the citizens were willing to do so; and that when Crobylus, the informer, met him, as he was going up to the Acropolis in company with Chabrias, and said, "Are you come to act the pleader for another person, when you are not ignorant that the poison-cup of Socrates is waiting for you?"—he replied —"When I served in the army for my country's sake, I endured dangers; and now for duty's sake I will endure them for a friend."

He was the first who introduced reasoning by asking questions, as Phavorinus states in the eighth book of his "Various History;" and he expounded to Leodamas of Thasus the method of inquiry by analysis; and he first invented for the use of philosophy, the word "Antipodes,"[2] and "Element,"[3] and Dialectic," and "Poems,"[4] and "the Oblong of Number,"[5] and [6]"the Superficial Plane of Boundaries,"[6] and "the Provi-

[1]—[1] Instead of *συνείπετο*, Valckenaer on Eurip. Diatrib. p. 289, suggests *συνεῖπε*, similar to the subsequent *συναγορεύσων*— But see Clinton, Fast. Hellenic. p. 95, ed. 2.

[2] By this Plato meant, as we do now, the persons who live on the other side of the world, and whose feet are opposite to those who live on this.

[3] The word *στοιχεῖον*, "element," says Stanley, was confounded by all philosophers, since the time of Thales, with *ἀρχή*, "principle:" but Plato distinguishes *ἀρχὴ* from *στοιχεῖα*, by considering the former as that which has nothing, from which it might be generated; the latter, as that of things in the first state of being compounded.

[4] In lieu of *ποιήματα*, Menage would read *ποιότητα*. For he probably remembered the passage in Theætet. p. 182, A., *τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα*.

[5] Stanley says that by this expression Plato meant the product of a greater number multiplied by a less; and he refers to Theætet. p. 148, A.

[6]—[6] So far was Plato from introducing the expression, *τὴν ἐπίπεδον*

dence of God." [25.] He was the first of the philosophers who opposed the reasoning of Lysias, the son of Cephalus, by exposing it in detail[1] in his Phædrus; and he first examined theoretically the power of the science of grammar. But, as he first spoke against nearly all before his time, it has been made a subject of inquiry, why he has never mentioned Democritus. On his going up to the Olympic games, Neanthes of Cyzicus says that all the Greeks turned their eyes towards him, when he had a meeting with Dion, then about to lead an army against Dionysius. And it is reported, in the first book of "The Memoirs" of Phavorinus, that Mithridates the Persian put up a statue of Plato in the Academy, with this inscription—

Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, has dedicated to the Muses an image of Plato, which Silanion executed.

[26.] Heracleides says, that when Plato was a young man he was so modest and orderly behaved, that he was never seen to laugh excessively; and though he was such a kind of person, he was scoffed at by the Comic writers. For instance Theopompus in his "Autochares"[2] says thus—

[3]For one is none,
And two, as Plato holds, is scarcely one;[3]

and Anaxandrides too in his "Theseus"—

When olives he devoured, [4]that Plato loves;[4]

and Timon likewise, while thus playing on the letters (of his name)—

[5]As Plato plaits, in plaited[5] wonders skill'd.

ἐπιφάνειαν, that, according to Proclus on Euclid ii., the word *ἐπιφάνεια* is not found in the sense of *ἐπίπεδον*, either in Plato or Aristotle. There is doubtless some error here, which I must leave for others to correct, by the aid of Suidas, *Ἐπιφάνειά ἐστι σώματος πέρας ἢ τὸ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος μόνον ἔχον, βάθος δὲ οὔ*, transcribed from Diogen. L. vii. 135.

[1] Such is the meaning of *κατὰ λέξιν*, literally, "word for word."

[2] Casaubon would read *Ἠδυχάρει* in lieu of *Αὐτοχάρει*—

[3]—[3] This is Stanley's version.

[4]—[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἅς γ' ἐρᾷ Πλάτων*, not *ὥσπερ Πλάτων*, at variance with the metre; which Hermann supported by reading *ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων*.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *Ὡς ἀνέπλαττε Πλάτων, πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς*: where however one would prefer *πλατύσημα τὰ θαύματα*— ω preserve

[27.] Alexis in "Meropis"—

> Thou'rt come in time; since I, in doubtings tost,
> Am walking up and down, and, Plato-like,
> Find nought that's wise, but merely tire my feet;

and in "Ancylion"—

> A. Thou speak'st of what [1]thou knowest not one jot.
> B. Mind has with Plato been a-running.
> A. Know'st thou,[1]
> What is a pound, and [2]onions what?
> B. Not I.[2]

Amphis in "Amphicrates"—

> A. What is the good, which you are about to have
> Through her, I know still less than does my master,
> Of the good in Plato.
> B. Ear then give.

[28.] And in Dexidemides—

> Oh Plato! how thou nothing know'st, except
> To wear a scowling look, and eyebrows raise,
> Like one who's bilious,[3] with a solemn air.

Cratinus in "Pseud-Hypobolimæus"—

> A. Thou art a man, 'tis plain, and hast a soul.
> B. By Plato's doctrine, I know not; but[4] I
> Conceive, at least, I have.

---

the alliteration: and for the same reason I have translated πλαττειν, "to plait," instead of "to mould."

[1]—[1] The Greek is, οἶσθα συγγενὲς τρέχων Πλάτωνι καὶ γνώσει— out of which as it is impossible to extricate a particle of sense, I have translated, as if it were οἶσθα σύ γ' ἔν· Νοῦς ἴσ' ἔτρεχεν Πλάτωνί γ'. Ἡ γνοὺς εἶ— where ἴσ' ἔτρεχεν Πλάτωνι may be compared with ἴσα βαίνων Πυθοκλεῖ, and the other passages quoted by Harpocration in Ἴσα βαίνων, to which Meineke has referred. My νοῦς is partially supported by συγγενοῦς in Hesych. Miles. The slave, who was speaking, professed to be a Platonist.

[2]—[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were, not κρόμμυον, but κρόμμυ'. Οὔ: for it seems hardly likely that onions would be spoken of in the singular number.

[3] How a cockle or a periwinkle, for such is κοχλίας, could be said to raise its eyebrows, I must leave for others to understand. It is above my comprehension. Hence from these letters I have elicited χολικὸς— for a person suffering from the pain of a bilious attack would naturally lift up his eyebrows.

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were οἶδ', ἀλλ' ὑπονοῶ γ' ἔχειν— not οἶδ', ὑπονοῶ δ' ἔχειν— contrary to the metre, where Hermann would read οἶδ', ὑπονοῶ δ' ὧδ' ἔχειν.

Alexis in "Olympiodorus"—

A. My mortal body has become quite dry;
The immortal portion has been lifted up[1]
To the air.
B. This is not from the school of Plato.

And in "The Parasite"—

Or to hold idle talk with Plato staid'st thou?[2]

And Anaxilas likewise makes him his butt in "Botrylion," and "Circé," and "The wealthy women."

[29.] Aristippus too, in his fourth book "On Ancient Luxury," says that he became enamoured of a certain youth, Aster, while studying with him astronomy, and likewise of the before-mentioned Dion; and, some say, of Phædrus too; and that these epigrams, which are from his hands upon them, plainly prove his love.

[3]The stars, my Star, thou see'st. I heaven would be,
That I with many eyes might gaze on thee.[3]

And another—

[4]Like morning star, when living thou wast bright;
Now dead, thou art of eve's pale star the light.[4]

[30.] But on Dion in this manner—

For Hecuba and Troy's matrons tears has Fate
Woven, well suited to their hapless[5] state;
But for thee, Dion, who hadst won the wreath
Of victory by brilliant deeds, the breath

---

[1] In lieu of ἐξῆρε, the sense evidently requires ἐξῆρτο, as I have translated. C. F. Hermann, as I learn from Huebner, would read ἐξῆξε—

[2] For the sake of what seems to be the sense, I have translated, as if the Greek were not καταμόνας, but κατέμενες.

[3—3] This is Stanley's version, slightly altered.

[4—4] Stanley's version is—

A Phosphor 'mongst the living late wert thou;
But shin'st among the dead a Hesper now—

which is rather closer to the original, literally—"Formerly thou didst shine amongst the living, the star in the east; but now, when dead, thou shinest an Hesperus amongst the dead."

It has been thus translated by Shelley;

Thou wert the morning star among the living,
Ere thy fair light had fled;
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving
New splendour to the dead.

[5] I have adopted here the emendation δύσποτμα for δήποτε, which I proposed in "The Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 443.

Of dæmons has blown down hopes built in air,[1]
[2]And all that seem'd for Sicily good and fair;[2]
[3]Thou liest by people honour'd in the grave;[3]
For whom my heart did erst love-madden'd rave.

And this they say was inscribed on Dion's tomb at Syracuse. [31.] They say moreover that, being enamoured of Alexis and Phædrus, as stated above, he acted the poet in this manner—

Alexis, now how great, was then[4] how small!
I merely said—he's pretty; when by all
[5]The boy was stared at; all to him their feet
Turn'd. Why to dogs didst thou, Soul, show their meat?[6]
For this thou'lt sorrow feel.[7] Bird-like[8] e'en so
Did I not lose my Phædrus long ago?

He kept likewise Archæanassa, on whom he made these words—

From Colophon Archæanassa came;
She's mine; and on her wrinkles sits Love's power.
Unhappy ye had run through what a flame!
Who met her [9]blooming in youth's bursting flower.[9]

---

[1] Here too I have translated my own *ἀερίας ἐλπίδας*, in lieu of *εὐρείας ἐλπίδας*.

[2—2] This verse has been introduced, not so much for the rhyme, as to point out the native country of Dion.

[3—3] The original is literally—"Thou liest in thy extensive country, honoured by citizens;" where the expression *εὐρυχόρῳ* is strangely applied to the country round Syracuse, which, as being hilly, is rather contracted than extensive.

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *Νῦν, τότε μηδὲν, Ἀλεξις ὅσον· μόνον*— not *Νῦν, ὅτε μηδὲν Ἀλεξις ὅσον μόνον*— which is perfectly unintelligible, although Apuleius has thus attempted to translate it—"Dixerit hic tantum, cum nil nisi pulcher Alexis Exstitit—" not aware that *εἶφ'* is the first person, *εἶπα*, not the third, *εἶπε*—

[5] The Greek is at present *Ὤπται, καὶ πάντη πᾶς τις*— It was originally *Ὤπται πᾶς πάντη· πᾶς τις*— as I have translated. For though *πάντη πᾶς* would be perfectly correct, yet in that case *τις* would not be added; at least it is not so elsewhere.

[6] Literally "bone."

[7] I have adopted Stephens' *ἀνιήσει* (2nd pers. fut. med.) in lieu of *ἀνιήσει* (3rd pers. fut. act.).

[8] In lieu of *ὕστερον* I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς πτερὸν*— remembering the expression *ὡσεὶ πτερὸν* in Homer, descriptive of a rapid flight.

[9—9] Such is the meaning given by Jacobs to *πρωτοβόλου*, which he has suggested in lieu of *πρωτοπλόου*. Stanley's version is—

To Archæ'nassa, on whose furrow'd brow
Love sits in triumph, I my service vow:

[32.] And these on Agathon—

While kissing Agathon, my soul
I felt upon my lip,
For there it hapless came, I ween,
To take its final trip.[1]

And another[2]—

I pelt thee with an apple; if a love
Thou feel'st, accept the gift, my fair:
And in return—[3]that I the truth may prove—[3]
Grant of thy virgin charms a share.
But if thou think'st, what ne'er may be, (of wrong,)
This counsel take (by lover told):
Thy youthful years consider well; not long
They'll last; and soon thou wilt be old.
I am the apple, that a lover throws;
[4]Consent, ere on us both age sends its snows.[4]

[33.] They say too that the epigram on the Eretrians, who were caught in a net, is his—

[5]We are of the race of Eretria in Eubœa; but near Susa
We are lying. Alas! how far from our own land.[5]

If her declining graces shine so bright,
What flames felt you, who saw her noon of light!

[1] This epigram has been thus translated by Shelley—

Kissing Helena, together
With my kiss, my soul beside it
Came to my lips, and there I kept it,—
For the poor thing had wandered thither,
To follow where the kiss should guide it:
O, cruel I, to intercept it!

[2] Before ἄλλο has evidently dropt out εἰς καλήν, or the name of some female; for to such only would the following epigram be addressed, as shown by Virgil's—"Malo me Galatæa petit, lasciva puella."

[3—3] For the words between the numerals there is no warrant in the original.

[4—4] Literally—"Nod kindly, Xanthippé; I and thou are decaying." Stanley's version is—

An apple I, Love's emblem, at thee throw;
Thou in exchange thy virgin zone bestow.
If thou refuse my suit, yet read in this,
How short thy years; how frail thy beauty is.
I cast the apple; loving, who loves thee,
Xanthippé, yield. For soon both old will be.

[5—5] Stanley's translation is—

We, in Eubœa born, Eretrians are
Buried in Susa, from our country far.

And that one—

[1]The Cyprian (goddess said) to the Muses, "Damsels, Venus
Honour, or I will arm Love against you."
The Muses (replied) to Venus, "These mouthings are for Mars:
That little boy flies not to us."[1]

And another—

[2]A man, on finding gold, left a rope; but he the gold,
Who had left it, not finding, tied (to himself) the rope he found.[2]

[34.] But Molon,[3] who had a feeling of enmity against Plato, observed, that "It was not a wonderful thing for Dionysius to be in Corinth, but for Plato to be in Sicily."[4] Xenophon, too, appears to have been not kindly disposed towards him; for, as if through a love of contention, the two wrote a Symposium, an Apology for Socrates, and Memoirs relating to ethical subjects: further, one wrote a polity, and the other,

With regard to the fact of their being caught in a net, the story is told by Herodotus, vi. 101, and alluded to by Plato in Menex. § 10.

[1]—[1] Stanley's version is—

"Virgins," said Venus to the Muses, "pay
Homage to us, or Love shall wound your hearts."
The Muses answer'd—"Take those toys away;
Our breasts are proof against his childish darts."

Another translation will be found in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 2.

[2]—[2] Stanley's translation of this Epigram, where the terseness of the original defies a modern metrical version, is not the worst attempt that has been hitherto made—

One, finding gold, in change his halter quits;
Missing the gold, t' other the halter knits.

Shelley has translated it thus—

A man, who was about to hang himself,
Finding a purse, then threw away his rope;
The owner coming to reclaim his pelf,
The halter found and used it. So is Hope
Changed for Despair—one laid upon the shelf,
We take the other. Under heaven's high cope
Fortune is god. All you endure and do
Depend on circumstance as much as you.

[3] Instead of ἀλλά τοι Μολων, MS. Cantab. offers ἀλλὰ Τιμολέων, correctly, it would seem; for τοι never, I believe, thus follows τοι.

[4] To understand this remark, it should be borne in mind that Dionysius, after being the tyrant of Syracuse, turned schoolmaster at Corinth, where he could practise the virtues he had been taught by the philosophers, whom he had attracted to his court; whereas Plato would stand a chance of forgetting there all the lessons of virtue he had inculcated upon others.

the education of Cyrus; while Plato in the "Laws" asserts that the education of Cyrus was a fiction; for he was not such a kind of person; and though both make mention of Socrates, neither of them do so of each other, except Xenophon of Plato in the 3rd book of his "Memoirs." [35.] It is reported likewise that Antisthenes, being about to read something he had written, invited Plato to be present; and on Plato asking what he was about to read, he said—[1]On the being to not contradict;[1] when on Plato saying—How then are you writing on this very subject?—and on his showing that Antisthenes was turning round on himself,[2] the latter wrote a dialogue against Plato with the title of "Sathon;" from whence they continued through life estranged from each other. They say, too, that Socrates, on hearing Plato read his Lysis, remarked—How many falsehoods, by Hercules, has this young man told against me! For the man had written not a little that Socrates had never said. [36.] Against Aristippus likewise Plato had a feeling of hatred. At least in his dialogue "On the Soul," he slanders Aristippus, by saying that he was not present at the death of Socrates, but absent in Ægina, although it was close at hand.[3] He had likewise a feeling of rivalry towards Æschines; and they say that, [4]although he was himself in good repute with Dionysius, yet, that Æschines, who had come (to Syracuse) on account of his poverty, was looked down upon by Plato,[4] but was taken under his protection by Aristippus; and Idomeneus asserts that the reasons which Plato assigns to Crito, while consulting (with Socrates) in person about his flight, were those given by Æschines; but that Plato assigned them to Crito through his ill-feeling towards the other party.

[37.] Of himself Plato has no where in his writing made any mention, except in the dialogue "On the Soul," and in the "Apology." Of his dialogues Aristotle says that their

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*: where we must read *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐᾶν ἀντιλέγειν*, "about not permitting a person to contradict," for *εἶναι* and *ἐᾶν* are elsewhere interchanged, as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 120.

[2] Such, I presume, is the proper meaning here of *περιτρέπεσθαι*.

[3] I have translated, as if *οὖσῃ* had dropt out after *συνεγγὺς*—

[4]—[4] I have adopted the emendation, suggested by Wyttenbach on Plutarch Moral. p. 504, ed Ox. = i. p. 407, Lips., who reads *ἐκεῖνον* for *ὃν* before *ἐλθόντα*.

style is between poetry and prose; while Phavorinus states some where, that Aristotle alone remained, when Plato was reading his dialogue "On the Soul;" whereas all the others rose up (and departed). And some affirm that Philip of Opuntium transcribed his "Laws," when still on the wax-tablet; and they say that to Philip belongs the Epinomis. Moreover, Euphorion and Panætius have stated that the commencement of "The Republic" was found to have been frequently turned about,[2] nearly the whole of which, says Aristoxenus, had been written in "The Opposite Reasonings"[3] of Protagoras; [38.] and that the first dialogue he wrote was the Phædrus; for the question mooted there has something of a juvenile character; while Dicæarchus blames the whole manner of writing as being rather gross.[4]

Plato, when he saw a person playing at dice, is reported to have found fault with him; and on the party saying "It was for a trifle," he replied, "But the habit is not a trifle."

On being asked whether any thing of his would be, like those of former men, kept in recollection? he replied, "There is need of a name first; and then there will be many."

On Xenocrates once coming into his house, Plato told him to whip his slave; for he himself was not able, through being in a passion: and to one of his slaves he said, "You would have been flogged, had I not been in a passion."

[39.] After sitting upon horse-back, he got down immediately, observing that he was careful not to be convicted of horse-pride.[5]

To drunkards he recommended to look into a mirror; for they would abstain from conduct so unbecoming: and he said (in the Laws, vi. p. 775, B.) it was not proper to drink to

[1] So I have translated *ἰδέαν*, without any regard to the philosophical meaning attached to that word; which Hermogenes has used in a similar sense in his Criticisms on Demosthenes.

[2] The metaphor in *ἐστραμμένην* will be best understood by Horace's "Sæpe stylum vertas."

[3] Of these "Opposite Reasonings" of Protagoras, some idea may be formed by a perusal of the Pseudo-Platonic Demodocus.

[4] Such is the proper meaning of *φορτικός*. For Dicæarchus, doubtless, saw through the real meaning of that dialogue, of which the Neo-Platonists, judging from Hermias' Commentary, had not the most distant idea.

[5] In the word *ἱπποτυφία* there is a play on *ἵππος*, which, in composition, means "great as a horse." So in English we say, "horse-radish," and "horse-mackerel."

intoxication, except during the festival of the god, who gave wine (to man).

To sleep much was displeasing to him. At least he observes in the "Laws," (vii. p. 808, B.,) that "a person sleeping is worth nothing."

[40.] On the subject of truth he speaks thus in the "Laws," (ii. p. 663, E.,) "A beautiful thing, and enduring, O stranger, is truth: but it seems to be not easy to persuade (persons of this)."

Moreover he thought himself worthy of some memorial being left of him either by his friends or in (his own) books.[1]

He went from place to place for the most part by himself,[2] as some say.

He died in the manner we have mentioned above, in the thirteenth year of the reign of Philip (of Macedon), as Phavorinus states in the third book of his "Memoirs;" and from him (Philip), says Theopompus, he met with some reproof.[3]

Myronianus remarks in his "Similars," that Philo makes mention of the lice of Plato, as if he had died in that way.[4]

[41.] He was buried in[5] Academia, where he had passed the greatest part of his life as a philosopher: from whence his sect was called "The Academaick;" and his funeral was attended by the people there in a body, after he had made his will in this manner:—"Plato has left this property and (thus) disposed of it, (to wit,) the plot of ground in the ward of Hephæstia, on which the road, that leads from the temple in Cephisia, borders on the north side, and on the south the temple of Hercules in Hephæstia, and on the east is Archestratus, the Phrearrian, and on the west Philip, the Chollidean; and let it be lawful for no one to sell it, or to exchange it;

[1] I have inserted "his own." For the remark seems to have been an answer to some person, who probably found fault with Plato for making mention of himself in the "Phædo" and "Apology."

[2] I confess I cannot understand what *αὐτὸς* means here. Perhaps in *καὶ αὐτὸς* lies hid *ἄκλητος*, "uninvited—"

[3] It is to be regretted that Theopompus did not state, or that Diogenes did not transcribe more fully from Theopompus, what and for what was the reproof alluded to.

[4] The subject of "The Similars" of Myronianus may be guessed at by knowing that Pherecydes and others mentioned by Plutarch and Heladius, quoted by Menage, died of the "morbus pediculosus."

[5] Not "in," but "near," says Menage on the authority of Pausanias, *Ἀκαδημίας οὐ πόρρω Πλάτωνος μνῆμά ἐστιν.*

but let it be, as far as is possible,[1] the property of the boy Adeimantus. [42.] Likewise the plot of ground in the parish of Eroiadæ,[2] which I purchased from Callimachus, whose neighbour on the north side is Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, and on the south side Demostratus of Xypeté,[3] on the east Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, on the west the (river) Cephisus. (Likewise) 3 minæ; a silver phial weighing 165 drachms; a boat-(like vessel[4]) weighing 45 (drachms); a gold finger-ring, a gold ear-ring, both together weighing 4 drachms and 3 oboli. Euclides the stone-cutter owes me 3 minæ. I give Artemis[5] her freedom. I leave behind me as domestics, Tycon, Bictas,[6] Apolloniades, Dionysius; [43.] the utensils written down, of which Demetrius has the counterpart writings;[7] and I am in debt to nobody. The executors are

[1] The same formula, to which Casaubon once objected, is found, he says, in the will of Epicurus, and answers to the Latin "quacunque ratione" in Digest. de Legatis iii.

[2, 3] I have adopted *Ἐροιάδων* and *Ξυπετεών*, in lieu of *Ἐρισιάδων* and *Ξυπετέρων*, as suggested by Casaubon: who refers to Steph. Byz. in *Ἐροιάδαι* and *Ξυπέτη*.

[4] In lieu of *κυμβεῖον* we must read *κύμβιον*, as shown by Harpocration in *Κύμβιον*, so called from its similarity in shape to a boat, just as we speak of a "butter-boat."

[5] This seems a strange name for a female slave; and so is Dionysius for a male one.

[6] In lieu of *Βίκταν*, Menage would read *Βιθίαν*, referring to Suidas, *Βιθίας· ὄνομα κύριον*: or rather *Βιτίαν*, remembering in Virgil, Æn. i. 742, "Tum Bitiæ dedit increpitans;" where Servius says that Bitias was a Carthaginian name, as shown by Livy, who mentions a Bitias as a commander of the Punic fleet. It was likewise a Trojan name, says Menage, as shown by Æn. ix. 672, "Pandarus et Bitias Idæo Alcanore creti." But *Βίκτας*, I suspect, is the Latin "*Vict-as*." For B in Greek supplies the place of V in Latin, as shown by *Φαβωρῖνος* and "Phavorinus." And if this be a correct notion, the will would be a forgery, as Stanley seems to have suspected. For he remarks that "if this will be not forged," the assertion of Apuleius is false; who states in his treatise De Dogmat. Platon., "that the patrimony Plato left was a little orchard, adjoining the Academy, two servants, and a cup, wherein he supplicated to the gods, of gold no more than he wore, as an ear-ring, when he was a boy, the emblem of his nativity." The word in the early Latin translation by Ambrosius is "hyctam." From which it is evident that he found in his MS. *νίκταν*— where *ν* is an error for *υ* (i. e. *β*). See my note on Æsch. Eum. 115, in Addend.

[7] By *ἀντίγραφα*, Stanley understands "inventory." The word means rather "the counterpart copies" of a will, as shown by Casaubon and Salmasius, quoted by Menage on Diogen. L. v. 57.

Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus." In this manner did he dispose of his property. And upon him these epigrams were written. The first is—

In temperance and morals just who shone
All men beyond, Aristocles here lies.
If Wisdom ever praise from all has won,
He has won most; and from him Envy flies.

[44.] And another—

Earth in her bosom Plato's body hides;
His soul to the ranks of blest immortals strays:
To Ariston's son the good man, who abides
Far off, for a godlike life[1] due honour pays.

And another of a more recent date—

Why, eagle, hast thou come over a tomb? and of whom is it, say?
And (why) art thou looking to the starry dwelling of the gods?
Of the soul of Plato, that has flown to Olympus,
I am the image; but his earth-born body the land[2] of Attica holds.[3]

[45.] And there is my own to this effect—

[4]Had not Apollo, to the Grecians kind,
To Plato's wit his godlike art resign'd,
Where had we found a cure for human souls?
For as Asclepius by his skill controls

---

[1] Literally, "on beholding a godlike life."

[2] Instead of δὲ τοῦ, Jacobs suggests δὲ γῆ— to which δὲ δὴ in MS. Cant. evidently leads.

[3] Of this epigram there is a metrical translation by T. P. R. in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 27, to which may be added my own—

A. Why, eagle, comest thou o'er this spot? Declare
Whose tomb is here? Why on the starry throne
Of the gods look'st thou? B. To the upper air
The soul of Plato, like a bird, has flown,
Of which I am the image; the remains
Of earth-born body Attic soil retains.

It has also been translated by Shelley—

Eagle! why soarest thou above that tomb?
To what sublime and starry-paved home
Floatest thou?
I am the image of swift Plato's spirit,
Ascending heaven——Athens doth inherit
His corpse below.

[4]—[4] This translation has been slightly altered from the one by Smith in "The Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers, from Diogenes Laertius."

The various pains the body's forced to feel,
So Plato's words the pains of mind can heal.[4]

And another, as to how he died—

Asclepius and Plato Phœbus gave
To man; that one the body's health might save,
The soul's the other. But when down, to grace
A marriage, came the god, and deign'd to trace
The city, that for him had Plato made,
[1] Him off he bore,[1] and in Jove's foot-path placed.

Such are the epigrams.

[46.] His disciples were, Speusippus of Athens, Xenocrates of Chalcedon, Aristotle of Stageira, Philip of Opuntium, Hestiæus of Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus[2] of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of Scepsus, [3]Timolaus of Cyzicum, Euæon[3] of Lampsacus, Bithon[4] and Heracleides of Ænus, Hippothales and Callippus of Athens, Demetrius of Amphipolis, Heracleides of Pontus, and many others; together with whom were two women, Lasthenéa of Mantinéa and Axiothea the Phliasian, who, as Dicæarchus says, put on male attire.[5] And some say that Theophrastus was one of his auditors, and Hyperides, the orator; and Lycurgus, too, says Chamæleon; and Demosthenes in like manner, as Polemon has handed down; [6]what Sabinus too asserts, bringing forward as his authority[6] Mnesistratus of Thasus, in the fourth book of his "Wood of Meditations;" and the thing is likely.

[47.] Now for thee,[7] who art justly fond of Plato, and

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are not in the Greek.

[2] Ælian, in Var. Hist. iii. 19, has *Ἀμύκλας*, which Menage says is more correct. For *-ας* is the Doric termination, which would be adopted in Heraclea, a city said to have been colonized by the people of Megara and Tanagra.

[3]—[3] Instead of *Τιμόλαος*, Athenæus has *Τίμαιος*, in xii. p. 509, A.; and in p. 508, F., *Εὐάγων* instead of *Εὐαίων*, as remarked by the critics here.

[4] The name, says Casaubon, is *Πύθων* in Demosthenes, Aristocrat. p. 659, 27, R., and Plutarch ii. p. 1126, C., to whom Menage adds, Philostratus, V. A. vii. 1; but in Aristot. Polit. v. 10, *Πάρων*, where Victorius would read *Πύθων*. The two brothers were crowned with golden crowns for the good service they had done Athens by destroying Cotys, the tyrant of Thrace.

[5] Axiothea was therefore the strong-minded Bloomer of her day.

[6]—[6] I have adopted Casaubon's correction, *ὃ Σαβῖνος λέγει κατὰ*— in lieu of *Σαβῖνος λέγει καὶ*—

[7] Reinesius, in Var. Lect. ii. 12, with whom Menage agrees, conceives

seekest at the hands of any one soever very zealously the settled opinions of the philosopher, I deem it necessary to delineate both the nature of his reasonings and the order of his dialogues, and the road of his instruction,[1] in a manner, as far as is possible, elementary and reduced to heads, in order that the account of his life may not be without a share of that relating to his settled opinions; for it would be, as they say, [2]bringing an owl to Athens,[2] should it be required to narrate them to thee according to each species.

[48.] They say then that Zeno of Elea first wrote dialogues. But Aristotle, in the first book "About Poets," says it was Alexamenus a Styrian, or Teian, as Phavorinus asserts in his "Memoirs." But it appears to me that Plato would, by having bestowed great care on that kind of writing, justly carry off the first prize, as well for beauty as invention likewise.

Now a dialogue is a conversation, composed of question and answer, upon some of the subjects relating to philosophy or polity, with a becoming representation of the manners of the persons introduced, and [3]the dressing of their diction.[3] But the dialogue-art is that of a conversation, by which [4]we arrange or re-arrange[4] a subject, according to the questions and answers of the parties conversing. [49.] Now of the Platonic dialogue[5] there are two kinds marked of old;[6] the expositive and the inquisitive: and these are divided, the expositive into two other marked kinds, the theoretical and practical; of which the theoretical belongs to the physical and logical;

that the female here alluded to was the Arria mentioned by Pseudo-Galen de Theriac. ad Pison, § 2.

[1] Casaubon, unable to understand *ἐπαγωγῆς*, proposed to read *ἀγωγῆς* I have translated, as if the Greek were *παιδαγωγίας*—

[2—2] As owls seem to have been plentiful at Athens, being sacred to the tutelary deity, the proverb may be compared with the corresponding one in English, "To carry coals to Newcastle."

[3—3] This is perhaps the best translation of *τῆς κατὰ λέξιν κατασκευῆς*: for the words *σκευὴ* and *κατασκευὴ* were technically used to express, what we mean by dressing a character for the stage.

[4—4] The Greek is *ἀνασκευάζομέν τι ἢ κατασκευάζομεν*, with an *ὕστερον πρότερον*, which I have avoided in the version.

[5] Since two MSS. read *τοῦ δὴ λόγου* in lieu of *τοῦ δὲ λόγου*, Huebner correctly suggested *τοῦ δὲ διαλόγου*— what I have adopted.

[6] As *οἱ* is found before *πρῶτοι* just afterwards, so it should be here before *ἀνωτάτω*— to preserve at once the syntax and sense.

but the practical to the ethical and political. And of the inquisitive there are likewise two principal marked kinds; one is [1]after the manner of a fight (with gloves), and the other after that (with fists);[1] and to the former belongs that which is maieutic[2] and tentative; but to the latter that which is detective[3] and eversive.

[50.] It does not however lie hid from us, that some assert that dialogues differ in another manner. For they say that some are dramatic, and some of a narrative, and others of a mixed kind. But such persons have designated the difference in dialogues by a name rather after the manner of tragic writers, than of philosophers.

Now of the physical kind there is the Timæus; of the logical, the Statesman, and Cratylus, and Parmenides, and the Sophist. But of the moral, the Apology, and Crito, and Phædo, and Phædrus, and the Banquet, and Menexenus, and Clitophon, and the Letters,[4] and Philebus, Hipparchus, (and) the Rivals. But of the political, the Republic and Laws, and Minos and the Epinomis, and the Atlantic.[5] [51.] Of the maieutic, the two Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, (and) Laches; of the tentative, Euthyphron, Meno, Ion, Charmides, (and) Theætetus; of the detective one,[6] the Protagoras; and of the eversive, the Euthydemus, the two Hippias, (and) Gorgias. Thus much then suffice it to say on the subject of the dialogue, as to what it is, and what are its different kinds.

But since there is much of factious contention, some asserting that Plato dogmatizes, and others not, come, let us take a part in these matters likewise. Now to dogmatize is to lay

[1]—[1] By this version an English reader will have the best idea of what is meant in Greek by *γυμναστικὸς* and *ἀγωνιστικός*: the latter of which is applied to a real contest, the former to a sham one.

[2] The word *μαιευτικὸς* is literally, "that which belongs to a midwife;" an expression introduced by Socrates, who, being the son of a midwife, said he treated the minds of men, as his mother did the bodies of women, by delivering them respectively of their thoughts and children.

[3] By *ἐνδεικτικὸς* Casaubon understands "the accusatory." But as Plato never, if I rightly remember, brings an accusation against any of his opponents, but merely lays bare their fallacies, I have translated "detective."

[4] It seems rather strange to rank the Letters amongst the moral dialogues. See § 61, and 62.

[5] This is now called more commonly the Critias.

[6] Instead of *ὡς*, I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς*—

down an opinion, just as to legislate is to lay down laws: and the word dogma is applied in both ways, to the thing about which there is an opinion, and to the opinion itself. [52.] Now of these, the thing about which there is an opinion, is a proposition, but the opinion itself is a supposition. Plato then, on subjects which he comprehends, exhibits his opinions; but what is false, he refutes; while on such as are not clear, he holds back. Now on points, that seem to him (to be true), he shows himself through four characters, Socrates, Timæus, the stranger from Athens,[1] and the Eleatic stranger.[2] These strangers are not, however, as some imagine, Plato and Parmenides, but fictitious characters without a name; since, while Plato is detailing what is said by Socrates and Timæus, he is putting forth his own opinions. But he introduces by name,[3] when convicted of false notions, Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus and Gorgias, and Protagoras, and Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and those who are like them. [53.] And while he is putting together his proofs, he makes use of induction for the most part; not however in one form, but two-fold. Now induction is a reasoning that from certain truths (really existing)[4] infers a truth peculiarly[5] similar to itself. Of this induction there are two kinds; one, according to a contrariety, and the other from consequence. That according to contrariety is, when about[6] the whole answer the contrary to what has been asked shall follow; for example—My father is either different from, or the same as, your father. If then your father is different from my father, he would not, as being different from a father, be a father. But if he is the same as my father, he would, as being the same as my father, be my father. [54.] And again—If man is not an animal, he would be stone or wood. Now he is not stone or wood. For he is a thing with life, and is moved by himself. He is

[1] This person is introduced in the Laws.

[2] This character is introduced in the Sophist.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὀνόματι*, not *οἷον*— For thus the persons without a name in some dialogues are opposed to those with a name in others.

[4] The sense evidently requires *τινων ὄντως ἀληθῶν* in the Greek, not *τινων ἀληθῶν*— and so I have translated.

[5] I confess I cannot understand *οἰκείως*— Perhaps the author wrote *εἰκότως*, "reasonably—"

[6] Instead of *περὶ*, "about," one would have expected *παρὰ*, "along—"

then an animal. But if he is an animal, so also is a dog and a bull an animal. [1]A man then, as being an animal, would be a dog or bull.[1] Now this is the kind of induction according to a contrariety [2]and a contest,[2] of which Plato makes use, not to dogmatize, but to confute. But the kind according to a consequence is likewise two-fold; one demonstrating what is sought for in part by means of that which exists in part; the other, rendered credible as a whole by means of that which is taken as a part. The former is suited for oratory; the latter, for logic. For example, in the former it is inquired, whether this man [3]has murdered somebody, a proof being,[3] that he was found at that very time, with blood upon him. [55.] Now this is the oratorical kind of induction, since the orator's art is occupied about particulars, not universals. For it does not make an inquiry about abstract justice, but about things that are just in a particular point of view; but the other is dialectical, through the universal being proved[4] by the particulars. For example, it sought whether the soul is immortal, and whether the living proceed from the dead; which is shown in the dialogue "On the Soul," through something universal, (namely,) that opposites proceed from opposites; and that the Universal is itself composed of particulars; for example, that sleeping proceeds from being awake, and conversely; and that the greater proceeds from the less, and conversely. Now of this kind has Plato made use for building up his own notions.

[56.] And as of old in a tragedy at first the Chorus alone went through the drama, but afterwards Thespis invented one actor to enable the Chorus to be at rest, and Æschylus a second actor, and Sophocles a third, and they thus filled up the tragedy; so in the case of a philosophical discourse, it was formerly of one kind, relating to physics; but Socrates

[1]—[1] The Greek is *εἴη ἂν καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον καὶ κύων καὶ ὁ βοῦς*: where C. F. Hermann was the first to read *εἰη ἂν ἄνθρωπος, ζῶον ὄν*— but he failed to read likewise *ἡ κύων ἢ βοῦς*— similar to *λιθος ἢ ξύλον* just before. And so I have translated. Compare Euthydem. § 62, 63.

[2]—[2] The words *καὶ μάχην* are quite unnecessary here.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀπέκτεινέν τινα, ἀπόδειξις οὖσα*— not *ἀπέκτεινεν· ἀπόδειξις*—

[4] In lieu of *προαποδειχθέντος*, C. F. Hermann would read *προσαποδειχθέντος*— I should prefer the omission of *προ-* were it not difficult to account for its introduction.

added ethics, and Plato dialectics, and he thus worked out philosophy to an end. But Thrasyllus says that Plato put forth his dialogues after the manner of the tragic tetralogy; just as they[1] (the tragedians) contended with four dramas, [2]at the Dionysia, the Lenæa, the Panathenæa, and the Chytri;[2] of which the fourth was a satyric drama; and the four were called a tetralogy. [57.] Now there are, says he, in all fifty-six genuine dialogues of Plato—the Republic, [3]nearly the whole of which, says Phavorinus in the 2nd book of his "Various History," is found in the "Opposite Reasonings" of Protagoras,[3] being divided into ten, and the Laws into twelve, forming nine tetralogies, the Republic occupying the place of one book,[4] and of one book[5] likewise the Laws. And he lays down as the first tetralogy, that which embraces a common argument. For he is desirous of showing of what kind would be the life of a philosopher. And he adopts for each book a double title; one derived from a name, and another from the matter. [58.] In the tetralogy, which is the first, the Euthyphron, or On Holiness, takes the lead; and the dialogue is tentative; the second is The Apology of Socrates, moral; the third, Crito, or About what is to be done, moral; the fourth, Phædon, or About the Soul, moral. The second tetralogy, in which the Cratylus, or On the Rectitude of Names, takes the lead, is logical; the Theætetus, or On Knowledge, tentative; the Sophist, or On the Being, logical; the Statesman, or On Kingly Power, logical. In the third (tetralogy), the Parmenides, or About Ideas, is logical; the Philebus, or On Pleasure, moral; the Banquet, or About Good,[6] moral; the Phædrus, or About Love, moral. [59.] In the fourth (tetralogy), the (first) Alcibiades, or About the

[1] ἐκεῖνοι is to be referred to τραγικοὶ, to be got out of τραγικήν. See Porson on Hec. 22.

[2—2] The words between the numerals are rejected by Wyttenbach in Biblioth. Crit. ii. 3, p. 56, for he knew that tragedies were not performed at the two Panathenaic festivals, nor at the Χύτροι, which was the last day of the Ἀνθεστήρια. Perhaps, however, in the time of Thrasyllus, or even earlier, when Athens ceased to be an independent state, plays were not confined, as formerly, to the Dionysia and Lenæa.

[3—3] The same story told in § 37.

[4, 5] In lieu of βιβλίου one would have expected διαλόγου, to show that the thirty-six dialogues made nine tetralogies.

[6] This title seems strangely mentioned, instead of "About Love—" for such is the subject of the Banquet.

Nature of Man, takes the lead, maieutic; the Second Alcibiades, or About Prayer, maieutic; the Hipparchus, or About the Love of Gain,[1] moral; the Rivals, or About Philosophy, moral. In the fifth (tetralogy), the Theages, or About Philosophy, takes the lead, maieutic; the Charmides, or About Temperance, tentative; the Laches, or About Fortitude, maieutic; the Lysis, or About Friendship, maieutic. In the sixth (tetralogy), the Euthydemus, or the Disputations, takes the lead, eversive; the Protagoras, or the Sophist, detective; the Gorgias, or On the Orator's Art, eversive; the Meno, or On Virtue, tentative. [60.] In the seventh (tetralogy), the two Hippias take the lead; the first, or About the Beautiful; the second, or About Falsehood, (both) eversive; the Ion, or About the Iliad,[2] tentative; the Menexenus, or The Funeral (Oration), moral. In the eighth (tetralogy), the Cleitophon, or the Exhortative, moral; the Republic, or About Justice, political; the Timæus, or About Nature, physical; the Critias, or the Atlantic, moral. In the ninth (tetralogy), the Minos, or About Law, political, takes the lead; the Laws, or About Legislation, political; the Epinomis, or the Night-meeting,[3] or Philosopher, political. [61.] There are thirteen Epistles of a moral kind, on which he inscribed Εὖ πράττειν,[4] but Epicurus Εὖ διάγειν,[5] and Cleon Χαίρειν[6]— one to Aristodemus; two to Archytas; four to Dionysius; one to Hermeias, (and) Erastus, and Coriscus; one to Leodamas; one to Perdiccas; and two to the family-friends of Dion. Such is the division that Thrasyllus makes, and some others. But some, amongst whom is Aristophanes the grammarian, distributed the dialogues into trilogies; and they put down as the first, the one in which the Republic, Timæus, (and) Critias take the lead; as the second, (where) the

[1] I have adopted Περὶ φιλοκέρδους, or, as it should be written, Περὶ φιλοκερδείας, in lieu of ἢ φιλοκερδῆς, to which Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Min. p. 36, objected, not aware that Περὶ φιλοκερδοῦς was found in ed. Steph. and MS. Vindob.

[2] The correct title would be, "About the Rhapsodist's Art."

[3] The "night-meeting" alluded to is mentioned in Epinom. p. 992, D. § 13, but more fully in the Laws, x. p. 909, A. § 15; xii. p. 968, A. § 14.

[4] i. e. "Be prosperous." [5] i. e. "Pass life happily."

[6] i. e. "Rejoice," or "hail." The latter is the usual version; but the other is better suited to the event, which Cleon's letter announced, when he told his countrymen of the surrender of the Spartans at Sphacteria.

Sophist, Statesman, (and) Critias (do so); [62.] as the third, (where) [1]the Laws, Minos,[1] (and) Epinomis; as the fourth, (where) the Theætetus, Euthyphron, (and) Apology; as the fifth, (where) the Criton, Phædon, (and) Epistles;[2] but the rest singly, and in no order. But some, as before stated, begin with the Republic; others from the greater[3] Alcibiades; and others from the Theages; and some, too, from the Euthyphron; others from the Cleitophon; some from the Timæus; some from the Phædrus; and others from the Theætetus; and many make a beginning with the Apology. Of the dialogues, which are rejected as confessedly spurious, there are [4]Midon, the horse-breeder;[4] Eryxias, or Erasistratus; Alcyon;[5] and, the headless,[6] Sisyphus, Axiochus, Phæaces,[7] Demodocus, [8]Chelidon, Hebdomé,[8] Epimenides;[9] of which the Alcyon appears to be Leon's,[10] as Phavorinus says in the fifth book of his "Memoirs."

[63.] He has made use of words with various meanings, so that the business, which he has in hand, might not be easily seen at one view by the uneducated. He considers wisdom to be peculiarly the knowledge of things, perceptible by the mind and existing in reality; which knowledge he says (is conversant) about god, and soul apart from body; but individually he calls [11]philosophy wisdom, as being a longing after the divine wisdom;[11] but commonly all skill is by him

[1]—[1] Boeckh on Pseudo-Platon. Min. p. 32, would place Μίνως before Νόμοι.

[2] How the Epistles could be classed with the Criton and Phædon, it is difficult to understand. See § 50.

[3] The "greater" is used here, it would seem, for the "longer," like the "greater" Hippias.

[4]—[4] Of this dialogue I have spoken sufficiently in the Introduction to it.

[5], [7], [9] Of the Alcyon, and Phæaces, and Epimenides nothing is known but the titles.

[6] The "headless" were so called, from their not having a regular beginning.

[8]—[8] Whether the Χελιδὼν and Ἑβδόμη were one or two dialogues it is impossible to ascertain. I suspect however that the title was Χελιδὼν εὖ δειμαμένη, i. e. "The well-building Swallow."

[10] Menage asks whether to this Leon is to be attributed the dialogue, called Ἀλκύων, found amongst the works of Lucian?

[11]—[11] This remark seems to be founded on Definit. p. 414, B., Φιλοσοφία τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμης ὄρεξις.

designated wisdom; as when he calls the Demiurgus[1] wise. And he makes use of the same word in different senses. For instance, the word φαῦλος is taken by him in the sense of "simple," as it is applied by Euripides in his Licymnius to Hercules, thus—

> Simple, not over-fine, greatly good, cutting off
> In acts all sophistry,[2]
> In the talkings of idlers unpractised.

And sometimes Plato uses it in respect to what is good,[3] and sometimes likewise to what is little. [64.][4] And frequently he applies different nouns to signify the same thing. For example, Idea is both Species, and Genus, and Pattern, and Principle, and Cause. He adopts likewise contrary words to express the same thing. For he calls what is perceptible by the mind, both [5]Entity and Non-entity; Entity, on account of its being generated; Non-entity, on account of its constant change; and likewise Idea, as being neither moved nor at rest; and the Same, and One, and Many.[5] And he is accustomed to do the same in the case of more words.

[65.] The exposition of his reasoning is three-fold. First, it is requisite to show clearly what is each of the points spoken of; next, on what account they are spoken of, whether according to the leading notion, or in the portion of a similitude, and for the building up of the fixed opinion; and thirdly, whether they are spoken of correctly.

But, since some marks are placed in his books, come let us say something about them.

The X is adopted for (peculiar) words and figures of speech, and universally for what is the custom of Plato.

[1] Perhaps the writer alluded to δημιουργὸς σοφὸς in Repub. i. p. 340, E.

[2] Here σοφίαν is taken, like σοφιστὴς, in a bad sense. These verses, descriptive of the character of Hercules, might be applied with equal truth to England's great captain, recently departed; and not less so the language of an unknown author quoted by Suidas in Εὐδικία, to this effect—"The glory, which he had acquired by his victories over enemies, and by his strict justice in times of peace, made him a still more worthy object for all to look upon."

[3] The antithesis requires, as Casaubon saw, κακοῦ, "bad," in lieu of καλοῦ.

[4] This section begins in Menage with χρῆται δὲ, just above.

[5]—[5] See Sophist, § 63 and 91.

The double (line) > is used for the fixed opinions and favourite views of Plato.

The × with dots around, ⁘, for extracts and [1]pretty pieces of writing.[1]

The doubled (line) with dots around, ⩾, for corrections of some kind.

The spit with dots around, ⨪, [2]for the rejections of what is silly.[2]

The antisigma[3] with dots around, ⊃, [4]for the two uses and change in the position of the writings.[4]

The thunderbolt ↓ for the leading to philosophy.

The asterisk * for the agreement in fixed opinions.

The spit ⎯ for the rejection (of matter).

Such are the marks, and so many the books, which, says Antigonus in his work "On Zeno," when recently published, if a person wished [5]to read and know thoroughly,[5] he paid to their owners for the hire of them.

[67.] His favourite notions were these. He said that the soul was immortal, and invested itself with many bodies,[6] and that its principle was in [7]arithmetic, but that of the body in geometry;[7] and he defined it as the form of a spirit standing [8]altogether apart;[8] and that it is self-moved;[9] and is tripartite; [10]for that its rational portion is seated about the head; its irascible about the heart; and its concupiscible about the

[1]—[1] Such, I presume, is the sense here of καλλιγραφίας: which elsewhere means the mechanical act of writing beautifully.

[2]—[2] Unable to understand πρὸς τὰς εἰκαίους ἀθετήσεις, I have translated, as if the Greek were πρὸς τὰς τοῦ εἰκαίου ἀθετήσεις.

[3] The mark) is called anti-sigma, because it is the contrary to (; for so that letter was sometimes written of old.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek πρὸς τὰς διττὰς χρήσεις καὶ μεταθέσεις τῶν γραφῶν— which I must leave for others to understand, or correct, if they can.

[5]—[5] Instead of διαγνῶναι, Casaubon proposed to read ἀναγνῶναι, found subsequently in a Paris MS., as Menage testifies. I have translated, as if the author had written ἀναγνῶναι καὶ διαγνῶναι.

[6] This is stated in Phædon, p. 87, B.

[7]—[7] I do not remember where Plato thus describes the soul and body.

[8]—[8] In the words τοῦ πάντη διεστῶτος— there is probably a lacuna to be thus supplied—τοῦ ἀπὸ παντὸς πάντη διεστῶτος, i. e. "standing apart from every thing on every side."

[9] This is the leading doctrine, on which the immortality of the soul is based in the Phædon.

[10]—[10] See Rep. p. 580, D., which Cicero in Tuscul. i. had in mind.

navel and liver;[10] [68.] and that (proceeding)[1] from the middle [2]it embraces entirely (as) in a circle the body; and that it is composed of the elements; and that, divided according to harmonic intervals, it forms two circles united together; of which the inner circle, being divided into six parts, makes seven circles in all; and that this lies along a diameter towards the left from within; but the outer along a side towards the right; on which account it rules, as being one; for the other is divided from within;[2] and that one circle belongs to the same, and the others to the different; (and he asserts) that this[3] movement is of the soul, but that of the Universe, and the carrying round of the planets; [69.] and that (the soul),[4] after the division had thus taken place from the middle and was fitted to it at the extremes, knows the things that exist, and adjusts them, through its possessing in itself the elements according to harmony: and that opinion is produced, according to the circle of the different proceeding correctly,[5] but knowledge, according to that of the same. And he showed that of all existing things there are two principles, god, which he calls likewise mind and cause, and matter;[6] but that matter is without form and boundless,[7] from which are produced coalitions; and that, being formerly moved in no order, it

[1] I have translated, as if *ἰοῦσαν* had dropt out after *μέσου*—

[2—2] Aldobrandinus has shown that all this is to be referred to the soul of the world, as delineated in the Timæus; and he might have added, that much of this abridgment, taken by itself, is a mass of unmeaning words; for the writer had evidently only a vague idea of what Plato himself has not expressed in the most intelligible manner.

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὴν*, not *τὸν*, which has nothing to which it can be referred; while *τὴν* belongs to *κίνησιν*—

[4] I have introduced "the soul," conceiving that the author wrote *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν, οὕτως ἐχούσης*— not *οὕτω δ' ἐχούσης*-- for otherwise the subsequent *αὐτῇ* would want its substantive.

[5] C. F. Hermann reads *ὀρθούμενον* instead of *ὀρθουμένου*, doubtless remembering the expression *ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰὼν* in Tim. p. 37, B.

[6] Since the words *καὶ ὕλην* could not be interposed between *θεὸν* and *ὄν*, I have translated, as if they ended the sentence.

[7] In lieu of *ἄπειρον*, Menage would read *ἄποιον*— referring to Cicero in Academ., "Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate materiam—" and to Origen in Philosophics—*τὴν δὲ ὕλην δυνάμει μὲν σῶμα, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδέπω· ἀσχημάτιστον γὰρ αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἄποιον, προσλαβοῦσαν σχήματα καὶ ποιότητας, γενέσθαι σῶμα*—a work, which Menage describes as being then unedited, but which has been given to the world by Miller at Oxford in 1851.

was brought to one spot by the deity, who considered order to be better than disorder.[1] [70.] And (he said) that this existence (of matter) is to be resolved into four elements, fire, water, air, earth; from which both the world and what is in it are generated; but that the earth alone is unchangeable, assigning as a reason, the difference in the forms, of which it is composed; for of all the others he says the forms are homogenous; for they are all composed from one [2]triangle, whose sides are longer one than the other;[2] but the form of the earth is peculiar to itself. For the element of fire is pyramidal; that of air, octohedral;[3] and that of water, eikosihedral;[4] but that of earth, cubical; from whence the earth neither changes into them, nor they into the earth. [71.] [5]And that each is not separated into its own place; because the circular movement, by compressing and bringing things to the centre, causes the small particles to coalesce; but separates the large; from whence the species, as they change themselves, change likewise their places.[5] And that the world is one, (and) generated; since it has been made by the deity, perceptible by mind; and that it is animated,[6] in consequence of that, which is animated, being superior to that, which is not animated; and that this is laid down as the workmanship of the best cause; and that it was made one and not boundless; because one likewise was the model, by which he fabricated it. [72.] [7]And that it is spherical; because he, who produced it, has that form; for that (the world) contains the rest of living beings;[7] but this (the deity) the forms of all things; and that it (the world) is smooth, [8]in a circle, and possesses no organs,[8] on account of there being no use for them; moreover that the world will continue[9] undestroyed,

[1] See Timæus, p. 30, A.

[2]—[2] On this *πρόμηκες τρίγωνον* see Timæus, p. 54, A. Such a triangle is now called scalene.

[3], [4] i. e. one with eight, and the other with twenty sides. See Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 98, D., for this is not stated distinctly in the Tim. of Plato.

[5]—[5] See Timæus, p. 58, A.

[6] See Timæus, p. 32, B. [7]—[7] See Timæus, p. 32, B.

[8]—[8] I have translated, as if the Greek were *λεῖον δὲ κύκλῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ὄργανον ἔχοντα*— not *λεῖον δὲ καὶ οὐδὲν ὄργανον ἔχοντα κύκλῳ*— For the passage in the Timæus, p. 32, C., is *λεῖον δὲ δὴ κύκλῳ—ἀπηκριβοῦτο—ὀμμάτων τε γὰρ ἐπεδεῖτο οὐδὲν—οὐδὲ ἀκοῆς*—

[9] I have adopted *διαμενεῖν*, as suggested by Casaubon, in lieu of *διαμένειν*.

on account of its being not resolved [1]into the deity.[1] Moreover that the deity is the cause of the whole of generation; because the good is naturally the doer of good; and that the best is the cause of the generation of heaven; for that the best of things perceived by the mind is the cause of the most beautiful of things generated; so that, since such is the deity, heaven is like the best, as being the most beautiful; and it would be like not one of things generated, but the deity (alone).[2] [73.] And that the world is composed of fire, water, air, (and) earth; of fire, that it might be visible; and of earth, that it might be solid; of water and air, that it might be according to a proportion—[3]for the powers of solid substances have a proportion by two middle terms—so that the whole might become one[3]—and that from all together it might be perfect and undestroyed. And that time is the image of eternity;[4] and that this remains for ever; but that time is the movement of the heaven; for that night, and day, and month, and all such things, are parts of time; and hence [5]time would not be without the natural movement of the world;[5] for that as soon as [6]a movement took place in it,[6] time was; and that for the generation of time, the sun and moon and planets were generated. [74.][7] And that the number of the seasons might be very plain, and living things have a share in number, (he says) that the deity lit up the light of the sun;[8] and that the moon is above the circle of the earth, and the sun in that, which is near to it; and the

[1]—[1] The MS., which Ambrosius used, seems to have read *εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν*, not *εἰς τὸ θεόν*, as remarked by Casaubon.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ*— not *ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ θεῷ*.

[3]—[3] See Timæus, p. 32, B.

[4] In lieu of *τοῦ ἀϊδίου*, the syntax and sense require *τοῦ αἰῶνος*— the former, because the following *κἀκεῖνον* ought to be *κἀκεῖνο*, the latter, because Plato's expression in Timæus, p. 36, D. is *εἰκὼ—αἰῶνος—ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν*.

[5]—[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου φυσικῆς κινήσεως οὐκ ἂν εἶναι χρόνον*— not *ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου φύσεως οὐκ εἶναι χρόνον*: for time is the measure of matter in motion, and has nothing to do with the nature of the world in a state of rest. Hence too in [6]—[6] I suspect that *κίνησιν* has been lost before *καὶ*— and if so, we need not alter *αὐτῷ* into *αὐτὸν*, as suggested by Casaubon.

[7] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *πρὸς δὲ*—

[8] See Timæus, p. 39, B.

planets in the circles above; and that it (the world) is altogether animated, through its being bound to an animated motion; and, in order that the world might be rendered perfect, after being generated similar[1] to the living being perceptible by the mind, that the nature of the rest of living beings was generated; [2]and that since it possessed,[2] it was requisite for heaven likewise to possess; and that it possessed therefore gods for the most part of fire;[3] and that the other races are three, on wing, in the water, and on land. And that the earth is the oldest of the gods[4] in heaven; and that it is a piece of workmanship for[5] producing night and day; and that being at the centre it is moved about the centre. [75.][6] And since there are two causes, we must say, he asserts, that some things exist through mind,[7] and some from a necessitous cause; and that these are air, fire, earth, water; and that they are not exactly elements, but recipients; and that these exist from triangles put together, and are resolved

[1] The Greek is at present *ὁμοίως*— It was originally, I suspect, *ὅμοιος* —what I have translated.

[2]—[2] Since there is nothing to serve as the object of *εἶχε*, we must probably read *ἐπεὶ δὲ νοῦν ἐκεῖνος εἶχε*— instead of *ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖνος εἶχε*— Opportunely then has the Latin version—"Quoniam igitur ille mentem habebat—"

[3] This can be understood only by finding in the Timæus, p. 40, A. § 15, *τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπειργάζετο*: while, instead of *ἔχειν*, Ambrosius seems to have found *εἶναι*, as remarked by Casaubon.

[4] From Cicero's version of the Timæus, p. 40, C. § 15, *γῆν δὲ—εἰλουμένην περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον φυλάκα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι*, "Terram—quæ trajecto axe sustinetur, diei noctisque effectricem eamdemque custodem antiquissimam corporum voluit esse eorum, quæ intra cœlum gignerentur," it is evident that he found in his MS. *δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ φυλάκα πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων*— and so did the author of Tim. Locr. p. 97, D., *πρεσβίστα δὲ ἐντι τῶν ἐντὸς ὡρανῶ σωμάτων*— Hence one would elicit *θείων σωμάτων* from the two readings, *θεῶν* and *σωμάτων*—

[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰς τὸ*, not *ὡς*—

[6] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *γῆν δὲ*— a little above.

[7] In lieu of *διαμονὴν*, Menage would read, what I have adopted, *διὰ νοῦν*— confirmed by *διὰ νοῦ* in one MS. subsequently collated, and by Pseudo-Tim. Locr. § 1, *δύο αἰτίας εἶμεν τῶν συμπάντων, νόον μὲν, τῶν κατὰ λόγον γιγνομένων· ἀνάγκαν δὲ, τῶν βίᾳ*, quoted by Menage; to which may be added, Tim. p. 48, A., *ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως γεγένηται*: from whence one would substitute *ἀναγκαίας συστάσεως* in the place of *ἀναγκαίας αἰτίας*.

into them; and that their elements are [1] the triangle, whose sides are longer, one than the other, and that, whose two sides are equal.[1] [76.] (He says) then that the principles and causes are the two mentioned, of which the pattern is god and matter; which (last) is of necessity without form, as is the case with the rest of recipients; and that the cause of this proceeds from necessity; for[2] (the mind) by receiving somehow ideas produces existences; and through an inequality of power it is moved; and being moved it moves in return the things moved by that power; and (he says) that these were moved formerly without reason and order; but, when they began to constitute the world out of what they received from the deity, they were moved[3] symmetrically and orderly. [77.] For (he says) there were two causes even before the creation of heaven, and a third, generation; but not clear, and only vestiges,[4] and without order; but, when the world had been created, they too received order; and that heaven was created out of all existing bodies. And it seems to him that the deity, like the soul, is incorporeal;[5] for thus he is especially non-receptive of corruption and suffering. And he lays down, as before stated, ideas, as the causes and principles of things being constituted by nature such as they are.

[78.] On the subject of good and evil he said thus—that the aim should be[6] to become like the deity; that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness; but that it wants, as instruments, the superfluities connected with the body, namely, strength, health, a good state of the senses, and the like; and of ex-

[1]—[1] See Tim. p. 54, A.

[2] The Greek is *δεχόμενον γάρ πως τὰς ἰδέας γεννᾷν τὰς οὐσίας*, where, since there is nothing to which *δεχόμενον* can be referred, I have translated as if *νοῦν* had dropt out after *γεννᾶν*— In Tim. p. 52, D., the expression is, *τὴν γεννήσεως τιθήνην—διὰ τὸ μήθ' ὁμοίως δυνάμεων μήτ' ἰσορρόπων ἐμπίμπλασθαι—σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων αὐτὴν, κινουμένην δὲ αὖ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν.*

[3] I have adopted *κινεῖσθαι*, furnished by one MS., in lieu of *γενέσθαι*.

[4] Compare Timæus, p. 53, B., *ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν ἄττα*—

[5] Although Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 12, says, "sine corpore ullo Deum (Platō) vult esse, ut Græci dicunt *ἀσώματον*," yet I do not remember where the philosopher has so expressed himself.

[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τέλος μὲν δεῖν εἶναι*, not *τέλος μὲν εἶναι*— With regard to the sentiment, compare Theætet. p. 247, A. § 84, where Heindorf quotes from Themist. Or. xiv. p. 330, D., *μηδὲν ἄλλο φιλοσοφία ἢ ὁμοίωσις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν θεῷ.*

ternals, such as wealth, good birth, and reputation; but that the wise would be, nevertheless, happy, even if those things were not present. And (he says) that a person should be a public man,[1] and marry,[2] and not transgress the laws laid down; and should legislate from events, as they arise, for his country, unless he sees that affairs are in the exceeding corruption[3] of the people perfectly [4]invincible to a person in a state of doubt.[4]

[79.] He thinks too that the gods look upon the affairs of men;[5] and that there are demons.[6]

And he first showed that the [7]idea of what is beautiful is close upon what is laudable, and rational, and useful, and becoming, and fitting;[7] all of which are close upon what follows nature, and is confessed (to do so).

He has conversed likewise on the correct imposition of names,[8] so that (he seems)[9] to have been the first to put together the science of correctly [10]answering and questioning[10] by using it in an opportune[11] manner in his dialogues.[12]

He considered, moreover, justice to be a law of god,[13] as being more powerful to turn persons[14] to acting justly, lest, like[15] evil-doers, they suffer punishments, even after death;[16]

[1] Aldobrandinus refers to Rep. vii. p. 519, C.

[2] This is laid down in the Laws, vi. p. 768, B.

[3] I have adopted Casaubon's correction, *διαφθορᾷ*, in lieu of *διαφορᾷ*.

[4]—[4] Casaubon was the first to see an error in *εὐπαραίτητα*, but failed to correct it by reading *ἀπαραίτητα*. I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀπόρῳ ἀήττητα*—

[5, 6] Aldobrandinus refers to the Laws, x. p. 899, D., and the Banquet, p. 202, E.

[7]—[7] This is the whole subject matter of the Hipp. Maj.

[8] See the Cratylus.

[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὥστε δοκεῖν*, not *ὥστε καὶ*— Casaubon would elicit *δοκεῖν συστῆσαι* from *διασυστῆσαι*—

[10]—[10] Instead of this absurd *ὕστερον πρότερον*, the sense evidently requires *ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι*—

[11] In lieu of *κατακόρως*, which I cannot understand, I suspect the author wrote *κατακαιρίως*, what I have translated.

[12] The words *ἐν δὲ* (or *γε*) *τοῖς διαλόγοις* evidently belong, as I have translated, to the preceding, not the following, period.

[13] This doctrine is not, as far as I remember, laid down distinctly in Plato; although it may be inferred from the first book of the Laws.

[14] In lieu of *πράττειν ἵνα μὴ*, C. F. Hermann has suggested *πράττειν τινὰ, μὴ*— which has led myself to *τινὰς, μὴ*—

[15] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς κακοῦργοι*, not *οἱ κακοῦργοι*, where the article is without meaning.

[16] See Gorgias, p. 523, B.

from whence he was considered by some to be rather inclined to fables, by his mixing up accounts of this kind with his writings, in order that, through the uncertainty of the manner, in which matters stand after death, persons may thus be restrained from acts of injustice. These then were his favourite notions.

[80.][1] And he divided, says Aristotle,[2] things in this manner. Of the good some relate to the soul, some to the body, and some are externals. For example, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and things of this kind relate to the soul; but beauty, and a good habit, and health, to the body; but friends, and the happiness of one's country, and wealth, are amongst externals. [81.] [3]Of good things then there are three kinds; some relating to the soul, some to the body, and some (are) external.[3] Of friendship there are three kinds; one natural, another social, and another hospitable. Now by natural we mean that, which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations towards each other; and in this other animals likewise have a share; by social that, which is produced from habitual intercourse, and not at all connected by family-ties, such as that between Pylades and Orestes; but the friendship from hospitality is that from a meeting together, and carried on by means of writings[4] to strangers. Of friendship then there is the natural, the social, and hospitable. But some add a fourth, the amorous.

[82.] Of a political state there are five kinds;[5] one is democratical; another, aristocratical; a third, oligarchical; a fourth, regal; (and) a fifth, tyrannical. The democratical exists in states, when the people rule, and choose through

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. with ὅθεν καὶ—a little above.

[2] This analysis of the doctrines of Plato is not, says Aldobrandinus, to be found in the extant writings of Aristotle; nor do I think it ever was. The author was, perhaps, the Plato mentioned in § 109, as μαθητὴς Ἀριστοτέλους, or some other Peripatetic. And hence I would read here φησὶν ἀπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τις— or simply φησιν ὁ Ἀριστόξενος—

[3—3] A similar summary of the preceding account is found through the whole of the subsequent analysis; and as it generally follows the order of the subjects, wherever that order is not preserved, there is reason to believe that some error has crept into the text, as will be duly pointed out in the Notes.

[4] By writings are meant such as were put upon the so-called σύμβολον, on which see my note on Philoct. 404.

[5] See Rep. viii. p. 540, A.; ix. 580, B

itself magistracies and laws. [1]The aristocratical is, when neither the rich, nor the poor, nor persons in repute, rule, but when the best possess power in the state.[1] Oligarchy is, when magistracies are elected from persons of property; for the rich are fewer than the poor. Of regal power there is one kind according to law, and another according to family; as at Carthage it is according to law; for that is a citizen-state; but at Lacedæmon and Macedonia[2] it is according to family; for they make a kingly power from a certain family. But a tyranny is, when persons, [3]after being cheated or forced,[3] are ruled over by some one. Of a political state then there is the form of a democracy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a kingly rule, and a tyranny.

[83.][4] Of justice there are three kinds; [5]one relating to the gods, another to men, and another to the departed. For they, who sacrifice according to the laws, and have a regard for holy things, it is plain, act piously towards the gods; and they, who pay debts and restore deposits, act justly towards men; while they, who have a regard for monuments,[5] it is plain, (act justly)[6] towards the departed. Of justice then there is a kind relating to the gods, another to men, and another to the departed.

[84.] Of sciences there are three kinds; [7]one relating to the power to do something, another to make something, and another to speculate on something.[7] For house-building and ship-building are sciences that make something; for one can see the work done; but the sciences of statesmanship, and of playing on the pipe or harp, and such like, are those that do something; [8]for it is not possible to see any thing that has been

[1]—[1] A similar definition of Aristocracy in the Menexenus, § 8.

[2] Lacedæmon and Macedonia are similarly united in § 92.

[3]—[3] Of a people being cheated or forced into the acceptance of regal power recent events in a neighbouring country afford a curious proof.

[4] This section begins in Menage's ed. a little before, at *ἡ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι*—

[5]—[5] Of these three kinds the two first are mentioned in Euthyph. p. 12, E., and the last alluded to in the Laws, xii. p. 958, D., as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

[6] I have supplied the ellipse in the Greek.

[7]—[7] Of these three kinds the first and third are mentioned in the Statesman, p. 259, C., and the second in Soph. p. 219, B., not in Theætet., as stated by Aldobrandinus.

[8]—[8] I have translated, as if *θεατὸν*, which is superfluous after *ἰδεῖν*,

done by them; but when they are doing something, it is to be seen.[8] For one is playing the pipe, another the harp, and another the part of a statesman. But the sciences of geometry, harmony, and astrology[1] are speculative; for they neither do any thing, nor make any thing; but one speculates, as a geometrician, how lines are with respect to each other; another, as a harmonist, (speculates) on sounds; and the other, as an astrologer, on the stars and the world. [2]Of sciences then some are speculative, others relating to doing, and others to making.[2]

[85.] Of medical science there are five kinds;[3] the pharmaceutic, the chirurgic,[4] the dietetic, the nosognomic, and the boethetic. The pharmaceutic cures illness by drugs; the chirurgic restores health by cutting and burning; the dietetic produces a change in disorders by a change of diet; the nosognomic by knowing the characters of the disease; and the boethetic, by assisting on the instant, gives a relief from pain. Of the medical science then there is the pharmaceutic, the chirurgic, the dietetic, [5]the boethetic, and the nosognomic.[5]

[86.] Of law there are two divisions; one written, the other unwritten. That, by which we act the statesman in cities, is the written; but that, which exists according to custom, is called the unwritten. For instance, there is no law to prevent our going naked to the public place of meeting, or putting on female attire; and yet we do not do such acts, through being prevented by an unwritten law. Of law then there is the written and the unwritten.

[87.][6] Speech is divided into five[7] kinds; of which one is

were placed after ἀλλ', ὅτε πράττουσί τι, for so we must read in lieu of ἀλλὰ πράττουσί τι—

[1] By astrology is meant what is now called astronomy.

[2—2] In this summary the order is inverted by the speculative being placed first instead of last.

[3] Of these five kinds only the first four are alluded to in Rep. iii. p. 406, D., as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

[4] The English "surgeon" is a corruption of the Greek χειρουργός.

[5—5] Here again the order in the summary is neglected by placing the boethetic before the nosognomic.

[6] This section begins in Menage's ed. with ἑτέρα δὲ, just afterwards.

[7] Of these five kinds three are spoken of in Phædr. p. 258, D., and p. 272, F., and the dialectic in Rep. vii. p. 533—537, as remarked by Aldobrandinus.

what statesmen speak in public assemblies, and is called political; and there is another division of speeches, such as orators write and bring forward as a display, for the purpose of praise, or blame, or accusation. Now this kind is the oratorical. And there is a third division, when private persons converse with each other. Now this is called the private kind. And there is another division, when persons, by putting questions and giving answers to the questioners, converse in a brief manner. Now this is called the dialectical. The fifth division is, when artists converse with each other about their own art. Now this is called artistical. Of speeches then there is the political, the oratorical, the private, the dialectical, and the artistical.

[88.] Musical science is divided into three kinds: one is by the mouth alone, such as singing; the second by means of the mouth and hands, such as playing on, and singing to, the harp; the third is by means of the hands alone, such as harp-playing. Of musical science then there is one kind by the mouth alone; another, by the mouth and hands; and another, by the hands.

[89.][1] Nobility[2] of birth is divided into four kinds: one is, when the ancestors were [3]persons of a beautiful (body) and of a fine (mind),[3] [4]and just[4] persons say that their descendants are nobly born; another is, when the ancestors possessed power and were rulers, the descendants of these likewise persons call nobly born; and another, when the ancestors obtained a name, for instance, from generalship, (or)[5] contests, [6]crowned with garlands,[6] the descendants of these likewise we call nobly born; and there is another kind, when a man is himself of a noble soul [7][and of a great soul].[7] And this man persons say is nobly born; and indeed of nobility of

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. with ἄλλο εἶδος— a little below.

[2] Plato no where, says Aldobrandinus, touches upon these different kinds of noble birth.

[3]—[3] Such is the proper translation of καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί.

[4]—[4] As there is no allusion to the καὶ δίκαιοι in the subsequent summary, those words ought to be omitted, unless it be said that they are included in the ἐπιεικεῖς.

[5] I have introduced ἢ, required by the sense.

[6]—[6] By these were meant the conquerors at any of the four public games in Greece.

[7]—[7] The words καὶ (or ἢ) μεγάλοψυχος are evidently an explanation of γεννάδας.

birth this is the best.[1] Of nobility of birth then there is one kind derived from ancestors of probity; another from those in power; another from those in great repute; and another from a person's own greatness of soul.[2]

[89.][3] Beauty is divided into three[4] kinds; one is that, which is a subject of praise, as the beauty of form, (perceived) by the sight; another, as an object of utility, as any instrument or dwelling, and such like things, beautiful in respect to their use; and things, which, as regards laws and pursuits, and such like, are beautiful on the ground of a benefit. Of beauty then there is one kind on the score of praise; another, on that of utility; and another, on that of benefit.

[90.] The soul is divided into three[5] parts; for one part is rational; another, concupiscible; and another, irascible. Of these the rational is the cause of consulting, and calculating, and reflecting, and of all such like acts; the concupiscible part of the soul is the cause of desiring to eat, and of having sexual intercourse, and of such like acts; and the irascible part is the cause of feeling boldness, and joy, and sorrow, and anger. Of the soul then there is one part, rational; another, concupiscible; and another, irascible.

[91.][6] Of perfect virtue there are four[7] kinds; one, prudence; another, justice; the third, fortitude; the fourth, temperance. Of these, prudence is the cause of doing things correctly; justice, of acting justly in our intercourse and dealings with (each other); fortitude, of not being out of our wits[8] in dangers and things of dread, but remaining (in them); and temperance, of mastering our desires, and of not being

[1] Menage aptly compares Juvenal's "Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus."

[2] As the *καλοκἀγαθία* belongs to the first kind of nobly-born, while the last is described as *γενναδας τὴν ψυχην*, it is evident the author wrote *μεγαλοψυχίας*— what I have translated: while *τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας* should be inserted before *προγόνων ἐπιεικῶν*—

[3] This section is united in Menage's ed. to the preceding.

[4] See § 79, n. [7—7].

[5] On these three parts see Rep. ix. p. 571, D., and 580, E.

[6] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τούτων ἡ φρόνησις*, a little below.

[7] These four kinds are called the cardinal virtues. See at Menex. § 20, n. 31.

[8] The Greek is *ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν*: where Emper would omit *ποιεῖν*. He should have suggested rather *ἀπογνοίᾳ*— "through despondency."

the slave of any pleasure, and of living orderly. Of virtue then there is one kind, prudence; another, justice; a third, fortitude; a fourth, temperance.

[92.][1] Ruling power is divided inio five kinds; one, according to law; one, according to nature; and one, according to custom; a fourth, according to family; and a fifth, according to violence. The rulers then in states, when they have been chosen by the citizens, rule according to law. They, who rule according to nature, not only amongst men, but animals likewise, are the males; for the males for the most part rule every where the females. The rule according to custom is of such a kind, as boy-leaders have over children, and teachers over their disciples.[2] The rule according to family is of such a kind, as the kings at Lacedæmon[3] possess; [4]for the kingly power comes from a certain family;[4] and after the same manner persons bear sway in Macedonia; for there the kingly power is appointed from a family. But if persons rule over unwilling [5]citizens by violence, or over willing by fraud,[5] a rule of this kind is said to be according to violence. Of rule then there is one kind according to law; another, according to nature; another, according to family; and another, according to violence.

[93.] Of oratory there are six kinds. For when (speakers) bid (a state)[6] to make war against, or alliance with, any one, such a kind is called a drawing-on; but when they require it not to make war or an alliance, but to keep quiet, such a kind is a drawing-off. The third kind of oratory is, when a person says he has been injured by some one, and shows such a one to have been the cause of many evils. Now this kind is called an accusation. The fourth kind of oratory is called a defence, when a person shows he has injured no one,[7] nor

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. a little below, with *οἱ μὲν οὖν*—

[2] In Greek *τῶν φοιτώντων*, literally, "those who go them." But Hesych. has *Φοιτητής· μαθητής*.

[3] See at § 82, n. [2].

[4]—[4] The words between the numerals are perfectly unnecessary.

[5]—[5] Such is evidently what the balance of the sentence requires. Hence I have translated, as if *ἢ ἑκόντων* had dropt out after *ἀκόντων*. For thus *ἀκόντων* would refer to *βιασάμενοι*, and *ἑκόντων* to *παρασπουσάμενοι*.

[6] I have introduced "a state," required by the sense and syntax, especially as *πόλιν* might easily have been lost before *πολεμεῖν*.

[7] I have translated, as if the Greek were *μηδέν'*— not *μηδέν*—

done any thing out of the way. Now this kind persons call a defence. The fifth kind of oratory is, when one shows a person to be of a beautiful (body) and of fine (mind). Now this kind is called a praising. The sixth kind, is when one shows a person to be ill-favoured (in body and mind). Now this is called a blaming. There are then of oratory one kind, [1]a praising; another, a blaming; another, a drawing-on; another, a drawing-off; another, an accusation; and another, a defence.[1]

[94.][2] To speak correctly is divided into four kinds; one is, to speak what is requisite; and one, to speak how much is requisite; the third, to speak to whom it is requisite; and the fourth, to speak when it is requisite. [3]As to what is requisite, it is meet[3] to speak, what is about to benefit the speaker and hearer. As to how much is requisite, to speak neither more nor less than what is sufficient. As to whom it is requisite to speak, if (a person) addresses his elders in error,[4] it is meet to address fitting language (to them) as (being) older; but if younger persons, it is meet to address fitting (language to them) as being younger. [5]As to when it is requisite, it is meet[5] to speak neither before nor after [6](it is fitting);[6] or else [7]that he will be in error and speak ill.[7]

[95.][8] Kindness is divided into four (forms). For (it is shown) either in purse, or person, or by science, or words. In purse, when a person, [9]being in easy circumstances,[9] assists

[1]—[1] In this summary the different kinds are strangely inverted.

[2] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *πέμπτον εἶδος*, a little above.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἃ μὲν οὖν δεῖ, δεῖ λέγειν*— not *ἃ μὲν οὖν δεῖ λέγειν*—

[4] Meric Casaubon, with whom Menage agrees, would expunge *ἁμαρτάνοντας*. But Menage says it is defended by Bochart, who refers to Chrysostom's Homily on Timotheus — *Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς*—— *ἀλλ' ὡσανεὶ πρὸς πατέρα προσενεχθείης ἁμαρτόντα, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλέγου*. At all events *τις* has been lost after *ἁμαρτάνοντας* —

[5]—[5] The Greek is at present *πηνίκα δὲ λέγειν ἐστι*— It was originally *πηνίκα δὲ δεῖ, λέγειν ἐστι*— what I have translated.

[6]—[6] I have translated, as if *οὗ δέῃ* had dropt out before *εἰ δὲ*—

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. But as Stephens makes mention of a various reading, *οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖν* in lieu of *καὶ κακῶς ἐρεῖν*, perhaps the author wrote *διαμαρτήσεσθαι ἐκεῖνον ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖς*—i. e. "you will correctly say that he will be in error."

[8] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τὸ δὲ πρὸς οὕς*, a little below.

[9]—[9] I have adopted Casaubon's *εὐπορήσας* in lieu of *εὐπορῆσαι*.

a party begging money; in person parties act kindly towards each other, when, being present, they assist those, who are being beaten; while they, who give instruction, and medicine, and teach any good thing, benefit by their science; but when one goes to a court of justice, and assists another, and makes a proper speech in his behalf, he does a kind act by words. Of kindness then there is one form in purse; another in person; another by science; and another by words.

[96.][1] The end of things is divided (by him) into four kinds. Things have an end according to law, when a decree is proposed and a law ratifies it. Things have an end according to nature, (such as) a day, and a year, and the seasons. Things have an end according to art, as house-building; for a person puts the finish to a dwelling; and as ship-building, for [2](a person puts the finish to)[2] vessels. There is an end to things according to accident; when they turn out in a different manner, and not as one fancies. There is then an end of things according to law, and nature, and art, and accident.

[97.][3] Power is divided into three kinds; one, when[4] we are able, by the thinking faculty, to calculate and reflect; another, (when) by the body, for instance, to walk, and to give, and receive, and (to do) such like acts; a third, when[5] we are able by the multitude of soldiers and wealth (to rule);[6] from whence he, who has much power, is called a king; but the fourth is a division of power, [7]in suffering and doing well and ill;[7] for instance, we are able to be in bad health, [8]and to be instructed, and to be in good health, and all such like things.[8] Of power then there is one kind, in the thinking

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *οἱ δὲ παιδεύοντες*, a little above.

[2—2] I have supplied the words requisite for the sense.

[3] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *κατὰ τύχην*, a little above.

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅτε*, not *ὃ*—

[5] Here again I have substituted *ὅτε* for *ὃ*—

[6] The train of ideas evidently shows that *βασιλεύειν*, or something similar, has dropt out after *χρημάτων*—

[7—7] I have adopted the correction of Menage, *πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ κακῶς*.

[8—8] The words between the numerals ought to be thus arranged and read in the Greek—*καὶ ὑγιεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι εὖ καὶ τἀναντία, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, instead of *καὶ παιδεύεσθαι καὶ ὑγιεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

faculty; another, in the body; another, in an encampment[1] and wealth; and another, in doing and suffering.

[98.] Of philanthropy there are three kinds; one exists by being of an easy address,[2] as when some persons accost all they happen to meet, [3]and, throwing out the right hand, give them a greeting;[3] another kind is, when a person affords assistance to every one in misfortune; another kind [4][of philanthropy][4] is, when persons are liberal in feastings. Of philanthropy then there is one kind, in addressing; another, in acting kindly; and another, in feasting and being fond of society.

[99.][5] Felicity is divided into five parts. One is in well planning; another, in a sound state of the senses, and in bodily health; the third is in good fortune in one's doings; the fourth in a good repute amongst men; and the fifth in an abundance of means, and of things useful for life. (Of these) well-planning comes from instruction and from being skilled in many matters; a sound state of the senses from the members of the body, as when a person sees with his eyes, and hears with his ears, and perceives with his nose and mouth, what he should perceive. Now a thing of this kind is a sound state of the senses. And good fortune is, [6]when a person proceeds in the right road to what he is aiming at, and accomplishes,[6] what it is meet for a man, who is in earnest, to do. And good repute is, when a person hears himself well spoken of. And abundance of means is, when a person is so situated with respect to the use of things in life, that he can benefit friends and indulge in expense on a large scale and in an easy manner. Now he, in whom all these circumstances meet, is completely happy. Of felicity then, well-planning is

[1] Such is the literal meaning of *στρατόπεδον*. But it is sometimes taken in the sense of *στράτευμα*, "an army."

[2] I have adopted Casaubon's correction, *εὐπροσηγορίας* in lieu of *προσηγορίας*—

[3—3] Menage quotes from Plautus—"me benignius Omnes salutant—copulantur dexteras—" He might have added Aristoph. Plut. 784, *ἠσπάζοντο καὶ Ἐδεξιοῦντο*.

[4—4] The words between the brackets are quite superfluous.

[5] This section in Menage's edition begins with *ἡ μὲν εὐβουλία*, a little lower.

[6—6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅταν ἰὼν ἐφ᾽ ἃ σκοπεῖ, κατ᾽ ὀρθὸν, πράξῃ*— not *ὅταν ἐφ᾽ ἃ σκοπεῖ πράξῃ κατ᾽ ὀρθὸν*. But *ἐφ ἃ* would require to be united to a verb of motion.

one part; a sound state of the senses and bodily health another; and another, good fortune; another, good repute; and another, an abundance of means.

[100.] Arts are divided into three (kinds), first, second, and third. The first is, that of mining for minerals, and of felling wood; for they are preparative: (the second)[1] is that of the smith and carpenter; for they are shape-giving; since from iron the smith forms arms, and from wood the carpenter pipes and lyres: and (the third)[2] is that of the party using materials, as the horseman makes use of reins; the warrior of arms; and the musician of pipes and a lyre. Of art then there are three kinds; that, which is the first; that, which is the second; and that, which is the third.

[101.] The good is divided into four kinds. One of which we say is in a person possessing virtue, peculiarly a good; another we speak of, as being a good in itself, namely, virtue and justice; (we speak) of the third, as, for example, food, and suitable exercise, and drugs; the fourth good we say is such a thing, as the art of the piper, and of the actor, and such like. Of the good then there are four kinds; one, to possess virtue; another is, virtue itself; a third is, food, and useful exercise; and a fourth good we say is, the art of the piper, and actor, and poet.[3]

[102.] Of existing things some are bad, some good, and some neither one or the other. Of these we say those are bad, which are able to do ever a mischief, such as intemperance, and thoughtlessness, and injustice, and such like things. But the opposites to these are good. [4]But some things are able at one time to benefit, and at another to do a mischief, as to walk, and to sit down, and to eat; or wholly unable to either benefit or hurt; and these are neither good nor bad.[4] Of existing things then, some are good, some bad, and some neither the one or the other.

[103.] A good state of law is divided into three kinds; one, when the laws are [5]carefully made,[5] we say is a good state of

[1] I have supplied here and in [2] the words that seem necessary for the sense.

[3] Since the poet is not mentioned by name before, he must be considered as included in the general expression *καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

[4—4] Compare Gorgias, p. 467, D. § 52.

[5—5] Such seems to be the meaning of *σπουδαῖοι*, which is not elsewhere, if I rightly remember, applied to *νόμοι*.

law; another, when the citizens abide by the laws laid down; and this we say is a good state of law; the third, when, although there are not laws, yet persons conduct themselves correctly as citizens, according to custom and (proper) pursuits; and this we call a good state of law. Of a good state of law then, one kind is, that laws be carefully made; another, that persons abide by existing laws; and a third, when they conduct themselves as citizens according to custom and proper pursuits.

A bad state of law is divided into three kinds; one of which is, when the laws are bad, as regards [1]strangers and citizens;[1] another, when persons do not obey the existing (laws); and another, when there is no law at all. Of a bad state of law then, one kind is in there being bad laws; another, in persons not obeying those that exist; and a third, in there being no law.

[104.][2] Opposites are divided into three kinds—as we say that good things are opposite to bad; and[3] justice to injustice, and prudence to imprudence, and such like; and that bad things likewise are opposite to bad, (such as) prodigality to illiberality,[4] and the being unjustly put on the rack to being treated so justly; and such like [5][bad things are the opposite to bad];[5] [6]and some, as being neither the one nor the other, are opposite to those, that are neither the one nor the other, as for instance, the being poor to the being rich; for each by itself is neither good nor bad; and similarly opposite is light to heavy, and quick to slow.[6] Of opposites then, some things,

[1]—[1] The strangers are here strangely mentioned before the citizens.

[2] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *ἕτερον δὲ, ἐὰν*— a little above.

[3] In lieu of *ὡς*, the sense requires *καὶ*— On the confusion in those words, see Markland on Iph. A. 173.

[4] The flow of ideas evidently leads to *τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ*, instead of *καὶ τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν*—

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals, *κακὰ κακοῖς ἐναντία ἐστι*, are clearly superfluous after the preceding *κακὰ δὲ κακοῖς ἐναντία εἶναι*.

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are made out of two readings; one found in ed. Steph., *τὰ δὲ, ὡς οὐδετέρως οὐδέτερα, οἷον τὸ πένεσθαι τῷ πλουτεῖν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· ἐναντία δὲ ὅμως· τὸ δὲ βαρὺ*— and the other in ed. Menag., where all those words are omitted, while the following period is closed with *ὡς οὐδέτερα οὐδετέρως ἐναντία ἐστι*— and hence it is easy to see that the author wrote *τὰ*

as being good, are opposite to bad; and some, as being bad, (are opposite) to bad; and some, as being neither one nor the other, (are opposite) to those that are neither one nor the other.

[105.][1] Of good things there are three kinds; some are to be had, some to be shared in, some (meet) to be in existence. Those to be had are, as many as it is possible to have, such as justice and health; those to be shared are, as many as it is not possible to have, but of which it is possible to have a share; for instance, it is not possible to have the good itself, but it is possible to have a share of it; and those (meet) to be in existence are as many as it is not possible either to have a share of them or to have, but as many as are meet to be in existence; for example, to be earnest in a matter and just: now these things it is possible neither to have nor to share in them, but they are meet to be in existence [2][to be earnest in a matter and just.][2] Of good things then some are to be had, some to be shared in, and some (meet) to be in existence.

[106.][3] Counselling is divided into three (kinds). One is taken from the past, one from the future, and one from the present. Things (taken) from the past are examples, as—"What did the Lacedæmonians suffer by trusting?"[4] Things

τὶ ὡς οὐδέτερα οὐδετέροις ἐναντία ἐστι, οἷον τὸ πένεσθαι τῷ πλουτεῖν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· ἐναντία δ' ὁμοίως τό τε βαρὺ — The reading of ed. Steph. has been followed by E. Smith in his version—"Thirdly, where there is a contrariety between things neither good nor bad, as poverty and riches; for neither are good in themselves, yet contrary one to another. In like manner ponderosity and levity, swift and slow," &c., p. 59.

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. with τῶν ἐναντίων ἄρα—in the preceding period.

[2—2] The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous.

[3] This section begins in Menage's ed. with τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα—in the preceding period.

[4] I confess I do not know to what circumstance the author is alluding, unless it be the one mentioned by Thucydides in v. 45, relating to the trick played upon the Spartan ambassadors by Alcibiades, in whose words they placed too implicit confidence. Still less do I know how the following words crept into the Latin translation—before τί ἔπαθον—"quid prudenter egerit (gens) ut caveamus;" from which came the version of E. Smith, "The time past affords us examples, when we consider what the Lacedæmonians suffered through their over-confidence; what they bravely acted for our imitation."

from the present; as for instance, [1]"to show that the walls are weak, the people cowards, (and) bread-corn[1] scarce." Things from the future, as for instance, [2]"Not to do wrong through suspicion to an embassy, lest Greece should be in bad repute."[2] In counselling then there are matters (taken) from the past, the present, and the future.

[107.] Voice is divided into two (kinds); one is with life, and one without life; that with life is of living beings, that without life is sounds and noises. Of voice with life one kind is expressed by letters, and one not expressed by letters. That expressed by letters is of men; that not expressed by letters is of animals. [3]Of voice then there is one with life, and one without life.[3]

[108.][4] Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible. And of the divisible, some are with similar parts, some with dissimilar parts. Now the indivisible are as many as have no division, or are not composed of something; as for instance, unity, a point, and a sound; but the divisible are as many as are composed of something; as for instance, syllables, and concords, and animals, and water,[5] and gold. Now those with similar parts are as many as are composed of similar things, and where the whole differs in nothing from the part, except in multitude; as for instance, water, and gold, and every thing that is fusible,[6] and such like; but those with dissimilar parts are as many as are composed of dissimilar parts; as for instance, a dwelling and such like things. Of existing things then some are divisible and some indivisible;[7] and of the divisible some are with similar parts and some with dissimilar parts.

[1]—[1] Here I am quite at a loss as to the event alluded to.

[2]—[2] Here again I must leave for others to discover what the author is alluding to.

[3]—[3] To complete the summary one would have expected to find ἐγγράμματος after ἔμψυχος, and ἀγράμματος after ἄψυχος.

[4] This section begins in Menage's ed. with καὶ ὁμοιομερῆ—somewhat further on.

[5] This introduction of water seems very strange here amongst the things that are composed of something. One would have expected rather δένδρα in lieu of ὕδωρ—

[6] I have adopted Huebner's correction, χυτον for τυχὸν –

[7] Instead of ἀμερῆ one would have preferred ἀμέριστα, given as a var. lect. by Stephens, as better opposed to μεριστά.

[109.][1] Of things existing some are spoken of[2] with reference to themselves, and some with reference to another thing. Those that are spoken of with reference to themselves, are as many as do not need any thing in the way of explanation. Now these would be a man, a horse, and the rest of animals; for of these not one is currently understood by means of an interpretation; but of those that are spoken of with reference to another[3] thing (there are) as many as need some explanation; as for instance, that which is greater than something, and that which is quicker than something, and that which is more beautiful (than something),[4] and the like. For the greater is greater than the less, and the quicker (than the slower).[5] Of things then existing some are spoken of with reference to themselves, and some with reference to another[6] thing. And so too the first is divided according to Aristotle.[7]

There was likewise another Plato,[8] a philosopher of Rhodes, a disciple of Panætius, as Seleucus the grammarian says in the first book "On Philosophy;" and another, a Peripatetic, a disciple of Aristotle; [9]and another, (a son) of Praxiphanes, and a writer of the old comedy.[9]

[1] This section begins in Menage's ed. with *τῶν δὲ πρός τι*—a little lower.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄλλο λεγόμενα*, not *λέγεται*.

[3] Here, as in [2], *ἄλλο* seems to have dropt out.

[4] After *κάλλιον* I have inserted, what the balance of the sentence evidently requires.

[5] Here too the train of ideas demands, not *τινος*, but *βραδίονος*—what I have translated.

[6] See at [2] and [3].

[7] In lieu of *'Αριστοτέλην*, one would prefer *'Αριστοτέλειον*— See at § 82, note.

[8] Perhaps to this Plato is to be attributed some of the spurious dialogues.

[9]—[9] The words between the numerals are thus rendered by E. Smith, "And one more, the son of Praxiphanes, a comic poet, that wrote after the ancient manner of freedom, without respect of persons, in imitation of Aristophanes." With regard to the comic writer being the son of Praxiphanes, Meineke appears to doubt it; at least he has not mentioned it in his Histor. Critic. Comic. Græcor., nor has Fabricius in Biblioth. Græc., nor Cobet in his Observat. Crit. in Platonis Comici Relliquias.

THE

LIFE OF PLATO,

BY

HESYCHIUS OF MILETUS.

PLATO the philosopher is said to have never undergone even once the marriage-state or sexual intercourse. And they say that his mother became pregnant from a divine vision when Apollo appeared to her; but when she had brought forth Plato, that then her husband cohabited with her, and that being with [1]broad shoulders or face he was called Plato;[1] but some assert that he was so called from being [2]broad in his discourses.[2] Hence Timon, while ridiculing him, says in his Farcical verses—

> The broadest man led all, but with sweet voice
> He talk'd, the picture of the Tettix kind,
> That settling on the trees of Hecademus,
> Their pleasant note pour forth—

For the spot, which (is now) Academia, was formerly called Hecademia. He made for himself a mingling of the doctrines of Heracleitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates. For on things, perceptible by the senses, he philosophized according to Heracleitus; on those, perceptible by mind, according to Pythagoras; but on those, relating to politics, according to Socrates. He was likewise much indebted to Epicharmus. For Epicharmus[3] says—"The wise assert that the soul perceives some things through the body; as, for example, by

[1—1] To understand this remark the reader should bear in mind that the Greek for "broad" is πλατ-υς, a word very similar to πλατ-ων.

[2—2] If my emendation of εἰρωνείας for ἑρμηνείας, in Diogen. L. § 4, be correct, we must read here γέλωσι in lieu of λόγοις.

[3] In Diogen. L. § 12, this saying is attributed to Alcimus.

hearing and seeing; but on other things it reflects itself by itself, without making any use of the body: and hence, of the things that exist, some are perceptible by the senses, and some by the mind." On which account Plato has said that it is requisite for those, who desire to look into the principles of the Universe, to separate, in the first place, ideas, themselves by themselves, such as similitude, and unity, and number, and magnitude, and rest, and motion: secondly, to lay down itself by itself, beauty, and goodness, and justice, and such kind of things: and, thirdly, to look into such of the ideas as have a relation to each other, to wit, science, or magnitude, or arbitrary power, and to consider that what are with us have the same name as those, through their participating in them—I mean, that things are just, such as (participate in) the abstractedly just; and are beautiful, such as (participate in) the abstractedly beautiful; and that each of the species is eternal, and a notion,[1] and, moreover, not subject to circumstances. Hence he says likewise that ideas exist[2] in nature, as if they were patterns; and that the rest of things are like to them, as being their resemblances. Epicharmus too thus expresses himself touching the abstractedly good, and ideas—

> Seems not the case then to be thus about
> The good? that of itself it is a thing;
> And he, who learning knows it, good becomes;
> Just as a piper, who has learnt to pipe,
> Or to dance has a dancer learnt, or some
> Weaver to weave, or what you will of trades
> Like these, himself's the artist, not the art.

Plato accompanied Chabrias, the general, on trial for a capital charge, when not one of the citizens was willing to do so; and when Crobylus the informer met him as he was going up, together with Chabrias, to the Acropolis, and said—"Art thou come to plead on the side of another, not knowing that the hemlock of Socrates awaits thee? he replied—"When too I served in the army for the sake of fatherland, I endured dangers; and now for the sake of duty on account of a friend I will endure them." But though he was such a kind of

[1] Although *νόημα* is found both here and in Diogen. L. § 13, yet one would prefer in both places *νοητὸν*, as suggested there by Menage.

[2] I have followed Fischer, in changing *ἱστάναι* into *ἑστάναι*, as read in Diogen. L. § 13.

person, he was nevertheless scoffed at by the writers of comedy. At least Theopompus says—

For one is none,
And two, as Plato holds, is scarcely one;

and Anaxandrides too in his "Theseus"—

When olives he devoured, that Plato loves;

and Timon likewise, while thus playing on the letters (of his name)—

As Plato plaits, in plaited wonders skill'd.

Alexis in "Meropis"—

Thou'rt come in time; since I, in doubtings tost,
Am walking up and down, and, Plato-like,
Find nought that's wise, but merely tire my feet;

and in "Ancylion"—

A. Thou speak'st of what thou knowest not one jot.
B. Mind has with Plato been a-running.
A. Know'st thou,
What is a pound, and onions what?
B. Not I.

Amphis in "Amphicrates"—

A. What is the good, which you are about to have
Through her, I know still less than does my master
Of the good in Plato.

On questions which he comprehended, Plato exhibits his opinions; and falsehoods he confutes; but on points that are uncertain he holds back. And what he has made up his mind upon, he exhibits by means of four characters, Socrates, Timæus [1]the Athenian Guest, and the one from Elea;[1] but amongst those confuted for falsehoods he introduces Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, (and) Gorgias. He asserted that the principle of the soul was arithmetical, but of the body, geometrical; and he defined it to be an idea of a breath standing apart on every side, and that it is self-moved [2]and tripartite.[2]

[1—1] The words between the numerals have been properly supplied by Fischer, from Diogen. L. § 52, and so have those between ([2]—[2]) from § 67.

THE

LIFE OF PLATO,

BY

OLYMPIODORUS.

COME then, let us speak of the family of the philosopher, not for the sake of prolixity,[1] but of benefit rather and instruction to those, who betake themselves to him. For he was not "a Nobody,"[2] but rather—

[3] To many of mankind he was a care.[3]

For Plato is said to have been a son of his father Ariston, the son of Aristocles, from whom he carried up his family to Solon, the law-giver; and hence he wrote, in imitation of his ancestor, the Laws in twelve books, and a Political Constitution in eleven.[4] He came into the world by his mother Perictioné, who was descended from Neleus, the son of Codrus.[5] For they say that Apollo in a vision had an intercourse with his mother Perictioné, and, appearing in the night to Ariston, ordered him to have no connexion with Perictioné until the time of her bringing forth.[6] And so he acted. And his pa-

[1] I have adopted *πολυηκοΐας*, suggested by Windet, instead of *πολυκοΐας*.

[2] Here is an allusion to the name *Οὖτις*, assumed by Ulysses to enable him to deceive the Cyclops. It has been twice restored to Plato by myself; once in Hipp. Maj. § 24, and again in Alcibiad. II. § 23.

[3]—[3] Here too is an allusion to *Οδ.* A. 177.

[4] How this number is to be made up, it is difficult to state distinctly. Perhaps Olympiodorus meant to unite the Critias with the 10 books of the Republic.

[5] According to Diogen. L. iii. 1, and Apuleius, the father, not the mother, was a descendant of Codrus.

[6] I have adopted *ἀποτέξεως*, similar to *ἀποκυήσεως* in Diogen. § 2, as suggested by Windet, for *ἀποτάξεως*.

rents taking him after his birth, and when he was still an infant, placed him on Mount Hymettus, intending to make a sacrifice to the deities there, namely, Pan, and the Nymphs, and Apollo, who presides over shepherds. But while he was lying there, bees came and filled his mouth with honey from the comb, in order that it might be said[1] truly of him—

> [2]From his mouth flow'd a voice than honey far
> More sweet,[2]

And he calls himself [3]on every side and[3] a fellow-slave with the swans, as if he had proceeded[4] from Apollo; for the bird belongs to Apollo. In early life he first went as a pupil to Dionysius the grammar-master, to learn the common course of instruction, of whom he has made mention in the Rivals, in order that Dionysius might not be without a share of remembrance on the part of Plato. After him he made use of Ariston the Argive, as his master in gymnastics, by whom, as they say, his name was changed into Plato, having been previously called Aristocles, after his grandfather; and he was called Plato, from his having two parts of his body very wide, namely, his breast and forehead, as his likeness proves, put up every where with such a representation. But others assert that it was not for this reason his name was changed, but on account of the breadth, and diffuseness, and openness of the style adopted[5] by him; just as they say that Theophrastus, who was previously called Tyrtamus, had his name changed to [6]Theophrastus on account of the divine nature of

[1] In lieu of *γένηται*, the sense evidently requires *λέγηται*— what I have translated.

[2—2] This description is applied to Nestor in Il. A. 249.

[3—3] Since Plato, in the person of Socrates, calls himself only once in Phædon, p. 85, B. § 78, *ὁμόδουλος—τῶν κύκνων*, there is probably some error in *παντόθεν*— from which it would be easy to elicit *θεράποντα θεοῦ*— and to confirm the correction by Phædon, § 77, *οἱ κύκνοι—τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος θεράποντες μαντικοί τ' εἰσί*— for so we must read in lieu of the unintelligible *ὄντες*, for Plato had a little before spoken of *τῶν κύκνων —οἱ γεγηθότες, ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὗπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες*—

[4] Instead of *προσελθὼν*, Windet has suggested, what I have adopted, *προελθὼν*—

[5] So I have translated *ἀνακειμένου*— although I know of no other passage where that verb has such a meaning.

[6—6] To understand this, the reader should know that *Θεόφραστος* is compounded of *Θε-ὸς*, "god," and *φραστὸς*, "spoken."

his language.[6] For his music-master he had Dracon, the pupil of Damon,[1] of whom he has made mention in the Republic. These were the three things the boys at Athens were taught, [I mean][2] grammar, music, and wrestling, not simply for themselves; but grammar, to embellish the language, natural to them; music, to tame violent passions;[3] and wrestling and gymnastics, to strengthen the relaxed state of desire. In these three points Alcibiades appears to have been instructed by him;[5] and hence Socrates says to him, [6] "But to play on the pipe you were not willing," and what follows.[6] (Plato) went likewise to painters,[7] from whom he derived some benefit in the mixing of colours, of which he has made mention in the Timæus. Subsequently he received instructions from the writers of tragedy likewise, who were considered[8] to be the instructors of Greece; and he went to them for the sake of the moral and solemn style of tragedy, and the heroical nature of their subjects (selected by them); and he made an acquaintance with the dithyrambic poets, for the honour of Dionysus, who was said to be the superintendent of generation;[9] for to that deity the Dithyramb is sacred, from whom likewise it had its name; for Dionysus is Dithy-

[1] Windet was the first to correct Δάμενος into Δάμωνος: of whom, as Fischer observes, Plato has made frequent mention.

[2] The words φημὶ δὲ appear to be interpolated. For after τρία—ταῦτα, the three things alluded to are elsewhere mentioned at once, without the intervention of φημὶ δὲ — answering to "scilicet" in Latin, and "to wit" in English.

[3] Of the power of music to allay violent feelings the most facetious proof is given in the Epigram —

Music hath charms to soothe the savage beast;
And therefore fitted for a city feast.

[4] In lieu of ἐπιθυμίας one would prefer ἀποθυμίας, "despondency," as better suited to χαλαρόν.

[5] This παρ' αὐτῷ has nothing to which it can be referred. Olympiodorus wrote, I suspect, παραυτίκα, "straightway"—

[6—6] The passage alluded to is in Alcib. I. § 7.

[7] The same fact is told by Apuleius.

[8] I have translated, as if the Greek were νομιζομένοις in lieu of ὀνομαζομένοις— Compare Xenoph. K. II. i. 6, 12, τοῖς στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσι νομιζομένοις εἶναι.

[9] How Dionysus could be said to be ἔφορος τῆς γενέσεως, I cannot understand, except with reference to the proverb — "Sine Baccho et Cerere friget Venus." Perhaps the author wrote γανύσεως—so Virgil— "Lætitiæ Bacchus dator."

rambus, as having proceeded from [1]two doors, namely, Semele and the thigh of Jupiter.[1] For the ancients were wont to call things caused by the names of the causing; as they call Dionysus[2] likewise: and hence Proclus says on this subject—

> Parents,[3] from what they see (and know),[4]
> Upon their children names bestow.

Now that Plato exercised himself in Dithyrambics is evident from the Phædrus, a dialogue that breathes very much[5] of a dithyrambic style; inasmuch as Plato wrote, as reported, that dialogue the first. He took likewise great delight in Aristophanes, the comic writer, and in Sophron; from whom he benefited in his imitation of the characters in his dialogues. And he is reported to have been so delighted, that, when he was dead, (copies of) Aristophanes and Sophron were found on his couch; and he made himself this epigram upon Aristophanes—

> [6]The Graces, when they wish'd to find
> A shrine, that should for ever live,
> Said, what they sought, alone the mind
> Of Aristophanes could give.[6]

And he made fun of Aristophanes in his dialogue (called) the Banquet, as having derived some benefit in the style of comedy. For after making him hymn the god of Love, he introduces him as seized [7]during (the conversation)[7] with hiccups, and unable to finish the hymn. He composed likewise Tragic and Dithyrambic poetry, and some other things;

[1]—[1] So the Etymol. M. in *Διθύραμβος—ἀπὸ τοῦ (διὰ) δύο θύρας βαίνειν, τήν τε κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς Σεμέλης καὶ τὸν μηρὸν τοῦ Διός.*

[2] This I confess I cannot understand. The sense seems to require *καθάπερ τὸν οἶνον Διόνυσον καλοῦσι*—"as they call wine Dionysus"—where wine would be the thing caused, and Dionysus the causer; as shown by Euripides, who says in Bacch. 278, *ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος Βότρυος ὑγρὸν πῶμ' εὗρε*—

[3] I have adopted Windet's *τοκῆες*, required by the sense and syntax, in lieu of *τοκεῦσιν*—

[4] The words "and know" have been added for the rhyme.

[5] As *πνέειν* requires an accusative, it is evident that *τι* has dropt out before *πνέων*—

[6]—[6] The literal translation of the original and another metrical version may be seen in the "Greek Anthology, Prose and Verse," p. 179.

[7]—[7] I have translated, as if *τοῦ λόγου* had dropt out between *μεταξὺ* and *λυγγὶ*— See the Banquet, § 13.

all of which he burnt, after he had made a trial of an intercourse with Socrates, and pronouncing a verse of this kind—

[1] Come here, Hephæstus, Plato needs thy aid.[1]

And a certain Anatolius, a grammarian, on speaking (again)[2] the verse, was in some repute with Hephæstus, who had been appointed governor of the city;[3] for he said to him[4]—

Come here, Hephæstus, Pharus needs thy aid.

They say, moreover, that when Socrates was about to receive him (as a disciple), he saw, as a vision in a dream, that a swan without wings had settled on his knees; and, becoming fledged on the instant, flew up to the sky, and sung something so sweet, that he enchanted all who heard it; and this indicated the future fame of the man. But after the death of Socrates, he again[5] made use of Cratylus, one of the sect of Heracleitus, as his teacher; on whom he composed the dialogue of that name, inscribing it "Cratylus, or On the Correctness of Names." Afterwards[6] he sailed to Italy; and finding that Archytas had established there a school of Pythagoreans, he again[7] had as a teacher the Pythagorean of the same name;[8] there[9] he has made mention of Archytas.

But since it is requisite for a philosopher to be fond of seeing the works of Nature, he sailed to Sicily likewise, to view the craters of fire that are in Ætna, and not for the sake of a Sicilian table,[10] as thou, noble[11] Aristides,[12] sayest. And,

[1]—[1] This is a parody of Il. Σ. 392.

[2] In lieu of *ἐνταῦθα*, the sense requires either *εἰσαῦθις*— what I have translated, or *ἐντεῦθεν*—"in consequence of this"—which would perhaps be preferable.

[3] The city was Pharus, as shown by the quoted verse.

[4] I have adopted Etwall's correction, *δ' ἐς αὐτὸν*, in lieu of *δ' αὐτὸν*—

[5] For Plato, according to Apuleius, had been a disciple of Cratylus, previous to his attendance upon Socrates.

[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ταῦτα*, not *τοῦτον*—

[7, 8, 9] I cannot understand either *πάλιν*, or *ὁμώνυμον*, or *ἔνθα*— There is, no doubt, something wanting here, which may perhaps be supplied by the MSS. of this treatise hitherto uncollated; just as the Vienna MS. has filled up two gaps, as will be noticed in their proper places.

[10] By "a Sicilian table" is meant a "luxurious one," as understood by Horace in his "Siculæ dapes."

[11] This is a strange epithet applied to a person whose statement is called in question. Hence in lieu of *γενναῖε*, one would have expected *γελοῖε*, "ridiculous"—

[12] The passage of Aristides alluded to is in Orat. Platon. ii. p. 376, Cant.

when he was at Syracuse with Dionysius the Great, he endeavoured to change the tyranny there into an aristocracy; for which purpose he had gone to him (Dionysius); and on the latter inquiring of him—Whom do you think amongst men is happy? fancying forsooth that the philosopher would, out of flattery, say that he was, Plato answered that (he thought) Socrates was. (And when) Dionysius asked him again—What do you consider as the business of a statesman? Plato replied—To make the citizens better. (And when) he asked a third time—What then? Does it seem to you a little thing to act the judge correctly?—for Dionysius had a reputation for acting the judge correctly—Plato replied, [1] not lowering his sail [1] a jot—It is indeed a little thing, and of a statesman [2] the farthest portion; for they, who act the judge correctly, are like the menders of cloth, who weave up again torn garments. (And when) he asked a fourth time—What is it, think you, [3] to be a tyrant? Is it not a brave thing? Plato replied—Of all the most cowardly; since [4] he fears even the razor [4] of the barber, lest he should lose his life by it. Whereupon Dionysius, being greatly annoyed, ordered him, while the sun was still above the earth, [5] to take himself off from Syracuse; and thus was Plato with dishonour [5] driven out of Syracuse.

Of his second journey to Sicily the reason was this. After the death of Dionysius the Great, Dionysius, the son of Dionysius, succeeded to the kingdom, having Dion for his uncle, who had been a familiar acquaintance of Plato during his first journey. Dion therefore writes to him (saying) that —"If you were now present, there would be [6] a hope of changing the tyranny into an aristocracy." For this purpose then, when he had made a second journey, he was falsely accused by the spear-bearing attendants upon Dionysius, how that he was plotting to make over the government to Dion,

[1]—[1] Such is the exact meaning of *μηδὲν ὑποστειλόμενος*, similar to "vail his bonnet," in Shakspeare.

[2] I have followed the suggestion of Hemsterhuis on Thom. Mag. p. 27, who would insert here *πολιτικοῦ*, preserved by Eusebius in Chronic. i. p. 56, ed. Scaliger.

[3] I have translated, as if *οἴει* had dropt out before *εἶναι*—

[4]—[4] From *μαχαίρια διαδέδοικε* Casaubon happily elicited *μαχαιρίδιον δέδοικε*. See Pierson on Mœrid. p. 259.

[5]—[5] The Vienna MS. has supplied all the words between the numerals.

[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔσται*, not *ἐστι*—

and to depose Dionysius; when being overpowered, he was by Dionysius delivered over to Pollis of Ægina, who was then trading with Sicily, to be sold. And he carrying Plato to Ægina, found there Anniceris, the Libyan, who was about to sail to Elis for the purpose of entering the contest with a four-horsed car; and meeting with Pollis, he purchased Plato from him, having bought[1] this glory, superior to all the victory of a four-horsed car; respecting whom Aristides[2] says that no one would have known[3] Anniceris, if he had not purchased Plato.

Of his third journey to Sicily this was the motive. Dion, after being proscribed by Dionysius and deprived of his property, was thrown into prison. He writes therefore to Plato, that Dionysius had promised to release him, if Plato would come to him again; when he readily undertook this third journey to assist his friend. And thus much on the travels of the philosopher to Sicily.

It should be known likewise that he went to Egypt to the men of the priesthood there, and learnt from them the science of a priest. Hence he says in the Gorgias—[4]"No, by the dog,"—which was a god in Egypt.[4] For that, which statues mean amongst the Greek, animals do amongst the Egyptians, through being the symbols of each of the gods to whom they are dedicated. Being desirous, moreover, to meet with the Magi, but unable to reach them in consequence of a war raging at that time[5] in Persia, he departed for Phœnicia; and meeting there with the Magi, he obtained the science of the Magi; and hence he appears in the Timæus to be skilled in the art of sacrificing, while speaking of the signs of the liver and entrails, and such like matters. But this ought to have been told [6]previous to the statement of the causes of his journeys[7] to Sicily.[6]

[1] In lieu of *ἀγωνισάμενος*, which is perfectly unintelligible, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀπωνησάμενος*, what the sense evidently requires.

[2] In Orat. Platon. 2, t. iii. p. 385, Cant.

[3] I have adopted *ἐγίγνωσκεν ἄν*, as suggested by Etwall.

[4]—[4] On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18.

[5] In lieu of *θεὸν*, Casaubon would read *καιρὸν*— He should have suggested *χρόνον*, what I have translated.

[6]—[6] From this it would seem as if Plato travelled to Egypt and neighbouring countries before he went to Sicily.

[7] Meric Casaubon would read *τῶν τριῶν* instead of *τῶν* simply.

On his return to Athens he established a school in the Academia, by separating a portion of the Gymnasium for a grove sacred to the Muses; and there Timon, the man-hater, associated with Plato alone. Very many persons did he attract to learning, both men and women in male attire, by preparing them to hear him, and showing them that his philosophy was superior to all love of business. For he freed himself from the irony[1] of Socrates, and from passing his time [2]in the place of public meeting, and at work-shops,[2] and from composing discourses to catch young persons.[3] He freed himself likewise from the Pythagorean oath,[4] about keeping their doors closed, and the—"He said it,"[5] and exhibited himself more like a citizen to all. [6]After making many his admirers, and benefiting the most of them,[6] when he was about to die, he had a dream, how that having become a swan,[7] he went from tree to tree, and caused the greatest trouble to bird-limers. This Simmias, the Socratic philosopher, expounded (by saying) that he would be not caught by those, who after him wished to interpret him; for the interpreters who wanted to catch[8] the meaning of the ancients were like bird-limers; and not caught he is; since one may take his words, like those of Homer, in a sense physical, moral, ethical, theological, and, (to speak) simply, in a variety of senses. For these two souls are said to be alto-

[1] This seems rather a strange assertion; for the Socratic irony is to be found in all the genuine dialogues, with the exception of the Laws.

[2—2] This I suspect Plato never did at any time; although it was a frequent practice with Socrates, as we learn from Xenophon.

[3] This was the practice of a sophist rather; and hence such a person is ridiculed on this very ground in the dialogue of that name.

[4] I have adopted *ὅρκου*, suggested by Meric Casaubon, in lieu of *ὄγκου*. The oath alluded to was to not divulge their doctrines to persons who were not Pythagoreans.

[5] This was the formula adopted by the disciples of Pythagoras, when they alluded to any of the doctrines of their teacher.

[6—6] Of all the words between the numerals the original has been hitherto furnished by the Vienna MS. alone, with the exception of the letters *λήσας*, the termination of *ὠφελήσας*.

[7] To this dream of Plato fancying that he had become a swan, is perhaps to be referred the origin of Horace's ode, where he describes a similar transformation of himself into that bird.

[8] In lieu of *πειρᾶσθαι*, the sense evidently requires *θηρᾶσθαι*, what I have translated. The two verbs are confounded elsewhere, as I have shown at Eurip. Tro. 982.

gether in harmony; and hence [1]one may take them both in various senses.[1]

After his decease the Athenians buried him in an expensive manner, and they inscribed upon his tomb—

> [2]These two, Æsculapius and Plato, did Apollo beget;
> One, that he might save the soul; the other, the body.[2]

And thus much respecting the family of the philosopher.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the original. But, unless I am mistaken, *ἃ εἴπωσιν* have dropt out after *παντοδαπῶς*: which could hardly be applied to writers, although it might to what they wrote.

[2]—[2] Of this distich there is a metrical version in p. 199

THE

INTRODUCTION OF ALCINOUS,

TO

THE DOCTRINES OF PLATO.

[1.] *What Philosophy is, and what the person ought to be naturally, who is about to be a Philosopher.*

The teaching of the peculiar opinions of Plato would be something of this kind.

Philosophy is a longing after wisdom, or a release or withdrawal of the soul from the body, while we are turning ourselves to what is perceived by mind, and to things that exist truly. Now Wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human; and the person called a philosopher is so named from it,[1] as a musician is from music. Now it is necessary for such a person to be naturally disposed, in the first place, towards those kinds of learning, that possess the power to fit him for, and lead him to, the knowledge of the existence, perceived by mind, and not of that, [2]which wanders about, and is in a state of flowing.[2] Next, he must have a love for truth, and by no means admit a falsehood. Moreover, he must be naturally temperate, and, as regards the portion of the soul, [3]subject to being affected by circumstances,[3] naturally sub-

[1] The Greek is *ἀπὸ ταύτης*, with the ellipse of *φιλοσοφίας*, to be got out of *φιλόσοφος*: a fact not unknown to Ficinus, who has filled up the ellipse, "a philosophia cognomen accipit."

[2—2] The Heracleitean doctrine, that all things are in a perpetual state of flowing, is here applied to knowledge, according to the sentiment of Solon—

Ever as I grow old, still much I learn.

[3—3] Such is the periphrase required to understand the full meaning of *τὸ παθητικὸν* in Greek.

dued. For he, who is [1]eager after instruction[1] relating to things existing, and who turns to these his longing, will look upon pleasures[2] with little admiration. It is requisite too for him, who is about to be a philosopher, to be mentally free. For all little considerations are opposed to the soul, that is about to contemplate [3]subjects pertaining to god and man.[3] And towards justice likewise it is requisite for him to be naturally disposed, as it is[4] towards truth and freedom (in thought)[5] and temperance; and there ought to be in addition an aptitude to learn, and a (good) memory. For these things form the species of a philosopher. Since these naturally good qualities, when they meet with a proper education and fitting aliment, render a person perfect for virtue; but when they are neglected, they become the cause of great mischief. And these Plato was accustomed to call by names similar[6] to the virtues, temperance, and fortitude, and justice.

[2.] *That as Contemplation takes the lead, Action is necessary and follows.*

Since life is twofold, Contemplative and Active, of the former the chief point lies in the knowledge of truth; but of the latter, in doing what is suggested by reason. The Contemplative life then is the one held in honour, but the Active that which follows and is necessary.[7] That such is the case will be clear from hence. Contemplation is an operation of the mind, while it is thinking upon [8]what is perceptible by mind;[8] but Action is an operation of the rational soul, perfected by means of the body. The soul then, when contemplating the deity and the thoughts of the deity, is said to be in a good state;

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "veritatis avidus," as if his MS. read *ἀληθευμάτων* in lieu of *μαθημάτων*.

[2] Ficinus has "voluptates corporis," what the sense requires; and hence perhaps he found in his MS. *οὐ θαυμάζοι ἂν σωματικὰς τὰς ἡδονάς*.

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "veritatem rerum—"

[4] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὥς γε*, not *εἴγε*, which I cannot understand.

[5] The words, "in thought," are added, to answer to the preceding *ἐλευθέριον—τῇ γνώμῃ*.

[6] Ficinus has "communiori quodam nomine," as if his MS. read *κοινοτέρῳ ὀνόματι* in lieu of *ὁμωνύμως*—

[7] Ficinus has, in lieu of *ἀναγκαῖος*, the Supplement, "necessariarumque rerum ministra."

[8]—[8] Instead of *τὰ νοητὰ*, the MS. of Ficinus seems to have read *τὰ θεῖα*— for his version is "divina—"

and this state goes by the name of intelligence; which a person would say is nothing else than an assimilation with the deity; and hence such would take the lead, and be held in honour, and be prayed for the most, [1] and be the most appropriate (for man);[1] [2]nor is it to be hindered, and is placed in our power;[2] and it is the cause of the end laid down for us. But Action and the Active, performed through the body, can be hindered [3]or may be carried on,[3] when the things, which are seen during a contemplative life, require a person to apply them to the moral conduct of man. For he, who is intent upon his duty,[4] will come to public affairs, when he sees them improperly administered by some persons, through his considering that to act as a general, and a judge, and an ambassador, are [5]things of circumstances,[5] but that the best in action, and as taking the lead in it, is that relating to legislation, and statesmanship, and [6] the regulation and instruction of young persons. It is proper then, from what has been said, for the philosopher to be never deficient in Contemplation,[7] but to feed it ever and to increase[8] it, [9]as being near to his proceeding on[9] to a life of Action.

[3.] *That the study of the philosopher rests, according to Plato, on three points; on viewing things that exist; on doing what is correct; and on the art of reasoning.*

[1]—[1] I have adopted the Supplement found in Ficinus—"necnon hominis quam maxime propria—"

[2]—[2] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of *ἀκώλυτόν τε καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμενον*— Ficinus has—"cui nulla obsistunt impedimenta, quo minus in nostra potestate consistat—" adopted by Stanley.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[4] Such seems to be the meaning of *σπουδαῖος*, which embraces the two ideas of haste and earnestness in the Greek word *σπουδή*. Ficinus has "studiosus disciplinæ—"

[5]—[5] So I have translated *περιστατικὰ*— but Ficinus has "adminicula quædam quasi externa existimans—" Stanley—"things necessary—"

[6] I have translated, as if *καὶ* had dropt out before *κατάστασιν*— Ficinus—"præscribere ordinem —" Stanley—"the compression of sedition," thus following in part the reading of ed. pr., *κατὰ στάσιν*—

[7] Ficinus has "veritatis indagationem," which would be in Greek *τῆς ἀληθείας ἐρευνήσεως* in lieu of *τῆς θεωρίας*—

[8] Ficinus has "agere," evidently a typographical error for "augere—"

[9]—[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς ἐχόμενόν γε τοῦ*—*χωρεῖν*— not *ὡς ἐπόμενον δὲ καὶ*—*χωρεῖν*— which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is—"humanas autem actiones tanquam inferiora quædam non nunquam attingere—" in which there is not a single word like the original. On the confusion between *ἐπόμενον* and *ἐχόμενον*, see the Statesman, p. 213. n. 63.

The study of the philosopher seems to rest, according to Plato, on three points; on the view and perception of things that exist; on doing what is correct; and on the theory[1] itself of reasoning.

The perception of things that exist is Contemplative; but Practical (science) is concerned about things to be done; and Dialectical about reasoning. Now this last is subdivided into the Distributive, and the Definitive, and the Inductive, and the Syllogistic; and this last into the Demonstrative, which is concerned about the syllogism, which exists of necessity; [2]and into the Tentative, which is seen in the case of a syllogism, resting on opinion;[2] and into the third, Rhetorical, which is concerned about the enthymeme,[3] which is called an imperfect syllogism; and still further into Sophisms; [4]which would not be that, which takes the lead in the eye of the philosopher, but what is necessary.[4]

Of Practical science one part is seen to be concerned about the care of morals, and another about the regulation of a household, and another relating to the state, and its safety. Of these, the first is called Moral; the second, Œconomical; the third, Political. Of the Contemplative one portion, relating to what is unmoved and the first cause, and such things as are divine, is called Theological; another portion, relating to the movement of the stars, and their periodical revolutions, and their return to the spot from whence they started, and to the constitution of this world, is Physical; but another portion, viewed by means of geometry and the rest of learning,[5] is Mathematical.

[1] The Greek word *θεωρία*, which elsewhere means "contemplation," is taken here in the sense of the English "theory" derived from it. Ficinus, however, has "in sermonis consideratione"—understanding by *λόγου* not "reason," but "discourse."

[2]—[2] In lieu of the words between the numerals, Ficinus has "et in ostensionem, quæ ratiocinatio probabilis appellatur."

[3] After *ἐνθύμημα* Ficinus inserts "id est, sententiam cautam—"

[4]—[4] So I have translated *ὅπερ προηγούμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ἀναγκαῖον δέ*. The version of Ficinus is—"quibus legitimus philosophus operam dabit non quod ea, ut præcipua, probet, verum quod interdum necessaria fore censeat—" which is far more intelligible than the Greek. Stanley has, "This the philosopher must look upon not as the chiefest, but a necessary part;" which is evidently a guess at the meaning.

[5] Ficinus has, what is more explicit, "Sequitur Mathematica, quæ Geometricam et Arithmeticam continet."

Such then being the subdivision and portioning out of the kinds of philosophy, we must first speak of the Dialectical, as it is agreeable to the doctrines of Plato; and first of all about the Judicatory.

[4.] *Respecting the faculty of Judging, and the Judicatory powers of the soul.*

Since there is that, which judges, and likewise that, which is judged, there will be also that, which is effected by them, what a person would call judging. Properly one would call the act of judging the judging faculty, but more commonly that which judges. Now this is twofold; one, by which a thing is judged; the other, through which it is. Of which the former would be the intellect that is in us; [1]the latter, the organ,[1] that is naturally judicatory, [2]acting like a leader to what is true; but like a follower after what is false.[2] Now this organ is nothing else than natural reason. And, as regards things that exist, the philosopher would be called more clearly a judge, by whom things are judged. But reason likewise is a judge, through which the truth is judged, and which we have said is an organ. Now reason is twofold. One is altogether [3]to be not made captive[3] and is accurate; the other is not to be deceived by falsehoods as regards the knowledge of things. The former of these can be attained by god, but not by man; but the latter can be attained by man likewise. Now this is also twofold; one is conversant about things perceptible by mind; the other about things perceptible by a sense; [4]of which the one, conversant about things perceptible by mind, is Science and Scientific Reason; but the other, conversant about things perceptible by a sense, is Opinionative and Opinion.[4] From whence the Scientific possesses [5]a firmness and stability, as being conversant with

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὸ δέ ἐστιν ὄργανον*— instead of *τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ὄργανον*— where *δι' οὗ* has been interpolated from the preceding *τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ*—

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. Ficinus has "idque primo vera, secundo loco falsa dijudicat."

[3]—[3] Such is the well-defined meaning of *ἀληπτος*. Ficinus has "incomprehensibilis"—which is ambiguous; and the same remark is applicable to "infallibilis," his version of *ἀδιάψευστος*.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has thus abridged all between the numerals—"prima quidem, scientia est; secunda vero, opinio."

[5]—[5] Here again Ficinus has more briefly—"illa stabilitatem habet, quippe cum circa stabilia versetur—"

principles firm and stable;[5] but [1]the Credible and Opinionative (possess) probability, as being conversant about things not stable.[1]

Now of Science, conversant about things perceptible by mind, and of Opinion, conversant about things perceptible by a sense, the principles are Intelligence and Perception. Now Perception is an affection of the soul, that gives, like a leader, by means of the body a previous intimation of a power that has been affected. But when there has been produced in the soul by means of the organs of sense an impression according to its sensation, [2][which is a sensation,][2] then, in order that (the impression) may not be evanescent, but permanent, [3][and preserved][3] the preservation of it is called Memory.[4] But Opinion is the complication of memory and sensation. For when we meet for the first time with a thing perceptible by a sense, and a sensation is produced in us by it, and from this sensation Memory, and we subsequently meet again with the same thing perceived by a sense, we combine the memory previously brought into action with the sensation produced a second time; and we say within ourselves,[5] [6]as, for instance, say,[6] Socrates, (or) a horse, (or) fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Now this is called Opinion through our combining the recollection brought previously into action with the sensation recently produced. And when these, placed[7] along each other, agree, a true opinion is produced; but when they [8]swerve from each other,[8] a false one. For if a person, having a recollection of Socrates, and meeting with Plato, imagines, through some similarity, that

[1]—[1] Here too the Latin of Ficinus differs from the Greek—"hæc verisimilitudinem et imaginationem, utpote quæ ad mutabilia tendat."

[2]—[2] The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

[3]—[3] Here again is an interpolation. Ficinus has "ut firma indelebilisque permaneat—" adopted by Stanley. This, however, is an abridgment rather of *μὴ—διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἐξίτηλος γένηται, ἀλλ' ἔμμονος καὶ σωζόμενος—*

[4] Compare Plato, Phileb. p. 34, A., *σωτηρίαν—αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι.*

[5] Ficinus has "in iis dicimus"—for his MS. read *αὐτοῖς*, not *ἑαυτοῖς*—

[6]—[6] I have translated, as if *οἷον* had dropt out between *λέγομεν* and *φέρε*— Compare p. 253, lin. 2, *οἷον Εὐθύδημον φέρε*—

[7] Ficinus has "colligantur," by an error of the press for "collocantur," which leads to *τιθέμενα* in lieu of *γενόμενα*—

[8]—[8] Such seems to be the proper version of *παραλλάξῃ*.

he is meeting again with Socrates, and afterwards combines the sensation, which he has received from Plato, as if he had received it from Socrates, with the recollection, which he has of Socrates, the opinion would be a false one. Now that, in which memory and sensation are produced (conjointly),[1] Plato[2] likens to an impression on wax; but when the soul, after remoulding by an exercise of thought the things, which have been imagined out of sensation and memory, looks upon them, as upon those, out of which they have been produced, Plato calls this a painting to the life;[3] and sometimes too a phantasy. But he calls the exercise of thought a talking[4] of the soul to itself;[5] and talking (he says) is a flowing[6] from it, proceeding with a vocal sound through the mouth. Now Cogitation is an operation of the mind, while contemplating the first things perceptible by mind. And this seems to be twofold; one, while it was contemplating things perceptible by mind, previous to the soul [7]existing in the body;[7] another, after [8]it had been compelled to come[8] into this body. Of these, one [9][that contemplated previous to the soul existing in the body][9] was called Cogitation;[10] but [11]after it existed in the body,[11] that, which was then called Cogitation, was now called Physical Thinking, as being a cogitation in a subjective soul. When therefore we say that Cogitation is the beginning of Scientific Reasoning, we do not mean that, which is so called now, but that, which, as we have said, was then,

[1] I have translated, as if *ἅμα* had dropt out after *γένηται*—

[2] In Theætet. p. 191, C.

[3] The word in Plato is *ζωγράφημα*, not *ἀναζωγράφησιν*, as shown by Ast's Index.

[4] Ficinus has—"discursum ac ratiocinium—"

[5] Compare Phileb. § 81, where I should have remarked that the connexion between speaking to another and speaking to oneself, that is, thinking, is shown by the difference between *φράζειν* in the active voice and *φράζεσθαι* in the middle.

[6] Hence we can perceive the connexion between *ῥέω* and *ἐρέω*.

[7—7] Ficinus has "descendat in corpus—"

[8—8] Ficinus has "in corpus hoc mersa est," as if his MS. read *ἐμβεβύσθαι* in lieu of *ἐμβιβασθῆναι*—

[9—9] The words between the brackets are an interpolation, and properly omitted by Ficinus.

[10] Although *αὐτὸ τοῦτο νόησις ἐκαλεῖτο* might perhaps stand by supplying *ὄνομα* after *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, yet one would prefer to omit *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, or to read *αὕτη νόησις*, answering to "ipsa intellectio" in Ficinus.

[11—11] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

when the soul existed apart from the body, called Cogitation, but is now Physical Thinking. Now Physical Thinking is called by him (Plato) both a simple science, and a fledging[1] of the soul; and sometimes, recollection. From these sciences that are simple, Physical and Scientific Reason, which exists in Nature, is composed. Since then there is Reason existing, both Scientific and Opinionative, and there is a Cogitation existing and Sensation, there are also things, that are subjective to them; as for instance, those, that are perceptible by mind, and those likewise, by a sense.

Now, since of things perceptible by mind some are primary, as ideas, and some secondary, as species, which, being (impressed) on Matter, are inseparable from it, Cogitation is twofold, one of the primary, and another of the secondary. And again, since of things perceptible by a sense, some are primary, as qualities—for instance, colour, whiteness,—but some according to accident—as white mixed with another colour,—and, moreover, [2]a congregated mass,[2] as fire, honey,—so there is sensation, one part of which is of primaries, and called itself primary; and another of secondaries, (and called) secondary. Of the primaries, perceptible by mind, Cogitation judges, not without Scientific Reason, [3]by means of a certain apprehension, and not by a discourse in detail;[3] but of the secondary, a sense judges not without Opinionative Reason; but of the congregated mass, Opinionative Reason (judges) not without a sense. Now since the world, perceptible by mind, is a primary perceptible, but that, perceptible by a sense, is a congregated mass, of the world, perceptible by mind, Cogitation judges, [4]together with Reason that is not without reason;[4] but of that perceptible by a sense Opinionative Reason (judges) not without a sense.

Since then there is Contemplation and Action, right reason does not judge in a similar manner of things, which fall under Contemplation, and of what are to be done; but in the case of Contemplation it looks to the truth, and to what is not in that

[1] Here is an allusion to Phædr. p. 249, C. D.

[2—2] This in modern metaphysics would be called "a concrete substance."

[3—3] Ficinus has "per comprehensionem quandam atque discursum—"

[4—4] Since *μετὰ λόγου* differs not an atom from *οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου*, it is probable that *μετὰ λόγου* is from an interpretation, especially as *οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου* is properly balanced by *οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως*.

condition; but in the case of things to be done, to what is appropriate, and what is strange, and [1]what is being done.[1] For by having a natural notion of what is beautiful and good we make use of reason; and referring to these natural notions, as to some determinate standards, we decide, [2]whether any of these things are in this state or in a different one.[2]

[5.] *About the Dialectic element and its aim.*

The most elementary part of Dialectic Science he deems to be, first, the looking upon the essence of every thing whatsoever, and then, upon what relates to its accidents. It looks upon each thing, as it is in itself, either from above, in the way of Division or Definition, or from below,[3] in that of Analysis; but on the accidents of, and that which exist in, essences, (it looks) either from the things contained, through Induction, or from the things containing, through a Syllogism; so that, according to this account, in Dialectical Science there is a dividing, and a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductive and syllogistic. Now the dividing is the separating a genus into its species, or a whole into its parts; as when we separate the soul into the rational, and [4]that affected by circumstances;[4] and again the (so) affected into the irascible and the concupiscible. The division too of the voice (is) into the things signified; as[5] when one and the same word is referred to many things; and the division of accidents into things subjective; as when we say of good things, that some are so, as regards the soul, some, as regards the body, and some are external; and that of things subjective into accidents; as when we say of men, that some are good, some bad, and some between (both).[6] It is necessary then to make use of the separation of the genus into its species for the purpose of knowing thoroughly each thing by itself, and what it is according to its essence. But this cannot take place without

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "quid agendum, quid non," which plainly leads to τί πρακτέον καὶ μή, in lieu of τί τὸ πραττόμενον.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has more briefly, "bonane an mala sint singula, dijudicamus."

[3] Ficinus has "vel ordine converso," as if his MS. read ἢ ἀνάπαλιν instead of κάτωθεν.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has "irrationalem—"

[5] I have adopted ὡς from ed. pr. in lieu of καὶ— The two words are constantly confounded, as shown by Markland on Iph. A. 153.

[6] Compare Martial's "Carmina sunt bona, sunt mediocria, sunt mala plura."

a Definition. Now a Definition is produced from a division after this manner. Of the thing, that is about to fall under a Definition, it is requisite to take (in the first place)[1] the genus; [2]as in the case of man (the genus) is an animal;[2] and then to separate it, according to its proximate differences, descending to the species; as, for instance, to rational and irrational, mortal and immortal; so that if the proximate differences are combined[3] with the genus, [4]that proceeds from them,[4] there exists a definition of man.

But of Analysis there are three kinds; one is an ascent from things perceptible by a sense to the primary perceptible by mind; another is an ascent through things (fully) shown[5] and obscurely shown to propositions not to be demonstrated and without a middle;[6] and another is that, which ascends from an hypothesis to principles not hypothetical. Now the first is something of this kind; as if we should proceed from the beauty relating to the body to the beauty relating to the soul; and from this to that in pursuits; and from this to that in laws; and then to the wide sea[7] of beauty; and then, after having proceeded thus,[8] we should discover [9]what remains, namely, beauty itself.[9] The second kind of Analysis is something like this. It is requisite to suppose what is to be sought, and to see what things are before it, and to show these from what

[1] I have followed Ficinus, whose version, "in primis capere," shows that *πρῶτον* has dropt out after *πράγματος*.

[2—2] Here again I have followed in part the version of Ficinus, "genus hominis animal;" for the Greek *ὡς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον* I cannot understand.

[3] Ficinus has "adjiciantur," as if his MS. read *προστεθεῖεν*, not *συντεθεῖεν*—

[4—4] I cannot understand *τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted those words. I could have understood *τὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅρον*— "the definition arising from them—"

[5] The antithesis evidently demands *ἡ δὲ διὰ τῶν διαδεικνυμένων*, not *δεικνυμένων* simply.

[6] On the word *ἄμεσος*, applied to a proposition, see H. Stephens in Index to Thes. Græc. Ling., who remarks at the same time that the interpretation put upon that word by A. Gellius is at variance with its derivation,—a proposition without a middle.

[7] Ficinus has a different metaphor, "ad ipsum—fontem." See p. 266, n. 3.

[8] Ficinus has "per hunc modum—gradatim," as if his MS. read *οὕτω—κατὰ πόδα*—

[9—9] Such is evidently what is required by the train of thought. Ficinus too has "ipsum per se pulchrum—" as if his MS. read *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, not *λοιπὸν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καλόν*: where however, the author wrote *τὸ λοιπὸν ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*.

come after, by ascending up to those before, until we arrive at the first and what is acknowledged; and beginning (again),[1] from this we shall descend to what is sought by the Synthetical manner. For instance,[2] I am seeking, whether the soul is immortal; and after supposing this very thing, I inquire whether it is always moved; and after showing this, whether what is always moved is self-moved; and again, after showing this, I consider whether what is self-moved is a beginning of motion; and then, whether a beginning is unbegotten; [3]which is laid down as being acknowledged,[3] inasmuch as the unbegotten is likewise the indestructible; from which, as from a thing quite clear, making a beginning I will put together a demonstration of this kind—If a beginning be a thing unbegotten and indestructible, that, which is self-moved, is a beginning of motion. Now the soul is a thing self-moved; it is therefore indestructible, and unbegotten, and immortal. But the Analysis from an hypothesis is of this kind—A person, inquiring into a matter, lays down that very thing hypothetically; and he then considers what will follow upon the assertion so laid down; and after this, whether it is requisite to give a reason for the hypothesis; and, laying down another hypothesis, he inquires whether what had been previously laid down, follows again[4] the other hypothesis; and so he continues to do, until he arrives at some principle not hypothetical.

Induction is wholly a method by reasoning, which proceeds from the like to the like, or from particulars to generals. Induction is particularly useful for exciting notions connected with physics.

[6.] *On the kinds of the (so-called) Propositions, and on Syllogism.*

Of that portion of reasoning, which we call a Proposition, there are two kinds; one is Affirmation, the other Negation. Affirmation is a thing of this kind—Socrates is walking about;

[1] Since Ficinus has "rursus incipientes," he, doubtless, found in his MS. *δ' αὖ ἀρξάμενοι*, not *δὲ ἀρξάμενοι*—

[2] This example contains the leading arguments put forth in the Phædo, to prove the immortality of the soul on philosophical principles.

[3—3] Ficinus has, what is more intelligible, "quod quidem, ut perspicuum, a cunctis admittitur."

[4] This "again" seems very strange where the sense requires rather "still," in Greek *ἔτι*, not *πάλιν*—

but Negation is a thing of this kind—Socrates is not walking about. Of Affirmation and Negation, there is one kind relating to what is Universal, another to what is Particular. An Affirmation relating to what is Particular is of this kind—"A certain[1] pleasure is a good:" a Negation is of this kind—"A certain[2] pleasure is not a good." But an Affirmation relating to what is Universal is of this kind—"Every disgraceful thing is an evil:" a Negation is of this kind—"Not one of disgraceful things is a good."

Of Propositions some are Categorical, some Hypothetical. The Categorical are simple; as "Every just thing is beautiful;" but the Hypothetical point out a Consequence or Repugnance.

Plato makes use likewise of the operation of Syllogisms, when he is disproving or proving; when disproving falsehoods by a searching inquiry; and when proving truths by a certain kind of teaching. Now a Syllogism is a reasoning, in which, on some things being laid down, something necessarily turns out different from what has been laid down. Of Syllogisms there are some Categorical; others Hypothetical; and others Mixed. Of these the Categorical are those, of which the assumptions and conclusions are simple propositions; the Hypothetical are those, that proceed from hypothetical propositions; and the Mixed are those, that combine the (other) two.

The man[3] makes use likewise of Demonstrative (reasoning),[4] in the dialogues [5]that covertly lead (to truth),[5] and of Detective,[6] in those against the Sophists and young persons;

[1, 2] Here τις is found in an indefinite sense at the commencement of a sentence, contrary to the genius of the older Greek language; and although that position has been defended by Hermann and others, yet no unexceptionable instance can be produced before the time of Demosthenes, when, as remarked by Elmsley, the language of Athens had already begun to lose something of its pristine purity.

[3] Ficinus has "Plato—"

[4] Ficinus inserts here "argumentationibus," which I have adopted.

[5—5] Such, I conceive, is the meaning of ὑφηγητικοῖς— Ficinus has "quid ad expositionem pertinent—" But that would be in Greek ἐξηγητικοῖς.

[6] Ficinus, unable to understand satisfactorily ἐνδόξοις, gives, as usual, a double version, "probabilibus vero et apparentibus—" Unless I am greatly mistaken, Alcinous wrote ἐνδεικτικοῖς, which I have translated "Detective;" for such are the dialogues written against the Sophists, like those introduced in the Gorgias, and against young men, like Meno and Alcibiades.

but the Litigious, against those called peculiarly Litigious, as, say,[1] for instance, Euthydemus and Hippias. Of the Categorical, whose forms are three, the first is that, [2]in which the common extreme is first the predicate, and then the subject; the second is, in which the common extreme is the predicate in both; the third is, in which the common extreme is the subject in both.[2] Now the Extremes I call the parts of Propositions; as in the Proposition, "Man is an animal," we call "Man" an extreme, and so too "Animal." According to the first, second, and third forms, Plato frequently asks reasons.[3] According to the first (he argues)[4] thus in the Alcibiades[5]—"Just things are honourable. But honourable things are good. Therefore just things are good." According to the second, in the Parmenides,[6] thus—"That which has no parts, is neither straight nor round. But that which partakes of figure, is either straight or round. Hence that, which has no parts, does not partake even of figure." According to the third in the same book thus—[7] "That, which partakes of figure, has some quality; and that, which partakes of figure, is bounded; therefore that, which has some quality,

[1] So I have translated *φέρε* after *Εὐθύδημον*: for *φέρε* is frequently used for *εἰπὲ*, especially in the Meno. See p. 246, n. [6—6].

[2—2] I have adopted the phraseology of Ficinus, when translating the Greek, *ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος τοῦ μὲν κατηγορεῖται, τῷ δὲ ὑπόκειται· τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου, ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος ἀμφοτέρων κατηγορεῖται· τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἐν ᾧ ὁ κοινὸς ὅρος ἀμφοτέρων ὑπόκειται.* And hence, perhaps, is to be understood what is meant by Olympiodorus on Platon. Alcibiad. p. 126, ed Creuzer, where the words *ὑποκείμενον* and *κατηγόρηται* are found in two antithetical sentences.

[3] Such is the literal version of *ἐρωτᾷ λόγους*. But as Ficinus has "disputat," one would fancy he found something else in his MS., were it not that we meet with *τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς—ἐρωτωμένους* shortly afterwards. Since, however, no Proposition could be said to ask a question, it will be asserted perhaps that *ἐρωτᾷ λόγους* means, "he proposes reasons by means of questions;" a meaning, which Stephens, in Thes. Gr. i. p. 1903, D., says he was the first to point out; while *τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς—ἐρωτωμένους* would signify "hypothetical reasons given by means of questions."

[4] After "sic," answering to *οὕτως*, Ficinus adds "argumentatur," what I have adopted.

[5] In Alcibiad. I. § 23. [6] In Parmenid. § 23.

[7—7] This is not a quotation from, but an argument founded upon, the Parmenides. With regard to the text, Ficinus has, "Quod figura participat, quale est quod figura participat, finitum est; quod ergo est quale, finitur" e :" which is, what the Greek is not, unintelligible.

is bounded."[7] [1] And in many books we shall find hypothetical reasons asked by him; and especially in the Parmenides we shall find them such as these[1]—"If the one has no parts, it has neither a beginning, a middle, nor an end, [2] nor has it a limit;[2] and if it has not a limit, neither does it partake of figure. If then the one has no parts, neither does it partake of figure." According to the second hypothetical form, which the majority say is the third, according to which the common extreme follows both the ends, he asks[3] in this manner—"If the one has no parts, it is neither straight nor round. (But) if it partakes of figure, it is either straight or round. If then it has no parts, it does not partake of figure." And yet according to the third form, but the second with some persons, according to which the common extreme leads both, he asks[4] thus in the Phædo—[5] If, after we have received the knowledge of what is equal, we have not forgotten it, we know it; but, if we have forgotten it, we recall it to mind.[5] And of the Mixed he makes mention, which thus build up (a reasoning) from a consequence—"If the one is a whole and limited, it has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and partakes of figure. [6] Now, since the leading is so, so is the ending."[6] Of those too, that pull down from a consequence, [7] (it is most easy) to contemplate the differences in a similar manner.[7]

When therefore a person looks carefully into the powers of the soul, and into the difference of men, and the kinds of rea-

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, more briefly, "Argumentationes præterea, quæ per suppositiones contextæ sunt, crebras apud Platonem reperire licet, præcipue vero in Parmenide rationes hujusmodi."

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous, unless we read ἕξει, in lieu of ἔχει, answering to "habebit" in Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus, "ratiocinatur," and in [4], "argumentatur." See at p. 253, n. [4].

[5]—[5] The reasoning alluded to is in p. 75, C. D.

[6]—[6] This formula is repeated in § 9. Ficinus has "Verum antecedens, verum igitur consequens—" Stanley, "But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent." The formula, used by the Stoics, was, "Si primum, secundum; atqui primum, secundum igitur—" as we learn from Apuleius de Dogm. Platon. iii.

[7]—[7] I have translated, as if ὡσαύτως had been corrupted into οὕτω πως and κατὰ πάντα into κατὰ τοῦτο, and ῥᾷστον had dropt out after διαφορὰς— Ficinus has "sic quodammodo differentiæ considerantur—" as if he had found in his MS., or wished to read, αἱ διαφοραὶ θεωροῦνται, instead of τὰς διαφορὰς κατὰ τοῦτο θεωρεῖσθαι— for he doubtless saw that κατὰ τοῦτο was at variance with the sense, and θεωρεῖσθαι with the syntax. Stanley, more briefly, "Of those also, which overthrow by Consequence, the differences may be gathered out of Plato."

soning, [1] and acutely perceives which of them are suited to the soul in this way or that, and being what himself by what and what kind of reasonings he can be persuaded, such a person, if he lays hold of a fitting opportunity for the use (of his faculties),[1] will become a perfect orator; and his oratorical skill would be justly called the science of speaking well.

And of Sophisms too we shall find the method[2] delineated[3] by Plato in the Euthydemus, if we carefully read[4] the book; so that[5] it is indicated covertly, what Sophisms are in words, and what in things, and what are the solutions of them.

Moreover he has pointed out secretly the ten[6] Categories in the Parmenides and the other dialogues; and he goes through the whole question of etymology in the Cratylus; and, to speak simply, the man is the most sufficient and wonderful in the business relating to Definitions and Divisions; all of which[7] show forth especially the power of the Dialectic art.

The matter of the Cratylus has a meaning of this kind. Plato inquires there whether names are from nature or imposition; and he is satisfied that the correctness of names is referable to imposition; not however simply[8] so, nor accidentally, but so that the imposition follows upon the nature of the thing; for the correctness of the name is nothing else than the imposition, which agrees with the nature of the thing; nor is yet the imposition, whatever it may be, of the name, sufficient by itself[9] for correctness; nor is nature, nor the first

[1]—[1] The whole of the matter between the numerals is thus represented by Ficinus in a form partly abridged, and transposed partly—"deinde temporis occasione considerata, certis affectibus hominum proprias, quibus moveri possint, ratiocinationes adcommodarit." With regard to the syntax, it is evident we must read *αἰσθάνηται* and *δύνηται*, instead of *αἰσθάνεται* and *δύναται*: for *αἰσθάνηται* would thus be coupled with *κατίδῃ* by *τε*, and *δύνηται* follow *ὁποῖος* with the usual ellipse of *ἂν*—

[2] In lieu of *μέθοδον*, Ficinus found something different in his MS., as shown by his "captionumque laqueos—"

[3] Ficinus has "subinsinuatos—"

[4] The oldest example of this sense of *ἐντυγχάνειν* is to be found, I believe, in Plutarch.

[5] This *ὥστε* seems very strange here; and so, doubtless, thought Ficinus, whose version is "Illic enim—reperiuntur." Perhaps the author wrote *ἴστε γὰρ*— not *ὥστε καὶ*—

[6] On the ten Categories, see Aristotle's treatise under that title.

[7] Ficinus, "quæ duo," in Greek *αἵ δύο*, which is preferable to *αἵ πᾶσαι*—

[8] Ficinus, "non temere—" as if his MS. read *ἄλλως*, not *ἁπλῶς*—

[9] I have omitted, with Ficinus, *καὶ ἀποχρῶσαν* after *αὐταρκῆ*—

utterance of the voice; but that which is (compounded)[1] of both, so that the peculiarity[2] of every name is laid down according to its affinity with the nature of the thing; for assuredly, should what is accidental be imposed upon an accidental thing, it would not signify what is correct; as if, for instance, we should give to a man the name of a horse; since to speak is some one of actions; so that a person would not speak correctly by speaking in any manner soever, but if he should speak in such a way, as things exist naturally. Now since to give a name to a thing is a part of speaking, so is a name a part of speech; (and) to name a thing correctly or not would take place, not according to any imposition whatsoever, but according to a natural affinity with the thing. Hence he would be the best name-imposer, who should mark out by the name the nature of the thing. For the name is an instrument of a thing, not such as occurs accidentally, but [3]has a mutual relation by nature;[3] and through it we teach each other the things, and we judge of them;[4] so that [5]the name is something with a teaching, and the instrument, that judges of the existence of each thing,[5] as the shuttle is of weaving.

With regard to the Dialectic art, this too will take place, (to wit,) to make use of names correctly. For as a man skilled in weaving would make use of a shuttle, through knowing its work, after a workman had manufactured it, so the Dialectician would, after the name-imposer had imposed the name, make use of it in a proper and advantageous manner. For it is the part of an artificer to make a rudder, but of the steersman to make use of it properly. So too the name-imposer himself would make a proper use of the imposition, if he were to make the imposition in the presence of the Dialectician, who knows

[1] I have adopted the Supplement in Ficinus of "compositum," answering to *συναφθὲν*, which has dropt out, I suspect, after *ἀμφοῖν*—

[2] I have translated, as if *τὸ* had been lost before *παντὸς*— Ficinus has "omnis nominis rectitudo—"

[3—3] Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "quod naturæ congruum—" as if his MS. read something else than *κατάλληλον*.

[4] Ficinus has "naturamque discernimus—" as if his MS. read *αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν*, not *αὐτὰ* simply. Compare, however, Cratyl. § 12, *διδάσκομέν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν, ᾗ ἔχει*.

[5—5] So in Cratyl. l. c., *Ὄνομα διδασκαλικόν τι ἐστὶν ὄργανον καὶ δια κριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας*. Hence Ficinus has improperly, "atque distribuens uniuscujusque substantiam."

the nature of the things that are the subject (of the names.)[1] And let so much be written down on the Dialectical question.

[7.] *On the Contemplative kind and its division.*

Now let us speak in order of the Contemplative kind.

Of this we have said that one portion is Theological; another Physical; and another Mathematical: and that of the Theological the end is [2]the knowledge relating to the first causes, and to what is the most above, and to principles;[2] but of the Physical to learn what is the nature of the Universe; and what kind of animal is man; and what place he occupies in the world; and whether god has any forethought respecting the Universe; and whether there are other gods[3] under his orders; and what is the condition of man with respect to the gods; but of the Mathematical, to consider [4]the superficial and triply-separated nature, relating both to motion and an onward carrying on,[4] and how it exists.

Let then the Contemplation of the Mathematical portion be laid down summarily. Now this was received by Plato for the acuteness of thought, as sharpening[5] the intellect, and as furnishing an accuracy towards the consideration of things existing.[6] That too, which relates to Numbers, being a portion of the Mathematical, [7]introduces an affinity, not such as is accidental, to an upward approach to things existing;[7] and it almost relieves us from the error and ignorance relating to things perceptible by a sense; and it co-operates towards the knowledge of existence, and [8]becomes well-constituted, as

[1] I have supplied "of the names" from the version of Ficinus, "quæ sub nominibus latent:" who probably found in his MS. *τῶν ὀνόματι ὑποκειμένων*, not *τῶν ὑποκειμένων* simply.

[2—2] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has, more briefly, "supernarum causarum cognitio—"

[3] Ficinus has "ministri—"

[4—4] Ficinus, more briefly and intelligibly, "planam et in tres porrectam dimensiones naturam—" Perhaps the author wrote *τὴν ἐπιπέδου τε καὶ στερεοῦ μέτρησιν, καὶ τὴν τριχῇ διεστηκυῖαν φύσιν περί τε στάσεως καὶ κινήσεως καὶ φορᾶς* – for otherwise there would be nothing to answer to the *τριχῇ διεστηκυῖαν*—

[5] Ficinus has "attingens"—for his MS. probably read *θίγουσα*, by a literal error, for *θήγουσα*.

[6] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "rerum divinarum."

[7—7] Such is the literal version of the words between the numerals Ficinus has "non mediocrem ad divina percipienda vim præstat—" Stanley,—"conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are."

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "promp-

regards war, by means of the theory of tactics.[8] So too that relating to Geometry is the most fit for a knowledge of the good; at least when a person pursues Geometry, not for any practical purpose, but makes use [1]of it, as something additional, so as[1] to ascend to the ever-existing being, and not to waste his time about what is generated and destroyed. Geometry[2] is, moreover, very useful; for after its second increase there follows the contemplation according to it, which has a third increase. Useful likewise as a fourth subject for learning is Astronomy; according to which we shall contemplate[3] the onward movement of the stars in heaven, [4]and of heaven,[4] and the artificer of night and day, and of months and years; from whence [5]by some familiar road[5] we shall search out[6] the artificer of the universe while proceeding from these subjects of learning, as from some basis and elements [7](by degrees to higher matters).[7] And of Music too we shall have a care by bringing the hearing of it to our ears. For as the eyes are constituted with respect to Astronomy, so is the hearing with respect to Harmony. And as, by turning our thoughts to Astronomy, we are led on the road from things seen to an existence unseen and perceptible by mind, so by listening to the voice of Harmony, we pass, in like manner, from things heard [8]to those that are beheld by the mind itself;[8]

tumque ad certamen propter consequentium rerum ordinisque peritiam hominem reddit—" which is any thing but a translation—what Stanley has adopted in part—" It likewise renders a man expert in military affairs, especially towards the ordering of an army, by the science of Tactics."

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *προσχρώμενος αὐτῇ ᾗ, ὥστε*—not *προσχρώμενος αὐτῇ ὡς*—

[2] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "Stereometria—id est solidorum dimensio," doubtless from his MS., which read *στερεομετρία* in lieu of *γεωμετρία*, correctly; for thus the Mathematical has a fourfold increase in Arithmetic, Geometry, Stereometry, and Astronomy.

[3] In lieu of *θεασόμεθα* Ficinus found in his MS. *θεώμεθα*, as shown by his "inspicimus—" adopted by Stanley.

[4]—[4] The words *καὶ οὐρανοῦ* are properly omitted by Ficinus.

[5]—[5] Ficinus has "quasi proxima quadam regione—"

[6] Ficinus has "investigamus," as if his MS. read *ζητοῦμεν*, not *ζητήσομεν*—

[7]—[7] Ficinus supplies, what is adopted by Stanley, as being requisite for the sense, "et gradibus ad altiora—"

[8]—[8] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But the very balance of the sentences plainly requires something of this kind; that "as we are led from things visible by the eye of sense to an existence visible by the

so that,[1] unless we pursue in this way these subjects of learning, our contemplation on these matters will be incomplete, and unprofitable, and nothing worth. For it is meet to turn quickly from things to be seen and heard to those, which it is possible to see[2] by the reasoning faculty alone of the soul. For the looking into Mathematical learning is a kind of prelude to the contemplation of things existing. For Geometry, and Arithmetic, and the sciences that follow upon them, although desirous to lay hold of the Being, yet are they in a dream [3]respecting the Being, and unable to see it, as a day-dream,[3] through being ignorant both of the principles (of things) and of what are formed from those principles. They happen, nevertheless, to be very useful, according to what has been stated. From whence Plato said that such subjects of learning were not sciences at all. The Dialectic art is then a progression, that naturally ascends from Geometrical Hypotheses to the first principles of things and non-hypothetical. From whence he called the Dialectic art a science. But the subjects of (such) learning (he said) were neither opinion, through their being more clear than things perceptible by a sense; nor a science, through their being more obscure than the primaries perceptible by mind; but of bodies he says (there is)[4] an opinion; of the primaries a science; but of (such) subjects of learning a mental notion. He lays down too, that Faith and Fancy are something; and that of these Faith is of things perceptible by a sense; but Fancy of resemblances and kinds.

eye of mind, so we are led from things audible by the ear of sense to try things of rhythm inaudible except by the ear of mind;" where the concluding words would be expressed in Greek,—*ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ, ἀνήκοα εἰ μὴ ὡτὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ῥυθμούμενα*, instead of *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουστῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῷ θεωρούμενα*. For thus an ear would be attributed to the mind, as the eye is to it, in the verse of Epicharmus—*Νοῦς ὄρῃ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καί τυφλά*—while in *ῥυθμούμενα* there would be an allusion to the well-regulated harmony of the spheres.

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὥστ'*, not *ὡς*—

[2] Here again the balance of the sentences requires the mention of hearing as well as seeing. Hence, as Plato has *λογισμοῦ-μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας*, one would prefer here, *ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν μόνοιν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ*.

[3]—[3] On the difference between *ὄναρ* and *ὕπαρ* see Blomf. on Prom. 495.

[4] I have translated, as if *εἶναι* had dropt out after *φησιν*—

Since then the Dialectic art [1] is the most powerful of the subjects of learning,[1] inasmuch as it is conversant about things divine, and stable, on this account it is ranked [2] above the other subjects of learning,[2] and is, as it were, the coping-stone and guard.

[8.] *Respecting the Primary Matter.*

After this let us speak consecutively about Principles and Theological Contemplations, commencing from on high from the primaries, and descending from them, and looking into the creation of the world, and ending with the creation and nature of man.

And let us speak first of Matter.

This then he calls a mould, that receives[3] every impression, and a nurse, and a mother, and a space, and a thing subjective and tangible, (and) without sensation, and to be apprehended by spurious reasoning; and that it possesses a peculiarity of such a kind, that it receives all creations, and has the reputation of a nurse by nourishing[4] them, and admits all forms, being itself without Figure, and Quality, and Species, but moulded into such, and fashioned, as if it were a mould, and put into a form by them, possessing no peculiar figure or quality. For there would not be any thing properly prepared for various configurations and forms, unless it were itself without Quality, and not partaking of these species, which it must receive. For[5] we see that those, who prepare sweet-smelling ointments from oil, make use of the most sweet-scented;[6] and those, who are desirous of fabricating figures from wax or clay, smooth down those substances, and render

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "efficacior quam mathematica," as if his MS. read *ἰσχυρότερον τῶν μαθηματικῶν* in lieu of *ἰσχυρότατον τῶν μαθημάτων*.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "mathematicis universis," as if his MS. read *τῶν μαθηματικῶν—τῶν ὅλων* instead of *τῶν μαθημάτων—τῶν λοιπῶν*. Stanley, "it is put before all Mathematics, as a wall and fortification of the rest."

[3] I have, with Ficinus, omitted *καὶ* before *πανδεχές*—

[4] In lieu of *φέρειν* I have been led to *τρέφειν*, from "fovere" in Ficinus, followed by Stanley.

[5] I have adopted *γὰρ* for *δὲ*, answering to "enim" in Ficinus.

[6] In lieu of *εὐοσμοτάτῳ*, the sense evidently requires *ἀνοσμοτάτῳ*, "the most without scent;" for if the oil had any scent, it would interfere with the scent of the substance, of which the ointment is made.

them shapeless in order that they may receive (new shapes).[1] It is fitting then for Matter which receives every thing, if it is about to receive forms universally, to be subject to the possessing not one of their natures, but to be without Quality, and without form for the purpose of receiving forms; and being such, it would be neither a body nor without a body, but a body *in posse*,[2] as we understand of copper, that it is a statue *in posse*,[3] because, after having received the form, it will become a statue.

[9.] *Respecting Ideas and the Efficient Cause.*

While matter retains the character of a Principle, (Plato) admits still other principles likewise, both the pattern-like, that is, relating to Ideas, and that of god, the father and the cause of all things. Now Idea is, as regards god, a mental operation by him; as regards us, the first thing perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; but as regards the world, perceptible by a sense, a pattern; but as considered[4] with reference to itself, an existence. For universally all that is generated according to a design ought to be generated for something. For[5] if any thing be produced from any thing, as my own resemblance is from myself, there must be a pattern previously laid down; [6]and whether the pattern be within or without, each of the artificers, having the pattern in himself, on every side and in every manner, invests its form with Matter.[6]

Now persons define Idea as the eternal pattern of things existing according to Nature. For it does not please the majority of Platonists (to admit) that there are Ideas of works of art, such as of a shield, or lyre; nor yet of things, that are contrary to Nature, such as of fever, and cholera; nor of what exists according to a part,[7] as of Socrates and Plato; nor of

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὡς νέα δέχηται σχήματα, ἀσχημάτιστα παρέχοντας*, not *ὡς ἐνδέχεται, ἀσχημάτιστα παρέχοντας*: which I cannot understand; nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is, "donec figuræ pristinæ deleantur."

[2, 3] So I have translated *δυνάμει*, as being more intelligible than "potentially," the word adopted by Stanley. See p. 263, n. [6].

[4] Ficinus omits *ἐξεταζομένη*, probably as being superfluous.

[5] I have adopted *γὰρ* found in ed. pr.

[6—6] Ficinus has, more briefly, "Et, si exemplar haud omnino sit ab agente seorsum, ut quisque artifex in se ipso artificiorum exempla concipiens—horum deinde formas in materiam explicat."

[7] Ficinus renders *κατὰ μέρος* by "particularium—"

things of no value, such as of filth and rotten thatch; nor of that, which exists with reference to something, as of a greater and superior; for Ideas are the notions of god eternal and perfect in themselves.

Now that there are Ideas, [1] in this way too they exhort (us).[1] For whether the deity be mind or something mental, it has thoughts, and these too both eternal and not to be turned aside. And if this be so, there are Ideas. For if Matter is on its own account without (a standard of) measure,[2] it must meet with a standard from something else, that is superior and without matter; hence [3] if the antecedent (is true), so is the consequent;[3] and if this be so, Ideas are certain (standards of) measures without Matter. Moreover, if the world is not such, as it is, from chance, not only has it been produced out of something, but by something; and not only so, but for something likewise. Now what could that, for which it has been produced, have been else than Idea? so that thus there would have been Ideas. Moreover, if mind differs from true[4] opinion, what is perceived by mind differs also from what is held as an opinion; and if this be so, [5] [things perceived by the mind are different from those held as opinions; so that][5] there will have been the primaries perceived by mind, and the primaries perceived by a sense; and if this be so, there are Ideas. Now mind does differ from a true opinion; so that there will have been Ideas.

[10.] *How it is meet to delineate the deity, and respecting his mental operation.*

We must now render an account, next in order, of the third principle, which Plato considers to be almost impossible to be told. We may however be led to it after this manner. If things are perceptible by mind, and these too not perceptible by a sense, nor with a participation in the things perceptible

[1]—[1] Ficinus renders παραμυθοῦνται by "probant—" Perhaps the author wrote πόριμα τίθενται, "make it passible," as we should say.

[2] Such, I presume, is the meaning of ἄμετρος.

[3]—[3] See p. 254, n. [6].

[4] The chain of reasoning evidently requires the omission of ἀληθοῦς, both here and shortly afterwards, where it is omitted by Ficinus. Perhaps the author wrote in both places ἀσταθοῦς, "unsteady," for such is the character of opinion.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals, with the exception of ὥστε, are evidently an interpretation of τοῦτο—

by a sense, but belonging to some primaries perceptible by mind, there are simple primaries perceptible by mind, as there are primaries likewise perceptible by a sense. [1]If then the antecedent (is true), so is the consequent.[1] Now men—as being infected[2] with the suffering from sensation, so that, when they determine to think upon something perceptible by mind, they keep in their fancy that, which is perceptible by a sense, so as to think at the same time of magnitude, and form, and colour—do frequently think not clearly upon things perceptible by mind ; whereas the gods, being freed from things perceptible by a sense, (do think) clearly and without a mixture (of fancies).[3] Now since Mind is superior to the living principle,[4] and as the Mind, which is, according to its working,[5] thinking upon all things simultaneously and for ever, is superior to a mind *in posse* ;[6] and as [7]the cause of that is better than this,[7] [8]and what exists is still above these,[8] this would be the primary god, as being the cause [9]of perpetually operating for the mind of the whole heaven.[9] Now he is operating, although unmoved himself, for that (mind), [10]as the sun does for vision, when it looks for him,[10] and as that, [11]which has the faculty of desire, excites desire,[11] itself being

[1]—[1] See p. 254, n. [6].

[2] On this sense of *πίμπλασθαι* and its compounds, see Ruhnken on Timæus in *Ἀνάπλεως*, and myself on Philoct. 522. Ficinus renders "perturbatione sensuum occupati."

[3] I have added "of fancies," for the sake of perspicuity.

[4] Such is frequently the meaning of *ψυχή*, not "soul."

[5] Ficinus renders *κατ' ἐνέργειαν* by "actu—"

[6] See at p. 261, n. [2, 3].

[7]—[7] In *τούτου καλλίων ὁ αἴτιος τούτου* there is an ambiguity arising from the repetition of *τούτου*. To avoid it, Stanley follows the version of Ficinus, "intellectus ille hoc denique pulchrius, quod ejus est causa—"

[8]—[8] Here too is another ambiguity, proceeding from the union of *ἀνωτέρω* and *ὑφέστηκεν*. Ficinus has "quodque omnibus superextat—" as if his MS. read *καὶ ὅπερ ἀνωτέρω πάντων ἐφέστηκεν*— without *ἔτι*—

[9]—[9] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "isque causa est ut mundi mens semper agat—" as if he had found in his MS. *αἴτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν νοῦν*— without *τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ*.

[10]—[10] I cannot understand *ὅταν αὐτῷ προσβλέπῃ*, nor could, I think, Ficinus, who has omitted those words in his version, "haud secus quam in oculum subjectum sol agit." Stanley, "as the sun upon the eye, when it turneth towards him."

[11]—[11] Ficinus has "quod appetitur, immobile ipsum, appetentem agi-

unmoved. At least in this way will this Mind likewise excite the mind of the whole heaven. Now, since the primary Mind is the most beautiful, there must needs be the most beautiful thing placed under it. But nothing is more beautiful than itself. It would therefore be thinking for ever upon itself and its own cogitations; and this its mental energy is Idea. Moreover the primary god is eternal, ineffable, perfect in itself, [1]that is, not wanting in any thing,[1] [2]ever-perfect, that is, for ever perfect, all-perfect, that is, perfect in every way,[2] a divinity, holiness, truth, symmetry, good.[3] And I say not this, as if giving a definition, but [4]as of one had in mind according to all.[4] He is a good,[5] because, being the cause of all good, [6]he bestows kindness on all things according to his power;[6] and a beautiful thing, [7]because he is (so) by himself more than that by nature and symmetrical;[7] and truth, because he is the beginning of all truth, as the Sun is of all light; and he is the father, by being the cause of all things, and by putting into order the heavenly mind, and the soul of the world, with reference to himself and his own cogitations. For according to his own will he has filled all things with himself, after

tat—" where " appetentem " is probably a press error for " appetitum," answering to *τὴν ὄρεξιν*.

[1]—[1] As one can hardly believe that the author himself explained *αὐτοτελὴς* by *τουτέστιν ἀπροσδεὴς*, it is probable that those two words, or at any rate one, *τουτέστιν*, is an interpolation, as shown by its omission in Ficinus.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἀειτελὴς, τουτέστιν ἀεὶ τέλειος, παντελὴς, τουτέστι πάντη τέλειος*. But the version of Ficinus more correctly " semperque et undique absolute perfectus." For he, doubtless, found in his MS. *ἀειτελὴς καὶ πάντη τέλειος*.

[3] We must read either *τὸ ἀγαθὸν*, or, what would be preferable, *ἀγαθότης*, " goodness."

[4]—[4] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of *ὡς κατὰ πάντα ἑνὸς νοουμένου*. Ficinus has " ut unum potius cuncta contemplor."

[5] Here *ἀγαθὸν* is to be referred to *ἀγαθότης*, as *καλὸν* in the next clause is to *συμμετρία*.

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of *πάντα εἰς δύναμιν*. Ficinus has more intelligibly, " omnia pro capacitate cujusque beneficiis replet —" i. e. " he fills all things with kindness according to the capacity of each."

[7]—[7] Such, I presume, is the meaning of *αὐτὸς τοῦ φύσει πλέον ἐστι καὶ σύμμετρον*, thus translated by Stanley, " Fair, because he is in his essence both more and equal:" and thus by Ficinus, " Pulchrum vero ex eo, quod ipsum natura plenitudo ipsa et harmonia omnia omnis existit."

having raised up the soul of the world and turned it to himself, being the cause of that[1] mind, which, being put into order by the father, puts into order the whole of nature in this world. He is moreover ineffable, and to be comprehended by mind alone, as has been stated; since he is neither genus nor species, [2]nor difference;[2] nor has there happened to him any thing either evil—for it is not lawful to state this; or good—for he would be such[3] according to the participation of something, especially goodness; nor difference—for this (cannot be)[4] according to the notion of him; nor being with equality—for he has not been made a quality, nor perfected by quality; nor without quality[5]—for he has not been deprived of any quality, coming upon him; nor a part of any thing; nor as a whole, possessing any parts; [6]nor so as to be any thing the same[6] or different—for nothing has happened to him, according to which he is able to be separated from the rest of things; nor does he move, nor is he moved.

Now (the) first notion of him will be that, which is according to the abstraction from (all)[7] these things; as we have had a notion of a point[8] according to an abstraction [9]from what is perceptible by a sense,[9] by thinking upon a superficies, then a line, and lastly a point.[10] The second notion will be that, which is according to analogy somehow in this way. For the

[1] In lieu of *αὐτῆς*, which is without regimen, the sense and syntax require *αὐτοῦ*—

[2—2] The introduction of this clause seems out of place here: for the same point is touched upon just afterwards. One would have expected rather reasons to be given why god is neither genus nor species.

[3] Ficinus has "talis—" He therefore found in his MS. *τοιοῦτος* in lieu of *οὗτος*—

[4] I have adopted the Supplement that Ficinus offers in his version, "fieri potest—" answering to *οἷόν τε*— which might easily have dropt out between *αὐτοῦ* and *οὔτε*—

[5] Ficinus has "informis," through mistaking the meaning of *ἄποιον*.

[6—6] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *οὔτε ὥστε ταὐτόν τι εἶναι*— where it is difficult to account for the introduction of *ὥστε—εἶναι*— for the flow of ideas would require rather *οὔτε ἐστὶ ταὐτόν τῳ*— without *εἶναι*— similar to "neque idem est cuiquam—" in Ficinus.

[7] Ficinus has "horum omnium—" as if his MS. read *τοὔτων πάντων*— what I have adopted.

[8] Ficinus translates, here and in [10], *σημεῖον* by "punctum," which is in good Greek *στιγμή*.

[9—9] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[1]analogy which the sun has to the seeing faculty and to things seen, without being himself vision, but enabling it to see and them to be seen, this analogy[1] has the primary mind to the thinking faculty, and to the things thought of. For not being what the thinking faculty is, it enables it to think, and for things perceptible by mind[2] to be thought of, by throwing around them the light of truth. But the third notion would be something of this kind. A person, after contemplating the beauty in bodies, will then proceed to the beauty of the soul; and afterwards to that, which is in pursuits and laws; and then to the wide sea[3] of the beautiful; after which he will think of the good itself, and the lovely, and desirable, [4]as it were a light that has appeared, and is shining out upon the thus ascending soul.[4] [5]In this way he thinks too upon god, on account of his excellence in a state of honour,[5] and that he is without parts, through there being nothing prior to him; for a part, and that, from which [6](any thing is composed),[6] is prior to that, of which it is a part; for the plane is prior to the bulk in a body, and the line is prior to a plane. By not having parts then he would be unmoved, as regards space and change. For if he were changed, it would be either by himself or by another. Now if it were by another, that other would be more powerful than he; but if by himself, he would be changed either for the worse or the better. Now both of these (suppositions) are absurd. From all which it appears that he[7] is without body; which may be shown from these

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀνάλογον*, not λόγον—

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *δὲ*, not *γὰρ*—

[3] Here, as in p. 250, n. [7], Ficinus substitutes "fontem" for "mare," the proper version of *πέλαγος*.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "velut splendorem in animam, quæ illuc evolavit, subito refulgentem—" whose MS., if faithfully represented, must have offered a remarkable variation.

[5]—[5] Here too the version of Ficinus differs not a little, "Hujusmodi vero lumen deum ipsum esse ob excellentiam recognoscit; eumque in primis sine magnitudine quantitatis agnoscit—" where the last clause is required to fill up the chain of reasoning. Not less at variance with the Greek is the version of Stanley, "By this he comprehendeth god himself through reason of that excellence, which consisteth in adoration of him."

[6]—[6] The Supplement between the numerals has been adopted from "aliquid constituitur—" in Ficinus.

[7] I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτὸς*, not *αὐτὸ*—

proofs likewise. For if god were body, he would be Material and with a Form, through every body being a dual substance, composed of Matter and of Form united to it; which are assimilated to Ideas and partake of them in some kind of manner hard to be explained. Now it is absurd for god to be composed of Matter and Form. For he will not be simple, nor capable of being a beginning; so that the deity would be a thing without body; and from another point,[1] if he is body, he would be Material, and would be either fire or water, or earth or air, or something (produced) from them. Now each of these at least is not capable of being a beginning; and he would be really[2] produced posterior to Matter, if he were Material; which suppositions being absurd, we must understand him to be without body. For if he were body, he would be [3]destroyed, and produced, and changed.[3] But each of these events is absurd in his case.

[11.] *That Qualities are incorporeal.*

Qualities moreover can be shown in this manner to be incorporeal. Every body is in a subjective state. But a Quality is not in a subjective state, but accidental. Body is therefore not a Quality. Every Quality is in a subjective state; but no body is in a subjective state. Quality therefore is not body. Further, one quality is the opposite to another quality. But one body is not so to another body; and body differs, as far as it is body, in nothing from body; but it does differ in Quality, [4]and not, by Zeus, in bodies.[4] Qualities are therefore not bodies. And it is most reasonable, that, as Matter is devoid of Quality, so Quality should be devoid of Matter; and if Quality be immaterial, Quality will be incorporeal. [5]For if Qualities were bodies,[5] two and three bodies would be in the same place—a thing the most absurd. But if Qualities are incorporeal, that which fabricates them (would be)[6] incor-

[1] The Greek is at present *αὐτόθεν*, which is unintelligible. I have translated, as if it were originally *ἄλλοθεν*— Ficinus has "præterea—"

[2] Such is the meaning of *ἄλλως* here; unless we read *αὐτῆς -τῆς ὕλης*— similar to "materia ipsa—" in Ficinus.

[3—3] The natural order of events would be rather—"produced, and changed, and destroyed."

[4—4] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[5—5] I have translated, as if the Greek were, not *εἴ γε μὴν*— but *εἰ γὰρ ἦν*— where *γὰρ ἦν* is due to "enimvero si—sunt—" in Ficinus.

[6] I have translated, as if *ἂν εἴη* had dropt out after *ἀσώματον*— Compare *ἀσώματος ἂν εἴη* just before.

poreal. Now there can be no other things that fabricate but incorporeals. For bodies are subject to suffering and to flowing, and to being not always in the same state and similar, and not permanent [1]and firmly fixed;[1] and even in cases, where they seem to be active in something, they are found to be previously passive in much. As then there is something clearly passive, so there must be something truly active. Now we should not find any thing else to be this, but what is incorporeal.

The discourse then respecting the Principles of things would be of some such kind as this, when called Theological. Let us then proceed next in order to what is called Physical, beginning from some point here.

[12.] *On the Causes of the World, and further on its Generation, Elements, and Arrangement.*

[2]Since of the things, which are perceptible by a sense according to nature and individually,[2] there must be some patterns defined, (namely) Ideas, from which Sciences and Definitions are produced—for [3]besides all men a certain man is thought of, and besides all horses a certain horse[3]—and generally, besides living beings a living being not generated and indestructible, in the same manner as from one seal there are many impressions, and of one man ten thousand likenesses upon ten thousand, the Idea (itself)[5] being originally[6] the cause of each being such as it is itself—it is a thing of necessity that the World should have been fabricated by the deity, as the most beautiful composition, while he was looking to some Idea of a World, as being the pattern of this World, made, as it were, after the resemblance of that Idea, according to which it was, after being assimilated, worked out; while the deity came by a most wonderful forethought and mode of life[6] to fabricate the World, because he was good. He fabricated it therefore

[1—1] Ficinus correctly omits *καὶ ἔμπεδα*, as superfluous after *μόνιμα*—

[2—2] The version of Ficinus presents a remarkable variation, "Corporalium omnium, quæ secundum naturam distincta, invicem efficiuntur."

[3—3] Ficinus has, more intelligibly, "præter singulos homines, hominem ipsum intelligere decet; et præter equos singulos, ipsum equum—"

[4] I have introduced "itself" from "ipsa" in Ficinus, adopted by Stanley.

[5] Ficinus omits *ἀρχην*—

[6] I cannot understand *δίαιταν* here, nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is "optima norma—"

from the whole of matter; which moved about in no order and superfluously, previous to the generation of heaven; and taking it away from its disordered state he led it to the best[1] order, and he adorned its parts with becoming numbers and forms, [2]so as to discriminate[2] how fire and earth exist at present with reference to air and water—things that exhibited previously merely[3] foot-marks,[4] and (were) the receptacle of the powers of the Elements, and were without reason and without measure shaking Matter and were shaken by it. [5]For from each of the four elements, as a whole, he generated the World;[5] and from all fire and earth and water and air leaving out neither any part or power, through having reflected,[6] in the first place, that it was requisite to be a body and a production, and altogether tangible and visible; since without fire and without earth it was not possible for any thing to be either visible or tangible. According then to a fair reason he formed it of earth and fire. But since it was requisite for some chain to be in the midst of both of these; and since the divine chain is that of proportion, which has by nature the power to make itself and what are united with it one; and since the World was not a plane—for one middle power would have been sufficient—but spherical—and required two middle powers for the fitting together—on this account, in the midst of fire and of earth, both air and water were arranged according to the manner of a proportion; [7]so that, as fire is to air, so air should be to water, and this last to earth, and conversely;[7] and [8]by nothing being left from without, he

[1] Since Ficinus has "pulchrum ordinem—" perhaps his MS. read καλὴν— which would lead to ἀρίστην καὶ καλλίστην— "the best and most beautiful—"

[2—2] Ficinus has "ut ea mundus sit proportione contextus."

[3] I have supplied "merely" from "solum" in Ficinus.

[4] On ἴχνη see at § 13, p. 271.

[5—5] Ficinus has "ex integris enim quatuor elementis, eum compegit."

[6] Ficinus has "præcidebat," by a press error for "prævidebat—"

[7—7] Ficinus has, more fully, "ut quemadmodum se habet ignis ad aerem, sic aer ad aquam; utque aer ad aquam, sic et aqua ad terram; ac rursus, ut terra ad aquam, sic aqua ad aerem; utque aqua ad aerem, sic aer ad ignem." For he probably did not follow so much the MS. before him, as the passage in the Timæus, p. 32, A., to which there is an allusion. See too Tim. Locr. iii. § 6.

[8—8] Ficinus has "ex eo insuper, quod nihil extra mundum reliquit, unicum illum fecit."

made the World his only begotten,[8] and assimilated it, according to number, to the Idea, that was one O.[1] He made it, moreover, without disease and without old age—inasmuch as nothing could come to it, naturally able to corrupt it—and self-sufficient, and in need of nothing from without; and he put round it a spherical form, the most regular kind of figure, and the most capacious, and the most easy to be moved. But, since it requires neither vision nor hearing, nor any thing else of that kind, he did not attach to it organs of such a kind for ministering (to the senses);[2] and after taking away the other kinds of motion, he gave it only the circularly-progressive, which has an affinity with that of Mind and Thought.

[13.] *Respecting the Configuration of the World; and that each of its forms is analogous to the World and its Elements.*

As the things, of which the World consists, are two, (namely,) body and soul, of which the former is visible and tangible,[3] but the latter invisible and intangible, the power and constitution of each happens to be different. For its body[4] is generated from fire and earth and water and air. These four substances did the fabricator of the World take together, while they were not, by Zeus,[5] preserving the order of the elements; and he gave to them the form of a Pyramid, and a Cube, and an Octohedron, and Eikosihedron, but, above all, a Dodecahedron. And as far as Matter assumed the form of a Pyramid, it became Fire, [6]that form being the most piercing,[6] and made up of the fewest triangles, and in this manner the most attenuated; but as far as (it assumed the form) of an Octohedron, it took the quality of air; and as far as that of an Eikosihedron, it had the quality of water; and the form of a Cube he assigned to earth, as being the most solid

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, more clearly, "et ideæ suæ, quæ unica est numero, parem."

[2] I have supplied "to the senses" from "obsequium sentiendi" in Ficinus.

[3] In lieu of *ἁπτὸν*, Ficinus found probably *φθαρτὸν*, answering to his "corruptioni obnoxium—" adopted by Stanley.

[4] I have adopted, from ed. pr., *σῶμα αὐτοῦ* in lieu of *αὐτοῦ* simply. Ficinus too, "corpus—mundi."

[5] Ficinus omits *μὰ Δία* here, as he frequently does in his version of Plato, through his dislike of the oath.

[6]—[6] Ficinus has "ea quippe figura tenuis—" But there is nothing in the Greek answering to "tenuis."

and stable; but he made use of the form of the Dodecahedron for the Universe. But more than all these was the Plane of the nature of a Principle. For Planes are prior to Solids. And of the nature of a Plane there are, as it were, some two progenitors, [1]the most beautiful,[1] in the form of right-angled triangles; one, the Skalene; the other, the Isoskeles; the Skalene having one angle a right angle, and another two-thirds (of a right angle), and the remainder the third (of a right angle). Now the former, [2][I mean the Skalene triangle,][2] is the element of the Pyramid, and Octohedron, and Eikosihedron; the Pyramid consisting of four equilateral triangles, each of which is divided into six Skalene triangles, as described already; but the Octohedron in like manner of eight, each of which is divided into six Skalene; and the Eikosihedron (in like manner)[3] of twenty. But the other, [4][I mean the Isoskeles,][4] becomes the constituent form of the Cube; for when four Isoskeles triangles come together, they make a Square; from six squares of which kind is formed a Cube. But for the Universe the deity made use of the Dodecahedron. Wherefore there are seen [5][in heaven][5] the forms of twelve animals in the circle of the Zodiac, and each of them is divided into thirty parts. And nearly so in the case of the Dodecahedron; which consists of twelve pentagons, (each)[6] divided into five triangles, so that, as each consists of six triangles, there are found in the whole Dodecahedron three hundred and sixty triangles, being as many as there are parts in the Zodiac. Matter then, being fashioned into these forms by the deity, was moved at first with (indistinct)[7] footsteps, and without order, but was subsequently reduced into order by the deity, while all things were fitted together according to a pro-

[1]—[1] Ficinus omits *τὰ κάλλιστα*— words that ought to follow rather *πρόγονα* just before.

[2]—[2] After *τὸ μὲν πρότερον* one would omit *λέγω δὴ τὸ σκαληνὸν τρίγωνον* here, just as Ficinus omits a little below ([4]—[4]) after *τὸ δὲ ἕτερον* the words *λέγω δὴ τὸ ἰσοσκελὲς*—

[3] I have adopted the Supplement in Ficinus, "similiter," to which there is nothing answering in the Greek.

[5]—[5] The words *ἐν οὐρανῷ* are omitted by Ficinus.

[6] I have introduced, what Ficinus has supplied, "unusquisque," wanting in the Greek, where *ἑκάστων* might easily have dropt out before *ὥστε ἕκαστον*—

[7] This word seems absolutely requisite for the sense; although *ἴχνη* is found by itself in § 12, p. 268.

portion with each other. These things, however, when separated, do not remain at rest, but have a ceaseless shaking and communicate it to Matter. Wherefore being bound to the circumference of the World, they are driven on with it; and, while so driven on, they are carried against each other, the thinner particles into the places of the grosser; and by this means there is left no vacuum, destitute of some body; and as this inequality continues, it gives rise to a shaking; for by these particles Matter is shaken and they by it.

[14.] *Respecting the Soul of the World, and the Spheres, and the Stars.*

[1]Bodies then has (Plato) introduced for the instruction of the Soul, touching the powers that are exhibited in it.[1] For since we judge of each of things existing by the Soul, he has fairly placed in it the Principles of all existing things, in order that, while contemplating each of the things that fall under it, according to their affinity and proximity, we should represent to ourselves its being in harmony with its acts. By saying then that there is a certain existence perceptible by the mind, which is indivisible, he has represented to himself another existence likewise, relating to bodies, which is divisible, by showing that he is able to lay hold by intellect of each of these existences; and by seeing that, as regards things perceptible by mind, there is an identity and a difference, and (so too) as regards things perceptible by a sense, from all these he has made the Soul a contribution.[2] For either the like is known by the like, which is the favourite doctrine of the Pythagorean, or the unlike by the unlike, which is that of Heracleitus, the Physical philosopher. But when (Plato) says that the World has been generated, we must not understand him, as if there were once a time, when the World was not; but because [3]it is ever in generation,[3] and shows forth something as a cause more ancient than its own constitution. And even the deity does not make the Soul ever existing of the World, but puts it in order. And

[1]—[1] Ficinus has, more briefly, "Ex corporibus itaque animæ vires investigare concessit." For he could not understand clearly, nor do I, the Greek—*εἰς τὰς τῶν ἐμφαινομένων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δυνάμεων*— where the noun is wanting, required by *τὰς*—for the article cannot be taken here in a partitive sense.

[2] On the word *ἔρανος*, taken in its natural or metaphorical sense, see Casaubon on Theophrasti Character., p. 281.

[3]—[3] Instead of *ἔστι*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *ἐνεστι*: for his version is "perdurat—"

in this way he might be said to make it, by arousing up, as if from a drowsiness [1]or heavy sleep,[1] and [2]turning to himself both its mind and itself,[2] so that, by looking to what is perceptible by his mind, it may, while eagerly seeking his notions, assume species and forms. It is plain then that the World is a thing of life and intellectual. For the deity being desirous of making it the best (work),[3] made it consequently both with life and intellect. For that, which is with life, is, [4]taken as a whole, a completed work superior to that, which, taken as a whole,[4] is without life; and the intellectual than the non-intellectual; although perhaps by the mind not being able to subsist without a thing of life, but by the life being extended from the centre to the extremities, [5]it has happened, that it surrounds the body of the World in a circle and entirely conceals it, so that it stretches along the whole of the World, and in this manner binds and keeps it together;[5] [6]and that the particles without have a power over those within.[6] For that, which is without, remains uncut; but that, which is within, is cut into seven circles, divided from the commencement into double and triple intervals. Now that, which is comprehended by the (portion) of the sphere remaining uncut, is very like to the same; but the cut (like to) the different. For the movement of the heaven, which embraces all things, [7]is

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are, perhaps, an interpolation. At least Ficinus has "ex profundo quodam somno," as if he did not find *κάρου* in his MS., or did not understand the word, explained by Suidas, "the aberration of mind arising from drinking wine."

[2]—[2] Ficinus, more briefly, "ad se ipsum ejus mentem—convertit—"

[3] Ficinus supplies, what is requisite for the sense, although wanting in the Greek, "opus—" as if *ἔργον* was found in his MS. between *γὰρ* and *αὐτὸν*—

[4]—[4] I have translated *ὅλον ὅλου*, "taken as a whole," words not found in the MS. of Ficinus, or omitted by him, as being obscure.

[5]—[5] Ficinus more briefly, and with a change in the position of the words and sentences, "mundi corpus totum circulo complexa est, universum quippe circumtegens, singulis ejus communicata particulis eoque pacto insolubili connectit vinculo, incolumenque conservat." I have, however, been content to change *διὰ παντὸς περιέχειν καὶ* into *περιέχειν καὶ διὰ παντὸς*—

[6]—[6] Ficinus has "atque ea vis animæ, quæ extra restitit, partes ejus intimas antecedit."

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Stanley's is, "being not uncertain, is one and ordinate—" that of Ficinus, "cum minime pervagetur, unus est, ordinemque præcipuum servat."

not-wandering,[7] as being one and in order; but that, [1]which is within, is various, and changed by risings and settings; and hence it is called wandering.[1] But that, which is without, is carried along to the right, by being moved from east to west; but that, which is within, conversely to the left, from west to east, [2]meeting the world.[2] The deity made, moreover, the constellations and stars; and of these some not wandering, the ornament of heaven and of night, being very many in number; and [3](the planets), being seven,[3] for the generation of number and time, and the exhibition of things existing. For an interval in the movement of the World has produced Time, [4]the image, as it were, of eternity,[4] which is a measure of the staying[5] of the eternal World. But the non-wandering stars are not similar in power. The Sun is the leader of all, showing and illuminating all things. But the Moon is seen in the second rank, on account of her power; and the other planets proportionally, each according to its own share. Now the Moon makes the measure of a month,[6] after it has completely gone through its own revolution, and overtaken the Sun in such (a time);[7] but the Sun in that of a year. For

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "At vero subjectorum progressus varius ortibusque et occasibus permutatur; unde pervagatio quædam et oberratio nuncupatur."

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "superiori resistens." I confess I cannot understand either the Greek or the Latin; and the less so, as in a passage, similar in other respects, nothing similar is found in Tim. Locr. p. 97, C. § 4, where, however, from the words τὰ δὲ πᾶς (κινούμενα) τῷ ἑτέρῳ—ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας—τοῦ κα—ἐπαναφερόμενα—συμπερίεισιν—τῷ ταὐτῷ φορᾷ, κατὰ ἀριστερὰ ἐν κύκλῳ κύκλον—one ought perhaps to elicit here, τὸ ταὐτὸ ἵστησι τὸν τοῦ κόσμου ὅρμον—where ὅρμον might have been easily lost before ὁμοιομερῶς. By comparing however the reading of Ficinus with the words of Cicero in Somn. Scipion. 4, "Huic (eximo orbi) subjecti sunt septem, qui versantur contrario motu atque cœlum"—quoted by Ast on Epinom. § 9, πρὸς δ' ἔτι φορᾷς Μίμνουσιν (τὰν) ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ποριζόμενον—ἵνα δὲ—δι' αὐτῶν ἂν τις (τὸν) ἄνω κόσμον ποιοῖτο, ἢ ἐπιτηδὲς ἑκάτερα ἑκατέρᾳ περιτέτραπται—another reading might perhaps be elicited.

[3]—[3] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "Quæ vero vagantur numero septem," as if his MS. read ἑπτὰ πλανῆται ὄντα, not ἑπτὰ ὄντα—

[4]—[4] Compare Tim. p. 37, D. § 14.

[5] In lieu of στάσις, Ficinus perhaps found something else in his MS., for his version is "status mensura," adopted by Stanley in his "the measure of the state—"

[6] So Horne Tooke said that "month" comes from "it mooneth."

[7] Ficinus, unable to understand ἐν τούτῳ, has omitted those words

after it has gone round the circle of the Zodiac, it completes the seasons of the year; while the rest make use singly of their own periodical revolutions, which are beheld, not by ordinary persons, but by the properly instructed. Now from all these revolutions the perfect number and time is completed,[1] when all the planets, after arriving at the same point,[2] obtain such an arrangement, that a straight line being conceived to be let fall [3]from the non-wandering sphere[3] to the earth in the manner of a perpendicular, the centres of all[4] are seen upon that line. There being then seven spheres [5]in the wandering sphere,[5] the deity made seven visible bodies out of a substance, for the most part fire-like, and fitted them to the spheres, formed out of the circle of the different and the wandering. And he placed the Moon in the first circle [6]after the Earth;[6] and the Sun he arranged for the second circle, and Lucifer and the so-called sacred[7] star of Hermes into the circle, which moves with a velocity equal to the Sun, but at a distance from it; and above the rest,[8] (each) in its own sphere,[9] [10]the slowest of them lying under the sphere of the non-wandering, which some call by the name of the star of Saturn;[10] and that, which is the next after it in slowness, by the name of Jupiter, under which is that of Mars. But in the eighth the power, which is above, is thrown around them

and so too has Stanley; for they are wanting in Tim. p. 39, C. I have retained them, conceiving that *χρόνῳ* had dropt out, written χ^{ϱ}_{φ} in MSS.

[1] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "complebitur," as if his MS. read *συμπλήρης ἔσται*, not *συμπεραιοῦται*, "is passed through." Compare Tim. p. 39, C., *τὸν τέλεον ἐνιαυτὸν πληροῖ—*

[2] So Ficinus renders *σημεῖον*. See at § 10, p. 265, n. [3].

[3—3] Ficinus has "a supremo circulo—"

[4] In lieu of *αὐτῶν* Ficinus found in his MS. *πάντων*, as shown by his version—"omnium," adopted by Stanley.

[5—5] Ficinus has "in orbe circumvago—"

[6—6] I cannot understand *μετ' αὐτὴν*, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is, "circulo supra terram—" or else his MS. read *ὑπὲρ τὴν γῆν—* Stanley has, "in that circle, which is next the Earth—"

[7] I do not remember to have read elsewhere of the star of Mercury being called "sacred."

[8] I have, with Stanley, introduced "each," requisite for the sense.

[9] Ficinus has "gradatim disposita," as if his MS. read something answering to "gradatim—"

[10—10] Ficinus, more briefly, "tardiorem sane omnibus Saturni stellam in proxima sub non errante circulo sede locavit," as if he found in his MS. *πάντων*, adopted by Stanley, in lieu of *αὐτῶν—* See above, n. [4].

all. And all these are living intellectual beings, and gods, and of a spherical form.

[15.] *On Dæmons and the Elements,* [1] *with which they are combined.*[1]

There are other Dæmons likewise, which a person might call created gods, according to each of the Elements. Some are visible, others invisible, in Æther (hot air) [2] and Fire, and in Air (cold air)[2] and Water; so that no part of the World is without a share of life, nor of a living being superior to the nature of man. To these are committed all under the Moon, and upon the Earth. For the deity is himself the maker of the Universe, and of the gods and dæmons. Now [3] the Universe will not have,[3] according to his will, a dissolution; but the rest his children lead according to his command, and [4] doing what they do[4] in imitation of him; and from whom are rumours, and [5] voices (from heaven),[5] and dreams, and oracles, and whatever is made an art of by mortals in the way of prophecy. [6] Now the Earth lies in the midst of the whole (circles),[7] [8] and is twisted round the pole, which is stretched through all,[8] the guardian of day and night, and [9] is the oldest of the gods

[1]—[1] Ficinus omits *συννόμων*, probably as being scarcely intelligible.

[2]—[2] On the difference between *αἰθὴρ* and *ἀὴρ*, see my note on Prometh. 88.

[3]—[3] I have, with Stanley, translated, as if the Greek were *τὸ δὴ πᾶν λύσιν οὐχ ἴξει*— not *ὃ δὴ πᾶν λύσιν οὐκ ἴσχει*— where *ἴξει* has been obtained from "habebit" in Ficinus, who adds too "in posterum," as if his MS. read *ἐπὶ τὸ λοιπὸν* after *πᾶν*—

[4]—[4] Ficinus has merely "singula transigentes," not understanding perhaps the formula, *πράττοντες, ὅσα πράττουσιν*, of which many examples are given by Abresch and Blomfield on Agam. 67. I have translated, as if *κατὰ* had dropt out between *καὶ* and *μίμησιν*—

[5]—[5] On *κληδόνες* and *ὀπτεῖαι* see Wyttenbach in Julian Orat. i. p. 62.

[6]—[6] All between the numerals would more correctly close the preceding section.

[7] The sense requires "circles," in Greek *κύκλων*, which might have dropt out easily after *ὅλων*—

[8]—[8] Ficinus has "circa discordiam agitationemve, quæ per totum porrigitur coarctata," supplying the words "circa (where however there is a press-error, probably for 'extra') discordiam agitationemve," as if his MS. read *ἀστασίαστος οὖσα*, or something similar; and while from "porrigitur" it is evident that, in lieu of *τεταγμένον*, it read *τεταμένον*, what I have adopted, it is no less evident that his MS. omitted *πόλον*. At all events *τεταμένον* is confirmed by Tim. p. 40, C., where three MSS. read *τεταγμένον*—

[9]—[9] On this notion see Tim. p 40, C., and Tim. Locr. p. 97, D. § 5.

in heaven,[9] and, after the soul of the World, furnishing us abundant food; about whom the World revolves, she being herself a star, but who, through her being a thing equally balanced, remains lying in the middle, and similar to those surrounding her. But the Æther is separated towards the most outward parts, and to the sphere of the non-wandering, and to that of the wandering; and after those spheres is that of the Air; and in the middle is the Earth with its own moisture.[6]

[16.] *About the gods, who are offsprings; and that the deity enjoined upon them the making of man.*

When all had been put into order by him, he left three remaining kinds of living beings, the winged, the aquatic, and the foot-walking. These the deity enjoined upon his offsprings to make, in order that the things moulded by him might not be immortal.[1] They then, after they had borrowed from the primary matter certain portions for definite periods, as if they were to be paid back again, fabricated mortal things of life. But when there was respecting the race of Man, as being the nearest related to gods, again a care both to the father of all, and to the gods, his offspring, the artificer of the Universe sent down upon earth the souls of this race, equal in number to the stars; and after he had placed [2]each soul in a star, as in a vehicle connected with it,[2] he did, in order that he might be without blame, lay down laws, fixed by Fate, after the manner of a Law-giver; that from the body should arise mortal affections, first, sensations, then pleasure and pain, and fear and anger, and that the souls, which obtained a mastery over these (feelings), and were not controlled by them, should live justly, and arrive at the star, connected with them; while they, who were overcome by (their own) injustice, should come in their second birth to the life of a woman; and, if they did not cease then, at last to the nature of wild beasts; and that the

[1] The sense evidently requires "mortal," or else we must read ὅπως *μόνα τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πλασθέντα*, "in order that only the things moulded by him might be immortal." To avoid therefore the difficulty, Ficinus has altered the literal meaning of the words by translating "Nam si ipse hæc etiam genuisset, immortalia nata fuissent—" what Stanley has adopted.

[2—2] The Greek is ὡς εἰς ὄχημα ἄστρον τὸ σύννομον ἁπάσας: but the Latin of Ficinus, adopted by Stanley, "quamlibet antea cognato astro, tamquam vehiculo—" From both united it is easy to elicit *εἰς ἄστρον, ὡς ὄχημα, τὸ σύννομον, ἑκάστας*—

end of their labour should be to overcome what had grown upon them, and to return to[1] their proper state.

[17.] *Respecting the body and the members of man, and the powers of his soul.*

The gods then, in a leading manner,[2] moulded man from Earth and Fire and Air and Water, after borrowing certain portions with the view of repaying them. And, after putting them together with invisible bolts, they worked out some one body, and bound the master portion of the soul, sent down to the head, after placing as a substratum the brain in the manner of a ploughed field; and they put around the face the organs of the senses, to fulfil their fitting office. And they formed the marrow [3]out of the smooth and straight triangles,[3] of which the elements were composed, for it to be the generation of semen; but the bone from earth and marrow wetted,[4] and frequently dipped in water and fire, and the nerves from bone and flesh; but the flesh itself was created out of a saline and acrid substance, like something fermented. And they placed around the marrow, bone; and around the bones, nerves; and through the means of the nerves were produced the bendings and bindings of the joints; and coverings for them by means of the flesh applied over them, here white, and there tawny,[5] [6]for the great utility itself of the body.[6] From these were the internal viscera likewise put into folds, both the belly and the entrails rolled around[7] it, and higher up from the mouth (came) [8]the arteries and the opening of the larynx,[8]

[1] In lieu of ἔξιν ἐλθεῖν, I have translated, as if the Greek were ἕξιν ἀνελθεῖν—similar to "habitum jam redierint" in Ficinus.

[2] I scarcely understand προηγουμένως, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is "in primis—" from whence came Stanley's "first—"

[3—3] Compare Tim. p. 73, B. § 49.

[4] Ficinus has "os—coegerunt," as if his MS. read συναχθέντων in lieu of δευθέντων.

[5] Ficinus, "alba tum plurima," as if his MS. read πολλῆς in lieu of πελίας.

[6—6] Ficinus, "ad decorem et usum viventis—" the original of "for beauty and use" in Stanley. He found, therefore, in his MS., something different from πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ εὔχρηστον τῷ σώματι.

[7] One would have expected rather παρὰ ταύτην, "along it," in allusion to the folds of the colon.

[8—8] I have adopted the version of Ficinus, "arteria et fistula faucium—" and so in part has Stanley, "the *aspera Arteria* and the *Œsophagus*—" The Greek is ἀρτήρια καὶ φάρυγξ—

one of which goes to the stomach, and the other to the lungs. The food too is arranged along the gut, comminuted and macerated by the breath and heat, and thus passes on to the whole body, according to its peculiar changes; while the two veins, that proceed along the spine, from opposite sides, infold the head and meet each other, and divide themselves [1]hither and thither[1] into many parts. The gods then having made man, and bound[2] to his body the soul to be its mistress, located that, which rules according to reason, about the head, where is the commencement of the marrow, and nerves, and mental aberrations, according as they are affected; while the senses likewise lie around the head, as if they were the leading power of spear-bearing guards. In this spot is also that, which reasons, and contemplates, and judges. But that portion of the soul, which is affected by circumstances, they placed lower down, namely, the irascible about the heart, and the concupiscible about the lower belly and the parts about the navel; of which mention will be made hereafter.

[18.] *On the sense of Sight, and on light, and the formation of images in mirrors.*

After placing in the face the light-enduring[3] eyes, they enclosed[4] in them the light-like portion of fire; which being smooth and dense, they conceived to be the brother[5] of the light of day.[6] Now this [7]runs through the whole of the eye, and especially the middle of it, in the most easy manner, (as

[1]—[1] The Greek *σχίζονται τε γοῦν ἔνθεν*— where, in lieu of the unintelligible *γοῦν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were, *τ' ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν*, a formula found in Tim. p. 46, C., and restored by myself on Æsch. Eum. 95, to Eurip. Iph. T. 941; and to the passages there quoted I could add not a few more.

[2] Ficinus, "conjunxerunt—" as if his MS. had read *συνδήσαντες*, not *ἐνδύσαντες*— A similar var. lect. in Tim. p. 45, B., where one MS. offers *ἐνδύσαντες* for *ἐνδήσαντες*.

[3] So I have translated *φωσφόρα*, literally "light-bringing;" for the eyes do not bring light, but bear it." Stanley, "the eyes, conduits of light—"

[4] Ficinus, "accendere," as if his MS. read *καθῆψαν*, not *καθεῖρξαν*—

[5] On the metaphorical sense of *ἀδελφὸς*, found in Tim. p. 45, B., see Blomf. on Æsch S. Th. 490.

[6] Ficinus, "divini," probably a press error for "diurni—"

[7]—[7] Ficinus, "passim per oculos manat, verum per pupillas purius uberiusque transcurrit," thus avoiding the tautology in *καθαρώτατον* and *εἰλικρινέστατον*. Both these words are, however, found in Tim. p. 45, B. in contiguous sentences, but not, as here, in juxta-position.

being) the most pure and clear;[7] [1]and having a sympathy with the light without, as like has with like,[1] it furnishes the sense of sight. Hence when light has departed at night or become obscured, that, [2]which flows from us,[2] adheres no longer to the air that is near; [3]but, being kept within, it smooths down and disperses[3] the emotions within us, and becomes the bringer-on of sleep, by which the eyelids are closed; and when there is a great quietness, [5]slumbers fall upon (us)[4] with short dreams;[5] but when some emotions are still left, frequent[6] phantoms are produced around us; and in this way are formed visions, that become, according to a direct road,[7] some, day-dreams, and some,[8] night-dreams; and after these the image-makings, existing in mirrors, and other things, that are transparent and smooth, are perfected, not otherwise than by refraction, according as the mirrors have a convexity, concavity, or length; for the appearances will be different, through the lights being reflected to different parts, and slipping-off[9] from the convexity, but coming together to the convexity. For thus in some cases [10]the left and the right are seen on opposite quar-

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were ἅτε, not τὸ,—εἰλικρινέστατον— similar to ἀδελφὸν ὂν τούτου πῦρ εἰλικρινὲς in Tim. p. 45, B.

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "quod quidem externo fulgori simile contextum simili ac corroboratum—" which seems to have been obtained from Tim. p. 45, C., ἐκπίπτον, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ξυμπαγὲς γενόμενον.

[3]—[3] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "Quo fit ut, sese ad interiora recipiens, demulceat atque resolvat—"

[4] I have translated, as if ἡμῖν had dropt out after ἐμπίπτουσιν. For though the pronoun is omitted in Tim. p. 45, E., γενομένης δὲ πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας βραχυόνειρος ὕπνος ἐμπίπτει— yet as μὲν is there perfectly useless, and omitted in one MS., the author probably wrote ἡμῖν—

[5]—[5] Ficinus, "somnus ferme sine insomniis surrepit."

[6] Ficinus, "frequentia confestim—" thus rendering συχνὰ by two words.

[7] Although ἐνθυωρίαν is found in Tim. p. 45, D., I confess I do not understand its meaning in either place.

[8] I have translated, as if the Greek were τὰς μὲν ὕπαρ, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὄναρ— not ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ— Ficinus, "seu veræ seu falsæ." See at § 7, p. 259, n. [3]—[3].

[9] I confess I cannot understand ἀπολισθαινόντων here. Had a MS. offered ἀπολισθόντων, I would have suggested ἀπελασθέντων, "driven off," to balance συνιόντων— And so probably found Ficinus in his MS. At least his version is, "a convexo quidem repulsa atque dispersa—"

[10]—[10] Alcinous, by his brevity, has obscured what is sufficiently clear in Tim. p. 46, B., where nothing is to be found answering to ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, which I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has "in aliis pari modo;" what Stanley has adopted, "in others alike—"

ters; in others, according to equality;[10] and in others, what is at the bottom is changed to what is at the top, and contrariwise.

[19.] *Of the other senses, and for what purposes they are created.*

Hearing has been created for distinguishing sound. It commences from a movement about the head and ends at the seat of the liver. And sound is that, which passes through the ears and brain and blood[1] in succession, until the soul is struck. An acute sound is that, which is moved quickly; a grave, slowly; a great one (is what is moved) with much (force); a small one (that which is moved) with little (force).

Following upon these there has been put together the power of the nostrils for the perception of smells. Now Smell is an affection, descending from the veins in the nostrils to the places[2] about the navel. But it does not happen that the kinds of it have received a name, except two, [3]the most belonging to a genus,[3] (namely) the sweet-smelling, and the bad-smelling, which have the appellation [4]of painful and pleasant;[4] but (it does happen) that all smell is denser than air, and thinner than water; [5]and properly the things, in which the genus of Smell is reasonably said,[5] that have not obtained a perfect change, but have a participation in air and water; [6]and these are according to smoke and fog;[6] for

[1] This mention of blood, found likewise in Tim. p. 67, B., is to be attributed, perhaps, to the knowledge of the fact, that sound is conveyed easily along a liquid.

[2] In lieu of *τόπων*, one would prefer *πόρων*, "pores—"

[3—3] Such is, perhaps, the proper version of *γενικωτάτοιν*— which Ficinus, unable, I suspect, to understand, renders "præter duas communiores—"

[4—4] Ficinus, "suavitatis et nauseæ—"

[5—5] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the Greek, where ed. pr. reads *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν αἷς*— instead of *κυρίως δὲ ἐν οἷς*— Ficinus, "proprie autem in iis odoris genus accidit—" Stanley, "for odour is properly said to be of those things—"

[6—6] Ficinus, more intelligibly, "cujusmodi sunt, quæ ex fumo et caligine conficiuntur." Plato, in Tim. p. 66, D., has *μεταβάλλοντος γὰρ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, ἀέρος τε εἰς ὕδωρ, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων γεγόνασιν ὀσμαὶ ξύμπασαι ἀνιᾶσί τε, κάπνος ὡς ἡ ὁμίχλη*— for so that passage should be read, in lieu of *γεγόνασιν εἰσὶ τε ὅσμαὶ ξύμπασαι κάπνος ἢ ὁμίχλη*— for the sense is, "all scents are produced and rise up, like smoke and a fog." To meet, however, the difficulty in the Greek, that passage has been thus translated, "for odours are generated by the change of water into air, or of air into water; and all these are either smoke or vapour."

through these changing into each other the sense of smelling is completed.

And Taste too have the gods made the judge of juices the most varied, by extending to the heart the veins from it,[1] that are to be the provers and judges of the juices; for these, [2]when brought together and separated,[2] according as the juices fall upon them, define the change in them. Now there are seven varieties in juices; sweet, vinegar-like, rough, salt-like, sour, bitter. And of these it happens that the sweet is of an opposite nature to all the rest, diffusing familiarly[3] its moisture about the tongue; [4]but those, that stir about and tear its skin,[4] are acrid; those, that inflame and [5]run upwards,[5] are pungent; those, that have a detersive power so great as to cause it to waste,[6] are sour; those, that are quietly cleansing and detersive, are salt-like; but of those, that contract the pores and unite (their parts), the more rough, are harsh; while those, that produce a less effect, are bitter.

But the power of the Touch has been prepared by the gods to lay hold of things warm and cold, and soft and hard, and

[1] How the veins could be extended from *γεῦσις*, which is not the organ of tasting but the act, I cannot understand. By comparing, however, Tim. p. 65, D., *ὅσα μὲν γὰρ εἰσιόντα περὶ τὰ φλέβια, οἷόν περ δοκιμεῖα, τῆς γλώττης τεταμένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν*, it is easy to see that Alcinous wrote *ἀπὸ γλώττης*— not *ἀπ' αὐτῆς*— On the other hand, some person seems to have wished to read *γεύσεως* for *γλώσσης* in the Timæus; for the version is, "whenever any thing falls on the small veins around the tongue, which are the arbiters, as it were, of the taste, stretching to the heart—"

[2—2] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has more intelligibly, "dum dilatantur varie atque contrahuntur—"

[3] I cannot understand *οἰκείως*, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version, adopted by Stanley, is "etenim humorem linguæ imbibitum perfundit atque delinit—"

[4—4] In lieu of *τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς, τοὺς μὲν κυκῶντάς τε καὶ σπαράττοντας, ὀξεῖς*, Ficinus has merely "acer turbat atque dispergit." For doubtless he could not understand, nor can I, *τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς*— And hence I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοὺς δὲ λόπους αὐτῆς*—

[5—5] I confess I do not know what is meant by *εἰς τὰ ἄνω θέοντας* in the Greek, or by the Latin of Ficinus, "ad supera evolat—" Stanley has "some heat and fly upwards, as the hot." Perhaps the author wrote *εἰς τὰ ἄνω οὐρανοῦ* (i. e. *οὐρανοῦ*)— "to the upper parts of the palate—" On this meaning of *οὐρανός*, see Schæfer on Dionys. de Composit. Verbor. § 14, p. 164.

[6] The sense requires, not *συντήκειν*, but *τήκειν*, as translated. Ficinus has merely "qui vehementer abstergit et liquefacit—" Stanley, "others being abstersive, dissolve it."

light and heavy, and smooth and rough, so as to judge of the differences in them; and we call things, that receive a touch, yielding; but those, that do not yield, resisting. Now this happens according[1] to the bases of the bodies themselves. For those, that have a larger base, are [2]stable, and fixed to their seat;[2] but those, that stand[3] upon a small one, are yielding easily, and are soft and change their place easily. Now that, which is rough, would be with an unequal surface combined with hardness; but that, which is smooth, (would be) what is with an equal surface combined with thickness. Moreover as the properties of cold and heat are the most opposite, they are combined from opposite causes. For that, which by the sharpness and roughness of its particles cuts through (a thing),[4] produces the property of heat; but the thicker particles [5](produce) cold; while by their ingress they drive out the lesser, and compel the small ones to enter on the other hand[5] into their vacant place.[6] For a shaking and trembling takes place then; and upon this occurring the property of cold arises in bodies.

[20.] *On the Heavy and Light.*

It is by no means proper to define the Heavy and Light by the up and down; for there is neither the up nor the down. For since the whole of heaven is like a sphere, and [7]formed

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *κατὰ*, not *παρὰ*—

[2—2] Ficinus, "stabilia ac solida—" as if his MS. read *στερεὰ*, not *ἑδραῖα*—

[3] Ficinus, evidently dissatisfied with *βεβῶτα*, has adopted a less specific term, "utuntur—" I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἑστῶτα*— But *βεβῶτα* is defended by *ὑπείκει δὲ ὅσον ἐπὶ σμικροῦ βαίνει*— in Tim. p. 62, B.

[4] I have translated, as if *τι* had dropt out before *τὸ*— for *διατέμνον* requires its object.

[5—5] Unable to understand *ἀδρομερέστερον—ἐξωθούντων—βιαζομένων δὲ*— I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀδρομερέστερα—ἐξωθοῦντα —βιαζόμενα*— remembering the words in Tim. p. 62, B., *τὰ—μεγαλομερέστερα εἰσιόντα, τὰ σμικότερα ἐξωθοῦντα*— Ficinus, "frigida vero, quod ingressu pigrius, dum tenuia quidem expelluntur, et in illorum sedes crassiora penetrare coguntur—" which is evidently a bold attempt to make something like sense out of words, which, taken literally, are unintelligible.

[6] Although *ἐκείνων* seems to be defended by *εἰς τὰς ἐκείνων—ἕδρας* in Tim. p. 62, B., yet I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὴν γε κενὴν*—

[7—7] Ficinus, "in convexa superficie æqualiter lævigatum—" as if his MS. read *κυρτότητος* in lieu of *ἑκτὸς*—

accurately even on its outward surface,[7] some persons do not justly call one part up, and another down. For that is heavy, which is drawn with difficulty to a place contrary to nature; but (that which is drawn) easily, is light; and still further, heavy is that, which is composed of rather many particles; light, of very few.

[21.] *On Respiration.*

We respire in this manner. There is around us from without a great quantity of air. Now this passes to within through the mouth, and nostrils, and the rest of the pores of the body, [1]seen (only) by reason;[1] and, after being warmed, [2]it proceeds with haste to what is cognate in the external portions;[2] and according to the road, by which it goes out, it drives back again the air to the parts within; and in this manner unceasingly, the circle being completed, are inspiration and expiration produced.[3]

[22.] *Respecting the Causes of Diseases.*

The causes of diseases (Plato says)[4] are many. In the first place, the deficiency or the excess, in the elements, and their change into other places not their own; secondly, [5]the inverse generation of homogeneous substances;[5] as if from flesh were produced blood, or bile, or phlegm; for all these things are nothing else than a wasting away.[6] For phlegm is the wasting away of flesh; but sweat and a tear are, as it were, the serous portions of phlegm. Now phlegm, when left without,[7] produces [8]leprosy and scurvy;[8] but, when it is within and mingled with black bile, it induces what is called [9]the

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "latentes—" Stanley, "invisible—"

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "ad externum cognatumque aerem refluere nititur—" Stanley, "it floweth back again to the external air—"

[3] Ficinus, "sequitur—" as if his MS. read ἕπεται in lieu of *συνίσταται*.

[4] I have adopted the words between the lunes from "Plato—docuit" in Ficinus; the origin of "Plato allegeth" in Stanley.

[5]—[5] I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals, although something similar is found in Tim. p. 83, B., ὅταν ἀνάπαλιν ἡ *γένεσις τούτων πορεύηται*— Ficinus, "mutuam cognatorum regenerationem—" which to myself is quite as unintelligible as the Greek. Stanley, "a preposterous generation of homogeneal parts—"

[6] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, renders *σύντηξιν* by "colliquationem et putrefactionem—" as if his MS. read *σύντηξιν ἢ σῆψιν*—

[7] Ficinus, "extra—missa—" as if his MS. read, not *ἀπολειφθὲν*, **but** *ἀποπεμφθὲν*— Stanley, "intercepted—"

[8]—[8] Ficinus merely "albas infectiones—"

[9]—[9] On the "holy disease," see the learned on Herodot. iii. **33.**

holy disease.[9] Now the phlegm, that is acrid and salt-like, is the cause of the affections, that exist [1]with a cold.[1] And [2]all the parts, that are in a state of inflammation from bile, suffer this.[2] For bile[3] and phlegm work out very many and very various sufferings; the continued fever is produced from fire being in excess; the quotidian, from the excess of water being so; the tertian, from that of air; and the quartan, from that of earth.

Let us speak next in order of the Soul, taking up the discourse from some point here, even though we shall appear to repeat some things.

[23.] *On the three principal powers of the Soul.*

The gods, who formed the race of mortals, after they had received, as we have shown,[4] the Soul of man, that is immortal, added to it two mortal portions. But that the divine and immortal portion of it might not be infected by the trifles[5] of mortals, [6]they placed over the body, as if they were appointing a ruler and a king over a citadel[6] and assigning to him a residence, the head, which possesses a form, imitating that of the Universe; and they placed under it the rest of the body to minister to it; and attached that portion to it, as it were a vehicle, while they assigned to its mortal parts a dwelling-place, one to one part and another to another. For they placed that, which feels anger, in the heart; but that, which is affected by desire, in the intermediate place between the boundary on the side of the navel and that of the diaphragm, after binding it down, as if it were a mad[7] and wild beast.

[1]—[1] The Greek is ἐν ῥίγει, an error, I suspect, for σὺν ῥίγει— Ficinus, "per fluxum—" who therefore found in his MS. ἐν ῥεύσει—

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "omnes enim, qui pituita simul et bili gravantur, id pati necesse est," as if his MS. read πάντας δὲ τοὺς φλεγμαίνοντας—πεπονθέναι δεῖ— (of which Stanley has adopted πεπονθέναι δεῖ, as shown by his "must suffer—") not πάντα δὲ τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα—πέπονθε.

[3] In lieu of χολήν, ed. pr. χολή, and so Ficinus, "bilis cum pituita—" what I have adopted.

[4] Instead of δείξομεν, Ficinus found in his MS. ἐδείξαμεν, as shown by his "diximus—" what I have adopted.

[5] Ficinus, "deliramentis—" as if his MS. read ἀφροσύναις, not φλυαρίαις.

[6]—[6] Ficinus, "in ipsa corporis arce sedem ejus, utpote principis omnium, statuerunt—" as if his MS. read ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀκροπόλεως πάνταρχον ἀποφήναντες.

[7] By the aid of this passage we may perhaps read in Tim. p 70, E.,

But the lungs they planned, for the sake of the heart, to be soft and [1]without blood, and with cavities,[1] and sponge-like, in order that the heart, while leaping, according as anger was boiling, might have a softening down; but the liver for exciting the feeling of desire in the soul, and for rendering it gentle, [2]by having a sweetness and bitterness;[2] and moreover for making manifest the prophetic power in dreams; for there is shown in it [3]the power carried on from the mind through what is smooth and thick and brilliant;[3] but the spleen for the sake of the liver, in order that the former may cleanse the latter, and render it brilliant, [4]and at least receive to the same the differences, generated by certain diseases around the liver.[4]

[24.] *On the division of the parts of the Soul.*

That the Soul is tripartite according to its powers, and that its parts are distributed to their own place according to reason, we may learn from hence. In the first place, the things, separated by nature, are different. [5]Now that, which has the property of suffering, is naturally separated from that, which has the property of reasoning;[5] since the latter is conversant about things, perceived by the mind; but the former about things painful and pleasant, [6]and still further what has the property of suffering, being about things with life.[6] Secondly,

καὶ κατέδησαν δὴ αὐτὸ ἐνταῦθα, ἅτε οἰστροῦν καὶ ἄγριον θρέμμα in lieu of —δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἄγριον θρέμμα.

[1]—[1] In lieu of ἄναιμον, σηραγγώδη, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀνεμόεντα συριγγώδη— for his version is "ventosos et instar fistulæ cavos—"

[2]—[2] and [3]—[3] To understand these two passages, the reader must turn to the Timæus, p. 71, B.—D. § 46.

[4]—[4] Ficinus, "utque putredines corrodentes, quæ quibusdam morbis circa jecur affluunt, in splenem continuo delabantur—" as if he had found in his MS. διαφθορὰς εἰς αὐτὸν— where διαφθορὰς would answer to ἀκαθάρσιαι in Tim. p. 72, C., ὅταν τινες ἀκαθάρσιαι γίγνωνται διὰ νόσους σώματος περὶ τὸ ἦπαρ— while, instead of ταὐτὸν, which I cannot understand, one would prefer ἑαυτὸν— For though ταὐτὸν seems to be defended by Tim. p. 72, D., ταπεινούμενος εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυνίζει, it only seems; since the antithesis in μέγας καὶ ὕπουλος αὐξάνεται plainly leads to ταπεινούμενος εἰς τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ξυνίζει. Stanley's version is—what is no version—"so that those corruptions, which by some diseases are contracted about the liver, retire thither."

[5]—[5] Ficinus, "natura vero segregatur, quod rationem habet, et quod rationi subjicitur." Stanley, "passionate and reasonable are separated by nature."

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, more fully,

since the part, that has the property of suffering, and that, which has the property of reasoning, are different by nature, it is meet for them to be in separate places. For they are found to be at war with each other. Now nothing is able to be at war with itself; nor can the things opposed to each other stand together [1]at the same time about the same object.[1] At least in the case of Medea, anger is seen to be at war with reason; for she says—[2]

> I know how great the ills I'm about to do;
> But rage has a pow'r greater than [3]my counsels.[3]

And in the case of Laius, when carrying off Chrysippus, desire is at war with reason; for he says—

> [4]Alas! this thing from god[4] to man's an ill,
> When, what is good, one knows, but uses not.

Still further [5]is it presented to the mind,[5] that the property of suffering is different from that of reasoning, from the care of the property of reasoning being one thing, but that of suffering another; for the former is effected by the discipline of teaching; the latter by the practice of morality.[6]

[25.] *That the Soul is immortal.*

That the soul is immortal (Plato) proves by proceeding in this manner. The soul brings life to whatsoever she is attached, as being a thing born with herself. Now that, which brings life to any thing, is itself non-recipient of death; and a thing of this kind is immortal. If then the soul is immortal, it would be indestructible likewise. For it is an incorporeal

"quinetiam ratio hominibus duntaxat, pars autem perturbationibus obsequens, cæteris quoque viventibus competit."

[1]—[1] Ficinus, more fully, "circa idem secundum idem eodem tempore."

[2] In vs. 1075, 6.

[3]—[3] Although *τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων* is found in the MSS. of Euripides, and in those of the different authors, who have quoted this passage, yet the very balance of the sentence requires something like *Θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων ἦν καλῶν βουλευμάτων*— i. e. "But rage has greater power than good thoughts—" or *τῶν γε νοῦ βουλευμάτων*: which is nearer to the common reading, *τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων*.

[4]—[4] Since Plutarch, ii. p. 33, E., offers *τόδ' ἤδη θεῖον*— perhaps Euripides wrote either *τόδ' ἦλθε θεῖον*— or *τόδ' ἥκει θεῖον*—

[5]—[5] Such is the proper version of *παρίσταται*. Ficinus renders "plane patebit—" what Stanley has adopted.

[6] Ficinus, in lieu of *ἤθους*, seems to have found in his MS. *ἔθους*: for his version is "consuetudine et exercitatione—" adopted by Stanley.

existence, (and) not to be changed in its substance, and perceptible by mind, and invisible, and of one form; [1](and) therefore not to be put together;[1] not to be dissolved; [2]not to be scattered about.[2] But the body is altogether the contrary; it is perceptible by sense; visible; to be scattered about; to be put together; of many forms. [3]The soul too, being by means of the body close upon what is perceived by a sense,[3] [4]becomes giddy and is troubled, and, as it were, drunk;[4] [5]but being close upon what is perceived by mind, she becomes itself of itself composed and tranquil;[5] nor is she like to that, by which, when she is close to it, she is troubled; so that she is rather like to what is perceived by mind. Now what is perceived by mind, is naturally [6]not to be scattered about, and indestructible.[6]

Moreover the soul naturally [7]takes the lead.[7] [8]Now that, which naturally takes the lead, is like to what is divine;[8] so that the soul, [9]by being like to what is divine, would be indestructible, and incorruptible.[9] (Again,) the contraries, that have no middle term, and exist, not according to themselves, but by some accident, [10]are constituted by nature to be pro-

[1—1] Ficinus renders *οὐκ οὖν ἀσύνθετος* by "nonne igitur et simplex?" But an interrogation here would be out of place. Stanley's version is, "Hence it must be simple; neither can it be at any time dissolved and corrupted."

[2—2] Ficinus omits *ἀσκέδαστος*.

[3—3] Ficinus has "Præterea animus, cum per corporis sensus ad illa quæ sensibilia sunt, descendit—" while Stanley omits all between "The soul" and "drunk."

[4—4] Ficinus renders *ἰλιγγιᾷ* by "angitur—" and omits *οἷον μεθύει*, not remembering that Alcinous had in mind Phædon, p. 79, C., *ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα (ἡ ψυχή)*—

[5—5] All between the numerals is wanting in Ficinus; while Stanley renders, most strangely, "When the Soul adhereth to those things, which are perceptible by intellect, it acquiesceth."

[6—6] Ficinus, "semper incorruptibile."

[7—7] Ficinus, "corpori dominatur—" the origin of "doth naturally preside over the body" in Stanley; who adds, "not the body over the soul."

[8—8] Ficinus has "Quod autem natura suâ regit et imperat, divinitati cognatum—" translated by Stanley, "But that, which, by nature, ruleth and commandeth, is of kin to divinity."

[9—9] Ficinus, "deo proxima immortalis erit—" Hence Stanley, "being next to god must be immortal."

[10—10] Ficinus, "ut se invicem mutuo fieri valeant—" as if his MS. read *ἐξ ἀλλήλων γιεσθαι δύνασθαι*— not simply *γίνεσθαι* without *δύνασθαι*.

duced from each other;[10] for instance,[1] that, which men call life, is the contrary to death. As then death is the separation of the soul from the body, so likewise is life the meeting of the soul, which existed, it is plain, previously, with the body. [2]If then the soul will be after death, and was, before it fell in with the body,[2] it is reasonable to believe that it is eternal. For it is not possible to conceive what will destroy[3] it.

Moreover if learning is (but) recollection, the soul would be immortal. Now that learning is (but) recollection, we may be led (to believe)[4] in this manner; for learning could not be based otherwise than on the recollection of what has been known of old. For if we have an idea of universals[5] from things taken in parts, how shall we find a way through things that are infinite, as regards their parts? [6]or how from a few:[6] for [7]we should have been deceived by a falsehood,[7] as say for example, by having decided that, what makes use of respiration, is alone a living being; [8]or how would thoughts have the property of a principle?[8] By an act of recollection then we have an idea from small cogitations, that secretly fall[9] from some things taken in parts, while we are remembering what was known of old, but of which we met with the oblivion, when we were invested with a body.

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἷον ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τοῦτο*— not *ἐναντίον δὲ τοῦτο*—

[2—2] Ficinus, more correctly, "quod si et fuit ante, et post mortem erit—" although he omits *πρὸ τοῦ περιπεσεῖν σώματι*: and so Stanley after him. One would prefer merely *ὡς ἦν*, "as it was—" with the usual change of *καὶ* and *ὡς*. See on Tim. Locr. p. 156, n. [1].

[3] I have adopted *φθερεῖν* from ed. pr. in lieu of *φθεῖρον*— Ficinus too, "quod perdat illum, excogitare—" and so Stanley.

[4] Ficinus renders *ἐπαχθείημεν* by "adstruimus—" from whence Stanley, "we prove—"

[5] I have adopted "universals" from "universalia" in Ficinus, as the version of *κοινότητας*—

[6—6] Ficinus, more fully, "at quomodo ex paucis individuis communia ipsa percipimus?" Hence Stanley, "or how from a few perceive universals?"

[7—7] Ficinus, as usual, when in doubt, renders one word, *διεψεύσθημεν* by two, "deciperemur atque mentiremur."

[8—8] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, "vel quomodo ipsæ intelligentiæ in nobis principales essent?" Stanley, "or how could the Notions themselves have the reason of Principles?"

[9] Ficinus, "incidentibus—" as if his MS. read *ἐμπεσόντων* in lieu of *ὑποπεσόντων*—

Further, [1]the soul is not corrupted[1] by its own wickedness; neither will it be corrupted by that of another person, nor by any thing else at all. And being in this state, it would be a thing incorruptible. Moreover that, which is self-moved, is ever-moved in the manner of a principle. Now a thing of this kind is immortal. The soul too is self-moved. Now the self-moved is the principle of all motion and generation. But a principle is not generated, and is not to be destroyed; so that [2]the soul of the Universe would be such, and that of man likewise;[2] since both have a share in the same mixture. Now he says that the soul is self-moved, because it possesses a life born with it, (and) ever in action by itself.

That rational souls then are immortal, a person might, according to this man, firmly assert; but whether the irrational are so likewise, is a doubtful point. For it is probable that irrational souls, driven about by a mere phantasy, and making no use of either reasoning or judgment, or contemplation[3] and their combination, or [4]intellectual apprehension,[4] but, being altogether without thought, belong neither to a nature perceptible by mind, nor to an existence the same as the rational, and are mortal and corruptible.

And it follows upon the reasoning that souls are immortal, that they are introduced into bodies by their being innate in the natures, that form the fœtus; and, by passing into many bodies, both human and not human, [5]they ever remain the same in number,[5] either by the will of the gods or through incontinence[6] or a love for the body; for body and soul possess somehow an affinity with each other, like fire and brimstone.

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "si anima—nequaquam corrumpitur—" as if his MS. read *ἡ ψυχὴ εἰ φθείρεται οὐχ ὑπὸ—* in lieu of *οὐ φθείρεται ὑπὸ—*

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "et hominum et reliquorum animantium animæ—" as if he had found in his MS. not *τῶν ὅλων*, but *τῶν ἄλλων ζώων—*

[3] Ficinus renders *θεωρήμασι* by "intelligentiis—" See § 29, p. 302, n. [3].

[4]—[4] Ficinus, "aut boni malive discretione—" as if his MS. read something similar to *κακωτικαῖς* in ed. pr., in lieu of which D. Heinsius suggested, in ed. 2, *νοητικαῖς*. Stanley, "nor can they discern ills—"

[5]—[5] Ficinus, "eundem semper servantes numerum:" who found perhaps in his MS., not *ἢ ἀριθμοὺς μενούσας*, but *ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν μενούσας*— Stanley, "either according to certain numbers they expect—"

[6] Ficinus adds "vitæ" after "incontinentia."

The soul of the gods too possesses the judging faculty, which may be called Gnostic, and the impelling, which a person would name the Parastatic,[1] and the appropriating ;[2] which powers, existing in human souls likewise, after being invested with body, receive, as it were, a change, the appropriating into the feeling of desire, and the impelling into that of anger.

[26.][3] *On Fate and Self-power.*[4]

On the question of Fate something of this kind is the doctrine of this man. All things he says are in Fate, but all things are not however fated. For Fate, while holding the rank of a law, does not, as it were, say that one person shall do this, and another suffer that; for [5]it would proceed to infinity ;[5] since the things produced are infinite, and infinite too the accidents around them ; moreover [6]that, which is in our power, would depart,[6] and praise too and blame, and every thing (else) [7]that borders on them ; but (it says)[7] that if a soul selects a life of this kind, and does some such[8] acts, [9]some

[1] By *παραστατικὸν*, says Salmasius on Epictetus, p. 132, quoted by Fischer, is meant "the power by which a person moves himself from place to place." But how a derivative from *ἵστημι* can convey the idea of motion, I confess I cannot understand. Equally unintelligible is the version of Ficinus, "præterea et aggrediendi naturam, quem assistendi vigorem possumus nuncupare ;" for the idea of attacking is the opposite to that of assisting. Perhaps Alcinous wrote *περισταλτικὸν*—

[2] So I have translated *τὸ οἰκειωτικόν*— The version of Ficinus is "vim —qua conciliant et gubernant—" where two different words are given for one, of whose meaning he was uncertain. Stanley omits here *τὸ οἰκειωτικόν*, and translates just afterwards *ἡ οἰκειωτική*, "the assistant."

[3] The order of the sections from here to 32 differs in the version of Ficinus from that in the Greek text. This in Ficinus is 29.

[4] The word *αὐτεξούσιον* is elsewhere translated "free-will."

[5—5] Ficinus, "in infinitum namque progressio foret—" who perhaps found in his MS., not *εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ τοῦτο*— but *εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ προιεῦοιτ' ἂν τοῦτο*— what I have translated.

[6—6] Ficinus, "libertas quoque nulla restaret—" as if his MS. read *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτεξούσιον οἰχήσεται*— Hence Stanley, "besides this would take away our free-will—"

[7—7] I have translated, as if *ἄλλο* had dropt out before *ἀλλως*. Ficinus, however, after omitting *καὶ πᾶν τὸ τούτοις παραπλήσιον*, adds "verum sic Fatum pronunciat—" as if his MS. read *ἀλλὰ λέγει οὕτως— not ἀλλὰ ὅτι*, nor *ἀλλὰ διότι*, found in ed. pr.

[8] Since *τάδε τινὰ* is incorrect Greek, opportunely has Ficinus, "hujusmodi quædam—" which leads at once to *τοιάδε τινα*, both here and in the next sentence, where Ficinus has "talia—"

[9—9] Ficinus, "consequenter—patietur," which leads to something else than *αὐτῇ ἕψεται*.

such things will follow it.[9] The soul then is without a master, and it rests with itself to do or not an act; nor is it forced to do this (or that).[1] But that, which follows upon the doing, will be accomplished according to Fate. For instance, [2]should a Paris carry off a Helen, it being in his power to do so,[2] there will follow, that the Greeks will make war upon the Trojans[3] for the sake of Helen. So too[4] did Apollo foretell to Laïus[5]—

If thou child gettest, thee that child shall kill.

Now in the oracle[6] is comprehended both Laïus and his child-getting; but the consequence is fixed by Fate.

Now the nature of a possibility falls somehow in the middle between the true and the false; but [7]that, which rests on ourselves, is borne, as it were, on a vehicle, upon that (possibility) which is naturally indefinite.[7] Now that, which happens with our own choice, will be either [8]true or false;[8] but it differs from what is in possibility, that is (to say), what exists according to a habit and an active operation.[9] For

[1] In lieu of *τοῦτο*, the sense requires *τὸ ἢ τό*— as I have translated. The formula is found frequently in Thucydides and Demosthenes, and is still to be restored to numerous corrupt passages. Stanley, "without any compulsion or necessity."

[2—2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἷον εἴ τις Πάρις ἁρπάσει τιν' Ἑλένην, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὂν τοῦτο*— not *οἷον τῷ Πάρις ἁρπάσει τὴν Ἑλένην ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὄντι*— where it is impossible to discover a particle of syntax. What Ficinus found in his MS. it is difficult to discover from his version, "veluti ex eo, quod Paris Helenam rapiet, quod quidem in ejus erit arbitrio—" We might read *οἷον τῷ Πάριδι ἁρπάσαντι τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὂν τοῦτο, ἠκολούθησε ὅτι*— in lieu of *ἀκολουθήσει τὸ*— for in this allusion to a past event there could be no place for the idea of a future; although there might be, if the historical fact were put hypothetically. Stanley, "As from Paris's ravishing Helené, which it is within his power to do or not to do, it shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about Helené."

[3] Ficinus omits *Τρώεσσι*.

[4] Ficinus correctly omits *γὰρ* between *οὕτω* and *καὶ*—

[5] In Eurip. Phœn. 19.

[6] I have translated, as if the Greek were, not *θεσμῷ*, but *χρησμῷ*—

[7—7] Such I conceive to be the meaning of the words *ἀορίστῳ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ τῇ φύσει ὥσπερ ἐποχεῖται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. Ficinus was equally at a loss, as shown by his version, "eique suapte natura indefinito liberæ animæ rationalis potestas undique superfertur—" Hence Stanley, "and being so indefinite by Nature, that, which is in our power, is carried on, as it were, to it."

[8—8] Ficinus, "confestim aut verum est—" as if his MS. read *τοῦτ' αὐτίκ' ἔστι*— not *τοῦτο ἔσται*— Hence Stanley, "is presently either true—"

[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τοῦ δὲ, ὃ ἐν δυνάμει, τοῦτ'*

that, which is in possibility, indicates a certain fitness, as regards some things, which have not, as yet, the habit;[1] as for example, a boy will be said to be in possibility a grammarian, or a flute-player, or a carpenter; but he will be such in the habit of some one or two of these (trades), when he shall have learned them, or possessed some of these habits: but as regards active operation, when he operates from the habits, which he possesses. But possibility is neither of these; [2]while that, which rests on ourselves, being indefinite, receives, according to the balance either way, the truth or not.[2]

[27.][3] *On the Good, and on what is the most to be honoured in the things of the Good, and on Virtues.*

We must next speak in order and summarily of what has been said by the man on points of Morality. The good to be most honoured and the greatest, he conceived it was not easy to discover, nor safe for those, who discovered it, to expose before all. To a very few then of his well-known friends, and those [4]previously tried,[4] did he give a share of his lectures on the good. If any one however takes up his writings carefully, [5](he will say that)[5] he has laid down our good in the knowledge and contemplation of the primary good, which a person would call god and the primary mind. For all the things, that in any way are held by man to be good, he conceived to have obtained that appellation from their participating somehow in the primary and most honoured (good), in the manner that things sweet and hot obtain their appellations according to their participation in their primaries; but of the

ἔστι, τοῦ—γενομένου— not *ὃ δὲ δυνάμει, τοῦτ' ἐστι—τοῦ—λεγομένου*: where *τοῦ δὲ* is due to ed. pr., which D. Heinsius incorrectly altered into *ὃ δὲ—*

[1] Ficinus, "ordinem suum," as if his MS. read *τάξιν* instead of *ἕξιν*—

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. That of Ficinus is fuller, "Indeterminatum enim atque indifferens natura sua, libertate nostra, in utram placuerit stateræ lancem, quodammodo declinante, mox verum aut falsum ex possibile fit—" But whether he found the corresponding Greek words in his MS. is another question.

[3] This in Ficinus is § 30.

[4—4] Ficinus, "probe electis—" Hence Stanley, "of whom his judgment made choice—"

[5—5] Since Ficinus inserts "reperiet," adopted by Stanley, I have translated, as if the text were *λέγοι ἂν ὅτι*— words that might easily have fallen out between *ἀναλάβοι* and *ἐτίθετο*.

things, that are with us, only mind and reason reached to a similitude with the very (good).[1] Hence our good is a thing honourable and venerable and divine and lovely and symmetrical, and called somehow[2] happiness; but of the things, that are said by the many to be good, such as health, and beauty, and strength, and wealth, and [3]what are near to these,[3] there is not one altogether[4] a good, unless [5]it meets with[5] the use of it arising from virtue; for when these are separated,[6] they hold merely the rank of matter, existing as an evil to those, who use them evilly. And sometimes he has called even mortal things good. And happiness he conceived to exist not in human things, but in divine and blessed.[7] From whence he said that the souls of philosophers in reality were filled with things great and wonderful, and that after the dissolution of the body they became [8]hearth-fellows[8] with the gods, and go round with them, while surveying [9]the level plane of truth;[9] since even during the period of life they had a desire for his[10] knowledge, and [11]honoured his pursuit above (all);[11] by which

[1] I have adopted, what Ficinus probably found in his MS., *αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, not *αὐτοῦ* merely, as shown by his "ipsius boni—" Stanley, "with the first good."

[2] Ficinus, "apud illum," as if his MS. read *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* (i. e. Plato) instead of *πως*— Stanley, "he calleth—"

[3—3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus and Stanley.

[4] Ficinus, "prorsus:" who found therefore in his MS. *καθ' ἅπαν*, not *καθάπαξ*—

[5—5] In lieu of *τύχοι* I should prefer *τι ἔχοι*—

[6] Ficinus, "separata enim hæc ab ipsa virtute—" He therefore found in his MS. *χωρισθέντα γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀπ ἀρετῆς αὐτῆς*, to which *χωρισθέντα γὰρ ταύτης* in ed. pr. seem to lead, not *χωρισθέντα γὰρ ταῦτα*— Stanley, "For being separated from virtue—"

[7] Ficinus, "sanctis," as if his MS. read *ὁσίοις*, not *μακαρίοις*. Stanley, "immortal."

[8—8] Ficinus, "divinis epulis vesci—" remembering perhaps Horace's "cœnæ deorum—"

[9—9] On the expression *τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίον*, see the learned on Phædr. p. 248, B.

[10] The Greek is *τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτοῦ*— But as Ficinus has "scientiæ divinæ," he found, no doubt, in his MS. *τοῦ θεοῦ*. And if so, one would prefer *θεῷ* to *θεοῖς* just above.

[11—11] Ficinus, more fully, "eam præ cæteris omnibus veluti pretiosissimum quiddam coluerunt—" as if he found something to this effect in his MS., *πρὸ πάντων ἄλλων ἅτε τιμιώτατόν τι ὂν ἐσέβοντο*.

after (they)[1] are purified and revivified, [2]as it were, some eye of the soul,[2] that, having been previously[3] lost and blinded, is [4]better to be saved than ten thousand eyes,[4] becomes able to reach the nature of all that is rational. [5]But on the other hand,[5] [6]men without minds are likened to those, who live under the earth,[6] and who have never seen the brilliant light (of the sun),[7] but look upon some dim[8] shadows [9]of the substances, that are with us,[9] and conceive that they are clearly laying hold of what (really)[10] exist. For as these, when they meet with a return from darkness, and arrive at a clear light, reasonably condemn what appeared then, and themselves likewise, for having been greatly deceived before; so they, who pass from the darkness, in which they have lived, [11]to things

[1] I have inserted "they," i. e. philosophers; for otherwise the masculine *ἐκκαθῃραμένους—ἀναζωπυρήσαντας* would be without regimen; for *αὐτοὺς* might easily have dropt out before *ὥσπερ*— as may be inferred from the version of Ficinus, adopted by Stanley, "Cujus munere mentis illorum expergefactus oculus atque reviviscens, antea obcæcatus—"

[2—2] I have transposed, for the sake of perspicuity, *ὥσπερ τι ὄμμα ψυχῆς* — although the common order seems at first sight to be supported by Rep. vii. p. 527, D. § 9, which Alcinous had in mind, *ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον*. But there both members of the sentence belong to one subject, not, as here, to two.

[3] I have altered *τε* into *τέως*, to answer to "antea" in Ficinus, although the word is not found in the passage of the Republic just quoted.

[4—4] On this expression see Wyttenbach on Plutarch de S. N. V. p. 91. Here Ficinus, followed by Stanley, supplies "corporeis" before "oculis—" and hence his MS. read, perhaps, *μυρίων σαρκίνων ὀμμάτων*— what Iamblichus has in Vit. Pythagor. § 16, p. 58, quoted by Ast.

[5—5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *δ' αὖ*, not *γὰρ*—

[6—6] Ficinus, "in subterranea quadam spelunca—" Hence he probably found in his MS. *τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν ἐν κρύπτροις*, what Stanley has adopted, not *τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν ἀνθρώποις*— Compare Phædon. p. 109, C. § 134.

[7] Ficinus, "fulgidum solis lumen—" adopted by Stanley; for his MS. read, I suspect, *φῶς—λαμπρὸν Θ ἑωρακόσιν*— where Θ (i. e. *ἡλίου*, as shown in the Banquet, p. 555, n. 72,) might easily have dropt out before *Ε*—

[8] Ficinus, "exiguas et inanes—" as if he did not quite understand *ἀμυδρὰς*— Hence Stanley, "empty, thin shadows—"

[9—9] Ficinus, more explicitly, "corporum, quæ nos supra terram inspicimus—" Hence Stanley, "of such bodies, as are with us upon the earth—"

[10] I have translated, as if *ὄντως* had fallen out before *ὄντων*— and thus *ὄντως ὄντων* will answer to "vera" in Ficinus, the origin of "true" in Stanley.

[11—11] Ficinus, more briefly, and with a change in the order of the sentences, "ad divina se conferunt, rationabile est, quæ quondam maximi

that are truly divine and beautiful, will despise what was previously viewed by them with wonder, and they will have a more violent desire for the contemplation of the last mentioned.[11] And for them it is all in harmony to say that [1]the honourable is the (only) good;[1] [2]and that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness.[2] [3]But why the good consists in the knowledge of the first (being) and is honourable, has been made manifest through the whole of his compositions.[3] But in what relates to (the good)[4] by participation (he explains)[5] somehow in this manner, in the first book of the Laws[6]—"Good things are two-fold; some relating to man, others to the gods," and so on. Now if there is any thing separated (from virtue),[7] it is without a share in the existence of the First; and yet this is called by the senseless a good; and to him who has this, Plato says in the Euthydemus,[8] there is a greater[9] evil. And that he considered virtues to be chosen for their own sakes, we must take as a thing that follows, through his considering what is honourable as the only good. Now this very thing is shown in very many (dialogues),[10] and especially in the whole of the Republic. For (he thinks)[11] that the person, who possesses [12]the before-mentioned knowledge,[12] is the most fortunate and most happy; not on ac-

fecerant, aspernari, divinorumque beatam speculationem duntaxat amare—"

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "ipsum solum bonum—" from whence I have introduced "only—"

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are wanting in Ficinus.

[3]—[3] Ficinus, "in scientia primi, quod et pulchrum est, consistere, quod per omnes Platonis libros ostensum est—" thus moulding into one the imperfect sentences found in his MS.

[4, 5] I have inserted "the good" for the sake of perspicuity. Ficinus, "semper tamen secundum ipsam participationem, id assertum," from whence I have introduced "he explains." Stanley, "As concerning these, which are good by participation—"

[6] Legg. i. p. 631, B. § 6.

[7] Ficinus, more explicitly, "si quid autem absque virtute possidetur—" Hence I have inserted "from virtue—" Stanley, "If any thing be disjoined from the first good—"

[8] Alcinous seems to allude to Euthyd. p. 280, E. § 24.

[9] Ficinus, "ingens—"

[10] Ficinus supplies "dialogis," what Stanley and myself have adopted.

[11] Here too Stanley and myself have adopted, what Ficinus furnishes, "existimat—"

[12]—[12] Ficinus, "dei scientiam—"

count of the honours, which, by being such, he will receive, nor on account [1]of (other) rewards,[1] but that, even [2]if he lives in obscurity[2] amongst all men, and there happen to him what are said to be evils, such as disfranchisement,[3] and exile, and death, [4](he will nevertheless be happy);[4] but on the other hand,[5] that he, who possesses, with the exception of this knowledge, every thing considered a good, such as wealth, and great kingly power, and health, and strength, and beauty of body, will not be[6] at all more happy. To all which he placed [7]as an end, that was to follow,[7] a similarity to god, [8]as far as is possible.[8] Now he takes this in hand in various ways. At one time he says, as in the Theætetus, that to be prudent, and just, and holy, is a similarity with god;[9] and hence it is meet to endeavour to fly as quickly as possible thither from hence; for that flight is a similarity to god, as far as is possible; and that it is a similarity likewise to become just and holy with prudence. At another time he says, as in the last book of the Republic, that to be just alone (is so); [10]for never is that person at least neglected by the gods, who shall be willing to be ready to become just, and, by making

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "alicujus alterius præmii—" who found perhaps in his MS. ἄλλων before ἀλλὰ— Hence Stanley, "any other reward—"

[2]—[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were λανθάνῃ -βιὼς, remembering the Horatian, "vixit moriensque fefellit." For βιὼς might have been easily lost after ἀνθρώπους. At all events, something is required to show the cause or nature of the concealment.

[3] Such is the meaning of ἀτιμία. Taylor, on Libanius' Argument to Demosth. F. L., would identify ἀτιμία with "outlawry" in England.

[4]—[4] Ficinus supplies, what Stanley has adopted, "nihilominus beatum fore—" requisite to balance the antithesis. But whether the supplement came from a MS. or his own brain, time will perhaps discover.

[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were τὸν δ'αὖ — not τὸν δὲ—

[6] The sense and syntax require ἂν εἶναι, not εἶναι simply.

[7]—[7] Ficinus, "consequentem atque consonum finem—" where "atque consonum" were perhaps added to explain the otherwise unintelligible ἀκόλουθον τέλος, for which, however, it is easy to read Κολοφῶνα, and to reject τέλος as an explanation. For examples of the use of Κολοφὼν see Ast's Index; and on its corruption see Heusde in Specim. Crit. p. 33.

[8]—[8] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "quoad humanum genus assequi potest—" as if his MS. read κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνῳ, i. e. ἀνθρώπῳ, as shortly afterwards.

[9] In p. 176, B. § 84.

[10]—[10] In p. 613, A., from whence Fischer corrected here ὡς ἂν—θέλει into ὃς ἂν—θέλῃ, and might have altered likewise ἐπιτηδεύειν into ἐπιτηδεύων—

virtue his pursuit,[10] to be assimilated to god, as far as it is possible for a man to be. But in the Phædon he says that to be prudent and just is to have a similarity with a god, in these words—"Are not," says he,[1] "those the most fortunate and blessed,[2] and proceeding to the best place, who make the virtue relating to the people and the state their pursuit, which persons call temperance and justice?" At another time he says that the end (of life)[3] is assimilated with god; and another, (it is) to follow (god),[4] as when he states,[5] "Now god, as the old saw (says, contains) the beginning and end," and so on. At another time both; as when he says,[6]—"But the soul, that follows god, and is likened to him," and so on. For the beginning of utility is the good, and this is said (to be) from god. The end therefore would follow[7] upon the beginning, or[8] on the being assimilated to god; [9]that god, to wit, who is in heaven, or, by Zeus, above heaven, and who does not possess virtue, but is better than it.[9] From whence one would correctly say that misery is the evil-doing of a

[1] In p. 82, A. [2] Ficinus, "sancti—"

[3] Ficinus, "vitæ finem—" as if his MS. read *τὸ τέλος βίου*— where *βίου* might easily have dropt out before *ὁμοι-ωθῆναι*— which I have adopted with Stanley. One would, however, have expected *τὸ τέλος βίου εἶναι τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ*, i. e. "the object of life is to be assimilated with god—"

[4] Here again Ficinus supplies the word, adopted by Stanley, wanting at present for the sense, in his version, "sequi deum—" as if his MS. read *ἕπεσθαι θεῷ*— where *θῷ* (i. e. *θεῷ*) might have been easily lost after *ἕπεσθαι*.

[5] In the Laws, iv. p. 715, E. § 7, *ὁ μὲν δὴ θεὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθεῖα περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δ' ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη, τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός· ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος ξυνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος*: from whence Ficinus obtained his "Deus profecto, ut antiquus sermo testatur, principium medium finemque rerum omnium continens, rectitudine perficit singula secundum naturam undique circumcurrens; hunc semper judicium sequitur, judex eorum, qui a divina lege discesserint; cui, qui beatus futurus est, se sponte subjiciens, mitis et modestus obtemperat:" where from his "singula" one would fancy that he found in his MS. *ἕκαστα* before *κατὰ*, were it not that in the Laws his version is "recta peragit."

[6] In Phædr. p. 248, A. § 59.

[7] Ficinus renders *ἀκόλουθον* by "consonus—" Hence Stanley, "conformable—"

[8] Ficinus omits *ἢ*—

[9—9] All between the numerals is not a Platonic, but rather a Neo-Platonic notion.

presiding genius, but happiness the good-doing ;[1] and that we shall arrive at the being assimilated to god by making use of a fitting nature, and morals, and [2]of conduct according to law, and perception, (according to nature,)[2] and, what is the chief (of all), of reason and instruction, [3]and the handing down of contemplation, so that we may for the most part stand aside from human affairs, and be ever busied in those perceived by mind.[3] Now the previous sacrifice to,[4] and previous cleansing for, the deity within us, [5]if we are about to be initiated into the greater subjects of learning,[5] would be through Music, and Arithmetic, and Astronomy, and Geometry, while we are taking care at the same time of the body by means of the Gymnastic art, which puts bodies into a state well prepared for war and peace.

[28.][6] *What is Virtue, and how Virtues are divided by Plato.*

[7]While Virtue is a thing divine,[7] it is itself a constitution of the soul perfect and the best, by causing a man to be with a good habit, and firm, and consistent, in speaking and acting, as regards both himself and others. But of its forms some are under reason, some are not. For as the irascible, the rational, and the concupiscible are different, so different too would be the complete state of each. Now the perfection of the rational part is Prudence; of the irascible, Fortitude; but of the concupiscible, Temperance. Now Prudence is a knowledge of things good and bad, and [8]of what are neither

[1] I have omitted *τοῦ δαίμονος* repeated here unnecessarily, and translated *εὐεξίαν* "good-doing," for the sake of the antithesis, instead of "a good habit."

[2—2] Ficinus, "moribusque et victu ac sensu secundum legem." But as "victu" is not the meaning of *ἀγωγῇ*, perhaps he found some other word in his MS. Moreover, as I cannot understand *αἰσθήσει τῇ κατὰ νόμον*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἀγωγῇ τῇ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ αἰσθήσει τῇ κατὰ φύσιν*: for thus *νόμον* and *φύσιν* would be properly opposed to each other.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the Greek; in lieu of which Ficinus has "ut ab humanis negotiis longe admodum alieni divinisque contemplationibus dediti semper vivamus."

[4] On the proper and metaphorical meaning of *προτέλεια* see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 224.

[5—5] Ficinus, "si majoribus expiationibus opus fuerit—"

[6] In Ficinus, § 31.

[7—7] Ficinus, "cum vero virtus divinus quidam thesaurus sit—"

[8—8] Ficinus, "indifferentium," as if his MS. read *ἀδιαφόρων* instead of *οὐδετέρων*. Stanley, "and betwixt both—"

the one nor the other.[8] But Temperance is a [1]well-ordering (of the soul)[1] relating to [2]desires and longings,[2] and [3]their obedience to the leading power.[3] But when we say that Temperance is a well-ordering and obedience, we suggest[4] something of this kind, that there is a power, [5]according to which the longings are in a well-regulated and obedient state, as regards that, which is naturally the master, namely, the rational power.[5] But Fortitude is [6]a power preservative of a lawful dogma dreadful or not dreadful, [that is, a power preservative of a lawful dogma].[6] But Justice is a certain agreement [7]on the part of these with each other,[7] being a certain power, according to which the three parts of the soul agree and harmonize with each other, and [8]each performs its own office according to its worthiness,[8] [9]that there may be a completion of three combined virtues,[9] Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance, while reason is the ruler, and the rest of the parts of the soul are kept down, according to their own peculiarities, by reason, and by their being obedient to its

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if *ψυχῆς* had dropt out after *τάξις*—

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "voluptates atque libidines—"

[3]—[3] Ficinus, "eas obedientes rationi efficiens—" By uniting the two one might fancy the true reading to be *πρὸς τὸ τοῦ λόγου ἡγεμονικόν*—where *τοῦ λόγου* might easily have been lost between *τὸ* and *ἡγεμονικόν*. Stanley omits all between the numerals.

[4] Ficinus translates *παρίσταμεν* by "intelligi volumus—"

[5]—[5] Ficinus more briefly, "qua cupidines pedissequæ naturalis domini fiunt—"

[6]—[6] Ficinus, "legitimæ institutionis, seu arduæ sive facilis, servatio; id est conservatrix et executrix facultas legitimi rationis propositi—" But how Fortitude can be defined as *δόγματος ἐννόμου σωτηρία*, I must leave for others to explain, even if we take with Stanley *δόγμα* in the sense of "a precept." I could have understood *λήματος ἐμμόνου σωτηρία*, "the preservation of an enduring spirit," as in § 30, *ὀργὴν—ἔμμονον*: and so I would read, where *δόγματος ἐννόμου σωτηρία* are repeated shortly afterwards. Moreover, the words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[7]—[7] Ficinus, "omnium animæ partium—"

[8]—[8] So I have put into English the Latin of Ficinus, "unaquæque secundum dignitatem proprio munere fungitur;" for I cannot understand the Greek, *καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ γίγνεται καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντι κατ' ἀξίαν*— nor could, I think, Stanley; whose version is, "and that each be worthily conversant in those things, which are proper and belong to it."

[9]—[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were, *ὡς ἂν παντέλειά τις ᾖ συντριῶν ἀρετῶν*— not *ὡς ἂν—οὖσα τριῶν*— for *ᾖ* could hardly be omitted here after *ὡς ἂν*—

rein; from whence we must conceive that [1]these virtues follow (each other) in turn.[1] For as Fortitude is preservative of a lawful dogma, so it is of right reason. [2][For a lawful dogma is a kind of right reason.][2] But right reason comes from Prudence. Moreover, Prudence stands as an ally[3] with Fortitude. For it is the knowledge of good things. Now no one is able to see what is good, while it is rendered obscure by cowardice, and the feelings that follow upon cowardice. And nearly in the same manner a person is unable to act with prudence in union with intemperance, [4]or generally through being subdued by any feeling. And if he does any thing contrary to right reason,[4] Plato says that he suffers thus through ignorance and folly;[5] [6]so that he would not be able to possess Prudence, while he is intemperate and a coward. The perfect virtues therefore are thus inseparable from each other.[6]

[29.] *On Virtues and Vices; and, further, how each of them are distinguished.*

In another way likewise there are what are called Virtues, [7]such as good natural qualities, and a progress towards them,[7] that have an appellation, similar to their perfections, through a similarity with them. [8]Thus, for instance, we call certain

[1]—[1] The Greek is merely *ἀντακολουθεῖν*. Ficinus has "conjugatione quadam se invicem consequi—" what I have with Stanley adopted partially.

[2]—[2] The words between the brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus and Stanley.

[3] Such is the correct meaning of *ὑφίσταται*.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "ac generatim quisquis perturbatione concitus quicquam præter rationem efficit, propter inscitiam semper aberrat."

[5] After "aberrat," Ficinus inserts here some matter, which ought to be placed at the end of § 33, where see my note.

[6]—[6] With the words between the numerals Ficinus commences § 26, where he has more fully, "Quoniam vero secundum vires rationales et irrationales anima trifariam divisa est, id homini contingere Plato existimat, ut nunquam prudens esse queat, dum aut timidus aut intemperatus existit. Id eoque absolutæ virtutes invicem inseparabiles sunt." And he then goes on with the translation of the remainder of this section.

[7]—[7] Ficinus, "naturæ dotes et inclinationes bonæ—"

[8]—[8] Ficinus, more intelligibly, "Quamobrem milites fortes quandoque dicimus, necnon imprudentes ac temerarios quosdam fortes aliquando prædicamus, haud sane de perfectis virtutibus, sed de dotibus naturæ loquentes."

soldiers brave; and sometimes we say that certain persons are brave, although they are thoughtless, while we are taking into account virtues that are not perfect.[8] Now the perfect virtues have neither an extension nor remission. Vices however admit both of extension and remission; for one person is more thoughtless and more unjust than another. And yet vices do not follow each other. For some are opposites; which cannot exist around the same person.[1] For such is the state of boldness as compared with cowardice, and extravagance, with a love of money; since it is really impossible for a man to exist, [2]who is laid hold of by every kind of vice; for neither can the body possess in itself all the evils of the body.[2] We must therefore admit a certain intermediate state, neither bad nor good. For all men are not either (entirely)[3] good or bad; since such are those, [4]who are making a progress to a sufficient good;[4] for it is not easy to pass immediately from vice to virtue; since there is a great interval between extremes from each other, [5][and an opposition].[5] And we must consider that some Virtues lead and others follow; and that the leaders are those, which are [6]in the (portion), influenced by reason,[6] from whom the rest obtain their perfection; but the followers are those in the portion affected by suffering; for these work out what is right, not according to the reason that is in them—for they have it not—but according to that, which is bestowed upon them by Prudence, (and) generated[7] by custom and practice. And since neither sci-

[1] Ficinus, "in idem—" as if his MS. read *περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ*, not *περὶ τὸν αὐτόν*. Hence Stanley, "which are not competible to the same."

[2—2] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "omnium vitiorum maculis inquinatus; quemadmodum nec corpus cunctis morborum corruptionibus simul afflictum."

[3] I have translated, as if *ὅλως* had dropt out after *φαύλους*—

[4—4] The Greek is *τοὺς—ἐφ' ἱκανὸν προκόπτοντας*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, I think; for his version is, "qui jam ad integrum provenerunt—" I have therefore translated, as if the Greek were *ἐφ' ἱκανὸν καλὸν προκόπτοντας*— where *καλὸν* might have been easily lost after *ἱκανὸν*—

[5—5] Ficinus omits *καὶ ἐναντίωσιν*, words quite superfluous here. Stanley, "interval and distance—" But *ἐναντίωσις* is not "distance." And if it were, the two words would be synonymous.

[6—6] Ficinus, "in parte animæ rationali—" who therefore found in his MS. *λογιστικῷ*, the reading of ed. pr., not *λογισμῷ*, or rather *ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ μέρει*.

[7] Ficinus omits *ἐγγιγνόμενον*—

ences nor arts exist in any other part of the body except the rational alone, the virtues connected with that, which is affected by suffering, are not to be taught, because there are neither arts nor sciences; for they do not possess a peculiar contemplation.[1] Prudence however, as being a science, imparts to each (subordinate virtue)[2] its own peculiarity, just as the pilot gives to the sailors certain orders, not contemplated[3] by them, and they obey him. And the same reasoning applies to a soldier and a general.

Since then vices admit of extension and remission, the sins [4](arising from them)[4] would be not equal, but some greater and others less; and consequently some are punished more, and others less, by lawgivers. But though Virtues are extremes, through their being perfect, and similar to what is straight,[5] they would be in another way means, through there being seen about all or the most of them two vices, one on each side, in excess and deficiency; as in the case of liberality,[6] there is on one side parsimony, on the other extravagance. For in such circumstances there is a want of moderation, according as what is becoming is either in excess or deficiency. [7]For neither would a person be apathetic, who, when his parents are assaulted, is not angry; nor would he be moderately affected, who (is angry) at every thing even of a common kind; but quite the contrary.[7] Again, in like manner, he, who is not pained, when his parents die, is apathetic;

[1] Ficinus renders *θεώρημα* by "intelligentiam," as if he had found something else in his MS. But see § 25, p. 290, n. [2].

[2] I have inserted the words between the lunes to complete the sense, and translated, as if the Greek were *ἑκάσταις*, answering to "unicuique" in Ficinus, in lieu of *ἑκάστης*—

[3] Since Ficinus renders *ἀγνοούμενα* by "minime inspecta," I have translated "contemplated—" to make the sense more clear.

[4]—[4] Here again I have inserted words necessary for the sense.

[5] Ficinus strangely translates *ἐοικέναι τῷ εὐθεῖ* by "recto comparantur—" Stanley, "And though Virtues are certain heights, as being perfect, and like unto that, which is right—"

[6] The word *ἐλευθεριότης*, which is elsewhere applied to "birth" or "education," is here taken in the English sense of "liberality," applied to money matters.

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "neque vero, qui parentibus suis furentibus nihil movetur, neque etiam, qui ex quibuscunque minimis effertur, moderatus est—" For the sake, however, of the antithesis, I have introduced "is angry" in the second clause.

while he, [1]who is affected excessively,[1] so as to waste away by grief, is immoderately affected; but he, who suffers this pain in moderation, is moderately affected.[2] Moreover he, who dreads every thing and beyond moderation, is a coward; but he, who fears nothing, is bold; while he, who is moderate in things of fear and boldness, is brave. And the same reasoning applies to other cases. Since then moderation in all affections is the best, and nothing else is moderate, but what is a mean between excess and deficiency, [3]on this account Virtues (are) of this kind, through a mediocrity, because they cause us to be in a medium state in affections.[3]

[30.][4] *How Virtue is a voluntary thing, but Vice an involuntary one.*

[5]Since there is, if any thing else, what is in our power and without a master, Virtue is likewise a thing of this kind.[5] For what is honourable would not be an object of praise, if it were from nature or a divine lot. [6]Virtue therefore will be likewise a voluntary thing, existing, according to some impulse, fiery, and noble, and permanent. From Virtue then being voluntary, it follows that Vice is involuntary.[6] For who would willingly choose to have in the best part of himself and in the most worthy of honour the greatest of ills. But if any one rushes on to Vice, in the first place he will rush on not as to Vice itself, but as to a good thing. And if a person [7]improperly stretches himself onward[7] altogether to viciousness, such a person has been deceived, [8]as having been

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὑπερπαθής ἐστι*, not *ὑπερπαθής τε*— Ficinus has "qui vero mœrore se ipsum perdit, effrenis—" who found, therefore, a different reading in his MS.

[2] Ficinus, "moderatus dicitur—" what seems to be preferable.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, more intelligibly, "ob id virtutes hujusmodi mediocritates dictæ sunt, quod nos mediocriter affectos circa perturbationes humanas reddunt." And so Stanley.

[4] In Ficinus § 27.

[5]—[5] I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals. I could have understood words to this effect—"If there be any thing in our power and without a master, Virtue is a thing of this kind." Stanley's version is "Virtue being chiefly of those things, which are in our power, not compulsive, it followeth that Virtue is voluntary."

[6]—[6] This doctrine is laid down in the Gorgias.

[7]—[7] By aid of "inclinatur" in Ficinus, I have translated, as if the Greek were *παρατείνεται*, not *παραγίνεται*— Stanley, "is carried onward—"

[8]—[8] In lieu of the unintelligible *ἀποικονομησόμενον*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἄποικον ἀμησόμενον*— To avoid the difficulty Fici-

about to reap a greater good at a distance from home[8] by means of some lesser ill; and in this way he will arrive at it unwillingly. For it is impossible that a person should wish to rush on to what are ills in themselves, with neither [1]the hope of (some) good[1] nor the fear of a greater ill. Whatever wrongs then a bad man does are involuntary. Since then a wrong is involuntary, the doing an injustice is still more an involuntary act, by how much the greater ill it would be for that person to be active in doing an injustice, than for injustice to keep itself quiet. And yet, although acts of injustice are involuntary, we must punish the doers of injustice differently. For different are the mischiefs done; and the involuntariness lies either in [2]ignorance or some suffering.[2] Now all of these it is permissible to turn aside by reasoning, and [3]urbanity in conduct,[3] and care. [4]So great an ill (then) is injustice, that [5]to act unjustly is a thing more to be avoided than to suffer unjustly.[5] For the former is the work of a bad man; but the latter is the suffering of a weak one. And both is a base thing. But to act unjustly is so much the greater ill, as it is the baser thing. And it is an advantage to him, who acts unjustly, to undergo punishment,[6] as it is to a person diseased to give up[7] his body to a physician to cure. For all punishment is a cure for a soul that has sinned.

[31.][8] *What are Affections; and on their distinctions.*

nus has "ut per minus malum majus quoddam malum devitet—" Stanley, "that by a lesser ill he may arrive at a greater good—"

[1]—[1] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "spe aliqua boni," as if his MS. read *οὔτε τινι ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ* — I have translated, as if the author had written *οὔτε τινὸς ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ*.

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "in ignoratione quadam vel perturbatione." But as *ἄγνοια* can hardly be described by *τις* merely, I have translated, as if *τινι* followed *πάθει*.

[3]—[3] So I have translated *ἤθεσιν ἀστείοις* — Ficinus, "consuetudine civili," as if his MS. read *ἔθεσιν*—

[4] Here begins § 28, in Ficinus, with the heading, "On Injustice and the distinction in Affections;" but § 32 in Heins.

[5]—[5] This doctrine is promulgated in the Crito and Gorgias.

[6] Ficinus, "se judici ultro subjicere—" as if his MS. read *ὑποσχεῖν δικαστῇ ἑκουσίως, ὡς*— in lieu of *ὑποσχεῖν δίκην ὡς*— For thus *δικαστῇ* would be properly opposed to *ἰατρῷ*.

[7] In lieu of *ὑποσχεῖν* the sense evidently requires *παρασχεῖν*, similar to "committere" in Ficinus.

[8] This § is 32 in ed. pr. and Heins., but united to § 28 in Ficinus.

But since most Virtues are conversant with Affections, let us define what kind of a thing is an Affection.

Now an Affection is an irrational movement of the soul, as regards either an ill or a good. And a movement has been called irrational, because Affections are neither decisions nor opinions, but movements of the irrational portions of the soul. For in the part of the soul, subject to Affections, there exist [1] things, which, although they are our works, are nevertheless not in our power.[1] They are however frequently produced in us, when not willing and resisting. Sometimes too, while knowing that, what have fallen on us, are [2] neither painful, nor pleasant, nor fearful,[2] we are not the less led by them; [3] what we should not have suffered, had these Affections been the same as decisions.[3] For the latter we reject, [4] when we condemn them, whether fittingly or not fittingly.[4] [5] For a good or for an ill:[5] since on the appearance of an indifferent thing an Affection is not put into motion. For all Affections exist, according to the appearance of a good or an ill. For if we imagine that a good is present, we are pleased; and if it is about to be, we desire it; but if we imagine that an ill is present, we are pained; and what is about to be, we fear. For[6] there are two Affections, simple and elementary, (namely,) Pleasure and Pain, and from these the rest are formed. For

[1]—[1] I have, with Stanley, followed the Latin of Ficinus, "quæ etsi nostra sunt opera, nihilo tamen magis in nostra potestate consistunt—" who probably found in his MS. *συνίσταται, ἃ, εἰ καὶ ἡμέτερα ἔργα, οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*— not *συνίσταται, κατὰ ἡμέτερα*— nor, as in ed. pr., *συνίσταται δὲ τὰ*—

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "neque dulcia, nec expetenda, nec etiam metuenda—" Stanley has, more fully, "neither pleasing nor unpleasing, expetible nor avoidable—"

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὃ οὐκ ἂν ἡμεν παθόντες ταῦτα εἰ κρίσεσι τὰ αὐτὰ ἦν*— similar to the Latin of Ficinus, "quod sane nunquam pateremur, si perturbationes idem essent atque judicia—" The common reading, *οὐκ ἂν παθόντες ταῦτα, εἰ*— seems however to be defended by *οὐκ ἂν συνέβαινε δὲ τοῦτο, εἰ*— but only seems; for there *δε* is added, what is wanting here. Stanley, "which could never be—"

[4]—[4] Ficinus, "cum ipsa per consilium confutamus, sive, ut decet, seu non, id agamus." Stanley, "when we disapprove it, whether it ought to be so, or otherwise."

[5]—[5] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has, more fully and intelligibly, "Adjectum præterea in definitione est, boni cujusdam aut mali gratia."

[6] The sense requires *γὰρ* for *δὲ*, or else we must omit, with Ficinus, both particles.

we must not number with these Fear and Desire, as being of the nature of principles and simple. For he, who fears, is not entirely deprived of pleasure: [1] since if a person has existed through a time, that may have happened, while despairing of a release from, or an alleviation of, the ill; he abounds however in being pained and troubled; and on this account he is united to pain; [1] and he, who desires, while remaining in the expectation of obtaining (his wish), is pleased; but as he is not completely confident, nor has a firm hope, he is weighed down. Since then Desire and Fear are not of the nature of principles, it will be conceded without a doubt that not one of the other Affections is simple,[2] such, I mean, as Anger, and Regret, and Jealousy, and such like. For in these Pleasure and Pain are seen, [3]mixed up, as it were, in a manner with them.[3] But of Affections some are of a wild kind, others of a tame. Now the tame are such as exist in man according to nature; (being)[4] both necessary and proper; and they are in this state, while they preserve some measure; but when there is found in them[5] a want of measure, they then become deviations from right. Of such a kind are Pleasure, Pain, Anger, Pity, Shame. For it is proper to be pleased at things that happen according to nature, but to be pained at their contraries. And Anger is necessary [6]for self-defence and to avenge oneself upon foes;[6] and Pity is proper

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I cannot understand, nor could, I think, Ficinus; whose version is, "quippe, si malorum repulsionem vel levationem penitus desperarit, haud ultra metueret; immo acriori inde passione afflictus deleret jam potius quam timeret." Equally at a loss seems to have been Stanley, whose translation is, "nor can a man live the least moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some evil; but it is more conversant in grief and sorrow; and therefore he, who feareth, sorroweth."

[2] Ficinus, "minime simplices sunt—"

[3]—[3] Although Ficinus by his "tanquam ex iis compositis—" seems to defend *μεμιγμένοις*, yet as ed. pr. has *μεμιγμέναις*, the author wrote, I conceive, *μεμιγμένως*, as I have translated.

[4] I have translated, as if *ὄντα* had dropt out between *τε* and *καὶ*—Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "atque hæ sane, dum modum tenent, necessariæ ac propriæ sunt—" as if his MS. read *καὶ ταῦτα, ἕως ἂν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχῃ, ἀναγκαῖά ἐστι καὶ οἰκεῖα*— not *ἀναγκαῖα τε καὶ οἰκεῖα οὕτω δὲ ἔχει, ἕως ἂν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχοι.*

[5] The sense and syntax evidently require *αὐτοῖς*, as I have translated, not *αὐτῆς*—

[6]—[6] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "ad repellendam ulciscendamque injuriam—"

[1]for a love of mankind;[1] and Shame is requisite for a retreat from things that are base.[2] But other Affections, which are contrary to Nature, are of a wild kind, and arise from a perversion (of mind),[3] and improper habits. Of such a kind[4] is (excessive)[5] laughter, and a rejoicing over calamities, and a hatred of mankind; which, by being stretched out and relaxed, and existing in any state whatsoever, are deviations from right[6] through not receiving any moderation.

And on the subject of Pleasure and Pain Plato says, that these Affections, existing somehow naturally in us from the beginning, are put into motion and carried onward; since Pain [7]and Sorrow[7] are generated for those, who are excited contrary to nature; but Pleasure for those, who return to their former state according to nature. Now he conceives that the state according to nature is a mean between Pain and Pleasure—[8]while it is the same with neither of them[8]—in which (mean) we exist for the greater portion of time. He teaches moreover that there are many kinds of Pleasures, some (felt) through the body, and others through the soul; and that of Pleasures some are mixed with their opposites;[9] but others remain pure and undefiled; and that some are the result of memory, [10]and others united to hope;[10] and that some are disgraceful, such as are unrestrained, and combined with injustice, but others moderate, and participating somehow otherwise in the good,

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "humanitatis atque caritatis—" Stanley, "Mercy agreeth with humanity."

[2] Ficinus, "ab adversis—" who therefore found in his MS. the reading of the ed. pr. *ἐχθρῶν*, altered by Heinsius in ed. 2, to *αἰσχρῶν*. The two words are frequently confounded elsewhere.

[3] Ficinus, "ex perversione vitæ—" as if his MS. read *βίου* before *καὶ*— I have translated, as if *ψυχῆς* had dropt out after *διαστροφῆς*—

[4] Ficinus, "hujusmodi—" for his MS. read not *ταῦτα*, but *τοιαῦτα*, what I have adopted.

[5] Ficinus, followed by Stanley and myself, has "risus effusior—" as if his MS. read *γέλως πολὺς* or *γέλως πλατὺς*, not simply *γέλως*—

[6] Ficinus, whom Stanley follows, has "semper aberrant," as if his MS. read *Ἀεὶ ἡμαρτημένα*, not *Διημαρτημένα*—

[7]—[7] Ficinus omits *καὶ ἀλγήδονος*—

[8]—[8] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, has "dum neutro movetur—" as if his MS. read *οὐδετέρῳ κινούμενον τὸ αὐτὸ*— not *οὐδετέρῳ ἐκείνων ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ*—

[9] This doctrine is promulgated in the Philebus. Here, however, Ficinus, whom Stanley follows, has "dolori," the explanation of *τοῖς ἐναντίοις*.

[10]—[10] Ficinus, "secundum spem—"

such as the good-will felt towards the good, and the pleasure received from [1]acts of virtue.[1] But since many pleasures are naturally in no repute,[2] we must not inquire, whether they can belong to [3]the simple good.[3] For that seems (to be) evanescent[4] and of no value, which [5]is an after-production, not by nature,[5] and [6]has nothing essence-like, or that takes the lead,[6] but is co-existing with its opposite; for Pleasure and Pain are mingled. Now this would not have happened, if one (namely, Pleasure) were a simple good, and the other (namely, Pain) an ill.

[32.][7] *On Friendship.*

That, which is called especially and properly Friendship, is [8]nothing else[8] than what exists according to a reciprocal kind feeling. Now this takes place, when each party wishes equally that his neighbour and himself should do well. And this equality is not otherwise preserved than through a similarity in manners. For like is friendly to like, [9]when they are in moderation;[9] but when they are immoderate, they can suit neither each other, nor what are moderate. There are likewise some other friendships so considered, but not however really being so, that receive a colour, as it were, from Virtue; such as the natural friendship of parents towards their offspring, and of relations towards each other, and that which is called political and sociable.[10] But these do not always have a reciprocity of kind feelings. There is likewise an amatory kind of friend-

[1]—[1] Ficinus, whom I have followed, renders *ἐν ἡδοναῖς* by "ex virtutum operatione—"

[2] Ficinus strangely renders *ἀδοκίμων* by "obscæna—"

[3]—[3] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, more fully, "simpliciter et absolute bonum—"

[4] Ficinus, "exilis—" Stanley, "poor—"

[5]—[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἡ ἐπιγέννημά τι μὴ τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχουσα*— not *ἐπιγεννηματικὴ τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχουσα*— Ficinus has "cujus natura pedissequa est alterique succedens—"

[6]—[6] Ficinus, "neque substantiæ propriæ principalis particeps—" Hence Stanley, "and hath not a principal primary essence—"

[7] This § is in ed. pr., Heins., and Stanley, 31.

[8]—[8] Ficinus, "nihil aliud est—" who found therefore in his MS., not *οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἐστὶ*, but *οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ*— what I have translated.

[9]—[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *μετρίω ὄντε*— an absolute sentence, not *μετρίῳ ὄντι*— For both the likes ought to be in moderation.

[10] So Stanley translates *ἑταιρικήν*. But Ficinus has "rhetorica—" for his MS. doubtless read *ὀητορικήν*, instead of *ἑταιρικήν*.

ship Now of the amatory one kind is well-behaved,[1] as being that for a virtuous soul; but another ill-conducted,[2] as being for a vicious (soul); and there is an intermediate (kind) for that, which is of a medium disposition. For[3] as there are three states of the soul in a rational living being, one good, another bad, and a third between those two, so there will be three amatory states, differing from each other in kind. Now that they are three, their aims point out especially by differing from each other. For the bad is the love of the body alone, through its being overcome by what is pleasant; and this is after the manner of beasts; but the well-behaved is for the sake of the naked soul, [4]in which there is seen a fitness for virtue;[4] but the intermediate has a longing for the body, and a longing likewise for the beauty of the soul. He too, [5]who is worthy to be loved,[5] is himself a mean, as being neither ill-conducted nor well-behaved; from whence we must call the love, [6]that lays claim to the body,[6] some dæmon rather than a god, who has never [7]been generated in an earthly body,[7] (and) is [8]the conveyer of what is sent by the gods to man, and conversely.[8] The amatory then, being thus commonly divided into the three kinds before mentioned, [9]the one, which relates to the love of the good,[9] being freed from an affection, [10]becomes a thing of art;[10] from whence it is placed in the rational (portion) of the soul; and its contemplations are to know [11]the person worthy to be loved, and to possess and make use of him;[11] and further to judge[12] of him from his propensities and im-

[1, 2] Ficinus renders *ἀστεία* by "honestus," and *φαύλη* by "turpis."

[3] Ficinus, followed by Stanley and myself, "enimvero quemadmodum—" in Greek *ὥσπερ γὰρ*— not *ὥσπερ οὖν*—

[4—4] Ficinus, more briefly, "ad virtutis officia promptum—"

[5—5] Ficinus strangely translates *ἀξιέραστος* by "qui sumatur—"

[6—6] Ficinus renders *σωματοποιούμενον*, "ad corpus ex parte aliqua declinantem—"

[7—7] Ficinus, "in terrena corpora mersum—" as if his MS. read something else than *γεγεννημένον*— perhaps *εἰσενηνεγμένον*— Stanley, "which never descendeth into a human body—"

[8—8] Compare Sympos. p. 202, E. § 28.

[9—9] Ficinus, "boni quidem viri amor—"

[10—10] Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "artificiosus quodammodo est—"

[11—11] Ficinus, "qui ob animi dotes sit benevolentia dignus, atque eum sibi conciliare—"

[12] I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the syntax requires, *ἐπικρίνειν*, to answer to the preceding *γνῶναι*, not *ἐπικρίνει*—

pulses, whether they are noble, and [1]tending to what is honourable, and whether they are violent and fervid.[1] [2]And he, who strives to possess it, shall possess it, not by rendering delicate or praising the object of his love, but by repressing it rather, and showing that by a person, being in the state he is now, life is not to be lived.[2] [3]And when he gets the party loved into his power, he will make use of him, after having enjoined the things, through which he will, after being practised in them, become perfect; and the end to them (will be), that, instead of a lover and a beloved, they will become friends.[3]

[33.] *On the Forms of Polity.*

Of Polities (Plato) says that some [4](exist in reality, but some)[4] are supposed to exist, such as[5] he has detailed in the Republic. For in that (treatise), he has depicted [6]the former as unwarlike; but the latter as being in a feverish state and warlike,[6] while seeking which of these would be the best, and how they should be constituted. And it is there that, nearly alike to the division of the soul, is a Polity divided into three parts, relating to the guardians and aiders and operatives; to the first of which he assigns the counselling and ruling power; to the second, that of fighting for (the state), if need be; [7]who are to be put into order according to the principle of anger,[7] as if they were the allies of the rational principle;

[1]—[1] Ficinus, "ad bonum fervore quodam animi perferantur—" who therefore probably found in his MS. *ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν τεινόμεναι, σφοδραί τε καὶ διάπυροι—* not *γινόμεναι, εἰ σφοδραί τε—*

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus, after "perferantur," has "laudat et approbat; sin contra se habeant, nec assentabitur illi, neque suavibus verbis obsequiisque deleniet, sed absterrebit potius, atque docebit nequaquam illi, donec talis sit, esse vivendum."

[3]—[3] Here again Ficinus has strangely represented the original, "Promittet autem semper ac porriget ea, quibus exercitatus is, quem amat, ad optimam frugem evadat. Finis tandem iis etiam, ut ex amore amicitia fiat."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *τὰς μὲν ἐνυποθέτους εἶναι—* But as the apodosis is wanting for *τὰς μὲν*, I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὰς μὲν εἶναι ὄντως, τὰς δὲ ὑποθέτους—* Stanley has "some are supposed only and conceived by abstract from the rest."

[5] The sense evidently leads to *οἵας* in lieu of *ἃς—* as I have translated.

[6]—[6] Ficinus, more briefly, "priorem quidem concordem, secundam vero dissidentem—"

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Ficinus strangely renders "quos iracundiæ comparat—" For he did not understand, nor can I, what the writer meant here. Stanley, "to defend—by arms, which answereth to the irascible power."

but to the last (he assigns) arts, and the rest of handicrafts. And he conceives it right for the rulers to be philosophers, and contemplative of the primary good; for they alone[1] will administer all things properly; [2]for never will human affairs cease from ills, unless philosophers become kings, or those, who are called kings, become, from some divine allotment, truly philosophers.[2] For states will act[3] the best and with justice at that time, when each portion of it [4]is under its own law;[4] so that the rulers may consult for the people, and the co-fighters be their servants and fight in their behalf, while the rest follow them obediently. And he says there are five kinds of Polities; (the first),[5] an aristocracy, when the best are in power; the second, a timocracy, where [6]those fond of honours[6] are the rulers; the third, a democracy; and after this an oligarchy; and the last, a tyranny, which is the worst. He depicts likewise other Polities, hypothetically; of which there is that in the Laws, and that too, [7]after correction, in the Epistles;[7] of which he makes use for the states, that are labouring, as mentioned in the Laws, under a disease, and [8]possessing a region bounded off,[8] and persons selected from every age, so that, according to the differences in their nature, and places, there may be a need of peculiar instruction[9] and of bringing up and of using arms. For they, who are near the sea, would apply themselves to navigation and to naval battles: while those, dwelling inland, would be fitted for fighting on foot, and the use of

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *μόνους*, not *μόνως*.

[2—2] On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, see at Epist. 7, p. 502, n. [4—4].

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πράξειν*, not *ἐπάρξειν*— Ficinus, "administrari—"

[4—4] So I have translated *αὐτονομῇ*. Ficinus, followed by Stanley, "suo munere fungitur."

[5] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τήν τε ἃ ἀριστοκρατικὴν*— where *ἃ* means *πρώτην*, as shown by "primam" in Ficinus. On the loss of a letter, indicative of a number, see my Poppo's Prolegom. p. 223.

[6—6] Ficinus renders *φιλοτίμων* by "fastu inflati homines."

[7—7] Such is the meaning of *ἡ ἐκ διορθώσεως*, rendered literally by Ficinus "ex emendatione—" instead of which Stanley, apparently unable to understand it, has given "that, which reformeth others." With regard to the Epistles, Alcinous seems to allude to the 8th and 11th, for only in them is there a reference to any forms of Polity.

[8—8] See the commencement of book 4.

[9] Ficinus, "importatione et exportatione—" as if his MS. read *εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ ἐξαγωγῆς*, not *ἀγωγῆς* simply.

arms, either the lighter, like mountaineers, or the heavier, like persons living [1]on hilly plains;[1] and some would practise cavalry exercise. But in this state he does not lay down by laws that women are to be in common.

Political virtue is therefore contemplative and practical, [2]and that which chooses[2] to make a state good and happy, and [3]of one mind and of one voice;[3] (and) it enjoins commands, and has under it the science of war, and generalship, [4]and law-judgments. For Political science considers ten thousand other matters, and especially this very one, whether we must engage in war or not.[4]

[34.] *On the Sophist.*

It has been stated before what kind of person is the philosopher. From him the Sophist differs, first in manner, in that he is [5]the seeker of pay from young persons,[5] and is willing to be considered [6]a person with bodily and mental accomplishments,[6] rather than to be so; and (secondly) in matter, in that the philosopher is conversant with things existing for ever and in the same state; while the Sophist busies himself about that which is not, and [7]retires to a spot, difficult to be seen on account of its darkness.[7] For to that,

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of *γεωλόφοις—πεδίοις*. But as such a combination of words is unintelligible, opportunely has Ficinus "littora," which has led me to believe that the author wrote *ἐν αἰγιαλοῖς ἢ ἀφελέσιν—πεδίοις*— where *ἀφελέσιν—πεδίοις* may be compared with *ἀφελῶν πεδίων* in Aristoph. Ἱππ. 524. Stanley avoids all the difficulty by putting into English the Latin of Ficinus, "et armaturam leviorem, qui montes colant; graviorem, qui littora."

[2]—[2] Ficinus, "quæ eligit atque proponit—"

[3]—[3] Ficinus, "secum maxime consentientem—" Stanley, "and convenient to itself."

[4]—[4] Ficinus omits here *καὶ δικαστικὴν*, but adds at the end of his § 31, = 28 here, the Supplement following, which evidently belongs to this place, "Et ut rempublicam gubernat, civilis scientia nuncupatur; cujus sunt officia duo, leges condere et conditas exsequi; prima *νομοθετικὴ*, id est legum positiva; secunda *δικαστικὴ*, id est judiciaria nominatur; considerat denique civilis peritia ea, quæ ad pacem, et quæ ad bellum pertinent, et in eo cum alia plurima, tum hoc præcipue, bellumne ineundum sit an potius renuendum."

[5]—[5] See Sophist, p. 231, D. § 36, *νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτὴς*— from whence one would read here *ἔμμισθον θήραμα* in lieu of *μισθαρνία*—

[6]—[6] Such is the proper rendering of *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*.

[7]—[7] Compare Sophist, p. 254, A. § 84, *Ὁ μὲν (σοφιστὴς) ἀποδιδρασκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτειν ότητα—διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κα·*

which is, that, which is not, is not opposed. For the latter is unsubstantial and unintelligible, nor has it any basis; and which, if a person were compelled to speak of, or to think upon, he would be overthrown,[1] through his bringing a battle around himself.[2] Now that which is not, as far as it is understood,[3] is not a naked negation of what is, [4]but (it is) with a joint-meaning as regards another thing, which follows upon the primary being;[4] [5]so that, unless these too had participated in that, which is not, they would not have been separated from the others.[5] But now, as many soever as are the beings that are, so many times is the being, which is not. For that, which is a not-being, is not a being.

So much it suffices to be said for an Introduction to the doctrine-making of Plato; of which a part has been stated in an orderly manner; but a part dispersedly and in no order; [6]so that it is in the power of any one,[6] from what has been said, to become contemplative and detective of the rest of his doctrines by following out these.[7]

τανοῆσαι χαλεπός. From whence I have, with Ficinus, omitted *καὶ* between *σκοτεινὸν* and *δυσδιόρατον*.

[1] Ficinus, "oberrabit atque tergiversabitur—" as if his MS. read something else than *ἀνατραπήσεται*. Stanley, "he is deceived, because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant—" which is not even a paraphrase, much less a translation.

[2] I have translated, as if the Greek were *αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*— not *αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ*— for Ficinus has "secum ipse pugnet atque dissideat—"

[3] Ficinus renders *ἐξακούεται*, "pronuntiatum auditur—"

[4—4] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "sed cum suspicione quadam et subinsinuatione alterius, quod quidem modo aliquo ipsum, quod est, comitatur;" where "modo aliquo" would lead to *τρόπῳ τῳ*, in lieu of *τῷ τρόπῳ*, which Heinsius corrected into *τῷ πρώτῳ*. Stanley, "Yet that, which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implieth a relation to another, which in some measure is joined to Ens."

[5—5] Stanley, "so that, unless we assume something from that, which is, to that, which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other things."

[6—6] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐνόν τινας*, not *μέντοι*, which could not follow *ὥστε*—

[7] I have translated, as if *τούτων* had dropt out before *καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν*— And so probably read the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "ut horum vestigiis reliqua etiam—"

THE

INTRODUCTION OF ALBINUS

TO

THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO.

[1.] That[1] for a person about to enter upon[2] the Dialogues of Plato, it is fitting that he should know previously what a Dialogue is. For neither without some art and power[3] have dialogues been written, nor is it easy for a person, unskilled in contemplation, to know them artistically. It is agreeable then for a philosopher, who is making for himself an insight into every matter of whatever kind, to examine, (first,)[4] the essence of the thing, and afterwards, what power it has, and not with reference to what is naturally useful and what is not. Now (Plato) says thus—[5] "On every matter, O boy, there is one commencement to those about to consult properly. It is needful to know, about what is the consultation; or else there must needs be an erring in this matter. Now it lies hid from the majority, that they do not know the essence of each thing; (but), as if they did know, they do not, at the commencement

[1] From the word Ὅτι, here and elsewhere, it is evident that the whole of this Introduction is merely an extract from a longer treatise.

[2] I have translated, here and elsewhere, ἐντυχχάνειν, "to enter upon," or "to meet with," as being a meaning more nearly allied to the derivation of the word than "to read," the sense given by others.

[3] Perhaps "meaning" would be the proper rendering.

[4] I have translated, as if μὲν had dropt out after τὴν, to answer to ἔπειτα—

[5] In Phædr. p. 237, C. § 29, from whence Fischer reads here περὶ τοῦτο instead of παρὰ τοῦτο—

of the inquiry, agree (amongst themselves),[1] but as they proceed, [2]they pay the reasonable (penalty);[2] for they agree neither with themselves nor with others." In order then that we may not suffer this,[3] while entering upon the Dialogues of Plato, let us consider this very thing, which I have spoken of, what is a dialogue. [4][For neither without some art and power have dialogues been written.][4] [5]It is then nothing else than a discourse composed of question and answer upon some political or philosophical matter, combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the characters introduced, and the arrangement as regards their diction.[5]

[2.] Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a man (is called) an animal. But since of a discourse there is one kind arranged (in the mind)[6] and another pronounced (by the mouth),[7] let us hear about the one pronounced (by the mouth). And since of the latter there is one kind spoken, as a continued narration, and another by question and answer, questions and answers are the peculiar mark of a dialogue; [8]from whence it is said to be a discourse[8] by interrogation; and moreover[9] it is applied to some political and philosophical matter; because it is meet for the subject matter to be related to the dialogue.[10] Now the matter is that relating to politics and philosophy.[11] For as the matter of fables is laid down as adapted to tragedy and poetry in general, so is to dialogue philosophy, that is (to say), what relates to philosophy. But as regards that, which is combined with a becoming deline-

[1] So Heindorf explains *διομολογοῦνται*, which Fischer has restored here, in lieu of *οὐδὲ ὁμολογοῦντες*, from the passage referred to. For the active *ὁμολογοῦντες* would require *ἑαυτοῖς*, as shown by Alcibiad. I. p. 111, E., quoted by Heindorf, *οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσι σοὶ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς*.

[2]—[2] So Heindorf understands *τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασι*.

[3] One would prefer *τὸ αὐτὸ*, "in the same way."

[4]—[4] The words between the brackets are evidently a needless repetition.

[5]—[5] The same definition of a dialogue is found in Diogen. L. iii. 48.

[6, 7] I have added the words between the lunes for the sake of perspicuity.

[8]—[8] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ὅθεν λόγος*, not *ὅθεν ὁ λόγος*— where the article is improperly introduced.

[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔτι δὲ*, not *τὸ δὲ*—

[10] One would expect here *λόγῳ*, "the discourse," not *διαλόγῳ*.

[11] To complete the definition, one would have expected to find something added to this effect, "which is discussed the best during a dialogue."

ation of the manners of the characters introduced, (and) their being different in their discourses through life, some as philosophers, and others as sophists, it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners; to the philosopher that, which is noble, and simple, and truth-loving; but to the sophist that, which is of many hues, and tricky, and reputation-loving; but to an individual what is peculiar to him. Added to this, [1](the definition) speaks likewise of the arrangement,[1] as regards their diction; and reasonably so. For as [2]the measure ought to be[2] adapted to tragedy and comedy, and the fiction (of the subject) to the bruited story, so ought the diction and composition, adapted to the dialogue, possess what belongs [3]to the grace of an Attic style,[3] and is neither superfluous nor deficient.

[3.] But if a so-called discourse, not being made in the form, as I have laid down, but deficient on these points, is said to be a dialogue, it will not be said so correctly. [4]Thus that, which is said in the case of Thucydides to belong to the power to represent the peculiarity of dialogues, but rather two public speeches composed on set purpose against each other.[4]—Since then we have ascertained what is a dialogue, let us look into the different kinds of the Platonic dialogue, that is, into their characteristics, how many are the topmost,[5] and how many of them [6]exist subdivided into the uncut.[6]

[4.] As regards their characteristics, which are two, one explanatory and the other exploratory, the explanatory is suited to the teaching and practice of truth, but the explora-

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if ὁ ὅρος had dropt out before φησι— and περὶ after κατασκευῆς— Fabricius too perceived that περὶ was wanting here.

[2]—[2] Here too I have translated, as if the Greek were οἰκεῖον εἶναι τὸ μέτρον— not τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον—

[3]—[3] The Greek is τὸ Ἀττικὸν, τὸ εὔχαρι— as if two things were mentioned; whereas, since τὸ Ἀττικὸν is τὸ εὔχαρι, the author probably wrote, what I have translated, τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ τὸ εὔχαρι—

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where it is to be hoped that some of the MSS., not hitherto collated, either exhibit what the author wrote, or furnish a clue to it.

[5] On the uncertainty in the meaning of οἱ ἀνωτάτω, see in the Life of Plato by Diogenes, § 49.

[6]—[6] I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals, and especially how the middle aor., ἐστήσαντο, could be found here.

tory to an exercise and conflict,[1] and the confutation of falsehood; and while the explanatory directs its aim to things, the exploratory does so to persons.

[5.] Of the dialogues of Plato there are drawn out in the class of Physics, the Timæus; in that of Morals, the Apology; in that of Logic, the Theages, Cratylus, Lysis, Sophist, Laches, (and) Statesman; in that of confutation, the Parmenides (and) Protagoras; in that of statesmanship, the Crito, Phædon, Minos, Banquet, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Cleitophon, (and) Philebus; in the tentative (class are) the Euthyphron, Meno, Ion, (and) Charmides; in the obstetrical,[2] the Alcibiades; and in the overthrowing, the Hippias, Euthydemus, (and) Gorgias.

[6.] Since then we have seen their differences, how they exist naturally, and their characteristics, let us state, in addition, from what dialogues persons must begin their entrance upon a discourse of Plato. For opinions are different. For some begin with the Epistles; and some with the Theages. And there are those, who divide the dialogues into tetralogies;[3] and rank as the first tetralogy that, which contains the Euthyphron, Apology, Criton, and Phædon; the Euthyphron, as in it the charge against Socrates is brought forward; the Apology, since it was necessary for him to defend himself; the Crito, on account of his staying in prison; and afterwards the Phædon, since in it Socrates meets with the end of life. And of this[4] opinion are Derkyllides and Thrasyllus. But they seem to me to have wished to assign an order to the persons (of the dialogues) and the circumstances of their lives—a matter which is perhaps useful for something else, but not however for that, which we are wishing now; for we wish to discover the commencement and arrangement of instruction that is according to wisdom. We say then that the commencement of a discourse of Plato is not one and de-

[1] On the difference between *γυμνασία* and *ἀγών*, as applied to a mental conflict, see at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 49.

[2] On the expression "obstetrica," applied to a dialogue, see at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 49.

[3] On the so-called Platonic Tetralogies, see Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 56.

[4] I have adopted, what Fischer suggests, *ταύτης* before *τῆς*—

fined; for that, being perfect, it is similar to the perfect figure of a circle. For as the commencement of a circle is not one and defined, so neither is it of a discourse.[1]

[7.] We will not however on this account enter upon it in any manner soever, nor accidentally. For if it is requisite to describe a circle, a person does not describe it, beginning from any point, but[2] * * * * * in whatever state each of us may be with regard to the discourse, beginning from that he will enter upon the dialogues of Plato. For there is a state according to nature, for instance, good or bad; and that according to age, where a person, for instance, is in the season for philosophizing or has passed it; and that, according to a predilection, as, for instance, in favour of philosophy or[3] history; and [4]that, according to a habit,[4] as in being, for example, previously initiated (in instruction),[5] or without instruction, and that, according to the matter, as being engaged, for example, in philosophy, or dragged around by (political)[6] circumstances.

[8.] He then, who is, according to nature, well born, and according to age is in the season for philosophizing, and according to a predilection, for the sake of exercising himself, is proceeding to reasoning, and he, who, according to a habit, has been previously initiated in instruction, and has been drawn aside from political circumstances, will begin from the Alcibiades [7]to be well-turned by the inclination of intellect,[7] and to know of what thing it is needful to make for himself a

[1] The Greek is *διὰ τοῦ λόγου*: where evidently lies hid a var. lect. *διὰ τοῦ λόγου*— For other instances of one reading made up out of two, see my Poppo's Prolegomena, p. 175, to which I could now add many more.

[2] Fabricius thus supplies the missing matter, "but from that which is nearest at hand; in like manner—"

[3] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἢ*, not *καὶ*— On the confusion in those particles, see Porson on Eurip. Orest. 821.

[4—4] I have adopted the suggestion of Fischer, who conceives that *ἡ δὲ κατὰ* have dropt out between *ἕνεκα* and *ἕξιν*—

[5] I have translated, for the sake of the antithesis, as if *μαθήσει* had dropt out, similar to *προτετελεσμένος τοῖς μαθήμασι* in the next §.

[6] I have followed Fischer, who has inserted *πολιτικῶν* before *περιστάσεων*, similar to *πολιτικῶν περιστάσεων* in the next §.

[7—7] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πρὸς τὸ τῇ ῥοπῇ νοῦ εὖ ἐπιστραφῆναι*, to avoid the unmeaning tautology in *πρὸς τὸ τραπῆναι καὶ ἐπιστραφῆναι*—

care, and, as it were by a beautiful pattern, to see who is the philosopher and what is his pursuit, and upon what suppositions his discourse is carried on. [1](Such a person)[1] must enter upon the Phædo next in order; for in it (Plato) states who is the philosopher, and what is his pursuit; and upon the supposition of the soul being immortal he goes through the discourse relating to it. After this it would be requisite to enter upon the Republic. For, commencing with the earliest instruction, he delineates the whole of education, by making use of which a person would arrive at the possession of virtue. But since it is requisite for us to be versed in the knowledge of things divine, so as to be able, by possessing[2] virtue, to be assimilated to them, we shall enter upon the Timæus; for by entering upon this[3] account relating to Nature, and on the so-called theology, and the arrangement of the Universe, we shall clearly have a recollection[4] of things divine.

[9.] But if any one, to speak summarily, is able to survey correctly[5] the arrangement of the dialogues, suited to the teaching according to Plato, to him who chooses the doctrines of Plato * *[6] For as it is necessary to become a spectator[7] of his own soul and of things divine, [8]and of the gods themselves, and to obtain the most beautiful mind,[8] he must cleanse

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if οὗτος had dropt out between δεήσει and τῷ—

[2] The syntax requires κτησάμενοι, to answer to the plural ἐντευξόμεθα, in lieu of κτησάμενον—

[3] In lieu of αὐτῇ, the sense requires ταύτῃ—

[4] Fabricius was the first to read ἀναμνήσομεν for ἀν.

[5] To avoid the incorrect syntax in εἰ— δύναιτ' ἂν— we may read, as translated, εἰ—δύναιτ' εὖ—

[6] Fabricius has supplied, what he imagined to be the missing matter, in his Latin version, "Platonicæ disciplinæ futurus sectator ex Platonis ipsius doctrina hoc faciet quam optime—" But he has neglected to state on what the dative τῷ-αἱρουμένῳ is to depend, unless perhaps he conceived that the author wrote τῷ τὰ Πλάτωνος αἱρουμένῳ ἐνῆν τοῦτο ῥᾴστα δρᾶν, or something similar.

[7] I have adopted, what Fischer has suggested, θεατὴν, required by the subsequent ἑαυτοῦ, in lieu of θεατὰς—

[8]—[8] The words between the numerals present a very strange sense, as if it were possible for a person to be a spectator of the gods themselves and to obtain the most beautiful mind. Unless I am greatly mistaken the author wrote "διὰ τὸ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλλίστου νοῦ τι ἔχειν—" "through having a portion of the most beautiful mind itself of the gods—" not καὶ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ καλλίστου νοῦ τυχεῖν.

out the false opinions of his conceptions. For not even have physicians deemed the body capable of enjoying the food brought to it, unless a person shall have previously cast out what was in it in the way of an obstacle. But after the cleansing out, it is requisite to excite and call forth the sentiments, imparted by nature, and to cleanse out these too, and to exhibit them pure, as principles. In addition to this, through the soul being thus[1] previously prepared, it is necessary to introduce into it its peculiar doctrines, according to which it may be perfected; now these relate to physics, and theology, and morality, and statesmanship. And[2] that the doctrines may remain in the soul and not be[3] chased away, it will be necessary for it to be delivered to the reasoning relating to causation,[4] in order that a person may lay hold firmly of the proposed aim. In addition to these it is meet that, what is not contrary to reason, should be furnished, in order that we may not be carried aside by some sophist, and turn our thoughts into a worse direction. That we may therefore cast out false opinions, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the tentative character, and which possess the confuting and the so-called cleansing power. And that a person may call forth into light the notions relating to physics, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the obstetrical character, for this is peculiar to them; since in those there are doctrines relating to physics, and to morals, and to statesmanship, and to the regulation of a household; of which some have a reference to contemplation and a contemplative life; but others to action and an active life; but both of them [5]relate to the being assimilated to god.[5] And that these, after being imparted, may be not escaping from us, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of a logical character,

[1] I have transiated, as if the Greek were not ὡς, but οὕτως—

[2] I have adopted δὲ, inserted by Fabricius, after ἵνα—

[3] The syntax requires either the insertion of ᾖ after ἀναπόδραστα, or else the omission of καὶ before it.

[4] Such seems to be the meaning of αἰτίας here. Unless it be said that the author wrote τῆς ᾱ αἰτίας, i. e. τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας, "the first cause." On this sense of ᾱ and its loss before αι- see here, p. 312, n. [5].

[5—5] Such some will perhaps consider a proper version of ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ. But ἐπὶ could hardly, I think, bear that meaning. Hence I suspect the author wrote ἐποίει τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι— where, since the imperfect indicates a custom, ἐποίει would mean "is wont to make—"

which is also of the exploratory kind. For they possess both the distinguishing and defining methods, and, moreover, the analytical and syllogistical, through which truths are shown and falsehoods confuted. Moreover, since it is requisite for us to be not led aside contrary to reason by sophists, we shall enter upon the dialogues of a demonstrative character; in which it is in our power to learn thoroughly how it is meet to listen to sophists, and[1] in what manner to carry ourselves towards those, who act wrongly in matters relating to reason.

[1] I have omitted *καὶ ὅπως*, which are quite superfluous before *καὶ ὄντινα τρόπον*.

APULEIUS

ON

THE DOCTRINES[1] OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

[1.][2] [3]THE conformation of his body gave to Plato his name ;[3] for he was previously called Aristocles. His father was said to have been Ariston; while his mother was Perictioné, the daughter of Glaucus ;[4] and on both sides the nobility of his birth was sufficiently remarkable. For his father Ariston derived through Codrus his origin from Neptune; while the blood on his mother's side flowed from Solon, the very wise, who was the founder of the laws of Athens. There are however those, who assert that Plato sprang from a more exalted origin, at the time when a certain vision in the form of Apollo had a connexion with Perictioné. He was born in the month called Thargelion[5] at Athens, on the day[6] in which Latona is reported to have brought forth Apollo and Diana at Delos, (and) on the day before that, in which we have heard that Socrates was born. Mention is likewise made of the pretty dream that

[1] The more correct title would perhaps be that found in some MSS. and Ald., "Vita, Instituta, Dogmata Platonis per Apuleium."

[2] The sections are adopted from Hildebrand's edition.

[3]—[3] For the word Πλατ-ων was formed from πλατ-υς, as shown in the Life of Plato by Hesychius, p. 229, n. [1].

[4] Diogenes, more correctly, Glaucon, as remarked by Casaubon.

[5] This month marks a period from the middle of May to the middle of June.

[6] This was the 7th.

Socrates had; for he thought he saw a cygnet flying from an altar, which was in the Academia, sacred to Cupid, and settling on his lap; and that afterwards, a full-fledged swan, it directed its flight to heaven, entrancing the ears of men and gods with the music of its song. And after Socrates had mentioned the dream to some persons when they had come together, Ariston very opportunely[1] attended upon Socrates, with the view of offering Plato to him as (the youth's) instructor; on whom when Socrates had cast his eyes and [2]saw from his external appearance his internal disposition,[2] he said, "This, friends, is the swan (from the altar) of Cupid in the Academy."

[2.] Such and (sprung) from such did Plato not only excel heroes in virtue, but he equalled likewise the gods in power. For Speusippus, [3]who was furnished with family documents,[3] praises the acuteness of the boy's talent in perception, and his disposition as regards his wonderful modesty; and he makes mention of the first-fruits of his youth as being imbued with the proofs of labour and his love of study; and testifies that in the man there met together the growth of these and of other virtues.

From the same parents were his brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. For his instructors he had in [4]the rudiments of education,[4] Dionysius; and in the palæstra, Ariston, a native of Argos; and such a progress did practice bring with it, that he contended for the wrestler's prize at the Pythian and Isthmian games. Nor did he disdain the painter's art. For Tragic and Dithyrambic compositions likewise he fitted himself; and, carried away by a confidence in his poetical powers, he was already desirous of professing himself a competitor, had not Socrates driven from his mind the lowness of the desire, and taken care to implant in his soul the glory that arises from true praise. And even previously[5] he had

[1] Such seems to be the meaning of "commodum;" for which two MSS. read "commodo—"

[2—2] Compare Shakspeare's—"To read the mind's construction in the face"—which answers almost literally to the words of Apuleius, "ingenium internum de exteriore conspicatus facie."

[3—3] For he was the nephew of Plato.

[4—4] Such is the correct translation of "prima literatura—" For "literæ" in Latin, like γράμματα in Greek, meant something more extensive than "letters" do in English. See at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 4, n. [1—1].

[5] According to Diogenes, § 6, Plato attached himself to the sect of

been imbued with the (doctrines of the) sect of Heracleitus. But when he had given himself up to Socrates, he was superior to the rest of the disciples of Socrates not only in genius and learning; but by labour likewise and elegance he shed a lustre on the wisdom imparted to him by Socrates; by the labour, through which he endeavoured to make that wisdom his own; and by the elegance, through which he contributed to it a considerable dignity from the beauty and majesty of his language.

[3.] But after Socrates had left the world,[1] he sought out from whence he might make a further progress; and he betook himself to the discipline of Pythagoras; and though he saw it possessed a method of diligence and splendour combined, he was still more desirous of imitating its continence and chastity. And, as he perceived that the talents of the Pythagoreans were aided by other kinds of learning, he went to Cyrené to learn Geometry under Theodorus, and travelled even to Egypt to obtain a knowledge of astrology, and that he might learn from thence the rites of the prophets there. And [2]a second time he went[2] to Italy, and became a follower of the Pythagoreans, Eurytus of Tarentum, and Archytas, who was rather advanced in years; and he would have directed his thoughts to the Indians and Magi, had not the wars in Asia[3] at that time prevented him [4](from proceeding thither).[4] [5]On which account,[5] by following out with more than usual study the discoveries of Parmenides and Zeno, he so filled his treatises with things, [6]taken unitedly, which singly[6] had been an ob-

Heracleitus after the death of Socrates. But Aristotle, in Metaphys. i 6, agrees with Apuleius.

[1] Literally "men—"

[2—2] For the first time is alluded to in the expression "ad Pythagoræ disciplinam se contulit—" Perhaps, however, in lieu of "iterum venit," Apuleius wrote "iter convertit," i. e. "he turned his road—"

[3] So the earlier edd. But as all the MSS. read "caletica," Oudendorp has suggested "Chaldaica;" Hildebrand, "Halytica," i. e. Lydian, in allusion to the war carried on by the younger Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, that forms the subject of the early part of Xenophon's "Anabasis."

[4—4] The words between the lunes are due to Joann. Sarisbur. in Nug Curial. vii. 5, who has "procedere vetuissent—" not "vetuissent" simply.

[5—5] The introduction of "quapropter" here seems very strange.

[6—6] So we must translate "omnibus, quæ—singula," to preserve the antithesis.

ject of admiration, that he was the first to unite philosophy, previously tripartite, and to show that its parts, each necessary in its turn, were not only not at variance with each other, but that they afforded a mutual aid. For although the members of philosophy had been obtained from different factories, (such as) natural philosophy from the Heracleiteans, mental from the Pythagoreans, and moral from the very fountain of Socrates, yet from them all he formed one body, and, as it were, of his own begetting. But as the chiefs of these families (of Philosophy) had delivered to their auditors their sentiments in unpolished (language) and a rudimental (form), Plato rendered them perfect and even to be admired by polishing them up with reasonings, and investing them with the honourable dress of lofty diction. [4.] Many of his hearers, belonging to either sex, flourished as philosophers. He left behind him his patrimony, consisting of a small garden, adjoining the Academy, and [1]two slaves, and a goblet,[1] with which he made supplications to the gods; and of gold so much, as he had worn, when a boy, in his ear,[2] to mark his (noble birth). Some evil-disposed persons carp indeed at his three journeys to Sicily, and discuss them with opinions at variance with each other. But he went thither[3] the first time for the sake of information, that he might understand the nature of Ætna, and the burning of [4]the hollow mountain;[4] the second, at the request of Dionysius, to assist the people of Syracuse, and to learn the municipal laws of that province. His third arrival took place [5]in the wish to restore[5] Dion, then an exile, to his country, after Plato had obtained a pardon for him from Dionysius.

Of his tenets, that might be called by the Greek word δόγματα, which he promulgated for the beneficial use of man, and

[1]—[1] On Diogen. L. § 44, n. 2, Stanley has remarked the discrepancy in the statements of the two writers.

[2] This was the right ear, as we learn from Isidorus, in Origin. xix. 31, "In aures—in Græcia puellæ utraque aure, pueri tantum dextra gerebant."

[3] I have translated, as if the Latin word were "illic," not "ille—"

[4]—[4] Unless I am greatly mistaken the words "concavi montis" are an explanation of "crateris—" which was the technical expression applied to that natural phænomenon. See at Diogenes' Life of Plato, § 18, p. 185, n. 2.

[5]—[5] So Oudendorp renders "reddidit—" for Plato, he says, failed in the attempt; although he confesses that Ælian, in V. H. iii. 17, asserts he did not fail.

for a rational method of living, and understanding, and speaking, we will commence from hence. For since he first held that the three parts of philosophy have an agreement with each other, we too will speak of each separately, beginning with Natural Philosophy.

[5.] Plato considers the principles of (all) things to be three—God, Matter, and the Forms of Things, which he calls Ἰδέας, (Ideas,) that are incomplete, shapeless, (and) distinguished by no mark of species and quality. But of God his sentiments are that he is incorporeal.[1] He alone, says (Plato), is [2]ἀπερίμετρος, (without a circumference,)[2] the father and adorner[3] of all things, blessed (himself) and the cause of blessings (to others), the very best, in want of nothing himself, (and) conferring all things (upon all); whom he calls the heavenly, the ineffable, the not-to-be-named, or, as he says himself, [4]ἄρρητον ἀκατωνόμαστον;[4] whose nature it is difficult to discover; and, if discovered, it cannot be proclaimed to the many. [5][The words of Plato are these, θεὸν εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, εὑρόντα δὲ εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκφέρειν ἀδύνατον.][5] But of Matter he makes mention as unable to create, and to be destroyed, and that it is neither Fire, nor Water, nor any other of the principles and positive elements; but that of all things it is the first recipient of forms, and subjective to the act of making; (and) being as yet shapeless and devoid of the quality of configuration,[6] God, as the artificer, gives to it a form Uni-

[1] Compare Alcinous, § 10, and Diogen. L. iii. 77.

[2—2] The word ἀπερίμετρος is not found, I believe, in Plato. The idea however may be compared with the well-known representation of God, who has been considered as a circle, whose centre is every where, and circumference no where.

[3] So Oudendorp adopts "exornator," the conjecture of Lennep, in lieu of "extortor;" from which, as he could extort no meaning, he would elicit "exstructor," i. e. "the builder up—" remembering the expression τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ τὸν πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς in Tim. p. 28, C. Hildebrand suggests "exorsor," "the beginner;" for though, as he confesses, the word is not found elsewhere in Latin, yet it might have been coined by Apuleius, like many others from his mint.

[4—4] Neither of these words are applied, if I rightly remember, to God by Plato.

[5—5] The words between the numerals Scaliger was the first to reject, as being evidently introduced by some person, who had an incorrect recollection of the passage in Tim. p. 28, C., εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

[6] Compare Alcinous, § 8, p. 260.

versal, which is infinite on that account, because it is a magnitude without a limit. For that which is infinite has the limit of magnitude undefined; and hence, when (Matter) is deprived of limit, it can properly be seen[1] as infinite. Nor yet does he concede that it is with a body nor without a body. On that account he thinks it is not a body, because no body is free from some kind of form; nor yet can he say that it is without a body, because nothing, which is without a body, can exhibit a body; but that it seems to be with a body [2]by the force of reasoning;[2] and it is therefore to be comprehended [3]not by acting alone, nor yet by the opinion alone of thought—[3] for bodies, through the remarkable evidence of themselves, are known by [4]similar judgment—[4] but that those things, which do not possess a bodily substance, are seen by cogitation; from whence, [5]opinion being adulterated, the ambiguous quality of this matter is to be comprehended.[5] [6.] The Ἰδέαι, namely, the simple forms of all things, (he says,) are eternal, nor yet with a body; but they exist from such, as God has taken as the patterns of things, which are or will be; and (he says) it is not possible for any thing[6] to be found beyond the individual images in the patterns of each species; and that of all existing[7] things the forms and configurations are marked out from the impression of those patterns, in the manner of wax (impressions).

[1] In lieu of "videri," one would have expected rather "vocari," i. e. "to be called." For how a thing that is without limit, can be seen even with the eye of the mind, much less with that of the body, it is hard to understand.

[2—2] So I have translated "vi et ratione;" for otherwise there would be nothing to which "vi" could be applied. The Delphin editor indeed explains "vi" by "virtute—" to which he was perhaps led by knowing that ed. Junt. has "ut" instead of "vi—" and fancying that vi ut was an error for "virtute." But we are yet to learn to what is "virtute" to be referred. Moreover, as one MS. offers "secunda" for "sibi eam," it is evident there is some corruption here, which I must leave for others to correct, if they can.

[3—3] Here again I must confess myself quite at a loss.

[4—4] That is, says the Delphin editor, by an evident judgment. But "evident judgment" is an union of words perfectly without meaning.

[5—5] Here too I confess my inability to understand what Apuleius intended by the words between the numerals.

[6] I have translated, as if "quid" had dropt out before "quam—"

[7] Here "gignentium" is taken in an intransitive sense, as it is in Apuleius de Mundo, n. 736, and Sallust, B. J. § 79, quoted by Oudendorp; who would otherwise have read "entium—"

Οὐσίαι, which we call "essentiæ," (existences,) he says are two-fold, through which all things are produced, and even the world itself; one of which is perceived by reflection alone; the other can be subjective to the senses. Now that, which is perceived by the eyes of the mind, is found (to exist) for ever, and in the same manner, and equal and similar to itself, and what truly is. But the other is to be estimated by opinion, affected by a sense and a want of reason, and which he says is produced and perishes. And as the former is said to exist truly, so the latter we may say does not exist truly. And [1]of the first substance or existence is the first God,[1] and Matter, and the Forms of Things, and the living principle; of the second substance are all the things, which receive a form, and are generated, and derive their origin from a pattern of the former substance; (and) which are able to be changed and turned about, gliding away and escaping in the manner of flowing water. Moreover, since that substance of perception, which I have mentioned, rests upon a power that is consistent, the points, that are made the subject of dispute relating to it, are full of firm reasoning and belief; but of the latter, which is the shadow, as it were, and the image of the former, the reasonings and the words, which are used in disputes relating to it, are expressed by a method of teaching which is not consistent.

[7.] The beginning of all bodies he has stated to be Matter; and that it is marked by the impress of Forms; and that from hence have been produced the elements, Fire and Water, Earth and Air; which ought, if they are elements, to be simple, [2]nor to be united by a mutual connexion, after the manner of syllables;[2] what takes place in the case of those (things),[3] whose substance is made up by the coming together of powers in many ways; which, when they had been in no order and mixed together, were brought by the deity, who is the builder of the world, into order [4]by means of numbers and measures in a circuit.[4] These (he says) were reduced

[1]—[1] In the words "primæ-substantiæ vel essentiæ primum Deum—" there is an evident error of "primum" for "primæ—" For the question here is not about the first God, but the first existence.

[2]—[2] This comparison is from Tim. p. 48, B. § 21.

[3] Floridus understands "rebus," as the antecedent of "quarum—" but Hildebrand, "formis—" Others read "quorum—"

[4]—[4] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text. But

from very many elements into one; and that Fire, and Air, and Water, have their origin and beginning in a triangle, which is right-angled but with unequal angles; [1]but that the Earth is formed of direct angles, triangles, and of equal footsteps;[1] and that of the former form three kinds exist, the pyramidal, the [2]octangular, and twenty-angular;[2] but that [3]the sphere and pyramid[3] have in themselves the figure of Fire; and that the octangular sphere is dedicated to Air; and the twenty-angular to Water; but that the triangle with equal feet[4] forms out of itself a square, and the square [5]a cube, which is peculiar to the Earth.[5] On which account he gave to Fire the movable form of the pyramid, because [6]the quickness of one seemed to be very similar to the rapid movement of the other.[6] But of secondary velocity is the octangular sphere. This he assigned to the Air, which in lightness and quickness is the second after Fire. The sphere with twenty angles[7] is in the third place, [8]of this the rolling form seemed to be rather like that of flowing water.[8] There remains the form of dice (a

Plato, in Tim. p. 53, B. § 27, has *διεσχηματίσατο εἴδεσι καὶ ἀριθμοῖς*—where, however, there is nothing similar to "in ambitum;" nor is there in Alcinous, § 13, p. 271, who has, what is far more intelligible, "Matter—moved at first—without order—was subsequently reduced into order by the deity, while all things were fitted together according to a proportion with each other."

[1]—[1] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words "terram vero directis quidem angulis trigonis et vestigiis paribus esse—" supplied by MS. Fulv. and Excerpt. Bat. But a right angle is not elsewhere, I believe, called in Latin "directus angulus," nor does "vestigium" mean "the side" of a triangle. What Apuleius wrote and meant to say it is impossible to discover, even with the aid of Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 98, D. § 5.

[2]—[2] Floridus was the first to remark that Apuleius has mistranslated *ὀκτάεδρον* and *εἰκοσίεδρον*, found in Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 98, D. § 5, by applying to the angles, what the Greek writer said of the sides, of triangles.

[3]—[3] Here again Apuleius plainly proves that he was writing on subjects, of which he had very imperfect notions. For as the sphere is a circular figure, and the pyramid an angular one, they could not both be the figure of fire, which was pyramidal alone, as stated in Tim. p. 56, B. § 31.

[4] i. e. with equal sides— [5]—[5] Compare Tim. p. 55, C. § 30.

[6]—[6] Compare Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 98, D. § 5.

[7] So the Delphin editor understands "vigesimalis," the correction of Elmenhorst, similar to "viginti angulam—" just above.

[8]—[8] So I have translated, as if the words were "hujus forma volubilis

cube); [1]which, since it is immovable, has not absurdly obtained by lot the steadiness of the Earth.[1] Other beginnings too (he says)[2] might be discovered, which are known to God, [3]or to him who is a friend of the gods.[3] [8.] But of the primary elements, Fire, and Water, and the rest, he asserts[4] the slight bodies of things with life and without it, consist in the shape of particles; but that the World, taken as a whole, is made up of [5]the whole of Water, and the whole of Fire, and the whole of Air, and the whole of Earth,[5] and that not only no portion of these is left without the World, but that its power even is not [6]found beyond it,[6] and that these are fitted to and connected with each other within it; and consequently its seat is in Fire, Earth, Water, and Air; and as Fire is united to Air by a (certain) relationship, so Moisture is united[7] by an affinity to Earth.

Hence (he says) that there is one World, and in it all things; [8]nor is there a place left, in which another World

fluidæ aquæ similior est visa—" not "hujus forma fluida et volubilis . . . " which I will leave for those to understand, who can.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of "quæ cum sit immobilis, terræ constantiam non absurde sortita est—" where the natural train of thought would lead to quite the reverse. For it was the Earth, that was said to have obtained its stability from the form of the cube, not the cube from the form of the Earth. Hence Apuleius probably wrote "quam, cum sit immobilis Terræ substantia, constantem non absurde sortita est—" and hence we can account for what would be otherwise inexplicable, the variation in MSS. between "substantiam" and "constantiam." Unless indeed it be said that he had a confused and imperfect recollection of the passage in Pseudo-Locr. Tim. p. 98, C. § 5, *τὸν κύβον, ἑδραιότατον, καὶ σταδαῖον παντᾷ σῶμα—τοῦτο δὲ βαρύτατόν τε καὶ δυσκίνατον ἀ γᾶ.*

[2] I have adopted "ait, quæ," found in one MS., in lieu of "quæ aut."

[3]—[3] I do not remember where Plato says this, even if he does say so, of which I have great doubts.

[4] I have translated, as if the author wrote "ait," not "et," which is unintelligible; and I have elicited "exilia" from "ex illa—" furnished by one MS.

[5]—[5] By the aid of this passage may be restored Tim. p. 32, D., *ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς ξυνέστησεν—*

[6]—[6] I have adopted, what Floridus suggested, "sed ne vim quidem—" (where "ne" is omitted in MSS.) and confirmed by Tim. p. 32, C., *μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολιπὼν—*

[7] Colvius was the first to see that the syntax required the indicative "jugatur," instead of the subjunctive "jungatur—"

[8]—[8] Compare Tim. p. 33, A.

could be;[8] nor are there (other)[1] elements remaining from which there could be formed the body of another World. Moreover, there is attributed to it [2]a perpetual youth and a never-injured health;[2] and further, there is nothing left out of it that can corrupt its [3]natural condition;[3] and if there remained any thing [4](out of the World),[4] it would not injure it; since it is on every side so put together and arranged, that what is adverse and contrary cannot do an injury to its nature and discipline. On this account then it has been sought by the fabricating God, in behalf of the World, which, [5]like a beautiful and perfect sphere, is the most perfect and most beautiful, that it should be in want of nothing, and contain all things by shutting in and restraining them,[5] (and be)[6] beautiful and wonderful, like to and answering to himself. Now since there are held to be these[7] seven movements in space, the forward and backward, the right and the left; and of things, that strive (to move)[8] upwards and downwards; and of those, that are twisted into a spiral[9] and circuit, this one (way),[10] peculiar to wisdom and prudence, was left for the World, after the six former had been laid aside, that it should revolve according to reason.

And this World, he says, is now with a beginning; but [11]otherwise it has an origin,[11] and was produced, for there is no beginning or commencement, because it existed always; but that it seems to have been produced, because its[12] substance

[1] I have inserted, what the sense evidently requires; especially as "alia" might easily have been lost before "elementa."

[2—2] Compare Tim. p. 33, A., ἵνα ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον ᾖ.

[3—3] Such seems to be the meaning of "ingenium," applied to the World.

[4—4] The words between the lunes have been added to complete the sense. [5—5] Compare Tim. p. 33, B.—D., § 11.

[6] I have translated, as if "et" had dropt out before "pulcher," and "sit" after "admirabilis—"

[7] By the aid of this passage we may supply Tim. p. 34, A. § 11.

[8] This insertion has been made for the sake of perspicuity.

[9] This seems to be the correct translation of "gyrum—" a word applied to the revolutions of a top, which is set in motion by a string, wound round it in the form and with the power of a spiral.

[10] As there is nothing in the text to which "una" can be referred, I have translated, as if "via" had been lost after "una—"

[11—11] I confess, I cannot understand "alias habere originem—"

[12] I have omitted, with the majority of MSS., "totius" after "rebus."

and nature consist of those things which have obtained, by lot, the quality of being produced. Hence it [1]is tangible, and visible, and comes under the senses of the body.[1] But [2]because God has afforded a cause for its being produced, it is on that account about to be for ever of an immortal endurance.[2]

[9.] But the soul of all living beings (he says) is incorporeal, nor will it perish, when it shall have been released from the body; and that [3]it is older than all things produced, and that it therefore has a command over and rules[3] those things, of which it has obtained by lot the diligent care;[4] and that it is ever moved by itself and is the mover of other things, which are by their nature unmoved and sluggish; and he proclaims that the heavenly soul, which is the fountain of all souls and the best and wisest parent of virtues, is subservient to God the maker, and is at hand for all his inventions; but that the substance of this mind is made up of numbers and measures [5]by means of increase doubled and multiplied, and of increments obtained from themselves and from without;[5] and hence it happens that the World is moved [6]according to a system of music, instrumental and vocal.[6] (He says too) that the Natures of things are two-fold; and that one of them is that, which can be seen by the eyes and touched by the hand, which he calls δοξαστὴν, the subject of opinion; and the other is that, which presents itself to the mind, (called) διανοητικὴ, the subject of cogitation and intellect:—for let pardon be granted [7]to a novelty in words, that minister to the obscurity of things,[7]—and that the former portion is mutable, and easy

[1]—[1] Compare Tim. p. 28, B. § 9.

[2]—[2] I confess myself quite unable to understand the cogency of this reasoning. Diogenes, as remarked by the Delphin editor, has produced a more intelligible one in his Life of Plato, § 72, "the world will continue undestroyed, on account of its being not resolved into that which is not—" for so properly read the MS. used by Ambrosius.

[3]—[3] Compare Tim. p. 34, E. § 12, πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν—

[4] So I have translated "curam—diligentiamque—"

[5]—[5] What Apuleius meant by the words between the numerals will be perhaps best understood by Batteux's note at the end of the translation of the Pseudo-Timæus.

[6]—[6] Such is the full meaning of "musice—et canore—"

[7]—[7] This excuse was demanded by Apuleius for the use of the words "opinabilem" and "cogitabilem—"

[1]for a person beholding it;[1] but that the latter, which is seen by the eye of mind, and is perceived and conceived by reflection, that penetrates it, is incorruptible, immutable, enduring, and the same for ever. Hence two-fold too, he says, is reasoning and interpretation. For the latter, which is visible, is inferred by a suspicion accidental, and not so[2] very enduring; but the former, which is intelligible, is proved to be true by ratiocination perpetual and constant.

[10.] But Time (he says) is [3]an image of Eternity;[3] although Time is subject to motion, (while) the nature of Eternity is fixed and motionless; and that Time goes into it, and can be ended and resolved into its magnitude, if at any time God, the maker of the World, shall so determine: (and) that by the spaces of the same Time the measures of the revolution of the World are comprehended; since the globes of the Sun and Moon do this, and the rest of the Stars, which we do not correctly say are [4]Wandering and Wandering;[4] for our opinions and disputations respecting their orbits [5]may be led from the reality by an error of the understanding;[5] whereas the disposer of (all) things has so appointed their [6]returnings, risings, settings, recessions, delays, and progressions,[6] that there is no place left for even a moderate error; since days with nights fill up the space of a month, and months in their turn roll on the circle of a year; nor was it possible for the numeration of time to be

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of "contuenti," in lieu of which Colvius suggested, with the approbation of Brant, "converti—" One MS. has "continenti—" From the two one might perhaps elicit "facile alium locum tenentem," i. e. "easily having another place—" in opposition to the subsequent "constantem—"

[2] I have adopted "non ita," elicited by Scioppius from "inita—"

[3]—[3] Compare Tim. p. 37, D. § 14, *αἰῶνος—εἰκόνα—ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν*: and Alcinous, § 14, p. 274.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of "Erroneas et Vagas—" where it is evident that one word is a gl., but which is so, it is not easy to determine. For while Apuleius has in De Deo Socrat. "quæ vulgo vagæ nuncupantur ab imperitis—" the other word "erroneas" coincides more closely with the Greek *πλανῆτες*.

[5]—[5] I have translated, as if the text were, not "in errorem intellectum inducere" or "incidere," but "per errorem intellectus induci e re," where "per" might have easily dropt out before "errorem—" Hildebrand has edited, he says from MSS. "in errorem intellectuum incidere."

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are placed in a rather strange order; for the natural flow of ideas would be, "revolutions, risings, settings, returnings, progress, and delays—"

entered upon, before those signs began to burn in the starry light; and the keeping of this reckoning would have perished, if this antique[1] chorus had stood still of old. For that the measures and returns of time might be known, and the circuit of the World be seen, the light of the Sun was lit up; and in turn the darkness of night invented, that desired rest might come to living beings; and a month[2] was made up, when the Moon, after completing the course of her circle, returned to the same spot from which she had departed; whereas the space of a year is completed, when the Sun shall have reached the four changes of the seasons, and be carried (back)[3] to the same sign. The enumeration of those, [4]that return into themselves, and of those, that depart from themselves,[4] he discovered [5]by the contemplation of the understanding;[5] and (he says) that there are nevertheless [6]determinate revolutions of the stars, preserved for ever in their legitimate courses, which the skill of man can with difficulty comprehend.[6] From whence it happens, that the so-called Great Year is known very easily; the time of which will be filled up, when the company of the wandering stars shall arrive at the same end, and recover for itself a new commencement, and a journey through the roads of the World.

[11.] But of the celestial orbs, united to each other by mutual changes, the highest of all is that, [7]which is reckoned as the

[1] Lipsius, unable, as I am, to understand "antiquus," suggested "astricus—" for he probably remembered the words of Varro, quoted by Nonius vi. 16, "Cœli choreas astricas—" similar to ἄστρων αἰθέριοι χοροὶ in Eurip. El. 467.

[2] I have adopted "mensem," in lieu of "menses," as suggested by Wower; who aptly refers to Tim. p. 39, C. § 14, and to Alcinous, § 14. For the question is about each month, taken individually, not about many months.

[3] I have translated, as if the text were, not "fuerit invectus," but "fuerit retrorsum vectus."

[4—4] As the act of departure must precede that of return, one would have expected to find the two members of this period inverted.

[5—5] I have translated, as if the text were, not "intellectu cogitationis," but "intellectus cogitatione," similar to "cogitatione animi" in the interpretation of the Delphin editor.

[6—6] Compare Tim. p. 39, C. § 14.

[7—7] I have translated, as if the text were "qui inerrabilium meatus censetur; cujus—" not "qui inerrabili meatu censetur; ejus—" for it was not the "meatus," which was "inerrabilis," but the stars, that were placed there.

path of the non-wandering (stars), by whose[7] embrace the rest are restrained; and that to the non-wandering the first place was assigned; the second to Saturn; the third to Jupiter; that Mars holds the fourth; that the fifth is assigned to Mercury; that the sixth belongs to Venus; and that the seventh is burnt up by the passage of the Sun; (and) that the Moon measures the eighth.

Hence (he says that) all things are occupied by elements and principles; that Fire is above all; and next is the place of Air; that next is that of Water; and next that the orb of Earth, situated in the middle, [1]stands equal in place,[1] and immovable in figure. He says too that these fires, fixed to the spheres of the stars, glide on in their courses perpetual and untired, and that they are living gods; but that the nature of the Spheres is nourished by, and made out of, Fire.

Moreover, the races of living beings are divided into four species; one of which is of the nature of Fire of such a kind, as we see the Sun and Moon to be, and the rest [2]of the stars in the constellations;[2] another is of the quality of Air; and this he says is that of Dæmons; the third is a coalescence of Water and Earth; and that [3]the mortal race of bodies[3] (is) from this, (and) divided into the terrene and terrestrial—for so he considered the χοϊκὰ[4] should be called—

[1]—[1] I confess I do not understand what Apuleius meant by "equalem loco—" Perhaps he wrote "in medio situm æquilibrium loco," i. e. "situated in the middle place of the equally balanced." Compare Alcinous, § 15.

[2]—[2] Such, I presume, is the meaning of "siderum stellas—" for such a combination of words is not, I suspect, to be met with elsewhere.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of "mortale genus corporum—" words scarcely intelligible, except by a metaptosis, for "mortalium genus corporum—" But as three MSS. offer, instead of χοϊκα, "et pronenerteron," and two, "et pote enepteron—" Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "mortale genus in et pteroen et apteron—" where "pteroen" and "apteron" are the Greek words πτερόεν and ἄπτερον, written in Latin letters; and if this be a correct conjecture, we must read likewise "dividi; et exinde in terrenum atque terrestre—" in lieu of "ex eo dividi terrenum atque terrestre—" For thus Apuleius would be found to have drawn his facts, not from Plato himself, but from some writer, who had an imperfect recollection of Tim. p. 40, A., εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες (ἰδέαι), μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον· τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον [εἶδος]· πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τετάρτη.

[4] Since the word χοϊκὸς, applied to "mud," is not found except in the Alexandrine Greek of the Septuagint and New Testament, it is evident

and that terrene belongs to trees and other productions, which drag out an existence, while they are fixed to the ground; but terrestrial to things, which the earth feeds and sustains.

Of gods he enumerates three kinds; of which the first is that one and alone the highest, who is beyond the World, and incorporeal; whom we have shown above to be the father and architect of this divine World; another is such as the stars possess, and the rest of the deities, whom we call the heaven-inhabiting; the third embraces[1] those, whom the old Romans[2] called "Medioxumi," because they are, with relation to themselves and place and power, inferior to the highest gods, but naturally superior to man.

[12.] But all things which are carried on naturally, and on that account correctly, are governed by the guardianship of Providence: [3]nor can the cause of any evil be ascribed to God;[3] on which account [4](Plato) conceives that not all things are to be referred to the lot of Fate.[4] For he gives this definition, that Providence is a divine determination, the conservator of the prosperity of that, for the sake of which it has undertaken such an office; (and) that Fate is a divine law, by which the inevitable designs of, and the acts commenced by, the deity are fulfilled. And hence, if any thing is done by Providence, it is done likewise by Fate; and that, which is finished by Fate, should seem to have been commenced[5] by Providence. Now the first Providence is that of the highest (power) and the most above all the gods; who has ordained not only the deities, that dwell in heaven, whom he has dispersed to be [6]a guard and glory[6] through all

that Apuleius obtained his knowledge of the doctrines of Plato from some follower of that sect at Alexandria, who had himself only a slight acquaintance with the tenets of the Athenian. This inference, however, Hildebrand would not admit, as he rejects χοϊκὰ, and would read "πεζὸν et ἔννδρον—"

[1] I have translated, as if the word were "habet," not "habent," which has nothing to which it can be referred.

[2] By these Apuleius probably meant Plautus; who has in Cistellar. ii. 1, "At ita me Dii, Deæque, Superi atque Inferi et Medioxumi."

[3—3] Compare Plato Rep. ii. p. 379, C., τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

[4—4] I do not remember where Plato has so expressed himself; nor where he has given the definitions alluded to.

[5] I have translated, as if the word were, not "susceptum," but "inceptum," required by the very balance of the sentence.

[6—6] Compare "præsidium et—decus," in Horace.

the members of the World, but has given birth, [1]for ages upon ages,[1] to the deities naturally mortal;[2] who are superior in wisdom to the rest of beings that live upon earth; and, after laying down laws, he delivered over to the other deities the disposition and guardianship of the other matters, which were necessary to be done daily. From whence so strenuously did the deities of the second providence keep their hold of the providence undertaken by them, that all things, [3]which are shown to mortals from heaven,[3] preserve the state of the father's arrangement unchanged. But the Dæmons, whom we might call Genii and Lares, (Plato) decides are the servants of the gods, and the protectors of man, and their interpreters,[4] should they wish for any thing from the gods. Nor does he think that all things are to be referred to the force of Fate; but that there is something in ourselves, and something too in Fortune. He confesses, however, that the unforeseen[5] accidents of Fortune are not known to us; for that something unsteady and running against us is wont to come between the affairs, which may have been undertaken with design and meditation, so that it does not permit, what has been thought upon, to come to an end. And when that impediment arrives advantageously, the circumstance is called Good Fortune; but Misfortune, when those hinderances are of a noxious kind.

[13.] Of all earthly things, nothing more excellent has Providence given than Man. Well therefore does the same (Plato) proclaim that [6]the Soul is the mistress of the body.[6] But since he asserts [7]that the parts of the Soul are three,[7] the reasoning power, which is the best portion of the mind, he

[1]—[1] Such is perhaps the best translation of "ad ævitatem temporis—" similar to the Ecclesiastical formula "per sæcula sæculorum."

[2] That some of the deities were begotten, or supposed to be so, is stated in Tim. p. 40, D. § 15. But I do not remember where they are said to be mortal.

[3]—[3] Oudendorp proposed to elicit from "quæ cœlestibus mortalibus exhibeantur," the reading in two MSS., "quæ cœlestes mortalibus exhibeant—" for "cœlitus," he says, is not found in Apuleius nor in preceding authors; only in succeeding, as Lactantius, Prudentius, and Ammianus.

[4] See the Banquet, p. 202, D. § 28.

[5] I have translated, as if the word were "improvisos," not "improvidos—" [6]—[6] In Tim. p. 34, C.

[7]—[7] In Rep. ix. p. 571, D. and 580, E. See Diogen. L. in the Life of Plato, § 90.

says has possession of [1]the citadel of the head;[1] but that the feeling of anger, which is distant from the reasoning power, is carried down to the domicile of the heart, and follows it, and [2]in place answers to wisdom;[2] and that lust and desire, the lowest portion of the mind, occupy the lowest seats of the belly, as if they were certain stews and hiding-places of jakes, the resorts of iniquity and luxury; and that this portion seems to have been removed at a greater distance from wisdom, lest, by an unseasonable vicinity, reason might, while consulting[3] for the safety of all, be disturbed in the usefulness of its reflections. (He says too) that the whole of man is in the head and face; for prudence and all the senses are contained in no other[4] part of the body but that; since the rest of the members act as handmaidens [5][and are subservient][5] to the head, (and) minister food and other things; while the crown (of the head) is placed on high, [6]as a lord and ruler, and by its providence to be delivered from dangers.[6] Moreover, that the organs, with which the senses are furnished for perceiving and judging of quantities and qualities, are placed in like

[1]—[1] On this expression, see Davies on Cicero, N. D. ii. 56, "in capite, tanquam in arce—"

[2]—[2] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "in loco respondere sapientiæ;" which Oudendorp attempts to defend and explain by asserting that by "in loco" is meant, where the subject and place require; forgetting that, if anger is "procul a ratione," it will not be in a situation "respondere sapientiæ." Hence I suspect that Apuleius wrote "et illico respondere insipientiæ," i. e. "and straightway answers to a want of wisdom." Hildebrand says that "in loco" is the same as "illico," and refers to Hand on Tursellin. Particul. T. iii. p. 207.

[3] I have adopted "ratio consultans," the conjecture of Oudendorp, in lieu of the unintelligible "et rationem consumptam—" for which Salmasius on Epictetus, p. 146, would read "rationem consulturam—" from whence Hildebrand has "ratio consultura—"

[4] I have, with Oudendorp, adopted "alia," as suggested by Colvius, in lieu of "alias," which means "otherwise," not "in another place."

[5]—[5] Of the words "et subservire," the latter is evidently an interpretation of "ancillari," while the former should follow "capiti."

[6]—[6] Such is the literal translation of the words "ut dominum atque rectorem, providentiaque ejus a periculis vindicari—" which I cannot understand, nor could Wower; who has suggested "ut dominum—— providentia ejus—vindicaret." Hildebrand has "vectare etiam sublimen positum dominum atque rectorem; providentia ejus a periculis vindicari—" i. e. "and that they carry their lord and ruler placed on high; (and) are delivered by his providence from perils:" where "vectare" or "vectari" is found in all the MSS.

manner near the palace of the head, within the view of reason, in order that the truth, of understanding (by the mind) and perceiving (by the body), may be assisted.

[14.] But the senses themselves, being fitly formed by nature, have a cognate intelligence as regards those things which are the objects of sense.

In the first place, the twin pupils of the eyes are very clear, and, shining with a certain light of vision, they possess the office of knowing light; while hearing, by partaking of the nature of air, has a perception of sounds, through messengers in the air; whereas the taste, being a sense more relaxed, is on that account suited to things rather moist and watery; but the touch, as being of the earth and corporeal, perceives things, that are rather solid, and which can be handled and struck against. Of those things likewise, which are changed, when corrupted [1]there is a separate perception.[1] For in the middle of the region of the face Nature has placed the nostrils, by [2]the double door-way[2] of which there passes an odour together with the breath; and that conversions and changes furnish the causes of smelling; and that they[3] are perceived from substances, when corrupted or burnt, or in a mucous[4] or moistened state; [5]when those substances are sought out, they are exhaled in vapour and smoke, the judgment and sense of a smell come upon them.[5] For if the substances are

[1]—[1] So Oudendorp from MSS. in lieu of "separanda vis intelligenda." But he does not show how "vis" could have crept in here, nor how "intelligentia" could be applied to a bodily, not mental, perception. The disorder probably lies somewhat deeper.

[2]—[2] In lieu of "symphonia" in some MSS., Vulcanius was the first to edit from others "bifori via—" a variation for which it would be difficult to account, except on the supposition that "symphonia" conceals some Greek word written in Latin letters, which Fulvius Ursinus and others conceive to have been "syphonibus—" referring to τοὺς ὀχετοὺς τῆς ῥινὸς in Tim. p. 78, C.

[3] As there is nothing to which "eas" can be referred, it is probable that Apuleius wrote "odoratus causas esse, odoresque—" not "odoratus causas dare, easque—"

[4] So Colvius, by reading "mucescentibus" instead of "mitescentibus," which the Delphin editor says might allude to ripe fruit; while Scaliger suggested "putrescentibus," answering to σηπομένων in Tim. p. 66, D.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "cum quidem ea quæruntur, vapore vel fumo exhalantur, odoris in his judicium sensusque succedunt—" from which one might perhaps elicit "cum quidem, quæ pereunt, putrem vapore vel fumo exhalante per aera odorem,

sound and the air pure, [1]they never vitiate the gales of that kind.

Now these very senses are common to us and the rest of animals. But by the divine blessing the skill of man in that way is better furnished and more advanced, since his hearing and sight are superior. For he measures with his eyes the heavens and the orbits of the stars, and the settings and risings of the constellations, and he understands their distances, together with [2]the signs they give;[2] from which has flowed [3]the most beautiful and plentiful fountain of philosophy.[3] And what could happen to man more magnificent than the sense of hearing? by which he learns simultaneously prudence and wisdom, and measures and makes the numbers and modes of speech and melody, and becomes himself entirely attuned and musical. To this has been added the tongue, and the outwork of the teeth and the beauty of a little mouth, which has been furnished to other animals indeed for supplying the necessities of living, and bringing to the belly its resources; but to man this has been given as the storehouse of right reasoning and of sweetest discourse, in order that, what forethought has conceived in the heart, speech might bring forward to be understood.

nasi iis judicium sensusque succedunt," i. e. "when the judgment and perception of the nose comes upon those substances, which are perishing, while vapour or smoke is exhaling the smell of rottenness through the air." Hildebrand has "cum quidem ea genuntur, vapore vel fumo exhalante; odori in his judicium sensusque succedunt—" conceiving that "genuntur" might be written for "gignuntur;" and "exhalante" taken intransitively, as "vestes exhalant" in Statius, Theb. x. 108.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal and unintelligible meaning of "nunquam ejusmodi auras inficiunt—" But as nothing has been said of gales of any kind, it is evident there is some error here, which may be corrected by reading "nunquam ejusmodi odores nares afficiunt," i. e. "never do smells of this kind affect the nostrils." Opportunely then do some MSS. read "aures—"

[2]—[2] Such seems to be the meaning of "significatibus—" in which word there is an allusion to the signs of the seasons and of the weather given by different constellations at their rising and setting.

[3]—[3] By this Apuleius probably meant Astronomy; which is called "holy" in Pseudo-Tim. Locr. p. 96, E. § 4. Compare likewise Tim. p. 47, B., *ἐξ ὧν ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος* (read *γάνος*, similar to "fons" in Apuleius) *Οὔ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν [οὔτ'] ἦλθεν οὔθ' ἥξει ποτε [τῷ] Θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν, λέγω [δή] Τοῦτ' ὀμμάτων μέγιστον ἀγαθόν*— where, by omitting the words placed between brackets, we can recover a dramatic fragment, spoken either by Teiresias, or Phineus, or Œdipus.

[15.] Moreover the bearing of the whole body and the form of the limbs are under one condition the best, (but) under another, worse. The inferior are ruled by the superiority of the chiefs, and they perform the ministering suited for living. [1]Finally, the feet as far as the shoulders obey the head.[1] But the hedge of the eyebrows[2] protects the eyes, lest any thing should rush down from above, to disturb vision, which is tender and soft.

The Lungs by their place and affinity look very much to the welfare of the heart; (for) when it burns with anger and is palpitating[3] with rather quick movements, the top of the heart itself, wet with blood, is received by the softness and thirst[4] and cold of the lungs.

But the Spleen is near, and not vainly so, to the Liver, that it may relieve its redundance, by sharing in its absorptions, [5]and by cleansing what is filthy render the liver pure and clear;[5] which is very advantageous to its fibres.

(He says too) that the belly is furnished with the folds of the intestines; but that there is an impediment by ligatures, so that what is eaten and drank may not pass through [6]the place of sitting quickly,[6] but, by being retained for a little

[1—1] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "Pedes denique humerorum tenus capiti obediunt—" by which the Delphin editor understands "Denique a pedibus usque ad humeros omnia membra parent capiti—" He therefore fancied perhaps that "et omnia membra" had dropt out after "denique—"

[2] One would have expected rather "palpebrarum—" for it is the eyelashes, not eyebrows, that protect the eyes; Plato has therefore correctly in Tim. p. 45, D., *σωτηρίαν—τῆς ὄψεως ἐμηχανήσαντο τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν.*

[3] I have adopted "trepidat," suggested by Lipsius, in lieu of "trepidans—"

[4] I confess I do not understand what is meant by "siti—" The Delphin editor explains it by "sicciate—" But such is not the meaning of "sitis." Wower refers the thirst of the lungs to their porosity. But what connexion there is between these two ideas, I must leave for others to discover. By comparing however Tim. p. 70, C., where the lungs are said to be bloodless and porous and refrigerating, I suspect something has been lost here, of which "situ" in one MS., and "siti" in others, is the remnant.

[5—5] Compare Tim. p. 72, C.

[6—6] I have translated, as if the words were, not "sese penetrarent," which I cannot understand, but "sessum penetrarent—" remembering the expression in Tim. p. 73, A., *τὴν—κοιλίαν ὑποδοχὴν ἔθεσαν, εἱλιξαν τε πέριξ τὴν τῶν ἐντέρων γένεσιν, ὅπως μὴ ταχὺ διεκπερῶσα ἡ τροφὴ πάλιν τοσοῦς ἑτέρας δεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα ἐπαναγκάζοι.*

time, they may show their utility to animals by their approach; and that the necessity of desiring food may not be impending at every moment through those things being exhausted and passing off, which had been introduced; and that there may not be a need for us to be occupied night and day for this purpose alone.

[16.] (Moreover) the bones are covered with flesh,[1] and the same are bound to nerves; yet nevertheless the members, which are the intermediate messengers of feeling, are hidden by flesh,[2] in order that the sensations may not be blunted by the thickness (of the flesh).[3] Those, too, that are connected by joinings and couplings for a rapidity in moving[4] themselves easily, are not impeded by much flesh.[5]

Lastly, look at the top of the head itself, and you will see it covered with a thin skin, and shaggy with hair, (a protection) against the violence of cold and heat. But those parts are plump, [6]which labour wears down, as, for instance, the buttocks themselves, where is the region of sitting.[6]

What shall I say of the food? [7]which the roads, that emanate from the womb,[7] and are joined to the fibres of the liver, disperse, after being turned into the form of blood, so that Nature may skilfully cause it to [8]flow, like a river,[8] from that place through all the joints.

But from the region of the heart the meanderings of the veins take their rise, transferring through the coils of the lungs the liveliness, which they had received from the heart;

[1, 2, 5] Although "entrails" is elsewhere the meaning of "viscera," yet in all the three passages the Delphin editor, led by what the sense requires, explains the word by "carnibus—" whom I have followed.

[3] The words between the lunes are added for the sake of perspicuity.

[4] Hildebrand has "ad celeritatem, facilius se movendo—" and takes "movendo" as a dative "for moving—"

[6—6] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words "quas labor subigit, ut femina ipsa, qua sessitandi regio est—" which it is evident Apuleius could not have written; for the parts, which labour wears down, would not be those, which, while a person is sitting, are worn down the least. What, however, he did write, might be recovered without much difficulty; but the subject must be passed by, "ne quid habeat injucunditatis oratio," as Cicero says on a similar occasion, in N. D. ii. 15.

[7—7] Here again a literal version plainly proves the existence of some error in the text.

[8—8] I have translated, as if the text were "fluere, rivi instar," not "derivari—"

and being again distributed from that place through [1] the whole limbs they assist the whole man [1] by his breathing. From hence the alternations in breathing are drawn and given back in turn, in order that they may not be impeded by their mutual meetings.

The qualities (too) of the veins are various, which it is well known flow for the purpose of procreation from the region of the neck through the marrow of the loins, and are received into the place of the male organ; and again, that [2] Venus excites the productive receptacle of seed, so that his power departs from a man.[2]

[17.] But when he says that the substances of the whole body are various, he means that the first seem to consist of fire and water, and the other elements; the second, of similar particles of the intestines,[3] small bones, blood, and the rest (of substances); the third, of members discordant and various, that is, of head, belly, and unequal joints. From whence the substance, which consists of simple elements, [4] if that, which by the necessity of living is asked for, in what manner it agrees even with the genus of each,[4] guards the quality and temperature of the body; and increases the strength for those particles, which (consist of) the like, and of those, which we have said above are unlike to each other, it nourishes the beauty; and at the same time that equality of dry, moist, hot, and cold, gives health, strength, and form; just as an intemperate and immoderate permixture, while particles are individually and universally corrupted, destroys a living being with a rapid dissolution.

[18.] The same (philosopher) says that the soul is tripartite; (for) that one part is rationable, another hot (with anger) or irritable, the third we may call a longing, and (give to) the

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the text were "per membra tota omnem hominem juvant—" not "per membra totum hominem juvant—"

[2]—[2] The present text is "rursum venarum genitale seminium humanitatis exire—" which nobody has been able to understand. I have translated, as if it were originally "rursum Venerem genitale seminium, homine ut abeat vis, excire—" where "excire" is due to Colvius. Hildebrand conceives the error to lie in "rursum," for which he would read "cursu—"

[3] Here, as before, the Delphin editor interprets "viscerum" by "carnium—"

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of words, which I confess I cannot understand.

same (feeling the name of) lustfulness; but that healthiness, and strength, and beauty, are then present to a being with soul, when reason rules it wholly, and passion and pleasure, two inferior parts, are obedient to reason, and, agreeing amongst themselves, long for nothing and make no stir, that reason deems to be useless. Now when the parts of the soul are regulated to an equability of that kind, the body is broken down by no disturbance; otherwise it introduces a sickness, and unhealthiness, and foulness, when the parts are, with respect to each other, not well put together and unequal, as when desire subdues anger and good counsel, and brings them into subjection with itself; or when anger, more hot than usual, overcomes reason, the mistress and queen, while desire is obsequious and appeased. But [1]the sickness of the mind, he says, is a folly, and he divides it into two parts. One of these he calls unskilfulness; the other, madness;[1] and (he says) that the disease of unskilfulness takes place from a vainglorious boasting, when a person falsely lays claim to the learning and knowledge of those things, of which he is ignorant; but that madness is wont to arise from very depraved habits and a lustful life; and that this madness, which a vicious quality of body produces, is called so, when those things, which are prepared by reason in the top (of the head), become contracted by inopportune straits; but that a [2]man is then perfect when soul and body are united together,[2] and agree with, and respond to, each other, so that the firmness of mind be not inferior to the very strong powers of the body. The body however is increased then by natural increments when the portion of good health, being attended to [3]with skilful art,[3] knows not to exceed the measure of necessary living; and when health is not worn down by the greatness of external labours, nor by the weight of food introduced too immoderately, or not digested and distributed through the body as it should be. For then the joints and limbs retain the measure and force of due vigour, when that, which is introduced for the preservation of the whole body, is distributed to all the parts, as it were in equal proportions for each; but when that takes place in the least degree, then ensues the destruction of the body.

[1]—[1] Compare Tim. p. 86, B. [2]—[2] Compare Tim. p. 88, B.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "solerti arte—" not "salubriter," which could hardly be united to "procurata."

BOOK II.

ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

[1.] The head[1] of Moral Philosophy is, son[2] Faustinus, that you may know, by what means it is possible to arrive at a happy life. But previous to the other matters, which [3]are known to appertain[3] to happiness, which is the end[4] of good things, I will show what Plato thinks upon this point.

Of good things then he thought that some were pre-eminently so, and in themselves the first; but the rest he conceived were good through a participation.[5] The first good things are God, the highest, and that mind, which he calls Νοῦς; secondly, the things, which flow from the fountain of the first,[6] are the virtues of the mind, (namely,) Prudence, Justice, Modesty,[7] (and) Fortitude, but that amongst all these Prudence is the superior; but as the second in number and power he laid down Continence; to these succeeds Justice; (while) Fortitude is the fourth.

[1] I have written "head" in the sense in which Shakspeare uses that word in Othello, "The very head and front of my offending."

[2] It has been thought that Faustinus was not a son, but a disciple of Apuleius.

[3—3] I have translated, as if, instead of "contingerent," found in one MS., the reading were originally "contingere nota—" similar to "notum properare" in Horace, according to the correction of Bentley; while (4) in lieu of "fine," I have adopted "finem," the emendation of Bosscha, who understood by that word what Cicero does in his treatise "De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum." Hildebrand, unable to find a better reading, retains the one in MS. Flor., "bonorum finem contingere—"

[5] In lieu of "per perceptionem," in one MS., and per receptionem" in another, I have translated, as if the text were "per participationem," which it is strange that Floridus did not suggest, who aptly refers to the expression *κατὰ μίθεξιν* in Alcinous, § 27.

[6] Instead of "priorum," one would have expected "primorum," as understood by the Delphin editor.

[7] What Apuleius call here "Pudicitiam," and just afterwards "Continentiam," is in Greek *σωφροσύνη*, commonly rendered "Temperance;" and the four are called the Cardinal Virtues. With regard to the order of the words, Oudendorp observes that "Pudicitiam" should precede "Justitiam," as shown by the following enumeration. But Plato, in Legg. i. p. 630, B. § 5, has *δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις*.

In good things likewise he made this distinction;[1] that some are of God [2]and in themselves the first,[2] and are called simple goods; others are of man; nor are the same good things thought to be so by all; on which account the virtues of the mind are of God and simple; but those of man, which are goods in the opinion of some, are such as agree with the conveniences of the body, and are what we call external; which to the wise[3] and those, who live rationally and moderately, are really good, but must needs be evils to the unwise and to those who are ignorant of their use.

[2.] The first good is the true, and divine, and best, and worthy to be loved and desired; and for the beauty of which the minds, that are under the influence of reason, have a longing, under the guidance of Nature, and are by the same power lit up to an ardent love for it. But as not all are able to obtain it, nor can possess the faculty of acquiring the first good, they are carried on to that, which is of man. The second good is not common to many, nor is it in a similar manner a good to all. For the longing after, and the desire to do any thing is excited either by a true good, or by what seems to be a good; from whence under the guidance of Nature there is a certain affinity between good things and that portion of the soul, which agrees with reason. But he considers that to be a good by accident, which is united to the body and to things that come from without, and that he, who is imbued by Nature to follow what is good, thinks he has been [4]born not only for himself,[4] but for all men likewise; and that each one has been conceived[5] not [6]in an equal or similar manner,[6] but for the state; and next for those nearest to him; and then for the rest, who are united to him by familiarity or acquaintance.

[3.] That a man is (he says too) born, neither absolutely good

[1] In the Laws, i. p. 631, B. § 6.

[2—2] I have translated, as if the text were not "per se et prima," but "et per se prima," similar to "prima per se" a little before.

[3] Compare the Laws, ii. p. 662, B. § 7.

[4—4] So the editors have adopted Casaubon's "sibimet ipsi natum," elicited from "sibimet intimatum," and supported by Plato, Epist. 9, p. 358, A., and Cicero.

[5] Wower reads "conceptum" in lieu of "acceptum," from which, however, Hildebrand would elicit "assertum," and "civitati" from "etiam," not, as Oudendorp suggested, "communi—"

[6—6] I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals.

from his stock, nor bad, but that his disposition inclines to both; that he has indeed some seeds of both, which are united to the origin of his birth, but which, by the discipline of education, ought to burst out into another[1] part; and that the instructors of boys ought to have no greater care than to thoroughly imbue them with morals and instructions, so that they may wish to become lovers of virtues, and learn to rule and be ruled by Justice as their mistress. On which account the boys ought to be brought to this point,[2] beside all the rest, that they may know that the things which are to be followed and avoided, are honourable and dishonourable; that to the former belong [3]pleasure and praise; to the latter disgrace and baseness;[3] (and) that we ought with confidence to wish for the honourable things which are good.

Of dispositions three kinds are classed by him; of which he calls one the superior and pre-eminent; another, the most foul and the worst; the third, which is tempered moderately from both, he calls a mean. In this mean he desires to be partakers the docile boy and the man, who is making a progress to moderation, and who is [4]mild in his manner[4] and elegant; since he asserted that a mean of the same kind, (called) a third something, occurs in the case of virtues and vices; through which some acts are to be praised and others blamed. [5](Thus) between knowledge, (of one kind) firm, of another false, there is an obstinacy (of mind) united to a vanity;[5]

[1] Here again I am at a loss about the meaning of "alteram—" The train of thought requires rather "melioratam," or "præstantiorem—"

[2] I have translated, as if the text were "præter cætera—ad hoc," not "hos," which I cannot understand. Hildebrand too has "ad hoc—"

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the text of Oudendorp. But the balance of the sentences evidently requires not "illa voluptatis ac laudis, hæc vero dedecoris ac turpitudinis," but something like "illa veræ voluptatis ac laudis; hæc dedecoris ac ægritudinis;" for thus "veræ voluptatis" would be balanced by "ægritudinis—" and "the pleasure" arising from honourable acts be properly called "true," as being mentally opposed to the not-true pleasure of acts not honourable. Hildebrand conceives the whole passage to be so corrupt, as to defy correction, except by the aid of better MSS.

[4—4] I have adopted "comem modo," which Colvius elicited from "commodum—"

[5—5] The common text is "Inter scientiam validam, alteram falsam, pervicaciæ vanitate jactatam; inter—" where, although all the editors have seen that something was wanting, not one has remarked that the idea of a stubborn thing is at variance with that of a thing tost about by

between [1]a chaste and a lustful life he interposed abstinence and intemperance;[1] (and) has made [2]shame and sluggishness[2] as the means between fortitude and fear. Since of those persons, whom he wished to appear moderate, neither the virtues were sincere, nor the vices sheer and untempered, but mixed up on this side and on that.

[4.] But the wickedness of a person stained with all vices he said was the worst; which, he asserted, took place, when that portion, which is the best and rationable, and ought to rule the rest, was the slave of others; (and) when those leaders into vices, namely, anger and lust, are the lords, while reason is sent under the yoke. From things likewise quite different, (such as) abundance and want,[3] is wickedness made up. Nor by the fault of an inequality alone does he consider that wickedness goes halting, but that [4]it falls upon a dissimilitude;[4] for it could not agree with goodness, since it differs in so many ways from itself; and carries before it not an inequality, but an incongruity. On which account he says that the three portions of the soul are pressed by three vices. (Thus) against prudence fights indocility, which not only introduces the destruction of science, but is adverse to the discipline of learning. Of this indocility we

vanity. I have therefore translated, as if Apuleius had written "Ita inter scientiam validam alteram, alteram falsam, pervicaciam esse vanitate junctam mentis; inter—" For thus one "alteram" might have been easily lost before another; and "junctam mentis inter" corrupted into "jactatam inter—" Hildebrand, objecting to "validam," would read "ruditum" in the sense of "ruditatem;" and conceives that "alteram" is a corruption of some word, that had the meaning of "collocavit—"

[1]—[1] How "abstinence" and "intemperance" can be a mean between "chastity" and "lustfulness," I cannot understand. Opportunely then do some MSS. read "abstinentiam et temperantiam;" for from both united it is easy to elicit "abstinentis mediam temperantiam," i. e. "the temperance of a person abstaining, as a mean."

[2]—[2] Here again two terms could not be interposed, as the means between two extremes. Besides, as "pudorem" and "pudicitiam" just before are nearly synonymous, the former word could scarcely be found here united to "ignaviam." Hence Apuleius probably wrote "mediam ignaviam fecit."

[3] Compare Rep. iv. p. 422, A. § 2.

[4]—[4] In these words, says Oudendorp, "Latet quid." I confess I do not understand them; nor could Hildebrand, who calls them "obscura."

have received from him two kinds, (one)[1] unskilfulness and stupidity—of which it is found that unskilfulness is a foe to wisdom, (but) stupidity to prudence; (another)[2] anger [3](and) boldness.[3] [4]Its companionship indignation follows,[4] and unmovableness, called in Greek [5]ἀοργησία νοῦ τις,[5] for so I would say, which not only extinguishes the excitements of anger, but fixes them down by a stupor not to be moved. To the feelings of desire he applies luxuriousness, that is, a longing after pleasures, and insatiable draughts of things desired,[6] [7]for enjoyment and possession.[7] From this luxuriousness there flows avarice and wantonness; of which the former puts a restraint upon liberality; the latter, [8]by living too immoderately, squanders the means of a patrimony.[8]

[5.] But of a mind the best,[9] says Plato, virtue is the bearing, that presents a noble figure; and which makes the person, on whom it is faithfully impressed, to be in accordance with himself, and tranquil and consistent, not in words alone, but in deeds likewise, agreeing with himself and the rest (of mankind). And this is the more likely, should Reason, seated on

[1, 2] I have translated, as if "unam" had dropt out before "imperitiam," and (?) "alteram" between "inimicæ" and "iracundiam."

[3—3] I have adopted "audaciam" found in some MSS., and inserted "et—" for thus "iracundia et audacia" would properly form the second kind, just as "imperitia" and "fatuitas" form the first.

[4—4] As Apuleius is not talking of certain things, which follow others, but those, that are opposed to others, it is evident that he did not write "ejus comitatur sequuntur indignatio—" But what he did write it is not so easy to discover. And hence, says Oudendorp, "perhaps something is wanting here."

[5—5] From the letters ΔΟΡΤΗCΙΑΝΟΥΙC Floridus, by the aid of Sciopius, elicited ΑΟΡΓΗCΙΑΝΟΥ— to which I have added TIC— The word however has not been found in Plato; although it is in Aristotle, Ethic. ii. 7, and in Plutarch.

[6] I have translated, as if the text were "desideratorum," not "desideriorum—"

[7—7] One would have expected "ad potiendum fruendumque," as translated, rather than "ad fruendum potiendumque—" at least, if "potiendum" means "possession," as it must mean, to prevent an otherwise needless tautology.

[8—8] The text at present is "fundendo patrimonia prodigit facultates." I have adopted "vivendo," suggested by Colvius, and "patrimonii," found in one MS.

[9] I have adopted "optimæ" from some MSS., and rejected "et" after "optimæ" with a solitary one.

the throne of its kingdom, hold the appetites and passions ever in subjection and under the rein; and they so obey it, as to do their ministering tranquilly. (He says), however, that virtue is of one form, because that, which is good by its own nature, has no need of assistance; but, that it may be perfect, it ought to be content with solitude. [2]Nor is quality alone united to the natural disposition of virtue, but similitude likewise;[2] for so does it agree with itself on every side, that it is fitted from itself and answers to itself. Hence he speaks of virtues as means, and the same too as extremes, not only because (the former)[3] are from redundance and want, but because they are placed in the middle-ground of virtues. For example, Fortitude is surrounded on this side by Boldness, on that by Timidity. Now Boldness comes from the abundance of confidence, but Fear from the fault of a deficient Boldness. * * *

[6.] Of Virtues, some are perfect, others imperfect. Now those are imperfect, which by the kindness of Nature alone come forth in all, or are furnished by discipline alone, or are taught by Reason, as a mistress. Those therefore, that are made up of all,[4] we say are perfect. He denies, (however,) [5]that imperfect virtues accompany themselves;[5] but those, which are perfect, he conceives on that account especially to be inseparable and united to each other, because for the person, who has an uncommon natural disposition, if there be added industry, practice, and the discipline which Reason, the ruler of affairs, has laid down, there will be left nothing, that virtue cannot furnish.

[1] I have translated, as if the text were "ipsique ea ita obediunt—" not "ipsique ita obediunt—" for thus "ea," that is to be referred to "appetitus et iracundiæ," would be the subject to "obediunt—" which is at present without one.

[2—2] The words between the numerals I confess I do not understand.

[3] I have introduced this expression for the sake of perspicuity. But there is still something wanting to show how the means of virtues are the same as extremes. And hence I have marked a supposed omission by asterisks.

[4] It is not easy to understand to what "all" is to be referred, unless it be the combination of the gifts of Nature with what is furnished by discipline and taught by Reason. Hence one would prefer "omnibus his," found in some editions.

[5—5] Here too I am at a loss to understand how imperfect virtues can be said to accompany, or not, themselves.

He divides all the virtues amongst the parts of the soul; and he calls that virtue, which relies upon Reason, and is the spectator and judge of all matters, Prudence, and Wisdom; of which he wishes for Wisdom to appear as the instruction of things divine and human; but Prudence as the knowledge of understanding good and evil things, and those which are between the two. In that part then, which is considered as given rather to anger, is the seat of Fortitude and the strength of the soul, and the nerves, required for fulfilling those things, which are imposed upon us rather hardly by the rule of laws to be done. The third part of the mind belongs to desires and regrets; of which Abstinence is necessarily the companion; whom he wishes to be the preserver of an agreement in those things, that are naturally right and wrong in man. [1]By this is lustfulness turned to mildness and moderation;[1] and by the method and modesty of this, voluptuary doings, he says, are restrained.

[7.] Through these three parts of the soul (he places)[2] a fourth Virtue, namely, Justice, as dividing itself equally; and the cause of it, he says, is knowledge, in order that each [3]portion may be obedient both[3] to reason and moderation in performing its duty. This the demi-god[4] at one time calls Justice; at another he includes it in the appellation of virtue in general, and addresses it likewise by the name of Faithfulness;[5] [6]but when it is useful to the person, by whom it is possessed, it is benevolence;[6] but when it looks abroad, and is the trustworthy spectator of utility to another, it has the name of Justice. There is too that Justice, which obtains the fourth place in the ordinary division of virtues,

[1—1] I have translated, as if the text were "Ad placiditatem ab hac et mediocritatem—" not "Ad placentiam ac (MSS. 2, ad) mediocritatem—" where I cannot understand "placentiam;" while "ab hac" is confirmed by "ratione hujus" in the very next sentence.

[2] I have translated, as if "sistit" had dropt out between "se" and "scientiam—"

[3—3] From "potiore" in MSS. I have elicited "portio et—"

[4] So I have translated "heros;" for such the "hero" of antiquity was deemed to be.

[5] Apuleius alludes to the Laws, i. p. 630, D. § 5, as remarked by Boeckh. Compare likewise Rep. i. p. 331, D., where Justice is defined to be the saying what is true, and the restoring what a person has received; which is Faithfulness.

[6—6] The words between the numerals I confess I cannot understand.

which is coupled with Religiousness, that is, (in Greek,) ὁσιότης; of which (the latter), Religiousness, is a slave devoted to the honour of the gods, and to the supplications in a divine rite; while the former (Justice) is the remedy and medicine [1]of human society and concord.[1] Now for two equal reasons Justice rules over human utility; of which the first is the observance of equality[2] in numbers and divisions, and in those matters, which have been bargained for [3]according to a contract;[3] add to this, that it is the guardian of weights and measures, and of the common distribution[4] of public property; the second (reason) is that[5] relating to boundaries,[5] and is a sharing, proceeding from equity, so that a becoming ownership in lands may be assigned to each person, and the better (portion)[6] be preserved for the good, but the worse for the bad. Add to this, let every one, who is by nature and industry the best, be preferred for honours and offices; (but) let the worst be in want of the light[7] of dignity. Now in assigning and preserving honour that is the just measure on the part of him, who is the aider of the good, and the overthrower of the bad, that those things may ever be pre-eminent in the state, which are about to be of service to all; (but) that vices, together with their authors, may lie low and be trodden down; [8.] which result will be the more

[1—1] As a remedy and medicine would not be required for a healthy state of society, it is evident that the author wrote "hominum societatis discordiæ remedium," i. e. "a remedy for discord in human society."

[2] I have translated, as if the text were, not "æqualitas," but "æqualitatis," dependent on "observantia—"

[3—3] I have translated, as if "ad" had dropt out before "symbolum;" for otherwise one can discover neither syntax nor sense in "eorum, quæ pacta sunt, symbolum."

[4] The text is at present "communicatio—" But if that word had been meant to apply to justice, it would have been "communicatrix," to answer to "custos." Hence I have translated, as if the author wrote "communicationis," dependent on "custos—"

[5—5] So the Delphin editor understands "finalis—"

[6] By the conjecture of Oudendorp, "optio potior," I have been led to "portio potior—" what I have translated. Others perhaps would elicit "opima portio," from "optimis potior" in MSS. But "optimis" here is evidently a corrupt var. lect. for "bonus" in the next sentence; where the antithetical "pessimi" points to "optimus quisque" in lieu of "bonus quisque—" So too Hildebrand suggests "optima portio," or "optima optio—"

[7] Instead of "luce" one would prefer "loco—"

easily obtained, if we are supplied with two examples, one, of a person divine, tranquil, and happy; another, of a person irreligious, inhuman, and deservedly detestable,[1] so that he, who is a stranger to, and averse from, a correct manner of living, would wish his faculties to be more like to those of the worst man, (but)[2] the good person (his)[3] to those of the divine and heavenly man.

Hence there are with him two portions of the Oratorical art; one of which is the discipline, that contemplates what is good, (and is) tenacious of what is just, (and) fitted to, and agreeing with, the sect of that (philosopher), who wishes to appear a statesman; but the other is the science of flattering,[4] the catcher at what is like the truth, (and) an experience brought together without any reason—for so we express ἄλογον τριβὴν[5] (irrational exercise)—which wishes that to be received by persuasion, which it is unable to teach. Now this Plato has defined as [6]δύναμιν τοῦ πείθειν ἄνευ τοῦ διδάσκειν[6] (a power to persuade without teaching); (and) to which he has given the name of [7]the shadow, that is, the image,[7] of a portion of the Statesman's art. But Statesmanship, which he calls πολιτικὴν, he wished to be so understood by us, that we should consider it in the number of virtues; and that not only the person, who is acting and [8](occupied) in the very administration of affairs, should be viewed by it, (but)[8] that things universally should be discerned by it; and that not only forethought is profitable to state affairs, but that all the Statesman's feelings and design should be to render the situation of the state fortunate and happy.

[1] I have translated, as if the text were "detestabilis," not "intestabilis—" which means literally "unable to be a witness—" an idea ill-suited to the train of thought.

[2, 3] I have translated, as if "sed" had dropt out between "suas" and "divino," and "suas" between "bonus" and "similiores—"

[4] See Gorg. p. 466, A.

[5] In Gorg. p. 501, A.

[6—6] This is the splendid restoration of some unknown scholar, who referred to Gorg. p. 455, A., ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα—πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς.

[7—7] Apuleius has thus expressed by two words, what Plato has by one—εἴδωλον, in Gorg. p. 463, D.

[8—8] I have translated, as if "versatum," to which "verum" for "rerum," in some MSS. leads, had dropt out after "rerum" and "verum" before "universa—" and as if "atque,' omitted in some MSS., were a corruption of "æque—"

[9.] Now this same (Statesman's) art has a care for the usefulness of the soul by two methods. One[1] relates to law-giving,[2] the other[1] to law-courts.[2] The former is similar to the exercise, by which is acquired the beauty and strength of the soul, just as by exercise the health and beauty of the body is preserved: but that relating to law-courts is on a par with medicine; for it cures the diseases of the soul, as medicine does those of the body. These he calls disciplines, and professes that an attention to them brings a very great advantage; while their imitators are the arts of cookery and perfumery; but that the sophist's art, and the bland profession of the law, and the allurements of flattery, are disgraceful to those, who profess them, useless to all; of which arts he unites that of the sophist to that of the cook. For as the art of the cook sometimes catches the (good) opinion of the imprudent by its professing medical science, as if the things, which it is doing, are suited to the cure of disorders; so the art of the sophist, by imitating the manner of law-courts, furnishes to fools a (good) opinion, as if that art were attending to justice, which it is clear is favouring iniquity; whereas the professors[3] of law imitate the art of the perfumer; for while this wishes to be the remedy, through which beauty and health are preserved in bodies, it not only diminishes the usefulness of the body, but breaks down its strength and powers, and changes the true colour of the blood to slothfulness;[4] so that, by imitating the

[1, 1] How the feminine "altera" can be thus introduced with reference to the masculine "duobus modis," I confess I cannot understand. Perhaps Apuleius wrote "duabus methodis—" in allusion to the words of Plato, *Δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας*, in Gorg. p. 464, B. § 44.

[2, 2] So I have translated "legalis" and "juridicialis," remembering the expression just afterwards in Gorg., *τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαστικήν*. See too the learned on Phædr. p. 261, D. § 97, and on Quintilian, ii. 21.

[3] Oudendorp, objecting to this introduction of persons, where arts had been mentioned previously, and finding that MSS. offer "professiones," proposes to read "professio noxia" or "nociva juris imitatur;" while Bosscha suggests "professio inanis—" But the whole train of thought would require the rejection of an epithet here, even if it were found in every MS.

[4] Oudendorp attempts to explain "desidiam" by "torporem sanguinis, quo palleat homo—" but in my opinion very unsuccessfully. For "desidia" never has nor could have such a meaning. Opportunely then

science of law, pretends indeed to be able to increase virtue in souls, whereas it weakens whatever there is in them of natural industry.

He thinks (moreover) that those virtues can be taught and studied, which appertain to a rationable soul, that is to say, Wisdom and Prudence; and that those, which in the place of a remedy offer a resistance to the portions (of the soul),[1] that are corrupt, namely, Fortitude and Continence, are rationable. Now the Virtues before mentioned are held to be in the place of discipline; the rest, if they are perfect, he calls virtues; (but) if only half-perfect,[2] he conceives they ought not indeed to be called disciplines, nor yet does he consider them to be entirely strangers to discipline. But Justice, in that [3]it is scattered amongst three parts of the soul,[3] he imagines to be the art of living and a discipline; and that is at one time teachable, and at another proceeds from use and experience.

[10.] Of good things some he [4]asserts are to be sought for the sake of themselves, as for example, happiness, and a pleasure that is good; others, for not their own sake, as medicine; others, for the sake both of themselves and something else, as forethought, and the rest of virtues, which we seek after, both for their own sake, as being in themselves excellent and honourable; and for the sake of something else, that is to say, of happiness, which is the fruit of virtue the most to be wished for.[4] On this ground some bad things are to be avoided for the sake of themselves; others, for the sake of other things; (but) the majority, (for the sake) of themselves and of other things, as for example, folly, and vices of that kind, which are to be avoided both for the sake of themselves, and (for the sake) of those things, namely, misery and unhappiness, which may arise from them.

Of those things, which are to be sought after, some we say are absolutely good, those, (to wit,) which, when they are present always and to all, bring with them advantages, as for example, the virtues, of which happiness is the fruit: others

does one MS. offer "desideriam;" where probably lies hid "desidiæ luridum—" or something like it.

[1] The Delphin editor supplies correctly "animæ—"

[2] These have been called in. i. § 6, imperfect, and are such as proceed from the gift of Nature.

[3—3] See ii. § 7.

[4—4] On the three kinds of good things see Rep. ii. p. 357, § 1.

are a good to some persons, and not to all nor always, as for instance, strength, health, wealth, and whatever relate to the body and (depend on) fortune. In like manner, of those things too, which are to be declined, some appear always and to all to be evils, when they are a hurt or an obstacle, as for instance, vices and misfortunes; some are a hurt, and that too not always, to some,[1] as for instance, sickness, want, and [2]other things of a similar kind.[2]

[11.] But that virtue is at liberty, and placed in ourselves, and is to be sought for with willingness; but that sins, although not less at liberty, and placed in ourselves, are not to be entered upon with willingness. For the beholder of virtue, when he shall have understood that it is thoroughly good and excels in kindness, [3]will make for himself a road to it,[3] and will think it ought to be pursued for its own sake; in like manner how can he, who shall have perceived that vices not only bring disgrace upon reputation, but do a hurt in another manner, and are guilty of a fraud, be able to unite himself of his own accord to their fellowship? But if he proceeds to evil things of that kind, and believes that the use of them is advantageous to himself, through his being deceived by an error, and tempted by some[4] image of good, he is, [5]while ignorant of the truth,[5] thrown headlong into ills. For you would vary from common opinion, when you are indeed not ignorant, what difference there is between poverty and wealth, and, when these matters are placed easy to know, (namely,) that neither poverty brings honour, nor wealth baseness, you should prefer the want of things necessary for living to the abundance of means; (and)[6] you would seem to

[1] From the Delphin editor's interpretation, "aliqua quibusdam—" which is the sense required by the train of ideas, it would seem that he wished to read "quædam nonnullis" instead of quædam aliis—" for thus "nonnullis" would be properly opposed to "omnibus."

[2—2] As some MSS. read "cætera," and others "similia," I have united the two.

[3—3] I have adopted the reading suggested by Oudendorp, "ad eam affectabit viam."

[4] I have translated, as if the text were "imagine—quadam—" not "imagine—quidem—"

[5] Floridus was the first to object to "sciens vero—" but he did not see that Apuleius wrote "nesciens veri—"

[6] I have inserted the copulative conjunction required to unite "discrepes" and "videaris—"

be silly, and [1]to pursue a conduct still more absurd than does the person,[1] who despises the health of the body by choosing in preference disease.

[12.] But that is an act of extreme madness, when he, who shall have beheld with the eyes of the soul the beauty of virtue, and shall have discovered by use and reason its utility, shall still, while not ignorant how much of disgrace and disadvantage he shall obtain from a participation in vices, be willing to give himself up to them. (He says too) that the health of the body, (and) strength, and freedom from pain, and other things of that kind, are extraneous, and that wealth likewise, and the rest of things, which we consider the advantages of fortune, are not to be called simply good. For if any one, who possesses them, withdraws himself from their use, they will be useless to him; and if any converts their use to wicked purposes, they will be seen to be even hurtful to him. But if any one abuses them, he will be exposed to vices; [2]while he, who possesses them, is unable to hold them, when he is dead.[2] From hence it is inferred that these ought not to be called simply good things; nor ought those, which [3]sow diseases or poverty,[3] and other things, to be considered evils. For he, whose property is small, and who is moderate in his expenses, will perceive no mischief (coming) from it; while he, who makes a right use of his poverty, will not only find no disadvantage, but, on the contrary, will become superior in enduring [4]the rest of evils with a better

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the text were, "et adhuc illo id absurdius sequi," where "sequi" is found in all the MSS.

[2]—[2] Since all the words between the numerals are omitted in nearly all the MSS., they have been thought by the generality of editors to be an interpolation, formed out of an explanatory gloss. Hildebrand however has given from his own conjecture, "haberi hæc etiam oberit—" i. e. "it will be a hurt to him for them to be possessed."

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the text were "quæ serunt morbos au pauperiem—" not "quæ sunt morbosa, ut pauperiem—" Hildebrand gives up the passage in despair, except that he would read "contraria" for "ea—"

[4]—[4] Since Oudendorp and Hildebrand confess that they cannot see their way out of the difficulties of the reading found in MSS., "cetera melioratum præstantior—" I have translated, as if the author had written "cætera mala meliore ratione præstantior—" for thus "mala," which is absolutely requisite here, might easily have dropt out before "meliore," and "meliore ratione" be corrupted into "melioratum."

method.[4] If then [1]it is not contrary either to have poverty or to rule over it by reason,[1] poverty is not by itself an evil.

Pleasure, moreover, (he says,) is neither absolutely a good, nor simply an evil; nor is that to be fled from, which is honourable, and proceeds not from things to be ashamed of, but from glorious doings; but that, which Nature herself spurns, and is sought after with disgraceful delight, he considers ought to be avoided.

Anxiety and labour, if they are natural, and descend from virtue itself, and are undertaken[2] for the performance of some remarkable act, he considered to be an object of desire; but that they are bad[3] and detestable, if they are produced contrary to Nature for the sake of things the most base.

Not only does he know[4] that vices fall on the soul by an act of the will, and [5]come to bodies,[5] but that there is a certain middle state, such as, when sadness is absent, nor yet do we perceive that gladness is present.

[13.] Of the things, which are in ourselves, the first good and worthy of all praise is, to the person seeking a good, virtue. On that account[6] it ought to be called honourable; since we say that, what is honourable, is alone good, and what is base, bad; and deservedly so; (for) what is base cannot be good.

Friendship he says is a fellowship,[7] and consists in a fellow-feeling, and is reciprocal, and brings the alternation of de-

[1]—[1] I must leave for others to understand "contrarium" here. The Delphin editor explains it by "repugnat—" But we are not informed to what it is repugnant. I could have understood "neque habere pauperiem neque eam regere rationi contrarium est,"—"it is not contrary to reason to have poverty or to rule over it."

[2] How the feminine "susceptæ" and (3) "malas" can thus be applied to "sollicitudinem et laborem" I cannot understand. Hence I suspect Apuleius wrote "sollicitudines laborum—"

[4] From "sed" found in two MSS. after "vitia" Oudendorp would elicit "ait" or "scilicet—" I have translated, as if the author had written "scit—"

[5]—[5] The text is "venire corporibus," where the dative follows "venire" very strangely. Hence from "convenire" in ed. pr. one might elicit "convivere," i. e. "live together with," answering to *συζῆν* in Politic. p. 302, B.

[6] I have translated the old reading "ideo," not "adeo—" which Oudendorp has adopted from two MSS., observing that the words are synonymous.

[7] In lieu of "sociam" the sense evidently requires, as I have translated, "societatem—"

light, when [1](two persons) love equally in turn.[1] This result takes place for the benefit of friendship, when a friend is desirous that he, whom he loves, should enjoy a prosperous state equally with himself. Now that equality does not takes place otherwise, than when a similarity in equal affection meets in both. For as [2]like are united to like by an indissoluble connexion,[2] so those, who are at variance, are disunited amongst themselves, nor are they the friends of others. Now the corruptions of enmity are produced from malevolence through a dissimilarity in manners and a difference in life, and sects, and opposite dispositions. There are likewise, he says, other kinds of friendship; one part of which is produced for the sake of pleasure, and another for that of a close relationship. Now the love of a close relationship and of children is agreeable to Nature; but that other feeling, which, abhorrent to the kindness of humanity, is called love, is a burning desire, by the lighting up of which the lovers of the body, being caught through their lustfulness, imagine a person to exist wholly in that, which [3]they see (and wish for).[3] Such [4]unhappy feelings in the case of the soul[4] Plato forbids to be called by the name of friendship; because they are not mutual, nor can be reciprocated, [5]so that what is loved,[5] may be loved in return; nor is there a constancy in them; and a length of time is wanting to them; and loves of that kind are put an end to by satiety[6] and repentance.

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the text were "quando duo æqualiter redamant—" not "quando—redamat—" where "redamat" has nothing to which it can be referred.

[2]—[2] Compare Homer in Od. xvii. 218, and Plato in Lysid. p. 214, B., *τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι.*

[3]—[3] The sense evidently requires, as I have translated, "et voluerint," after "viderint—" For it is not enough for a lover to see the loved object; he cannot fail to wish for it. With this union of "viderint" and "voluerint" may be compared the antithesis in *ὁρῶν* and *ἐρῶν* in Legg. viii. p. 837, C., *ὁρῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ.*

[4]—[4] So I have rendered "calamitates animarum—"

[5]—[5] I cannot understand "ut ament, quæ redamantur," I have therefore translated, as if the text were "ut, quæ amantur, redamentur." The Delphin editor likewise saw that the train of thought required "ut quæ amantur—" although he has improperly added "redament."

[6] Oudendorp prefers "sanitate," furnished by many MSS., in lieu of "societate" in some, and "satietate" in others; and refers to Ovid. Amor. i. 10, "Cum bene pertæsum est, animique resanuit error—" But "satietate" answers to "pertæsum," and "pœnitentia" to "resanuit."

[14.] Of Loves of this kind Plato numbers three; because there is one, divine, agreeing with a mind uncorrupted and the method of virtue, (and) not to be repented of; another, pertaining to a degenerate mind, and to pleasure the most corrupt; the third, mixed up with both, belonging to a mediocre disposition and of moderate desires; but souls of a darker hue (he says) are impelled by a longing for the body, and that their only aim is to enjoy the use of it and to soften down their heart, by a pleasure and gratification of that kind. But these are the acts of an elegant and well-educated mind,[1] to love passionately the souls of the good, and to make them a study, and to wish it done, that they should indulge as much as possible in good pursuits and be rendered better and superior. The mean between the two (he says) is formed of both; so that they are not entirely void of bodily gratifications, and yet are able to be caught by an elegant disposition of soul. As then that Love is inferred to be the most filthy and the least human and base, not from the nature of things, but from a bodily sickness and disease, so it may be believed that the divine (Love) comes into the minds of men, when it is granted by the gift and kindness of the gods, and by the breath of a celestial Cupid. There is too a third kind of Love, which we have mentioned as a mean. It is brought together by the proximity of what is divine and earthly; and since it is united [2]by the connexion of a joint state amongst like persons,[2] it is, as[3] being near to reason, the divine one; but[4] the earthly, as being united [5]to baseness and the longing after pleasure.[5]

[15.] [6]Of persons worthy of blame there are four kinds;

[1]—[1] The text at present is "Illæ vero facetæ et urbanæ sunt." But as there is nothing to which "illæ" can be referred, and, if there were, one could not understand how souls can be called "facetæ et urbanæ," I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "Illa vero facetæ et urbanæ mentis sunt—" where "facetæ" and "urbanæ" would be expressed in Greek by *κομψῆς* and *ἀστείου*.

[2]—[2] I have translated, as if the text were "nexu utique consortii parilium—" not "nexuque et consortio parili—" which I confess I cannot understand; for the mention of persons, who are like, can scarcely be dispensed with.

[3] I have adopted "ut," found in ed. Vulc.

[4] In lieu of "et—" the balance of the sentence requires "at—"

[5]—[5] Since some MSS. read "turpitudini" for "cupidini—" Apuleius probably united both, as I have translated.

[6]—[6] A similar idea, but expressed in more correct language, is found towards the end of this book, in p. 379.

of which the first is of the seekers after honours; the next is [1]of the lovers of substance;[1] the third, of (the lovers) of popular rule; and the last of tyrannical (power).[6] On which account[2] that first vice[3] comes upon the mind, when the vigour of reason has become languid, and that portion of the soul, in which anger has the dominion, becomes the superior and stronger. Now that, which is called Ὀλιγαρχία,[4] (Oligarchy,) is produced in this way; when on account of the worst food being given to that part of the soul, which consists of desires, not only are the seats of what is rationable and given to anger occupied, but [5]of that likewise, which sharpen not necessary desires.[5] Such a person as this Plato has designated a gain-seeker and [6]a hawk after money.[6] [7]The popular quality exists,[7] when passions, being let loose[8] by indulgence, burn not only with just desires, [9]but with those

[1]—[1] For the sake, not only of the antithesis, but the syntax likewise, I have elicited "sequens, substantiæ amatorum" from "sequens abstemiorum—" For thus "substantiæ," applied to money, would be opposed to honours, and "popularis et tyrannicæ dominationis" recover the noun "amatorum," on which those words, at present without regimen, depend.

[2] I confess I cannot understand "quapropter" here. I suspect something has been lost, requisite to unite the broken chain of thought.

[3] Namely, "the love of honours."

[4] The word in Plato, as remarked by Floridus, is τιμαρχία, not ὀλιγαρχία, as applicable to the honour-seekers.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the words "ejus etiam, quæ non necessarias cupidines acuunt—" which I must leave for others to understand; for I cannot see how "quæ—acuunt" can thus follow "ejus—" Hildebrand has given from his own conjecture, "quæ non necessariam cupidinem ciunt—" from which nothing seems to be gained.

[6]—[6] Since this expression is not found at present in Plato, nor could, I think, be introduced there, it is probable that Apuleius was alluding to some Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, just as he does in "lucricupidinem" to the Pseudo-Platonic Hipparchus.

[7]—[7] The expression "qualitas popularis existit—" is strangely used here, where the nature of popular rule is to be defined. Hence, since the earlier editions offer "qualis" for "qualitas," perhaps the author wrote "Qualis sit vis popularis, ex eo visitur," i. e. "Of what kind is the power of the people, is seen from that," or something similar.

[8] Colvius was the first to object to "laboratæ," for which he suggested "saburratæ—" while Oudendorp has proposed "irritatæ—" but my "liberatæ" seems nearer the mark.

[9]—[9] The text at present is "sed his etiam quæ obviæ atque occursantes—" from which, as being perfectly unintelligible, I have elicited "sed iis etiam, quæ obvarant ab æquo occursantes—" where "obvarant" means "to pervert," as shown by Nonius Marcellus, "Obvarare, pervertere depravare."

likewise, which pervert from right the parties meeting with them,[9] and oppress with their own conditions both the soul, that is susceptible of good counsel, and the other too, that is given rather to anger. But Tyrannical power is a life of luxury and full of lust; which, welded together out of pleasures endless and various and unlawful, holds a dominion over the entire mind.

[16.] Now the person, who is the worst, (Plato) says is not only base, and pernicious, and a despiser of the gods and lives a life without moderation, and inhuman, and unsociable, but agrees likewise with neither his neighbour nor himself, [1][and thus is at variance not only with other persons, but himself likewise,][1] and is an enemy not to others only, but likewise to himself; and hence such a person is friendly neither to the good, nor to any one at all, and not even to himself; but that he, whom no excess of wickedness can go beyond, appears to be the worst of all.[2] (He says too) that such a person can never find a way for himself in the conduct of affairs, not merely on account of his ignorance, but because he knows not himself, and because thorough wickedness produces an unsettling in the mind, by impeding that person's designs, when commenced and reflected on, and by not permitting any of those things (to be done)[3] which he may wish. Hence against a person the worst and most reprobate not only do those vices, which are according to[4] Nature, produce a feeling of execration, such as envy is, and a delight in the misfortunes of others, but those likewise, which Nature does not reject, I mean pleasure, and sickness of mind, regret, love, pity, fear, shame, (and) anger. Now this takes place on that account, because an ill-regulated disposition has no moderation in whatever matter to which it rushes forward; and thus there is for it ever something deficient or redundant. Hence too the love of a man of this kind is de-

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets are evidently a mere repetition of the sentence preceding. As regards the matter, compare Lysid. p. 214, C. § 25.

[2] I have translated, as if the text were "omnium," not "eum—"

[3] I have translated, as if "fieri" had dropt out after "eorum."

[4] Such is the ordinary meaning of "secundum." But the antithesis requires "contrary to—" a sense that Oudendorp attempts, I conceive, vainly to defend; who once wished to read "quæ secus quam Natura sinit," in lieu of "quæ secundum Naturam sunt."

praved in its whole tenor; because it is not only eager from its unbridled lusts and insatiable thirst to swallow all kinds of pleasure, but because it is distracted in its judgment of beauty by an error without reason, through its being ignorant of true loveliness, and being a passionate admirer of the skin of the body, effete, enervated, and passing away; nor does it set a great value at least[1] upon limbs coloured by the sun,[2] or rendered firm by exercise, but [3](values rather)[3] [4]those darkened by shade, or soft by sloth,[4] and moulded[5] with too much care.

[17.] That wickedness does not stalk abroad willingly, is plain in many ways. For injuriousness Plato says[6] is an ill-regulated suffering and sickness of the mind; from whence he holds it clear that men are not carried to it willingly. For who would with his own will take upon himself so much of evil, as to carry knowingly crime and flagitiousness in the best portion of the mind. When therefore the possession of

[1] I confess I do not understand "saltem" here.

[2] To improve the colour of the skin, and the firmness of the flesh, the ancients were accustomed after washing first and then oiling themselves, to dry their skin in the sun, as shown by Aristophanes in Ἐκκλησ. 63, where a woman says, while imitating the acts of a man, Ἀλειψαμένη τὸ σῶμ' ὅλον, δι' ἡμέρας Ἐχλιαινόμην ἑστῶσα πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον: while effeminate persons were more fond of the shade, as we learn from Plato in Phædr. p. 239, C. § 35. Ὀφθήσεται δὲ μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμιγεῖ σκιᾷ, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δὲ ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης.

[3]—[3] I have inserted the words between the lunes for the sake of perspicuity.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "sed opacos umbra vel molles desidia:" where Oudendorp would explain "opacos" by "pingues—" But as such neither is nor could be the meaning, there is evidently an error here, which may be thus corrected—"sed Epicurei suis, umbraticola molles desidia—" "but those of an Epicurean hog, flabby with sloth, that loves the shade:" where the author had in mind not only the Horatian "Epicuri de grege porcus," but the expression likewise in Plautus, Trinumm. ii. 7, 49, "malacum—umbraticolam."

[5] I have retained "modulatos" with the ed. pr., in lieu of which Wower suggested "medicatos," elicited from "meditatos" in one MS.; while, since all the others offer "medullatos," Oudendorp would read "emedullatos," i. e. "without marrow." But then "cura nimia" would have been omitted; which could not be; for Apuleius had in mind the words of Horace,

"operata juventus
In cute curanda nimio plus."

[6] The whole of this doctrine is detailed at length in the Gorgias.

evil is taken by the unthinking, it is meet that its use and doings should be supported by the ignorant; and on that account it is a worse[1] thing to hurt than to be hurt; because the hurt is in those things, which are of less value, namely, in those of the body, and external, which can be either diminished or perish by fraud;[2] while the preferable are unhurt, that relate to the soul itself; while to hurt is a far worse act. From whence it can be understood that by this error a mischief is brought upon good souls; and that he hurts himself more, who desires the destruction of another, than he hurts him, against whom he plots things of such a kind.

Since then to hurt another is of all evils the greatest, [3]it is still much more grievous for him, who does a hurt, to depart with impunity;[3] and it is more grievous and bitter than every punishment, if impunity is granted to a noxious person, and he does not suffer in the mean time a punishment from men; just as it is more grievous for (a troop)[4] of most acute disorders to be in want of medicine, (and) to deceive medical men, and for those parts to be neither burnt nor cut off, by the pain of which the safety of the rest of the parts can be provided for.

[18.] Hence as the best physicians do not apply healing hands to bodies [5]despaired of and cried over (as lost),[5] in order that the attendance, which would do no good, may not prolong[6] the period of pain; so it is better for those to die, whose souls are stained by vices, and cannot be cured by the medicine of wisdom. For [7]Plato thinks that the man ought to be driven

[1] As the MSS. vary between "pejus" and "prius," Hildebrand would read "pravius—"

[2] Scioppius would read "funditus" in lieu of "fraudibus—" I should prefer "imminui possunt fraudibus vel vi interire—"

[3—3] See Gorg. p. 509, B. § 138.

[4] I have translated, as if "cohortem" had dropt out before "carere—" remembering the expression in Horace, "morborum—cohors—"

[5—5] The text is "conclamatis desperatisque—" I have in the translation avoided the ὕστερον πρότερον.

[6] In lieu of "promulget" two MSS. read "promulcet." Both word are equally unintelligible. Hence Wasse on Sallust, B. J. 29, suggeste "promicet—" referring to Nonius, "Promicare, extendere et porr jacere;—Nevius, Siquidem loqui vis non perdocere, multa longe prom canda oratio est—" But there "promicare" means to "flash before, as a person is wont to do a drawn sword. I have therefore translated, as if the text were "prolonget—"

[7—7] Oudendorp's text is "vita existimat Plato esse pellendum." But most of the MSS. read "vita existimate populo—"; one, "Plato noster"

from life,[7] by whom the study of living properly cannot be obtained from Nature or his own exertions; or, if the love of life holds him fast, that he ought to be delivered over to the wise, by whose art at some time[1] he may be turned to better things. And truly it is better for such a person to be ruled over, and not to have the power of ruling over others, and to be not a lord, but a slave himself, as being impotent [2]over his own vices,[2] and to be assigned to the power of others, after obtaining as his lot the office of obeying rather than of commanding. He said, likewise, that the worse man is the greater reprobate [3]not on the sole ground,[3] that he is ever distracted by a choice[4] of vices, and torn in pieces by the wave swell of desires; but because[5] the more he is desirous of more things, the more he seems to himself to be in want, and on that account to others likewise. For the things, that are hoped and wished for, arrive scarcely a few in number, and by the greatest trouble; and to these succeeds the still more burning madness[6] of desires; nor by future evils only he is pained, but tortured likewise by the past [7]and those in transit.[7] All of which persons it is manifest can be drawn from evils of that kind by death alone.

[19.] But the pre-eminently good, and the immoderately bad, are very few and rather scarce, and, as he says,[8] may be counted;

instead of "populo—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "vita existimat Plato noster populove pellendum."

[1] I have translated, as if the word were "quondam," not "quadam—" which is scarcely intelligible.

[2—2] As one MS. reads "servitio uni," and another "servorum," it is easy to elicit from both "suorum vitiorum—" where "vitiorum" is due to Colvius; while to Modius is due "aliorumque," in lieu of "aliorum—"

[3—3] I have translated, as if the text were "non ob solum id—" where id" might easily have been lost before "deteriorem—"

[4] In "editione" evidently lies hid "electione—" what I have translated.

[5] The text is "qui—" I have translated, as if it were "sed quia—" for sed" or "rerum" could not be omitted after "non solum—" Hildebrand would read "sed desideriûm—" in lieu of "et desideriûm—" in two MSS.

[6] I have, with Oudendorp, adopted "furores," the conjecture of Floridus, in lieu of "fluores" in MSS. Hildebrand suggests "fervores—"

[7—7] To avoid the tautology in "præteritis transactisque," I have translated, as if the text were "præteritis et in transitu," without "que," omitted in ed. Flor.

[8] Apuleius had perhaps in mind Phædon, p. 99, A. § 89, *ἠγήσατο τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.*

but the majority are those, who are neither clearly the best nor really the worst, but with, as it were, a medium in morals. And yet neither do the more excellent of them lay hold of all right things, nor do those, who are to be blamed, stumble in all. Of these the vices are not heavy nor out of season, nor with too much of crime, whose basis[1] is in a redundance or deficiency; to whom there is of approbation both an entirety and measure; and who, while[2] they are taking a middle road between praise and blame, are constantly excited by the desire of undertaking matters of that kind, [3]that at one time persons good and honourable invite them by reason; at another, dishonourable gains and base pleasures attract them.[3] With such men fidelity in friendship does not endure; and loves not always incorrect, nor yet honourable, come into their minds.

[20.] A man therefore, Plato says, cannot be perfectly wise, unless he excels the rest (of men) in disposition, and is complete in the arts, and in the parts of prudence, and has been imbued with them even from boyhood, and accustomed to deeds and words in accordance, [4]while his soul has been cleansed and strained from the lees of pleasure,[4] [5]and abstinence and patience[5] have been chosen with his (whole) soul, and learning and eloquence have proceeded from the knowledge of things. He, however, who has gone through these matters, and walked with a confident and secure step in the road of virtue, and has acquired a solid method of living, becomes on a sudden perfect, that is, he reaches on a sudden the extreme portions of time, past and future, and is in a

[1] Such is perhaps the best version of "substantia—"

[2] I have translated, as if "quum" had dropt out after "qui—" Hildebrand would read "qui, quia—"

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the text. But one would have expected rather to find the sentences more accurately balanced to this effect—"that at one time things good and honourable invite them to what is rational; at another, dishonourable gains attract them to disreputable pleasures:" in Latin, "ut nunc bona atque honesta eos ad rationalia invitent; nunc inhonesta lucra ad turpes alliciant voluptates."

[4—4] So I have translated, as if the text were "purgata et effæcata anima e voluptate—" not "purgata et effæcata animi voluptate—" for as in the pleasures of the mind there are no lees, the lees cannot be said to be strained off.

[5—5] Here is evidently an allusion to the doctrine of Pythagoras—*ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου.*

certain manner intemporal.[1] After this, when vices are shut out and all things implanted and introduced, which conduce to a happy life, the wise man thinks correctly that he[2] does not depend upon others, nor can (any thing)[3] be brought upon himself from others, but that (all things)[4] are in his own hand. On which account he is neither elated in prosperity nor does he become contracted by adversity, when he knows that he is so furnished with adornments,[5] that he can be separated from them by no violence. Such a person it behoves not only to inflict no injury, but even not to return it. For he does not consider that to be an act of contumely, which a wicked man commits; but he considers that (to be so), which patience cannot[6] firmly endure. By which law of Nature[7] let it be engraven on his mind, that not one of those things, which the rest of mankind conceive to be evils, can do a hurt to a wise man. Indeed,[8] (Plato) asserts[9] that the wise man, relying on his conscience, will be secure and confident in the whole of life, both because he considers, by drawing himself[10] to better

[1] Others may, but I will never, believe that Apuleius wrote "intemporalem—" which Oudendorp explains indeed "freed from time;" but since the ed. pr. has "in tempora lætum," it is evident that we must read "in templa aeria elatum—" where "templa aeria" may be compared with "O magna templa cœlitum Commixta stellis splendidis," quoted by Varro de Ling. Lat. vi. For thus such a person, carried up to the temples of the air, would be equal to the gods; as shown by Horace, "Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules Innisus arces attigit igneas."

[2, 3, 4] I have translated, as if "se" had dropt out after "aliis," and "quid" before "deferri," and "omnia" between "sua" and "manu." Compare Plato, Menexen. p. 247, E. § 20, *ὅτῳ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνήρτηται πάντα τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα—καὶ μὴ ἐν ἄλλοις αἰωρεῖται*—translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12, and imitated in Paradox. 2, "nemo potest esse non beatissimus, qui est totus aptus ex sese, quique in se uno ponit omnia:" and in Epistol. ad Famil. v. 13, "Laudem sapientiæ statuo esse maximam, non aliunde pendere, nec extrinsecus bene aut male vivendi suspensas habere rationes."

[5] In lieu of "ornamentis" one would have expected "armamentis—"

[6] I have adopted the reading of Oudendorp, who places "non," found before "putat," after "patientia—"

[7] This mention of the law of Nature seems very strange, where one would have expected rather "of instruction," in Latin "doctrinæ—"

[8] In lieu of "equidem," which can hardly be united to "dicit—" one would prefer "Et quidem—"

[9] I have adopted "dicit" found in one MS. in lieu of "dici et—" unless it be said that in "vita dici et" lie hid "vitæ die dicit—"

[10] I have translated, as if "se" had dropt out after "rationes—"

reasons, that all things are accidents, and because he receives nothing with moroseness or difficulty, and persuades himself that his affairs belong to the immortal gods. The same person [1] beholds the day of his death creeping on, neither unwillingly nor without hope,[1] because he trusts in the immortality of the soul. For the soul of the wise man, when liberated from the bonds of the body, migrates back to the gods, and for the merits of a life passed rather purely and chastely, he does by this very endeavour[2] [3]conciliate himself to the condition of the gods.[3]

[21.] To the same wise man he gives the name [4]of the best; and he rightly considers him both good[4] and prudent, whose sound[5] plans agree with acts the most correct, and whose principles proceed from a reason for what is just. This wise man he further says is the most brave; since by the vigour of his mind he is prepared to endure all things. Hence it is [6]he says that fortitude is the nerve and very neck[6] of the soul,[7] just as cowardice he says borders upon weakness. Him too he correctly considers[8] the only wealthy man; since he

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the text were "diem mortis suæ prorepentis, nec invitus exspesve spectat—" not "d. m. s. propitius nec invitus exspectat—" where Oudendorp vainly endeavours to defend "propitius," not remembering the expression "obrepit non intellecta senectus," in Juvenal ix. 129, and not perceiving that the allusion to a hope could hardly be dispensed with. Or we may read "mortis suæ prope euntis."

[2] I have translated, as if the text were "nisu," not "usu," which Oudendorp endeavours to explain by referring it to the use of a well-spent life. But "nisu" suits better with "hac arte—innisus" in Horace.

[3]—[3] Such is the literal version of "deorum se conditioni conciliat—" words quite unintelligible, unless we suppose there is a change of cases for "deorum sibi conditionem conciliat." But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius wrote "deorum se conditioni ac concilio levat—" "lifts himself up to the condition and the council of the gods."

[4]—[4] To find "bonum" thus following "optimum" seems rather strange. Perhaps the author wrote "Plato *τίμιον*—"

[5] The balance of the sentence plainly requires "sana" instead of "sane—"

[6]—[6] I do not remember where Plato says so of fortitude; although he has in Rep. iii. p. 411, B., *ἕως ἂν ἐκτέμῃ (τὸν θυμὸν), ὥσπερ νεῦρα, ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς*.

[7] I have adopted Oudendorp's "animæ" in lieu of "animi—" who aptly refers to "fortitudinis sedem esse et vires animæ," in ii. § 6.

[8] In Phædr. p. 279, C. § 147, where Ast refers to Cicero, Paradox 6, "That the wise man alone is rich."

alone appears to possess the riches of virtue, which are more precious than all treasures. Moreover the wise man ought to appear the most wealthy indeed, since he alone is able to rule over (wealth)[1] for necessary uses. For the rest of men, although they are flowing over with riches, seem nevertheless to be poor; because they either know not their use, or apply them to the worst purposes. For it is not the absence of money, that gives birth to want, but the presence of immoderate desires. It behoves (then)[2] the philosopher, if he will be in want of nothing, and the despiser of, and superior to, all those things, which men consider bitter to be borne, to do nothing otherwise,[3] than to endeavour constantly to separate the soul from its fellowship with the body. And hence Philosophy is to be deemed a desire for death and a habit of dying.

[22.] It is meet for all good men to be friends amongst themselves, even if they are little known (to each other); and they are to be considered friends by that power, through which their manners and tenets agree; since like is not abhorrent from like. From hence it is clear that the fidelity of friendship can exist amongst the good alone. (Now) wisdom makes that young man a sedulous[4] lover of good, who by the goodness of his disposition is rather ready (to learn) good arts. Nor will a deformity of body be able to drive away such a desire. For when the soul itself is pleasing, the whole man is loved; but when the body is desired, a man's[5] worse part becomes agreeable to the heart. Justly then it is to be deemed that he, who is acquainted with good persons, will be desirous[6] likewise of things of that kind. For he alone burns with good desires, who sees what is good with the eyes

[1] I have translated, as if "eas" had dropt out after "necessariis—"

[2] I have translated, as if "ergo" had been lost before "oportet—"

[3] In "sic," which is quite unintelligible, evidently lies hid "secius," as I have translated.

[4] I have translated, as if the text were "sedulum," not "sed eum—" where Oudendorp has suggested "scilicet eum—" although he says that "sed" may be defended; but how that can be, I cannot understand.

[5] I have adopted "hominis," found in one MS., in lieu of "ejus."

[6] I have adopted "cupiturum," furnished by some MSS., in lieu of "cupidum—" for the train of thought evidently requires the mention of a future time.

of the mind. [1][This is to be wise.][1] [2]But because he who is ignorant of that,[2] must needs be a hater also, and not a friend to virtue. Nor vainly is such a person a lover of disgraceful pleasures. (But) the wise man will not come, in the manner of a wild beast,[3] to do something[4] for the sake of some pleasure, unless there shall be at hand the honourable emoluments of virtue. The same person it behoves to live a life in this kind of pleasure, honourable, and admirable, and full of praise and glory; and to be preferred to all the rest of men, not only for the sake of these things, but to enjoy likewise alone and always its pleasantness and security. [5]Nor will he be pained, when deprived of the dearest objects of affection, either because all things, which tend to happiness, depend on himself,[5] or because the infliction of such pain is forbidden by the decree and law of right reason; or[6] because, if he tortures himself on such a ground, or takes upon himself that sickness of mind for the sake of him, who is dead, [7]as if the person were in a worse part,[7] for his own sake, because he grieves that he has been deprived of such an acquaintance.

[1]—[1] The words between the brackets Wower acutely saw were superfluous. But as it is not easy to discover how they came here, they probably conceal some error.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the words "istud vero quoniam qui est ignarus—" where Oudendorp would read "istius vero boni ignarus—" But he does not tell us from whence "quoniam" came, nor how it could be corrupted from "boni." Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "At studium veri quo animam agat—hoc enim est sapientiæ nosse—qui est ignarus, osor quoque ejus—" i. e. But he who knows not whither the study of truth leads the soul—for to know this is the part of wisdom—must needs be a hater of it (the study)—

[3] I have translated, as if the text were, not "meræ," but "feræ—" By a similar metaphor a flatterer is called "a terrible wild beast," in Phædr. p. 240, B. § 37.

[4] Instead of "voluptatis quidem alicujus gratia," the sense and syntax evidently require "voluptatis alicujus gratia quiddam—" for thus "agendum" recovers, what it had lost, its object.

[5]—[5] Compare Plato in Menexen. § 20.

[6] The train of thought evidently requires "aut," not "et—"

[7]—[7] Such is the literal version of "quasi sit in pejore parte—" But "parte" has no meaning here by itself. Besides, the apodosis of the sentence is clearly wanting; which may be supplied by reading "quasi in pejore statu sit, partes aget fatui, aut—" i. e. "as if the deceased were in a worse position, he will act the part of a simpleton;" for "statu" might easily have been lost before "sit," and "partes aget fatui aut" be corrupted into "parte aut—"

But neither for the sake of the dead ought lamentations to be indulged in, since we know that the party has suffered no evil; and, if he had been with good feelings, that he is added to the number of the better; nor for the sake of himself; inasmuch as he places every thing upon himself, nor by the absence of any thing can he be in want of virtue, of which he claims for himself the perpetual possession. The wise man, therefore, will not be sad.

[23.] The aim (then) of wisdom is that the wise man may by his merits[1] be carried up to god;[2] [3]and this is about to be all his study, says (Plato),[3] that he may by the emulation of his life approach to the doings of the gods. Now this will be able to happen to him, if he shows himself a man perfectly just, pious, (and) prudent. From whence, not only in the knowledge of looking forward, but in the labour of acting, it is fitting for him to follow those things, which are approved of by gods and men; since the highest of the gods not only thinks upon all this Universe through the reasoning of his reflections, but undertakes the first, the middle, and the last, and regulates what has been discovered thoroughly, by the universality and constancy of a provident arrangement.

Moreover, (he says) that the person[4] appears to be happy to all, to whom good is supplied, and who knows in what manner he ought to be free from vices. Now one kind of happiness is, when we protect by the presence of our talents, what we are doing; another, when nothing is wanting to the perfection of life, and we are content with the mere contemplation of it. Now of each kind of happiness the source flows from virtue. But for the adornment [5]of the genial place,[5] or

[1, 2] I have adopted "meritis," found in ed. pr., and changed "dei" into "deum" from conjecture, remembering the expression "evehat ad deos" in Horace. Hildebrand suggests "ad dei imaginem" in lieu of "ad dei meritum—"

[3—3] I have translated, as if the text were "hancque omnem futuram ejus operam, ut—" not "hanc namque futuram ejus operam, ut—" where, since "namque" is found in a place not its own, it is probably a corruption of "que omnem;" at least "que" follows "hanc" in one MS. and ed. pr.; while "ait" might easily have been lost before "aut."

[4] As I cannot discover to what thing "illud" can be referred, and, if I could, how such a thing could be said to know, I have translated, as if the text were "illum" to be referred to a person.

[5—5] As no scholar has yet been able to explain or correct satisfactorily "genialis loci," I must leave the passage, as I find it, inexplicable; unless

virtue, we need none of these aids from without, which we deem to be good. But for the uses of ordinary life there is a need of the care of the body, and of the protection of these things, which come from without; yet however in suchwise, that they may become better by virtue, and by its assistance be united to the advantages of happiness, without which they are least of all to be held in the place of good things. Nor is it in vain, that virtue alone can make persons most happy; since without it happiness cannot be found from other prosperous affairs. Since we say that the wise man is a foot-follower and imitator of god, and we fancy that he does follow the deity. For this does the saying[1] mean, Ἕπου θεῷ, "Follow god." Now not only does it behove him, while he inhabits (this) life, to speak words worthy of the gods,[2] and not to do those acts, which are displeasing to their majesty; but at that time likewise, when he is leaving the body, which he will not do, against the will of god.[3] For though the power over death is in his hand, (and) though he knows that, by leaving the things of earth, he shall obtain what are better, still he ought not to bring death upon himself, unless the divine law shall decree that he must of necessity suffer it; and, if the adornments of his previously-passed life do him honour, still it behoves him to be more honourable, [4]and the lover[4] of a favourable report, when, careless of the life of his posterity, he permits his soul to pass to immortality, and anticipates, because he has lived piously, that it will inhabit the places of the blest, and mingle with the choirs of the gods and demi-gods.

[24.] Respecting the constitution of states, and the preservation of commonwealths to be ruled over, Plato thus ordains.

it be said that Apuleius wrote "ingenii, aliusve dotis," i. e. "of disposition, or any other talent," to which I have been led by Lipsius's "ingenialis—"

[1] This saying has been attributed to Sosiades. It is not, I think, to be found in Plato; who speaks, however, in Phædr. § 59, 60, and 62, of "a soul following a god;" and in Legg. iv. p. 716, C., of an action being φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ. But in i. p. 639, D., the Cretans are said in somewhat a different sense to be ἑπόμενοι τῷ θεῷ.

[2] I have adopted, with others, "dis dicere," the emendation of Stewechius, in lieu of "discere—"

[3] Compare Phædon, p. 62, C. § 16.

[4—4] I have translated, as if "et amantem" had dropt out after "tamen—" for the genitive "secundi rumoris—" would be otherwise without a word to govern it.

At the very commencement he defines the form of a state after this fashion. A state is the union of very many persons amongst themselves; where (some)[1] are rulers, others inferiors, bringing, when united, [2]aid and assistance[2] to each other in turn, and regulating their duties by the same and correct laws; and a state would be one, [3]like a villa,[3] under the same walls, if[4] the minds of the inhabitants are accustomed [5]to like and dislike the same things.[5] On which account we must persuade the founders of commonwealths, that they increase [6]their own people to that point of places in such a way that[6] all may be known to the same ruler, and not unknown to each other;[7] for thus it will happen that all will be of one mind, and be willing for justice to be done to them.

(But) a great and healthy[8] state it does not behove to depend on the multitude of its inhabitants, and on their great strength. For (Plato) thinks that not the power of the body nor of money, collected for the dominion of the many, is to be valued, [9]with a bad heart and impotence, but when men, adorned with all virtues, and all the inhabitants, founded on laws, obey a common decree.[9] But the rest of states, which

[1] I have adopted the correction of Stewechius, who would repeat "alii—"

[2—2] To avoid the tautology in "opem atque auxilium" one would prefer "operam—"

[3—3] I have translated, as if the text were, not "illam—" which I cannot understand, but "uti villam—" For a state is thus compared to a single residence in Plato, Rep. ii. p. 369, C., πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν—

[4] I have rejected "et" before "si," as perfectly at variance with the syntax and sense.

[5—5] In the words "eadem velle atque eadem nolle" there is an allusion to Sallust's well-known definition of friendship, which he puts into the mouth of Catiline.

[6—6] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "ut usque ad id locorum plebes suas taliter—augeant, ut—" first edited by Vulcanius, and found subsequently in two MSS.: with which Oudendorp is however not satisfied, nor am I. For Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "ut usque ad id plebes suas et taliter augeant, ut, vicorum instar—" i. e. "that they increase their people to such a point and in such a way, that, like villages—"

[7] Compare Legg. v. p. 738, D. § 9.

[8] I have translated, as if the text were, not "sane," but "et sanam—" similar to "sanas civitates" just afterwards.

[9—9] Here a literal version best shows, how unintelligible is the text—"cum vecordia impotentiaque, sed cum decreto communi virtutibus omnibus ornati viri et omnes incolæ fundati legibus obsequuntur." And yet it is easy to see first, that "fundati legibus" could not be applied to

are not constituted after this model, he did not deem to be healthy, but were commonwealths filthy and swelling with disorders. Those, however, he said, were founded on reason, which were arranged after the manner of the soul, so that the best portion, which excels in wisdom and prudence, may rule over the multitude; and, as that has the care of the whole body, so [1]the beloved of prudence[1] may defend the things advantageous to the state in general. And let Fortitude likewise, the second portion of Virtue, as it chastises and restrains [2]the feeling of desire by its road,[2] be vigilant in the state. (And) in the place of watchers by day, let the youth become soldiers for the benefit of all; but let the discipline of a superior counsel bridle, restrain, and, if requisite, break down the restless and untamed, and on that account the worst of citizens. But that third part [3](of the soul, the seat)[3] of desires, he considers on a par with the common people and land-tillers, which he thinks is to be supported for its moderate usefulness. [4]He denies, however, that a commonwealth can stand, unless he, who rules, possesses a desire for wisdom, or unless he is chosen as the ruler, who, it is agreed amongst all, is the most wise.[4]

"incolæ;" and secondly, that something is required to balance "virtutibus omnibus ornati." Hence I suspect Apuleius wrote "sed cum decreto communi, virtutibus omnibus viri ornati, omnes incolæ sine vecordia imprudentiaque, fundatis legibus obsequuntur," i. e. "but when all the inhabitants, adorned with all the virtues of a man, obey without a bad heart and thoughtlessness the laws founded on a general decree." Perhaps however the words "cum vecordia impotentiaque" may be retained in their present place, at least, if we read after "putat," "junctas cum vecordia imprudentiaque," so that "vecordia" may be referred to "vires pecuniæ," and "imprudentia" to "vires corporis—"

[1]—[1] Such, I presume, is the meaning of "prudentiæ dilectus—" But whether such an expression is to be found elsewhere, is more than I know. Oudendorp indeed refers to Metam. viii. p. 554, A.; and, as regards the sense of the whole passage, Hildebrand refers to Plato, Rep. iv. p. 427—430.

[2]—[2] So Oudendorp. But since, in lieu of "via sua," one MS. reads "vi sua," and another "in sua," I suspect that Apuleius wrote "vi insanam appetentiam—"

[3]—[3] The words between the lunes have been supplied for the sake of the sense; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius actually wrote "Illam vero, sedem desideriorum, tertiam animæ partem—" For "sedem" might easily have dropt out before "desideriorem," and "animæ" after "tertiam—"

[4]—[4] In Plato, Rep. v. p. 473. See Ruhnken on Rutil Lup. i. 6.

[25.] He says, moreover, that all the citizens should be imbued with morality,[1] so that there may be no desire of possessing gold and silver in those, to whose guardianship and good faith the commonwealth is intrusted; and that they may not seek private wealth under the guise of its being public; and that hospitality may not take place of such a kind, that, while the door is not opened to others, they may so take care of food and living for themselves, as to waste on common feasts the money they may receive from those whom they protect. Marriages too (he says) [2]are not to be entered into individually, but are to be common,[2] through the wise men of the states and magistrates, appointed[3] to that business by lot, arranging in a public manner the betrothals for marriages of that kind, and taking especial care that persons be not united unequal to, or unlike each other. With these is connected a useful and necessary confusion,[4] so that through[5] the bringing up of children, unknown as yet, being mixed together, there is produced a difficulty of recognition by parents; for, while they do not know their own, they believe all, whom they may see of that age, to be their own, and all become, as it were, the parents of all the children in common. Of these marriages there is sought at a proper time the union; of which he believes[6] the fidelity will be firm, if the number of the days accords with the harmony of music; while they, who are born of such marriages, will be imbued with fitting studies, and taught by the best instructions in the common master-hall of the preceptors, (and this too) not merely those of the male sex, but of the female likewise; whom Plato[7] wishes to be united in all arts, that are thought to be peculiar to men, and even in those of war; since to both there is the same power, as their nature is one. (He says too) that a state of this kind has no need of laws, laid down from without; for being

[1] One MS. adds "et disciplinis—" of which Oudendorp approves.

[2]—[2] On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, see Rep. v. p. 459, E. and foll.

[3] I have translated, as if the text were "traditis," not "præditis," omitting with two MSS. "et" before "sorte—"

[4] Compare Tim. p. 18, D.

[5] I have translated, as if the text were originally, as Oudendorp saw, "per mixta—afferat—" not "permixta—afferant—"

[6] In Rep. viii. p. 546, and foll.

[7] In Rep. v. p. 451. and Laws vi. p. 780, C. and foll.

founded on [1]the rules of prudence,[1] and on that kind of institutions and manners, (of)[2] which mention has been made, it does not require other laws. And this commonwealth he intends to have been formed by himself, as a feigned representation of the truth, for the sake of an example.

[26.] There is likewise another commonwealth built up (by him) sufficiently just, and [3]the best indeed[3] in a certain appearance and by way of an example, and not, as the former is, without proofs,[4] but with some ground-work. In this. after seeking the principles of the origin of a state and its foundations, he discusses, not in his own name,[5] its situation[6] and advantages, and he proceeds to the point, as to how a civil governor, after obtaining a place of that kind, and an assembly of many persons, ought, according to the nature of things present and of persons coming together, to build up a state full of good laws and of good morals. In this too[7] he wishes the same bringing up of children and the same discipline in arts to be adopted. But in the case of marriages, and births, and patrimonies, he swerves from the rules laid down for the former commonwealth, [8]by making marriages an affair of individuals, and the business of the suitors themselves private.[8] But though the parties in contracting a marriage ought to take counsel from

[1]—[1] I have translated, as if the text were "regula prudentiæ," not "regia prudentia," where Lipsius proposed to read "egregia prudentia—" Hildebrand adopts "regi eam per prudentiam—" suggested by Oudendorp.

[2] I have inserted the preposition requisite for the syntax, in Latin "de—"

[3]—[3] I have transposed the words "optima quidem," which could not precede "satis justa—" but might be found before "ipsa quidem," at least if we alter "quidem" into "quadam" and refer it to "specie," as translated.

[4] I have adopted Oudendorp's "evidentiis," in lieu of "evidentia—"

[5] But in that of an Athenian stranger.

[6] I have translated, as if Apuleius had written, not "statu—" but "situ," remembering the passage in the Laws, iv. p. 704, where Plato discusses the advantages and disadvantages arising from the choice in the site of a city.

[7] Here, as before, "equidem" is found united improperly to a third person.

[8]—[8] I have translated, as if the text were "matrimonia singularia faciens, procorumque ipsorum rem privatam—" (where "rem" might easily have dropt out after "ipsorum—") not "matrimonia privata et singularia faciens, procorumque ipsorum—" where there is nothing on which "procorum" can depend.

their own wishes, yet he decrees that the matter, as belonging to public good, ought to be looked into by the chiefs of the state in general. [1]Wherefore let not the rich refuse a marriage with their inferiors, and let those in poverty obtain an union with the rich;[1] and should there be an agreement in the strength of property, still different dispositions are to be mixed together, so that a quiet woman may be joined to a passionate man; and to a mild man may be united a rather excitable woman, in order that [2]by such remedies and the fruits of living together[2] the offspring, formed out of differing natures, may coalesce by a better produce of manners, and so the state be increased by the means of families put together.[3] Children, too, conceived in the seed-bed of dissimilar manners, [4]when drawing in the fashion of a likeness of both,[4] there will be wanting in them neither vigour in carrying on affairs, nor counsel in surveying them; but they are to be instructed [5]according as the parents may determine.[5] Individuals too may have houses and private property, as they may be able; which, however, he does not permit to be increased by avarice, or wasted by luxury, or deserted through negligence. And for this state he orders laws to be promulgated; and he exhorts the framer of laws, when he has an idea of doing such a thing, to direct his contemplation to virtue.

[27.] As regards the mode of government, he considers that to be useful, which is formed by the mixture of three (kinds); for he does not think that the mere form of government, either by the upper orders or of the mob, is by itself useful; nor does he leave the faults of rulers unpunished; but he de-

[1]—[1] Compare the Laws, vi. p. 773, B. § 16.

[2]—[2] I have translated, as if the text were "talibus remediis et conversationum proventibus," not "talibus observationum remediis et proventibus," which, I confess, I cannot understand.

[3] One MS. has "consitarum," which better suits with the metaphor in "proventu," than "compositarum."

[4]—[4] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, "cum utriusque instar similitudinis traxerint—" Opportunely then does one MS. read "ab utrisque—" which lead to "cum ab utrisque insita formam similitudinis traxerint," i. e. "when, after being planted by both, they draw out the form of a likeness—"

[5]—[5] I have followed the reading of Elmenhorst, "utcunque parentes censuerint;" but since some MSS. offer "utcunque parentes nec ita sexus esse stratus censuerint civitatis—" various attempts all equally unsuccessful, have been made to elicit what Apuleius wrote.

termines that [1]a reason for ruling[1] exists rather with those, who are the superior in power. And other conditions of public affairs are thought to be defined by him, which have a leaning towards correct morals; and to the ruler over the commonwealth, which he wishes to stand fast by the correction (of errors), he gives an order, that he first fill up the laws, remaining (incomplete); and[2] that he desire the laws to be corrected, that are wrong; and then that he turn[3] the teachings, which are corrupting the good of the state, to a better account; from which, if the depraved masses cannot be turned aside by advice and persuasion, they must be drawn from the course, they have commenced, by force and [4]without a show of favour to any one.[4] He describes too how in an active state the whole mass conducts itself when led by goodness and justice. For such persons will take to their arms their nearest relations; will guard their honours; drive off intemperance; restrain injustice, (and) give to modesty and the other ornaments of life the greatest honours. [5]Nor let a multitude rashly fly together to the constitutions of commonwealths of that kind, except those who[5] have been brought up under the best laws and superior institutions, (and are) moderate towards others, (and) agreeing amongst themselves.

[28.] [6]Of citizens, worthy to be blamed, there are four kinds; one is of those, who are the chiefs in honour; another is of the few, with whom the power over affairs rests; the third is

[1]—[1] Instead of "rationem," Wower would read "gubernationem—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "constare imperii rationem—" as I have translated.

[2] To fill up the sense this word is added, and "aut" altered into "et—"

[3] I have translated, as if the text were, what the syntax demands, "convertat," not "convertit."

[4]—[4] Such, I presume, is the meaning of "ingratis" here.

[5]—[5] In the words between the numerals there is evidently something to be supplied. For Apuleius is here alluding to what Plato has laid down in the Laws, v. p. 740, that when by any event the prescribed number of 5040 of families shall become reduced, their place is to be supplied not from any source, but only from a select one. Hence he probably wrote "ad ejusmodi rerum publicarum status restituendos, si desit quid, sed qui—" where "restituendos" might easily have been lost after the letters "-rum status," and "si desit quid, sed qui," corrupted into "nisi qui—" and thus the sense will be, "to restore, if any thing be wanting, the constitution of commonwealths of this kind—"

[6]—[6] The same idea, expressed in less perfect language, has been repeated in p. 361.

of the rule of all; the last of that of a tyrant.[6] Now the first kind, [1]he says, is produced then,[1] when the more prudent persons are driven from the state by seditious[2] magistrates, and the power is transferred to these, who are strong in hand merely; and when not those, who could conduct affairs with milder counsels, obtain the means of ruling, but those, who are turbulent and violent. But the state of the few[3] is obtained, [4]when many persons poor, (and) criminal, and at the same time lying under the impotence of the wealthy few, give themselves up and permit,[4] and when all the power of government not good morals but riches have obtained. The popular faction is strengthened, when the mass without wealth does by its strength hold out against the means of the rich, [5]and the law is at the bidding[5] of the people promulgated, that it is lawful

[1]—[1] I have adopted the emendation of an unknown scholar, who, says Bosscha, has elicited "confieri dicit tum" from "confunditur" in one MS., and "confit" in ed. pr.

[2] The word "seditiosos" seems strangely introduced here. Apuleius wrote, I suspect, "seditione usos—" i. e. "taking advantage of a sedition—" as the so-called thirty tyrants did at Athens.

[3] Oligarchy.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of "cum inopes criminosi multi simul paucorum divitum impotentiæ subjacentes dederint se atque permiserint—" But, unless I am greatly mistaken, Apuleius wrote "cum inopes, crimine usi multo, suum modo, paucorum divitum impudentiæ subjacentes dederint se atque permiserint omnia; omnemque—" For this comparison of persons, wallowing in crimes, to swine, is confirmed by the expression in Rep. ii. p. 373, *εἰ—ὑῶν πόλιν—κατεσκεύαζες*, and by *ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται* in Rep. vii. p. 535, E., where one would prefer *θρέμμα ὑοβοιωτὸν*, in allusion to Pindar's *Βοιωτίαν ὗν* in Ol. vi. 152, on which see Porson in Supplement, Præf. ad Hec. 57, who might have remarked, and so too might Meineke in Cratin. Fragm. 153, that the words *Οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν συοβοιωτοὶ* lie hid in *οὗτοι δ' αὖ σῦς* in Plutarch, *Περὶ Σαρκοφαγ.* ii. p. 995. E. See too Pseudo-Locr. Tim. p. 104, E. § 12, where the souls of the lascivious are feigned to be sent into swine; and Horace, "Epicuri de grege porcus," which I have quoted in p. 364, n. [4]—[4], to support my restoration "Epicurei suis." Or we might read in Rep., *ὥσπερ θρέμμα ἡμερον ὕειον*— and compare *ὅσων ἥμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι* in Legg. v. p. 713, D. Moreover, I cannot understand why Elmenhorst and Oudendorp should prefer "impotentiæ" to "potentiæ;" for assuredly the wealthy are not powerless, as shown by Rep. i. p. 336, A., *μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός*. Lastly, "omnia" might easily have been lost before "omnem—" Or we may read "—permiserint totum—" similar to "se totum dedit atque permisit," with which Apuleius closes his treatise De Mundo.

[5]—[5] In the letters "ejus sub" lie hid "ea jussu," not "ejus jussu," as Oudendorp imagined, for "ejus" is scarcely intelligible.

for all to obtain honours equally. After this there arises then [1]the individual head of that tyranny,[1] when he, who shall have broken through the laws through his contempt for them, [2]shall make an attack upon the government, after being fitted for it by a similar conspiracy amongst the lawless,[2] and ordain subsequently that the whole mass of citizens are to obey his desires and wishes, and to regulate their obsequiousness by such an aim.[3]

BOOK III.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF REASONING.[4]

[1.] THE study of wisdom, which we call philosophy, seems to most persons to contain three kinds or parts, relating to Nature, (and) Morals, and Reasoning, of which (last) I now propose to speak, and in which is comprehended the art of Discussion. But while we are discussing the subject of

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the reading in MS. Flor., "tyrannidis illius singulare caput," adopted by some editors; others have given "tyrannis illa singulare dominationis caput—" Oudendorp suggests "tyrannis illa et singularis (for so one MS.) dominationis caput—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "tyranni vis, belluæ similis, et singulare dominationis caput—" i. e. "the force of a tyrant, like to a wild beast—and the individual head of lordly rule."

[2]—[2] I have translated, as if the text were "simili illegum conjuratione aptatus ad imperium invaserit—" not "simili legum conjuratione adoptatum imperium invaserit—" which, as being unintelligible, various scholars have attempted to amend in various ways; of whom Lipsius alone has hit upon the truth by reading "illegum;" while, as regards "adaptatus," since Oudendorp vainly assimilates it to "cooptatus," I have altered it into "aptatus ad—"

[3] How true is this description of a tyranny, is shown by the history of not only ancient but modern times.

[4] There is another title, "Or about Interpretation—" which I have omitted, as being scarcely intelligible in English; although it is the very word taken from Aristotle, whom Apuleius, through the whole of this book, had constantly in mind; for of the rules and forms of Logic scarcely a vestige is to be found directly in the writings of Plato; while of the treatise itself Colvius truly says, towards the close of it, that it contains passages in not a sufficiently sound state, and such as cannot be restored without the aid of MSS., although something may be done in that way by comparing the Latin of Apuleius with the Greek of Aristotle.

speaking—of which there are various kinds, such as of giving a command [or orders],[1] of narrating, [being angry,][2] wishing, vowing,[3] being angry,[4] hating, envying, favouring, pitying, admiring, despising, reproaching, repenting, deploring, and as well of bringing pleasure, as of striking terror, in which it is the part of a superior speaker to be able to make statements, that are diffused, in a narrow compass, (and) what are narrowed, in a wide one; what is common-place, in a pretty manner; (and) what is new, in a customary one; [5]to make, what is great, little, and matters very great out of little;[5] and (to do) very many other things of that kind—there is amongst these one, relating for the most part to a Proposition. This is called enunciable, when it comprehends an absolute sentiment; and is the only one of all, [6]that is exposed to truth or falsehood;[6] which Sergius calls "Effatum" (an expression); [7]Varro, "proloquium" (a fore-speaking); Cicero, "enuntiatum" (an enunciation);[7] the Greeks, *πρότασιν* (a fore-stretching); likewise *ἀξίωμα*, which I (render)[8] word for word, as well by "protensionem," as by "rogamentum," [9](an asking,)[9] but which may be called more familiarly a proposition.

[2.] Now of Propositions, as well as of their Conclusions, there are two kinds; one, the Predicative, which is simple too,[10] as if we should say—"He, who rules, is happy;" another, Substitutive, or Conditional, which is compounded too,[11] as if you should say[12]—"He, who rules, if he is wise, is happy."

[1] As in the whole of this list "vel" is never found elsewhere, it is pretty evident that either "imperandi" or "mandandi" is an interpolation.

[2, 4] Either "succensendi" here, or "irascendi" in [6], is an interpolation.

[3] I have adopted "vovendi," suggested by Lipsius, in lieu of "fovendi."

[5—5] Compare Phædr. p. 267, A. § 113, where see Heindorf.

[6—6] Aristotle, *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, § 4, defines in like manner *ἀποφαντικὸν λόγον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.*

[7—7] Compare Seneca, Epist. 117, § 13, Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. xvi. 8, who drew their information chiefly from Cicero, Academ. iv. 29, Tuscul. i 7, and De Fato, 1, 1; 9, 19; 12, 28.

[8] I have supplied the verb required by the sense.

[9—9] Floridus correctly remarks, that "rogamentum" is not the meaning of *ἀξίωμα*— which is rather, "a settled opinion," like "axiom" in Geometry. In English, however, the word "question" is used in the sense of an inquiry into any subject for discussion.

[10, 11] It is difficult to understand why "etiam" should be thus written before "simplex," and "composita."

[12] In lieu of the unintelligible "Aiax," Nansius happily suggested "aias."

For you substitute a condition, through which a person, unless he is wise, is not happy. (But) we will now speak of the Predicative, which naturally precedes, and is, as it were. the element (i. e. the principle) of the Substitutive.

There are likewise other differences, (namely) of Quantity and Quality. Of Quantity, in that some are General; as "Every breathing thing is alive; others Particular, as "Some animals do not breathe;" others Undefined, as "Animal breathes;" for the assertion does not define, whether it is every one, or some one. [1]Nevertheless it always avails in the place of a Particular; because it is more safe to admit from what is uncertain that, which is less.[1] But of Quality, in that some are Affirmative;[2] because they affirm something about something, as "Virtue is a good;" for it affirms that there is goodness in Virtue; others Negative,[3] as "Virtue is not a good;" for it denies that there is goodness in Virtue. The Stoics consider this too an Affirmative, when they say "It happens to a certain pleasure to be not a good." It affirms therefore, what happens to it, that is, what it is. For that reason, they say, it is Affirmative, because it affirms there is in that thing, in which it has denied there is that, which does not seem to be in it; but they call that alone Negative, to which a negative particle is prefixed. Now these will be beaten[4] as well in other points as in this, should a person make this inquiry, [5]"That, which has not substance, does not exist." For they will be compelled, according to

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of words, which, I confess, I do not understand. Martianus Capella, who evidently drew from the same source as Apuleius did, or rather Pseud.-Apuleius, according to Hildebrand, has in iv. § 396, more intelligibly—"Quod igitur indefinite dicimus, necessario particulariter accipimus; non necessario universaliter; et quoniam id potissimum enumerandum, quod securum habet intellectum, indefinitum pro particulari accipitur."

[2] The word in Apuleius is "dedicativæ," derived from "dedico," which Nonius identifies with "dico—" The modern expression is "Affirmative;" which I have adopted throughout.

[3] The word in Apuleius is "Abdicativæ," answering to the modern "Negative."

[4] I have translated, as if the text were, not "vincuntur," but "vincentur," as required by the subsequent "rogaverit—"

[5]—[5] Floridus, after making an attempt to unravel the meaning of the words between the numerals, ends his note by saying, that "he would be glad, if any person could produce a better explanation of a difficult passage."

what they assert, to confess that, what has no substance, is that, which does not exist.[5]

[3.] A proposition, says Plato in the Theætetus,[1] consists of two parts of speech, a noun and verb, in the fewest words, as "Apuleius discusses;" which is either true or false; and is therefore a proposition. From whence some[2] have laid it down, that there are only those two parts of speech; because from those alone can be formed a perfect speech, that is, one which includes a sentence entirely; and that adverbs and pronouns and participles and conjunctions, and the rest of things of that kind, which Grammarians enumerate, are no more the parts of speech than are the (parts) of ships their ornaments, or of men their hairs; but[3] that in the whole framework of a speech they are certainly to be reckoned in the place of bolts and pitch and glue. Moreover, of the two parts before-mentioned one is called the Subjective,[4] as if it were placed under, as "Apuleius;" the other the Declarative,[5] as "discusses," or "discusses not;" for it declares what Apuleius is doing. It is permissible, however, while the meaning remains the same, to extend each part to more words; as if, instead of "Apuleius," you should say, "the Platonic philosopher of Madaura;" and in like manner, instead of "discussing," you should say that "he is making use of a speech." For the most part the Subject is the mind

[1] The passage alluded to is not, I think, in the Theætetus, but in the Sophist, p. 262, C. § 103, where the Stranger, while conversing with Theætetus, says that "words cannot express an act, or the existence of any thing, unless a person mixes up verbs with nouns; and then, if they have been fitted properly, their combination becomes a speech, nearly of all speeches the first and shortest. . . . When, therefore, a person says, 'Man learns,' you assert that this is the shortest speech and the first—" for so that passage should have been translated, where Plato evidently wrote *τότε δὲ, εἰ ἥρμοστο εὖ ἐκεῖνα, λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ συμπλοκὴ, σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ σμικρότατος* – not *τότε δὲ ἥρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκὴ, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων πρώτος*— where *ἥρμοσε* and *σχεδὸν* are equally at variance with syntax and sense.

[2] Of the modern Philologists, who have adopted this notion, the principal are Hemsterhuis and Horne Tooke.

[3] I have translated, as if the text were "at," not "aut—" which is here unintelligible.

[4, 5] Instead of "Subjective" and "Declarative," the expressions in modern Logic are "Subject" and "Predicate;" which I have adopted generally elsewhere.

(in a proposition), and the Predicate the major, inasmuch as it embraces not only this Subject, but others likewise. For not only does Apuleius discuss, but many others who can be comprehended under the same Predicate; unless perchance a peculiarity belonging to something is predicated of it; as if you should say, "That, which is a horse, is able to neigh;" now "to neigh" is peculiar to a horse. Hence in these peculiarities equal is the Predicate, and equal too the Subject; but not, as in other cases, (the former,)[1] is the major; since, when[2] the same proposition might conversely become the Subject, and have as the Predicate of itself that, which it had previously as the Subject; as if, by changing the order,[3] you should say, "That, which is able to neigh, is a horse." But you would not be able to convert in like manner the terms, when they are unequal. For, not because it is true that "Every man is an animal," will it on that account be true, if you convert the terms, that "Every animal is a man." For it is not as peculiar to a man to be an animal, as it is to a horse to neigh; since there are other animals without number. Hence the Predicate is known in many ways; although the question be proposed in a converse order. First, because the Predicate can embrace more things than the Subject; next, because it is never ended by a Noun, but always by a Verb; by which especially it is distinguished even in the peculiarities alluded to from an equal Subject. This likewise is to be considered in the way of a comparison, that as propositions [4](taken as a whole)[4] are both definite and indefinite, so it is agreed that portions of them, Subjective as well as Declarative, are partly defined, as "man" (and) "animal," and partly undefined, as "not a man" (and) "not an animal." For they do not define what a thing is, when (they say) it is not, but merely show that there is something else besides it.

[1] I have added "the former" for the sake of perspicuity.

[2] If "cum" be retained, the apodosis of the sentence will be wanting; and if it be rejected, it is difficult to say, from whence it came.

[3] Such is the proper meaning here and elsewhere of "mutata vice—"

[4—4] I have added the words between the numerals for the sake of the antithesis in "particulas—" The Delphin editor explains, however, "particulas" by "vocabula—" with a view of making something like sense out of what would be otherwise nonsense.

[4.] We must now state in what manner these four[1] propositions are affected towards each other; which it will not be foreign to the purpose to view in the figure of a square. Let there be then on the upper line, as expressed below,[2] an Affirmative and a Negative, (both) Universal, as "All pleasure is a good," (and) "No pleasure is a good;" and let these be called Disagreeing.[3] And in like manner on the lower line under each (Universal) let a Particular be noted, "Some pleasure is a good," (and) "Some pleasure is not a good;" and let these be called "Sub-equals"[4] to each other. Then let oblique lines be drawn from the angles (of the square), one extending from the Universal Affirmative to the Particular Negative; another from the Particular Affirmative to the Universal Negative; and let them, as they are the contrary to each other in Quantity and Quality, be called "One or the other,"[5] because it is necessary for one or the other to be true; which is called a perfect and whole contest; but between the Sub-equals and the Disagreeing the contest is divided; because the

[1] Namely, 1. an Universal Affirmative; 2. an Universal Negative; 3. a Particular Affirmative; 4. a Particular Negative.

[2] Although "infra scriptum est" is found here, and further on "ostendunt infra scripta—" yet in both places one would prefer "in figura—"



[3, 4] In modern Logic, the expressions are "Contrary" and "Subcontrary." See the figure in Aldrich's Logic.

[5] Such is the literal meaning of "alterutræ." The expression in Aristotle is ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμεναι, or simply ἀντιφάσεις, as remarked by others. Hence in modern Logic the expression is "Opposites," "Contradictory."

Disagreeing never become at the same time true, although they are occasionally at the same time false; while conversely the Sub-equals are never indeed false at the same time, although occasionally they are at the same time true; and on this account the refutation of either of these confirms the other; whereas the confirmation of either does not refute the other. But of the Disagreeing he, who has laid down[1] either one, takes off[2] the other, whereas conversely he, who takes off either one, does not lay down the other. For in truth he, who confirms either of (the so-called One or the other)[3] never refutes the other; while[4] he, who refutes the other confirms either of the (so-called) [5]One or the other.[5] But when either of the Universals is proved, it confirms its own Particular; but when it is refuted, it does not weaken it; and conversely, when either of the Particulars is refuted, it weakens its own Universal; but, when it is proved, it does not confirm it. Now that all this is so, as we assert, that, which is delineated below,[6] easily shows from the propositions themselves. For it is ascertained what a person concedes, who shall have made any proposition.

[5.] Now either of the Universals is destroyed in three ways; when its Particular is shown to be false, or either one of the two others, whether the Disagreeing or the Sub-neutral.[7] But it is supported in one way, if the Sub-neutral[8] belonging

[1, 2] Such is the literal version of "posuit" and "tollit;" which the Delphin editor interprets by "probavit" and "negat."

[3] I have added these words to show that they refer to the definition mentioned a little above.

[4] The antithesis evidently requires "at," not "et—"

[5—5] As the MSS. vary between "alteram" and "quamvis," I have translated, as if the text were "alterutrarum quamvis," for the sake of the antithesis.

[6] Here too, for the balance of the sentence, I have translated, as if "utravis" had dropt out after "autem—"

[7] See p. 386, n. [2], where the figure alluded to is given.

[8] The strange word, "sub-neutra," which Oudendorp has adopted from three MSS., seems to have been coined, like "sub-par," and is taken by that editor in the sense of "alterutra—" found here in the text of some MSS., and written as a gloss over "sub neutra" in others. But though, as Oudendorp remarks, "sub-neutra" could hardly proceed from the brain of a transcriber, yet as it has not been used before, it seems scarcely probable that it would be used here without some explanation. Hence I once suspected, that Apuleius wrote "subneutra, velut alterutra—" just as he has on a former occasion, "altera subjectiva nominatur, velut sub-

to it is shown to be false. On the other hand, either of the Particulars[1][2] is destroyed,[3] if its Sub-neuter.[4] But it is supported in three ways; if its Universal is true, or either of the two others is false, whether its Sub-equal or Sub-neuter.

The same facts we shall observe in the case of Equivalent propositions. Now those are said to be "Equivalent," which under another enunciation have an equal power, and are at the same time true, or at the same time false, one on account of the other, as the Undefined[5] and the Particular. Moreover every proposition, if it assumes at its commencement a Negative particle, becomes (as)[6] its Sub-alternate Equivalent; as when there is an Universal Affirmative, "All pleasure is a good," if a negation be prefixed to it, it will be "Not all pleasure is a good," having the same meaning as its Sub-alternate had, "Some pleasure is not a good." And in the three other propositions the same thing is to be understood.

[6.] Then with respect to Conversion, an Universal Negative and its Sub-alternate, a Particular Affirmative, are said to be Convertible propositions, on that account, because their portions, Subjective and Declarative, are able to preserve always their mutual changes, the condition of truth or falsehood still remaining. For as this proposition is true—"No prudent man is impious—" so, if you make a change in its parts, it will be true (to say), "No impious man is prudent." In like manner, as it is false (to say), "No man is an animal," so, if you make a change, it will be false (to say), "No animal is man." By parity of reasoning a Particular Affirmative becomes Convertible, "A certain grammarian is man," and

dita." By referring, however, to the diagram, it would seem that both "alterutra" and "subneutra," would be best understood by "the diagonal" or "cross" proposition. But I have preferred the word "Sub-alternate," adopted in modern Logic, as the translation of "alterutra."

[1] Since "subneutra" has been used just above in the sense of "alterutra," so, I think, it was written originally, both here and in the next sentence ([4]), instead of "alterutra—" as I have translated.

[2] I have translated, as if "utravis" had been lost before "Particularis—" for it is absolutely requisite to balance the preceding "utravis Universalis."

[3] I have adopted "destruitur" from one MS., similar to "destruitur" just before; for the future would have no meaning here.

[5] What is here called "Undefined," answers to the "Universal" mentioned above.

[6] I have translated, as if "uti" had been lost after "fit—"

"A certain man is a grammarian." This result the two other propositions cannot always effect; although they sometimes undergo a Conversion; nor yet are they on that account said to be Convertible; for that which sometimes [1] deceives, is rejected as uncertain.[1] Each proposition must therefore be laid open[2] through all its significations, as to whether it agrees, when it is taken Conversely. [3] Nor are those universally true;[3] but only five. For either the peculiarity of something is declared, or its genus, or difference, or [4] defined limit,[4] or accident; nor beyond these (predicates) can any thing be found in any proposition. For instance, should you lay down "man" as the subject, you would say something of him, or mark out a peculiarity of his, as "being able to laugh;"[5] or his genus, as "an animal;" or his difference, as "being rational;" or defined limit, as "a mortal animal endued with reason;" or accident, as "being an orator." Since every thing, which is Declarative of any thing, either can, or cannot, be in turn its Subjective. And if it can, it either marks out what it is, and is (thus) a defined limit; or it does not mark out, and is (thus) a peculiarity. But if it cannot, there is either that, which ought to be placed in the definition, and (thus) there is a genus or difference; or what ought not (to be placed), and is (thus) an accident. Through these means then it will be known that the Particular Negative is not convertible. Now the Universal Affirmative is not by itself convertible; but it can be nevertheless made convertible,

[1]—[1] So Oudendorp from conjecture. The MSS. vary between "fallitur certum," and "fallitur certo," and "fallitur certi—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "fallit, pro incerto—" as I have translated.

[2] Instead of "reperienda," Wower suggested "repetenda—" I have translated, as if Apuleius had written "aperienda—"

[3]—[3] So Oudendorp from MS. Petav.; another reads "nec universæ vere sunt;" a third, "nec innumeræ revera sunt istæ—" which seems far preferable, as regards the antithesis in "quinque solæ—" I confess, however, I do not see what the writer meant by the words between the numerals. I could have understood, "Nor are Universal propositions in reality numberless, but only these five—" in Latin, "nec universæ sunt innumeræ revera; sed istæ quinque solæ."

[4]—[4] By "finis," some understand "definition," others "limit." I have united both.

[5] On laughter, as a peculiarity of man, Kopp, on Martian. Capell. iv. 348, refers to Pollux, vi. 200, Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 26, and Porphyr. Isagog. i. 4, and 6

as a Particular. For example, when the proposition is, "Every man is an animal," it cannot be converted, so as to be, "Every animal is a man;" but it may be, as a Particular, "A certain animal is man." But this (is) in a simple [1]conversion, which is called in the inferences of conclusions a Reflex.[1] There is likewise another Conversion of propositions, which draws not only the order, but likewise the parts themselves to the contrary; so that, what is defined, becomes undefined; and, on the other hand, what is undefined (becomes) defined. This conversion the two remaining, (namely,) the Universal Affirmative and the Particular Negative, admit in turn; as, "Every man is an animal;" (and) "Every thing, that is not an animal, is not a man;" in like manner, "A certain animal is not rational;" (and) "A certain thing, which is not rational, is (not)[2] an animal." Now that this is so constantly, as we have said, you will discover by exploring all the five species before-mentioned.

[7.] The combination of propositions is said to be their connexion through another common part,[3] by which they are united; for they can thus agree towards one conclusion. Now that common part must needs be in both propositions the Subject, or in both the Predicate; or in one the Subject, (and) in the other the Predicate. The forms therefore become three; of which let that be called the first, when that common part is in one the Subject, in the other the Predicate; which order [4]is content not with an enumeration only, but with the worthiness of the conclusions;[4] since the third form

[1]—[1] This is now called "a conversion by contraposition," which takes place, says Floridus, when a proposition is inverted, although its quantity is preserved, so that defined terms become undefined by the addition of the negative particle; and in this manner alone is a Particular Negative inverted. With regard, however, to the words, there seems to be a want of precision here; for elsewhere "conversio" and "reflexio" are synonymous, and so too are "conclusio" and "illatio."

[2] I have inserted, what Floridus has suggested, the negative particle, required by the sense.

[3] This is now called in Logic "a middle term," as remarked by Floridus.

[4]—[4] Such is the literal version of the text, and this the Delphin editor's interpretation, "which arrangement depends not merely upon an accidental enumeration, but on the excellence of the inferences." But as there is nothing in the text to answer to "fortuita," that word has been evidently introduced to make something like sense out of what seemed to

is the last; because from it nothing is inferred, except a Particular; (but) superior to this is the second, which contains Universal inferences, but only of a Negative kind: and the first is thus the powerful one, because in it[1] every kind of inferences is contained. Now I call that an inference or inferential question[2] which is collected and inferred from admissions. Moreover an admission is the proposition, which is conceded by the respondent; for instance, should a person propose (this question)—Is every honourable thing good?—it is a proposition; and if (the respondent)[3] says that he assents, there is, on the question being removed, an admission; which is itself in common parlance the proposition—"Every honourable thing is good." To this you may unite[4] another admission proposed and conceded in a similar manner—"Every good thing is useful." From this combination arises, as we shall presently show, the inferential (kind) of the first mode; Universal, if (stated) Directly—"Therefore every honourable thing is useful;" (but) Particular, if (stated) Inversely,[5]—"Therefore a useful thing is honourable;" because a Universal Affirmative can be converted in the manner of a Particular only in the case of Inverted Propositions. Now an inference I say is made Directly [6]when the same part is the Subject, as well in the combination as in the inference itself;[6] and likewise the Predicate is the same, when it exists in both ways; but it is made Inversely, [7]when the same thing takes place in an inverse order.[7]

be otherwise nonsense. One MS. has "numeri ratione," from which however nothing seems to be gained.

[1] I have translated, as if the text were not "in omne genus—concluditur—" but "in ea omne—"

[2] On the meaning of "rogamentum," see iii. § 1, p. 382, n. [9]—[9].

[3] I have inserted the respondent, for the sake of perspicuity.

[4] I have translated, as if the text were "jungere est," not "junge."

[5] So I have translated here and elsewhere "reflexim."

[6]—[6] Such is the literal version of the text; and this the Delphin editor's interpretation, "as well in one of the combined propositions, as in the conclusion itself;" while he says in the note, "that this takes place when the Subject of one Conclusion is the Subject in one of the Premises, but the Predicate of the same Conclusion is the Predicate in another of the Premises. But how "conjugatio," literally "a combination of propositions," can be applied to one of the propositions so combined, I cannot understand.

[7]—[7] That is, says Floridus, when the Predicate of the Conclusion is the Subject in one of the Premises, but the Subject is the Predicate in another.

[8.] Now let the whole of the reasoning, which is made up of admissions and inferences, be called by the name of a gathering-together of a conclusion; (and) it may be most conveniently defined, according to Aristotle,[1] as "a discourse, in which some things being conceded, something else beside what have been conceded, necessarily turns out, but yet through what have been conceded." In which definition no other kind of a discourse is to be understood than what is enunciable; which, as we have stated above,[2] is alone either true or false. And the expression, "some things being conceded," is put in the plural on that account, because a gathering together cannot take place from one admission; although it appears to Antipater the Stoic,[3] contrary to the opinion of all, that (this)[4] conclusion is complete—"Thou seest; therefore thou art alive;" whereas it would be complete in this way—"If thou seest, thou art alive; but thou dost see, therefore thou art alive." Moreover, because we want to draw a Conclusion not in what is conceded, but in what is denied, on that account (it is stated)[5] in the definition that "something else necessarily turns out, beside what has been conceded." On which account the forms adopted by the Stoics are superfluous, that go through not the same thing in a different manner. For example—"It is day or night. Now it is day."[6] Moreover, they double the same—"If day is, day is; therefore day is." Vainly then do they draw an inference, where a

[1] In Analytic. i. 1, Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστι—λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν, ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. There is a less perfect definition of a syllogism in Alcinous, § 6.

[2] See iii. § 1, p. 382, n. [6]—[6].

[3] This Antipater, the Stoic of Tyre, was the preceptor of Cato the younger, as we learn from the Life of the Roman by Plutarch.

[4] I have translated, as if "hæc" had dropt out between "plena" and "conclusio—"

[5] I have added these words for the sake of perspicuity.

[6] To complete the Syllogism, there is evidently wanting the Conclusion, "Therefore it is not night—" as in Isidorus Origin. ii. 28, "Quartus modus est ita—Aut dies est aut nox. Utique dies est. Nox ergo non est:" unless it be said that Apuleius designedly omitted the Conclusion, to show how illogically the Stoics reasoned; as Cicero does in Academ. Quæst. ii. 24, 'Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet. Lucet autem. Lucet igitur.' Crederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio connexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere:" a passage the most apt for enabling us to understand here the pseudo-syllogism immediately following

concession is made willingly and without a controversy. This is more like the truth, when I assert—"If day is, there is light. Now day is. Therefore it is light," that I am not wrongly drawing a conclusion beyond what I have admitted. For "it is light," which is in the Conclusion, has been also in the (major) proposition. But this we will refute in this manner, (by saying) that, "therefore it is light," is said in a different manner in the Conclusion, so that it may be shown it is now light; but it is taken in a different manner in the (minor) proposition, in which it is not said, that it is now light, but merely that it follows, that, if there be day, there will be likewise light. Now there is a great difference, whether you affirm that something exists in this way now, or merely that it is wont to be, when something else goes before. That too has taken place—namely, that in the same definition the idea of necessity has been included—in order that the force of the Conclusion may be distinguished from the likeness to an Induction. For in an Induction some things are conceded; for instance—"A man moves the lower jaw; a horse moves the lower jaw; and so does the ox and dog." From these admissions something else is inferred in the Conclusion—"Therefore every animal likewise moves the lower jaw." But as this is not true in the case of the crocodile, you cannot, although the preceding are conceded, admit the inference, which it would not have been lawful for you to refuse in the Conclusion; since the inference is comprehended in the admission itself; and on this account there has been added the expression—"turn out necessarily." Nor is even the last part of the definition superfluous; but it shows from the very things, which it has conceded, that the inference ought to turn out, but not that it would be established.

[9.] But on these points enough has been said. And we must now lay down, by what modes and combinations true conclusions take place within a determinate number of the Predicative kind (of propositions). [1]In the first form there are found nine modes, taken by themselves, but six combinations; in the second, four modes, (but) three combinations; in the third, six modes, (but) five combinations;[1] respecting which

[1] On these forms, modes, and combinations, the inquisitive reader must turn to Martian. Capell. iv. 411, and to the treatises on Logic by Aldrich and others.

(taken) in their order I will here put down the proofs, premising that a conclusion cannot be established from Particular propositions alone, or from Negative alone, because they can often lead even to what is false; moreover, that although, if either Negative[1] is united to many Affirmatives, an inference is produced, not Affirmative, but Negative, (still) only one (Negative), mixed with the rest, has any power. Similar too is the force of Particular propositions. For either of them,[2] if mixed with Universals, produces a particular inference.

Hence in the first form the first mode is that, which deduces[3] from Universal Affirmatives an Universal Affirmative directly, as,—"Every just thing is honourable. (Now) every honourable thing is good. Therefore every just thing is good." But if you draw the inference by a bend,[4] (for instance,) "Therefore a certain good thing is just," there is produced by the same combination the fifth mode; for in this manner alone I have shown above can an Universal Affirmative undergo a bend.[5]

The second mode is that, which deduces from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, an Universal Negative directly, as—"Every just thing is honourable. (But) no honourable thing is base. Therefore no just thing is base." Now if you draw the inference by a bend, as, "Therefore no just thing is base," you will produce the sixth mode; for, as it has been stated, an Universal Negative is bent back on itself. We ought however to remember only that the Subject is to be drawn from the Affirmative to the inference in the second mode, and on that account it (the Affirmative) is to be considered the prior, although the Negative is enunciated previously. In like manner in the case of the rest that, which

[1] General or Particular. [2] Affirmative or Negative.

[3] I have translated here and elsewhere, as if the text were "deducit," not "conducit—" which Oudendorp says, after Isidorus in Origin. ii. 28, has the same meaning as "colligere—" which is found in the same sense towards the end of this book, "illationes colligit," and "colligunt—illationem."

[4] In the terms of the Syllogism, by substituting a Particular in the place of an Universal assertion.

[5] So I have translated literally "reflectitur:" for which there is no corresponding expression in modern logic, that preserves the metaphor, which is scarcely seen in the word "inverted," generally adopted as the proper version.

is the prior in power,[1] is to be undestroyed as the prior (in order). But in the sixth mode the Subjective is drawn from the Negative; (and) this is their only difference.

Further, the third mode (is that), which deduces from Affirmatives, Particular and Universal, a Particular Affirmative, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) every honourable thing is useful. Therefore a certain just thing is useful." But if you draw an inference with a bend—Therefore a certain useful thing is just—you will produce the seventh mode; for, as it has been stated, a Particular Affirmative is turned back on itself.

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Affirmative and an Universal Negative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no honourable thing is base. Therefore a certain just thing is not base." From this mode are discovered the changes contrary to the preceding; [2]since the eighth and ninth preserve the inference of that (proposition), not as it is bent by it; (and) the (two) merely bend the combination itself[2] by propositions (called)[3] Equivalent, and in an inverted order, so that the Negative becomes the prior; and thus (the mode)[4] is said to deduce both by an inversion of the combinations. For if you insert the Universal Negative of the fourth (mode) and subjoin to it the Universal Affirmative, which the Particular Affirmative shall have inverted, there will be produced the eighth mode,[5] which deduces from Universals, Negative

[1] i. e. which contains the Subject.

[2—2] Such is the literal version of the text of Oudendorp, who has adopted, with Floridus, the readings of the Carnot MSS. in lieu of the corruptions to be found in other documents. I confess, however I do not understand "non ut illi reflexam—" and the less so, as I do not know why "illi" should thus follow "ejus—" I suspect there is an omission here of some matter, which Apuleius drew from another source than Aristotle; who, as remarked by Floridus, rejects the five indirect modes of the first form as useless.

[3] I have inserted "called," remembering the passage in iii. § 5, where Apuleius defines the expression "propositiones æquipollentes."

[4] Oudendorp thus supplies "modus" as the nominative to "dicitur." Floridus adopts "dicuntur" from the Carnot MSS. But he is then compelled to take "conducere" in the sense of "concludere," a meaning which seems scarcely admissible.

[5] Since three modes, namely, the fifth, sixth, and seventh, here omitted, are found in the abridgment made of this book of Apuleius by Isidorus in Origin. ii. 28, Colvius conceives that something has been lost here,

and Affirmative, a Particular Negative, in a bent manner, as, "No base thing is honourable. (But) every honourable thing is just. Therefore a certain just thing is not base."

But why the fourth mode alone should generate two (others), (while) the rest (generate) only one each, the reason is, that if we invert both propositions of the second mode, there will be produced a vain combination of two Particular (propositions); but if only one or the other,[1] there will be produced either the second form or the third.

[10.] Of these nine modes in the first form the four first are called "Non-Demonstrable;" not because they cannot be demonstrated, as [2]the swelling of the tides of the whole sea, which has not been demonstrated as yet by a person, who knows the things of Nature, and[2] the squaring of the circle; but because they are so simple and so manifest, as not to require demonstration; so that they produce themselves the rest, and impart from themselves a belief in them.

Of the second form we will now lay down the modes.

The first mode in the second form is that, which deduces

which Isidorus met with in a more perfect MS. of Apuleius. But Hildebrand says that "the three modes, which Colvius asserts are wanting, have been explained already," and he refers to Martianus Capella iv. 411, but without remarking that there, as here, "Octavus modus—" follows the mention of "Quartus modus—" from which the just inference would be, that the MS. of this treatise, used by Martian. Capell., was less perfect than the one, which Isidorus possessed.

[1] I have adopted "alterutram," found in the Delphin interpretation, in lieu of "alteram," in the text at present; which cannot be opposed to "utramque—"

[2—2] So I have translated, as if the text were "universi maris æstuum tumentia, quod nondum demonstratum naturæ res scienti, et—" which I have elicited by uniting the readings of MS. Carnot, "universi maris æstimat quod non demonstrentur sicut," with that of MS. Petav., "universi maris estum quod nondum demonstratum ei sit ut—" where "æstuum tumentia" might easily have been corrupted into "æstimat," and "naturæ res scienti" into "-entur sicut;" while "tumentia" might be used for a substantive, as "faventia" is. But though no demonstration had been given of the cause of the tides by any Natural philosopher, still it had been remarked that "menstruis cursibus Lunæ decrementa et accessus fretorum atque æstuum deprehenduntur," to use the language of Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 731 = 332, where Elmenhorst refers to Strabo, iii. p. 173 = 262, and other writers, who have alluded to the subject. Oudendorp, however, proposes to read "ut universim Aristo æstimat, aut quod nondum demonstratum ei sit, ut—" conceiving that Apuleius alluded to Aristo, the Peripatetic philosopher of Alexandria, mentioned a little below, and by Diogenes Laert. in Zeno, § 164.

from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, an Universal Negative directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (But) no base thing is honourable. Therefore that, which is not just, is dishonourable." This[1] (mode) is reduced to the second not-demonstrable by its second terms being inverted.

The second mode is that, which deduces from the Universals, Negative and Affirmative, an Universal Negative directly, as, "No base thing is honourable. (But) every just thing is honourable. Therefore no base thing is just." This mode does not differ from the former combination, except that it draws the Subjective portion from the Negative to the inference; because the order of the enunciation is varied in this way, a circumstance that could not take place in the first form.

The third mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Affirmative and an Universal Negative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no base thing is honourable. Therefore a certain just thing is not base." In this proposition if we invert the Universal Negative, there will arise[2] the fourth not-demonstrable; [3]from which this is produced.[3]

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from a Particular Negative and an Universal Affirmative a Particular Negative directly, as, "A certain just thing is not base. (But) every bad thing is base. Therefore a certain just thing is not bad." Now this mode alone is proved through the impossible alone; about which kind of proposition we will speak, while explaining the modes of the third form.

[11.] In the third form the first mode is that, which deduces from Universal Affirmatives a Particular Affirmative as well directly as inversely, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) every just thing is good. Therefore a certain honourable thing is good," or thus, "Therefore a certain good thing is honourable." Since it matters not, what part from each proposition you make the Subject, as it does not matter, which you first enunciate. Hence Theophrastus does not

[1] I have adopted, with the Delphin interpreter, "hic" from MS. Petav. in lieu of "hæc—" which is without regimen. Compare, just below, "Hic—non differt—"

[2] I have translated, as if the text were "fiet," not "fit—"

[3—3] I confess I do not see any necessity for the words between the numerals.

rightly decide that on this account there is not one mode, but two.

The second mode is that, which deduces from Affirmatives, Particular and Universal, an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (And) every just thing is good. Therefore a certain honourable thing is good."

The third mode is that, which deduces from Affirmatives, Universal and Particular, an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) a certain just thing is good. Therefore a certain good thing is honourable."

The fourth mode is that, which deduces from Universals, Affirmative and Negative, a Negative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (But) no just thing is bad. Therefore a certain honourable thing is not bad."

The fifth mode is that, which deduces from an Affirmative Particular and a Negative Universal an Affirmative Particular directly, as, "A certain just thing is honourable. (But) no just thing is bad. Therefore a certain honourable thing is not bad."

The sixth mode is that, which deduces from an Affirmative Universal and a Negative Particular, a Negative Particular directly, as, "Every just thing is honourable. (And) a certain just thing is not bad. Therefore[1] a certain honourable thing is not bad."

[12.] Of these six modes, the three first are reduced to the third not-demonstrable, by the first proposition of the first and second (mode) being inverted; while the third has the same combination with the second, (but) differing in this alone, that it takes from an Universal its Subjective portion, inasmuch as it is reduced to the third by the inversion not only of the proposition but of the inference. In like manner the fourth and fifth are produced from the fourth not-demonstrable by their first propositions being inverted. But the sixth mode cannot be reduced to any not-demonstrable mode by either both propositions, or one, or the other,[2] being inverted; but it is proved merely by what is impossible; just as the fourth mode in the second form; and on that account both are numbered the last. But of the rest the arrangement is made

[1] I have adopted "igitur" from MS. Petav.

[2] Here, as in iii. § 9, p. 396, n. [1], I have translated, as if the text were "alterutra," not "altera," which cannot mean "one of two."

in all the forms according to the difference of the combinations and inferences. For since to make an assertion is prior to giving a denial, and an Universal has a greater power than a Particular, Universals are prior to Particulars; and to both are similar an Affirmation and an Inference; and that mode is placed before, which is reduced more quickly to the not-demonstrable mode, that is to say, by one inversion; which is one method of proving that those modes are fixed for a conclusion. There is likewise another method, which is common to all, even the not-demonstrable, and which is said to be through what is impossible, and is called by the Stoics the first laying down or the first exposition; which they define thus, "If from two (assertions) a third is deduced, one of them, [1]when it collects inferences (from) a contrary, leaves the contrary.[1] But the old (logicians) have thus defined, "When one or the other of (two) propositions is assumed, if the [2]inference of every conclusion is done away,[2] the remaining (proposition) is done away." Now this was invented in opposition to those, who, after admissions have been made, impudently refuse (to receive) what is deduced from them; while from that, which they deny, something may be discovered contrary to that, which they had previously conceded. Moreover, (since)[3] it is impossible for contraries to be at one and the same time true, they are consequently driven by what is impossible to the conclusion. Nor have logicians vainly laid down that that mode is true, in which the contrary to an inference, together with an admission, of one or the other[4] (proposition), does away the remaining one. But the Stoics conceive that an inference is rejected, by merely prefixing a

[1]—[1] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the text, where Oudendorp confesses he sticks fast; and so too did Floridus; who would elicit "Si ex duobus tertium quid colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrario illationis colligit contrarium relicti—" from the reading of MSS. Carnot, "si —— colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrarium illationis colligit, contrarium relinquit." Oudendorp has proposed "tollit" in lieu of "colligit," referring to "cujus adversum illationis —— tollit reliquam."

[2]—[2] I confess I cannot understand "conclusionis illatio," for the two words are elsewhere synonymous. With regard to "tollo," the Delphin interpreter considers it here, and every where else, as synonymous with "nego." See iii. § 4, p. 387, n. [1, 2].

[3] I have translated, as if "cum" had dropt out before "contraria—"

[4] I have adopted "alterutra," found in MS. Petav., in lieu of "altera—" See iii. § 9, p. 396, n. [4].

negative particle, or that one of the propositions is done away, as, for example, "All," (and) "Not all;" (or) "Some one," (and) "Not some one."[1]

[13.] There are then produced against each Conclusion eight of a contrary kind, which may be opposed to it; since each admission may be done away by two methods; and there are produced twice four conclusions by a negative particle being at one time prefixed to the inference, and at another, by one or the other[2] of the inferences being accepted. Let there be, as an example, the first not-demonstrable (mode)—"Every just thing is honourable. (And) every honourable thing is good. Therefore every just thing is good." Now he who, after admitting the propositions, denies the inference, must necessarily say—"Some one just thing is not good." To this if you prefix[3] the former of the two conceded—"Every just thing is honourable," an inference is produced, according to the second mode in the third form,—"Therefore some one honourable thing is not good;" which is repugnant to the second proposition, that had conceded that "Every honourable thing is good." In like manner this conclusion is altogether an opposite one, if, while things remain the same, you introduce its equivalent, as for instance,—"Therefore not every thing honourable is good." In a similar manner two other conclusions would be produced, if, as we have just now laid down the former proposition, so we assume the latter—"Some one just thing is not good. (But) every honourable thing is good," there will be produced[4] a double inference belonging to the fourth mode of the second form, (namely)—"Therefore not every just thing is honourable," or—"Therefore some one just thing is not honourable;" both of which are equally repugnant to the former proposition, which had conceded that—"Every just thing is honourable." While these four conclusions remain, the proposition alone being changed, if, in lieu of that, which was—"Some one just thing is not good,"

[1] Hildebrand has introduced here from MS. Petav. "Veteres vero et per alterutram. Igitur bifariam omnis non omnis, quidam—"

[2] Here, as elsewhere, the Delphin interpreter explains "alterutra" by "contradictory." See p. 386, n. [5].

[3] I have adopted "præponas," found in MS. Petav., in lieu of "proponas."

[4] Instead of "fit," the sense requires "fiet," what I have translated. See p. 397, n. [3].

you make the proposition—"Not every just thing is good," so that the inference may be done away in two methods, there will be through the same changes four conclusions of the second form. In like manner, if in lieu of the same proposition, you make it—"No just thing is good," so that the inference may be done away by three methods, there will be four conclusions of the third form, but only in the case of those which have an Universal inference. For that alone can be done away by three methods; but in the others there are only eight; which, if a person wishes, he will be able to arrange[1] singly under each mode through all the forms, after the example we have laid down, so that, [2]in the manner of persons arguing hypothetically by means of letters,[2] the order of the propositions being changed, while their power remains, the first not-demonstrable mode may be—"A (is affirmed) of every B. And B of every C. Therefore A is of every C." [3]They begin from the Declaring, and consequently from the second proposition. This mode then, made perfect according to these, becomes backwardly of this kind[3]—[4]"Every C (is) B. (And) every B (is) A. Therefore every C (is) A."[4] The Stoics however instead of letters adopt numbers,[5] as—"If there is a first, there is a second. But there is a first. Therefore there is a second." But Aristotle puts forth in the first form only four modes not-demonstrable; while Theophrastus and the

[1] Such seems to be what the train of thought requires. The MSS. vary between "suggere" and "suggerere." Lipsius would read "lngere—" Perhaps Apuleius wrote "subregere—"

[2—2] This is the manner adopted by Aristotle in his Analytics.

[3—3] Such is the literal version of the whole passage, as it is read in MSS. Carnot. But since in MS. Petav. the readings are "inferunt a declarata," in lieu of "incipiunt a declarante," and "modus secundus hos si prætexas" in lieu of "modus secundum hos perfectus—" I must leave for others to discover what Apuleius wrote, and to explain it, when discovered, with the aid of Floridus; who says that, "by the word 'Declarans' is meant that proposition, in which is found the Attribute of the Conclusion; which proposition Apuleius considers as the second, and holds that as the first, in which is found the Subject of the Conclusion—a point in which he is at variance with Aristotle; while by 'retro' is meant 'in an inverse order,' so that the second proposition may become the first, and in each proposition the Subject may be enunciated the first and the Attribute the last."

[4—4] I have adopted the interpretation of the Delphin editor.

[5] So too does Cicero in Topic. § 4, quoted by Kopp on Martian. Capell. iv. 420.

rest enumerate five; for [1]by uniting an Indefinite proposition,[1] they deduce likewise an Indefinite inference. But this it is needless to bring forward; since an Indefinite (proposition) is done away in the place of a Particular (one); and the modes become the same as those in the case of a Particular proposition.

[14.] So too we have shown there are four in the first form; which if a person wishes to double, by accepting an Indefinite in the place of a Particular, and subjoining an Indefinite inference, there will be in all twenty-nine.[2] But Aristo of Alexandria and some younger Peripatetics suggest moreover five other modes of an Universal inference, (namely,) three in the first form and two in the second; in the place of which they deduce [3]something of a Particular one; for it is very silly [3] for him, [4]to whom more has been conceded, to infer less.[4] Now it is proved that all the determinate modes in the three forms are only the nineteen, which we have shown above. (For) there are four propositions, (namely,) two Particulars (and) two Universals. Each of these, says Aristotle, is combined in four ways, so that it may be subjoined to itself,[5] and be put before three others; and thus there will be sixteen combinations in each form. Of these there are six that possess a power equally in all; two, when of Negatives either one precedes the other; but four, when of Particulars any one precedes itself, or is subjoined to another. For nothing can be concluded, whenever there are either two Particulars

[1]—[1] Here is evidently something defective. For it should be stated to what the indefinite proposition is united.

[2] MSS. Carnot. "octo et viginti" in lieu of "novem et viginti—" on which Floridus remarks that, as he cannot make out the number intended by Apuleius, he is in doubt as to the true reading; and so too is Oudendorp.

[3]—[3] I have translated, as if the text were "particularis inferant quid: perquam enim ineptum est—" not "particulares inferant; quod per quam ineptum est—" For "particulares" in the plural could not be opposed to the preceding singular "universalis illationis:" nor could the infinitive "concludere" thus depend upon the parenthetic sentence, "quod perquam ineptum est—"

[4]—[4] Compare the expression of Cicero, quoted in p. 392, n. [6], "cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere."

[5] How a proposition can be said "to be subjoined to itself," as here, or "to precede itself," as just afterwards, I cannot understand; and the less so, as I do not know to what passage of Aristotle Apuleius is alluding.

or two Negatives. There remain then for each form ten combinations. Moreover out of these, as well in the first as second form, two possess no power, when an Universal Affirmative is placed before a Particular one. Similarly in both the first and second form two may be cut out, in which a Particular Negative precedes either of the Universals. From whence it arises that there remain of the first form six combinations, in nine modes; (and) still eight for the two remaining forms; of which there is one, that is proved in neither of them, when an Universal Negative precedes a Particular Affirmative. Of those seven, which remain, there are four in the second form peculiar (and) false, when an Universal Affirmative is united either to itself or to its Particular in any place, or when the other precedes. In like manner two in the third form are peculiar (and) possess no power, when either of the Negatives precedes an Universal Affirmative; but the remaining three in the second form, and five in the third, we have shown to be determinate, when we reduced them to six combinations of the first form. Hence out of forty-eight combinations fourteen alone are proved. The remaining thirty-four, which I have reckoned up, are rejected, because they are able to exhibit false conclusions from true premises; of which it is easy for any one to make a trial by means of the five significations mentioned above, of kind, peculiarity, &c. But of those fourteen, which we have proved, the inferences themselves show that there are not more modes than have been stated above, so that they may be received as well directly as inversely, as far as the very truth permits; and on that account their number cannot be increased.

SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE DIALOGUES AND OF THE EPISTLES

OF

PLATO.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The edition of Plato to which the following remarks are constantly referred, is that printed by Henry Stephens in 1578, in three volumes folio. But almost every other edition may be used with equal convenience, as the pagination of Stephens is given in the margin.

PREFACE

BY MATTHIAS.

BEFORE the reader enters on the perusal of this section, it is proper that he should be informed of what he is to expect. When the editor first heard that the works of Plato had been the subject of Mr. Gray's serious and critical attention, and that he had illustrated them by an analysis and by ample annotations, his curiosity was raised to no ordinary height. When the names of Plato and of Gray, of the philosopher and of the poet, were *thus* united, it was difficult to set bounds to his, or indeed to any, expectation. But when the volume, containing these important remarks, was *first* delivered into his hands, his sensation at the time reminded him of that which was experienced by an eminent scholar, at his discovery of the darker and more sublime hymns which antiquity has ascribed to Orpheus. His words on that occasion are as pleasing and as interesting as the enthusiasm was noble which inspired them: "In abyssum quendam mysteriorum descendere videbar, quum silente mundo, solis vigilantibus astris et lunâ, μελανήφατους istos hymnos in manus sumpsi."[1] Many a learned man will acknowledge, as his own, the feelings of this animated scholar.

It might, indeed, be conceived that, from the intense contemplation on the subjects offered to him by Plato, so full of dignity and so pregnant with the materials of thought, Mr. Gray might have indulged himself in a continuation of the discussions, by expanding still wider the exalted and diversified ideas of his sublime original. He had a spirit equal and adapted to such an exertion, and congenial with that of the philosopher; but it seems as if he had, on purpose, restrained his own powers and tempered their ardour. What he chiefly sought and aimed at, and what he indeed effected, was to exhibit the sobriety of truth, the importance of the doctrines, and the great practical effects of true philosophy on life, on manners, and on policy;

Ψυχῆς ὄμμα φαεινὸν ὑπὲρ βιότοιο τιταίνων.

He never for a moment deviated from his original; as he was desirous only to lay before himself and his reader the sum and substance of the

[1] See the Preface of Eschenbach to the Argonautics, the Hymns, &c. of Orpheus, edit. 1689.

dia ogues as they are, when divested of the peculiar attractions which so powerfully recommend these conversations on the banks of the Ilyssus. As a scholar, and as a reflecting man, he sat down to give an account to himself of what he had read and studied; and he gave it in words of his own, without addition, without amplification, and without the admixture of any ideas with those of Plato. He made large and valuable remarks and annotations, drawn from the stores of his own unbounded erudition, with a felicity and an elegance which never lost sight of utility and of solid information, without the display of reading, or the encumbrance of pedantic research. He never pretended to have consulted manuscripts, but, whenever he thought that an alteration of the text was necessary, or when a passage appeared to him to be obscure or corrupted, he proposed his own conjectural emendation. Yet it is pleasing to know, that Mr. Gray neither despised nor depreciated the advantages which may be derived from minuter and more subtle verbal criticism, and from the rectifying, or from the restoration, of the text of any author by that steady light which shone full on Bentley, and which, in after times, descended upon Porson. What he proposed to himself, that he effected; and through the whole of these writings there is such a perspicuity of expression, an eloquence so temperate, a philosophic energy so calm and unaffected, and the train of the specific arguments in each composition is presented so entire and unbroken, that his spirit may be said to shine through them; and, in this point of view, the words of Alcinous to Ulysses have a peculiar force, when applied to Mr. Gray;

> Σοὶ ἔνι μὲν μορφὴ ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί,
> Μῦθον δ', ὡς ὅ τ' ἀοιδὸς, ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας.[1]

His illustrations from antiquity, and from history, are as accurate as they are various and extensive. When, for instance, we peruse many of his notes drawn from those sources, we have often, as it were, the memoirs of the time and the politics of Syracuse; and scarcely could a modern writer feel himself more at home in the reign of Charles the Second, than Mr. Gray in the court of Dionysius. Or, if we turn to subjects of a different nature, where shall we find a nobler specimen of judicious analysis, and of manly, eloquent, interesting, and animated composition, than in his account of the *Protagoras?* But it would be useless, or invidious, to specify particulars where all is excellent. It is a proud consideration for Englishmen, that Mr. Gray composed all his remarks in his own native tongue, and with words of power *unsphered the spirit of Plato.*

In an age like this, it would be superfluous to speak of the merits and the character of the great philosopher, who has found *such* a commentator. We all know, that when Cicero looked for the master and for the example of eloquence and of finished composition, he found that master and that example in Plato; and all succeeding times have confirmed his judgment.

Plato has certainly ever been, and ever will be, the favourite philosopher of great orators and of great poets. He was himself familiar with the father of all poetry The language of Plato, his spirit, his animated

[1] Odyss. xi. 366.

reasoning, his copiousness, his invention, the rhythm and the cadence of his style, the hallowed dignity and the amplitude of his conceptions, and that splendour of imagination with which he illuminated every subject, and threw into the gloom of futurity the rays of hope and the expectations of a better life, have always endeared and recommended him to the good and to the wise of every age and of every nation. From the legitimate study of *his* works, from that liberal delight which they afford, and from the expanded views which they present, surely it cannot be apprehended that any reader should be "spoiled through philosophy and vain deceit."

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE WORKS OF PLATO

BY FLOYER SYDENHAM.

THE dialogues[1] of Plato are of various kinds, not only with regard to those different matters, which are the subjects of them, but in respect also of the manner in which they are composed or framed, and of the form under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will not therefore be improper to distinguish the several kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general, and then, subdividing them into the subordinate kinds; till we come to those lower species, which particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective denominations.

The most general division of the writings of Plato is, into those of the sceptical, and into those of the dogmatical, kind. In the former, nothing is expressly either proved or asserted; as some

[1] Socrates, the hero of these dramatic dialogues, lived a private life at Athens; quiet and studious, yet in the highest degree social, deigning his converse and communicating his knowledge, in proper measure, to all sorts of people: in this city therefore must of course lie the ordinary scene of those conversations, in which Socrates presides, or hath a share. As however that wise man used much exercise, and died before his days of exercise were past, probability admits the scene to be now and then diversified, by being changed to the adjacent country. Nor is it in these cases either confined to one spot of ground, or in general only, and at large, rural; sometimes it opens into the walks round the city-walls, and, at other times, is lengthened along the way to some appendant sea-port or village: now it is widened into the fields and groves; and now winds along the banks of the Ilyssus. Of those conversations which pass within the city, the particular spot is no less varied: here it is the open street; there the private house of one of the company; but oftenest one or other public place of general resort; the place of exchange, or some court of judicature; the place where the gymnic exercises were used, or some school where they were taught: neither is the banquet-room nor the prison wanting, to complete the variety. But in every dialogue the exactest care is taken to adapt the scene as much as possible to the subject, and even in the same dialogue the scene is shifted, if the economy of the drama require the different parts of it to be disposed in different places. By all this diversification propriety is preserved, the fancy, which is fond of change, is entertained, and the speculative mind is presented with a true, that is, with a variegated picture of human life.

philosophical question only is considered and examined, and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions, and to discover such truths, as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done either in the way of inquiry, or in that of controversy and of dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that is done, either indirectly, by involving them in difficulties and embarrassing the maintainers of them; or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those dialogues, whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; which is effected, either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom and by showing in what manner to investigate it, or by leading the way and helping the mind forward in the search.

The dialogues of the other kind, namely, the dogmatical or didactic, teach explicitly some point of doctrine: and this they do, either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and of argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, and at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching, used by Plato, proceeds either through analytical reasoning, resolving things into their principles, and from known or allowed truths tracing out the unknown; or through induction, from a multitude of particulars inferring some general thing in which they all agree.

According to this division is framed the following scheme, or table:



The philosopher, in thus varying his manner and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain the reader with their variety, nor to teach him, on different occasions, with more or less plainness and perspicuity, nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method as a consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of writing; and from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or from different ingredients in their mixture, he produces some peculiar genius and turn of temper, as it were, in each.

Socrates, indeed, is in almost all of them the principal speaker, but when he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist, when the modest wisdom and clear science of the one are contrasted with the confident ignorance and the blind opinionativeness of the other, dispute and controversy must of course arise; where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, if there be no other persons present, because such a man can never be coufuted in his own opinion; but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist must be convicted and exposed.

In some dialogues, Plato represents his great master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these persons happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues; in which, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited, and that of the disciple is encouraged, and, by proper questions, the mind also is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings and of more enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth, with all the demonstration possible in the teaching it, is due. Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or demonstrative genius: it is of the analytical kind, when the principles of mind or of science, the leading truths, are to be unfolded; and of the inductional kind, when any subsequent truth of the same rank with others, or any part of science, is meant to be displayed.

But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which kind is the doctrine of outward nature, being only hypothetical and a matter of opinion; the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional and the matter of obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of ancient sages; but in the latter, it is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a legislator. That this turn may be given to such dialogues with propriety, and with justice to the character of the speakers, the reasoning Socrates is laid aside, or he only sustains some lower and obscure part; while that which is the principal, or the shining, part is allotted to some other philosopher, to whom

may properly be attributed a more authoritative manner; or to such an antiquary, as may be credited or may be deemed to have received the best information; or finally, to such a statesman or politician, as may fairly be presumed best qualified for making laws.

Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Plato are severally composed, and for the turn of genius which is given to them in their composition. The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three sorts: 1. Either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy; or, 2. Purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing and communicated to some absent friend; or, 3. It is of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where the story of things past is recited to some person present.

Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, with respect to that inward form or composition, which creates their genius; and again with reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other vegetables, with a certain character; we are to make a further division of them, with regard to their subject and to their design, beginning with their design or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that, which is the end of all true philosophy or wisdom, I mean, the perfection and the happiness of man. Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy must be to inquire, what is that being, called man, who is to be made happy; and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness.

The philosopher considers man as a compound being, consisting of body and of soul, the superior part of which soul is mind, by which he is intimately connected with the divine nature, and of near kindred to it; while the inferior part is made up of passions and of affections, reducible all to two kinds, having all of them either pain or pleasure for their object: by means of which, and also of his body, he is outwardly related to the fellows of his own species, and is connected with them and with all outward nature. He is moved by some commanding power within him, the principle of action, commonly called Will; and when the motion, given by it, is right, and in a right direction, it moves him for his real good. The motion and the direction are both right, when the one is measured and the other dictated by right reason. The motion is thus measured, and the direction is thus dictated; or, in other words, the measure and the rule of a man's actions are agreeable to right reason, when the governing power within him (i. e. the reason of his own mind) harmonizes with reason universal: and this it does, when his mind sees things as they are, and partakes of truth; because truth is the standard of right reason, is the same in

every and in all mind, and is the perfection and the end of mind itself. By means of truth therefore, or by the knowledge of it, (for the mind is in possession of truth by knowing it,) is a man's reason empowered to govern him, and his will is enabled to move him, for his good. Now the power of so governing and of so moving him is man's virtue; the virtue of every thing being its power to produce, or to procure, some certain good. Thus the two great objects of the Platonic philosophy are truth and virtue; truth, which is the good of all mind; and virtue, which is the good of the whole man.

Every truth, in every particular science, is the relation of any two or more things, that is, of such things as are the subjects of that science; and in the knowledge of all of which that science consists. The subjects of every science are things in their real essences, or ideas; and truth universal comprehends all the relations of all the real essences of all things. These relations being eternal, absolute, and independent on any particular mind, the real essences of things themselves not only must always *be*, but must always have the same manner also of *being;* that is, they must be always uniform and invariable, not subject to the differences or to the changes of any thoughts concerning them, and must indeed be seated above the comprehension or the reach of any particular minds. Our ideas, when true, are the exact copies or perfect images of these essences; and when we know them to be such, and can resolve them into their principles, then have we true science, properly so called. It is the nature of the human soul to have these ideas generated in her, and to partake of mind eternal and immutable. Hence she is the offspring, and the image, of the divine nature; and hence, by a participation of that nature which is eternal, and whose principle is unity, she is herself indissoluble and immortal.

The resemblances of those real essences are also in outward things, serving first to excite in the soul those true ideas: but, because of the ever-changing and transient nature of such things, (those resemblances being uncertain,) they are no less apt to raise false fancies, and to give birth to erroneous opinions.

But besides these natural representations of things, there are others which are arbitrary; invented by men, in order to express, or to signify to each other, whatever they perceive, or fancy, or know, or think. These are words framed into propositions and discourses; in which we give an account of what we think, or would have others think. They are delivered in three ways: either, 1. In the way of reason, applying themselves to the understanding with pretensions to prove; or, 2. In the way of oratory, addressing the passions in order to persuade; or, 3. In the way of poetry, engaging the imagination with a view to please. The mind therefore is in danger of being seduced into error by words, in four

different ways: either, 1. By wrong names attributed to things, disguising thus their real nature; or, 2. By sophistical arts of reasoning, thus exhibiting falsehood in a dress like that of truth; or, 3. By the adulterated colours of rhetoric, deluding us; or, 4. By the fantastic figuring of poetry, enchanting us. In this manner does Plato warn his readers against the ways which lead aside into error; while he conducts his followers along the road of truth.

As to the other object of Platonic wisdom, namely, virtue, or the settled power in the soul of governing man rightly; when it is considered as adhering to its divine principle, truth, it takes the form of sanctity; when considered as presiding over every word and action, it has the nature of prudence; when it is employed in controlling and ordering the concupiscible part of the soul, or the affections and passions which regard pleasure, it is called temperance; and when it is engaged in composing and directing the irascible part of the soul, or the affections and passions relative to pain, it assumes the name of fortitude. And thus far it respects private good immediately, yet it also extends its influence to the good of others through the connexions of kindred nature and of social life.

But since every man is a member of some civil community, since he is linked with the fellows of his own species, and is related to every nature superior and divine, and is also a part of universal nature; he must always of necessity participate of the good and evil of every whole, greater as well as less, to which he belongs; and he has an interest in the well-being of every species with which he is connected. Virtue therefore, with immediate reference to the good of others, to the public good, to the general good of mankind, and to universal good, (yet remotely, and by way of consequence, affecting private good,) virtue, we say, as she regulates the conduct of man, in order to these ends, has the title given her of justice, (universal, or particular in all its various branches,) friendship, patriotism, humanity, equity, and piety, with every subordinate duty springing out of these.

But since, in order to effect thoroughly, and fully to accomplish, the good of any vital whole, there must be a conspiration and a co-operation of all the parts; there ought in every public body to be one mind or law presiding over, disposing, and directing all; that through all may run one spirit, and that in all one virtue may operate. To illustrate this, the idea is presented of a perfect commonwealth, and a just model is framed of public laws: and in this the nature of virtue is seen most godlike, that is, of herself most diffusive and productive of the most good in her making all happy, as she is political and legislative.

Thus all virtue is order and proportion, whether in the soul of man, or in a civil state; and by putting measure into all the manners, and into every action, whether of private or of public life, it

produces in them symmetry and beauty; for of these proportioned measure is the principle. Virtue can do this, because the rule, according to which the virtuous mind or the will governs, is beauty itself; and the science, through which she governs, is the science of that beauty: for truth and beauty concur in one; and wherever they are, there also is good found. The love of beauty then is nothing different from that first and leading motive in all minds to the pursuit of every thing, namely, that motive whence the philosopher sets out in his inquiry after wisdom, the desire of good. Thus the perfection of man consists in his similitude to this supreme beauty; and in his union with it is found his supreme good.

The dialogues of Plato, with respect to their subjects, may be divided, conformably to this sketch of their design, into the speculative and the practical, and into such as are of a mixed nature. The subjects of these last are either general, which comprehend both the others; or differential, which distinguish them. The general subjects are either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, and human nature, and the soul of man: those of the final kind are love, and beauty, and good. The differential subjects regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice, in which are considered two questions; one of which is, whether virtue is to be taught; the other is, whether error in the will depend on error in the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to words or to things: of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetry: of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of mind, and outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private conduct and to the government of the mind over the whole man, or to his duty towards others in his several relations, or to the government of a civil state and to the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three heads the particular subjects practical rank in order; namely, virtue in general, sanctity, temperance, and fortitude; justice, friendship, patriotism, and piety; the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, and law in general; and lastly, those rules of government and of public conduct which constitute the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is, a comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct, view of Plato's writings, it has been attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural distinctions; whether he choose to consider them with regard to their inward form or essence, or to their outward form or appearance, or to their matter or their end, that is, with regard to their genius, to their character, to their subject, and to their design.

ON THE WRITINGS OF PLATO.

BRIEF NOTICES

OF SOCRATES AND OF HIS FRIENDS.

SOCRATES.

ALL which Socrates possessed was not worth three minæ, in which he reckons a house he had in the city.[1] Critobulus often prevailed upon him to accompany him to the comedy.[2] Xantippe, his wife, the most ill-tempered of women: he made use of her to exercise his philosophy.[3] He amused himself by dancing when he was fifty years old: his face remarkably ugly, and resembling that of the Sileni or satyrs, with large prominent eyes, a short flat nose turned up, wide nostrils, great mouth, &c., nick-named ὁ Φροντιστής.[4] He rarely went out of the walls of Athens;[5] was never out of Attica, but when he served in time of war, and once to the Isthmian games.[6] He was seventy years old when he died.[7] He left three sons, the eldest a youth, the two youngest children. His intrepid and cheerful behaviour at his trial and death.[8] Compared to a torpedo.[9] Called Prodicus, the sophist, his master.[10] Learns, at near fifty years of age, to play on the lyre of Connus, son of Metrobius.[11] His mother, Phænarete, married Chæredemus, and had by him a son named Patrocles.[12] Seldom used to bathe, and commonly went barefooted.[13] He could bear great quantities of wine without being overpowered by it, but did not choose to drink voluntarily.[14]

[1] Xenophon, Œconomic. [2] Id. Eod. [3] Id. Sympos. [4] Eod. [5] Plato, Phædrus, p. 230. [6] Id. Crito. [7] Ibid. [8] Plato, Apolog. and Phædo; Xenophon, Memorabil. [9] Plato, Menon. p. 80. [10] Plato, Menon. p. 96. [11] Id. Euthydem. p. 272. [12] Id. Euthydem. p. 297. [13] Plat. Sympos. [14] Ibid. p. 214, 220.

THE COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES.

CRITOBULUS.

A MAN of fortune; his estate was worth above eight talents, which in Athens was very considerable. Had served the offices of gymnasiarch, choregus, &c., the most expensive of the city. Of an amorous disposition; negligent of economy; a lover of dramatic spectacles; he married a very young, inexperienced woman, with whom he conversed very little:[15] he was present at the entertainment given by Callias to Autolycus, Socrates, and others, and at that time was newly married. Ol. 89, 4. He was remarkable for his beauty; his fine panegyric on it: was passionately fond of Clinias. Crito, the father of the latter, introduced him to the acquaintance of Socrates, that he might cure him of this passion.[16]

ISCHOMACHUS.

HE was called in Athens, by way of pre-eminence, ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθός; he married a young maid under fifteen years of age, whom he educated and instructed himself. His first serious conversation with her, related by him to Socrates, on the duties of a mistress of a family. The order and arrangement of his house described: his morning exercises, walk to his villa, and ride from thence. He was a remarkably good horseman, of a vigorous constitution, and lasting health; was one of the richest men in Athens. His instruction and treatment of his slaves; his knowledge in agriculture. His father before him was a great lover of that art.[17] He meddled not much in public affairs:[18] was believed, while he lived, to be worth above seventy talents: but at his death he left not twenty, to be divided between his two sons.[19]

CALLIAS.

His genealogy: . . . . Phænippus

Callias[20] ὁ Δαδοῦχος.

Hipponicus[21]

Callias[22]

Hipponicus[23]

Callias — Hipparete — Alcibiades.

---

[15] Xenophon, Œconomic. [16] Id. Sympos. [17] Xenophon, Œconomicus. [18] Id. Eod. [19] Lysias, Orat. de bonis Aristophanis, 348. [20] Dictus ὁ Λακκόπλουτος. Herod. v. Plutarch in Aristide. Scol. in Demosthen. p. 393. Victor Celete Ol. 54. [21] Dictus Ammon. Athenæus, l. xii. Plut. de Malign. Herodoti. [22] ὁ Λακκόπλουτος, uti et avus. Plut. in Aristide. Herodot. vii. Demosth. de Fals. Legat. [23] Qui ad Delium occubuit, Ol. 89, 1. Thucyd.—Plut. Alcib. Andocides in Alcibiadem.

Callias was in love with Autolycus, the son of Lyco, who gained the victory (while yet a boy) in the Pancratium during the greater Panathenæa, Ol. 89, 4, upon which occasion Callias gave an entertainment to his friends [24] at his house in the Piræus. He had been scholar to the sophists Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus; was very wealthy; and had learned the art of memory from Hippias of Elis, at the recommendation of Antisthenes. He was Προξενος of the Lacedæmonians who came to Athens; was hereditary priest of the Eleusinian deities, ὁ Δᾳδοῦχος; was remarkable for his nobility and the gracefulness of his person; [25] he had two sons, who were instructed by Evenus, the Parian sophist; [26] he entertained Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, and other sophists, their companions, in his house, Ol. 90, 1.[27]

NICERATUS.

He was son to the famous Nicias; was present at the symposium of Callias, Ol. 89, 4, and then newly married. He could repeat by heart the whole Iliad and Odyssey, and had been scholar to Stesimbrotus and Anaximander. He was very wealthy and somewhat covetous; was fond of his wife, and beloved by her; [28] was scholar to Damon, the famous musician, who had been recommended to his father by Socrates; [29] and finally, he was put to death by order of the Thirty, with his uncle Eucrates.[30]

ANTISTHENES.

He was extremely poor, but with a contempt of wealth; was present in the symposium of Callias, where he proved that riches and poverty are in the mind alone, and not in externals. His way of life was easy and contented: he passed whole days in the company of Socrates, who taught him (he says) to be mentally rich. He was much beloved in the city, and his scholars were esteemed by the public. He recommended Prodicus and Hippias the Elean to Callias; [31] bore great affection to Socrates, and was present at his death.[32]

CHÆREPHON.

A man of warmth and eagerness of temper; [33] he was a friend to the liberties of the people; he fled to and returned with Thrasybulus; he died before Socrates's trial, for he is mentioned in Socrates's Apology, as then dead, and in the Gorgias, as then living:

[24] Xenophon, Symposium; Athenæus, v. p. 216. [25] Ibid.
[26] Plato, Apolog. [27] Plato, Protagoras. [28] Xenophon, Sympos.
[29] Plato in Lachete. [30] Xenophon, Gr. Hist. ii. Andocides de Mysteriis.
[31] Xenophon, Sympos. [32] Plato, Phæd. [33] Vid. Charmidem, p. 153.

his death must therefore have happened between Ol. 93, 4, and Ol. 95, 1. He consulted the Delphian oracle to know if any man were wiser than Socrates. His brother, Chærecrates, survived him.[34]

EPIGENES.

He was the son of Antipho of Cephisia:[35] and was present at the death of Socrates.[36]

APOLLODORUS.

He was brother to Aiantodorus:[37] was a man of small abilities, but of an excellent heart, and remarkable for the affection he bore to Socrates;[38] he was present in the prison at the time of his death.[39] He lived at Phalerus, of which Δῆμος he was;[40] was but a boy when Socrates was fifty-three years old, and must therefore have been under thirty-seven at the time of Socrates's death. He was called Μανικός from the warmth of his temper.

PHÆDO.

He was an Elean. See his account of Socrates's last moments.[41]

SIMMIAS.

He was a Theban, and a young man at the time of Socrates's death (as was Cebes), at which they were both present. He had received some tincture of the Pythagorean doctrines from Philolaus of Crotona; and was inquisitive and curious in the search of truth, far above all prejudice and credulity.[42]

CEBES.

He was a Theban. (Vid. Simmiam.)

HERMOGENES.

He was a man of piety, and believed in divination. He was present in Callias's symposium; was a person of great honesty, mild, affable, and soberly cheerful:[43] not rich, and a man of few words;[44] was son to Hipponicus and brother to Callias.[45] He was present at the death of Socrates.[46]

[34] Apol. Socrat. [35] Plato, Apol. [36] Phædo. [37] Apol. Socrat. [38] Phædo. [39] Id. [40] Plato, Sympos. [41] Plato, Phædo. [42] Plato, Phædo. [43] Xenoph. Sympos. [44] Ibid. p. 391 and 408. [45] Plato, Cratylus. [46] Plato, Phædo.

CHARMIDES.

He had a considerable estate in lands before the Peloponnesian war, which he thence entirely lost, and was reduced to great poverty. He was present at the symposium of Callias, where he discoursed on the advantages and pleasures of being poor. He ran at the stadium, at Nemea, contrary to Socrates's advice.[47] He was of extreme beauty when a youth.[48]

ÆSCHYLUS.

He was of Phlius, and was introduced by Antisthenes to Socrates.

CRITO.

He was father to Critobulus; was of Alopecæ, and about the same age with Socrates.[49] He made the proposal to contrive the escape of Socrates out of prison, and to send him into Thessaly;[50] he attended him daily in his confinement, and at the time of his death; he received his last orders; he closed his eyes, and took care of his funeral.[51]

[47] Plato, Theages. [48] Plato, Charmid. [49] Plato, Apolog.
[50] Id. Crito. [51] Id. Phædo.

PHÆDRUS.

This is supposed to be the first dialogue which Plato wrote, according to Diogen. Laert. iii. 38. Dionysius Halicarnassus (ii. 270, ed. Hudson) calls it one of his most celebrated discourses; and from it he produces examples both of the beauty and of the blemishes of Plato's style, which is all purity, all grace, and perspicuity; and he remarks that he sometimes rises to a true sublimity, and sometimes falls into an ungraceful redundancy of words and of ill-suited figures, ungraceful and obscure.

There is a good analysis of the Phædrus by the Abbé Sallier, wherein he shows its true subject and intention. It is upon eloquence, and is designed to demonstrate, that no writer, whether legislator, orator, historian, or poet, can do any thing excellent without a foundation of philosophy. The title prefixed to it, "On the Beautiful," cannot be genuine. It has no other relation to it, than that beauty is accidentally the theme of Socrates's second little oration, which is contained in this dialogue; not that it is, directly, even the subject of that, for the tendency of it is to prove, that a person ought to gratify rather the party who loves, than the one who does not, as the two preceding orations were to show the contrary. These are what Diogenes Laertius calls questions of a juvenile kind, though he may mean it of the whole dialogue, which is something juvenile and full of vanity, and such, Dionysius very justly says, was the character of Plato.

The Socratic dialogues are a kind of drama, wherein the time, the place, and the characters are almost as exactly marked as in a true theatrical representation. Phædrus here is a young man particularly sensible to eloquence and to fine writing, and thence a follower and an admirer of the famous Lysias, whose reputation was then at its height in Athens. He had been sitting the greatest part of the morning at the house of Epicrates, near the Olympium, to hear Lysias recite a discourse; and, having procured a copy of it, is meditating upon it with pleasure, as he walks without the city walls, where Socrates meets him. To avoid the heat of the day they retire to the shade of an ancient plane-tree, that overshadows a fane of Achelous and the Nymphs on the banks of a rivulet, which discharges itself at a little distance into the Ilyssus. The spot lay less than a quarter of a mile above the bridge, which led over the river to the temple of Diana Agræa. Here they

pursue their conversation during the hours of noon, till the sun grows lower and the heat becomes more mild.

We may nearly fix the year when this conversation is supposed to have happened. Lysias was now at Athens; he arrived there from Thurii in Italy in the forty-seventh year of his age, Ol. 92, 1. Euripides is also mentioned as still in the city; he left it to go into Macedonia, Ol. 92, 4, and, consequently, it must have happened in some year of that Olympiad, probably the 2nd or 3rd, and Plato must have written it in less than ten years afterwards, for his Lysis was written before the death of Socrates, which was Ol. 95, 1, but the Phædrus was still earlier, being his first composition; so he was between twenty and twenty-nine years of age.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 231, § 12. In my request.] What he desired, will appear but too plainly in the course of these little orations, and must appear a most strange subject of conversation for Socrates, to all who are unacquainted with the manners of Greece. The President de Montesquieu has observed, but too justly, on the nature of their love and gallantry. Esprit des Loix, v. 1. See also Xenoph. Œconomic and Symposium; and the Symposium of Plato; see also de Legib. i. 636.

P. 231, § 13. The law.] There were, indeed, laws of great severity in Athens against this vice; but who should put them in force in such general and shocking depravity?

P. 235. Nothing from myself. *Παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδέν.*] It is observable, that Socrates, whenever he would discourse affirmatively on any subject, or when he thought proper to raise and adorn his style, does it not in his own person, but assumes the character of another, Thus, for instance, he relates the beautiful fable between Virtue and Pleasure after Prodicus; he treats of the miseries of human life in the words of the same sophist; he describes the state of souls after death from the information of Gobryas, one of the Magi; he makes a panegyric on wine in the style of Gorgias; and here he does not venture to display his eloquence, till the Nymphs and the Muses have inspired him. This is consistent with that character of simplicity and of humility which he assumed.

P. 241. *Ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος.*] A proverb, taken from a game in use among children, called *Ὀστρακίνδα*, described by Jul. Pollux, ix. 154, and by Eustathius. They were divided into two parties, which fled or pursued each other alternately, as the chance of a piece of broken potsherd, thrown up into the air, determined it: the boy who threw it cried out *Νὺξ ἢ Ἡμέρα*; if the black (or pitched) side came uppermost, his party ran away, and the other gave them chase; if the white one, the others ran, and they pursued them. Hence *Ὀστράκου Περιστροφὴ* was used to describe a total reverse of fortune. Erasmus, in his Adagia, has not explained it well.

P. 257. A pleasant bend.] Erasmus explains it in his Adagia,

Εὔφημα φώνει, as though in a part of a river, where there was a long and dangerous winding, the sailors used this piece of flattery by way of propitiating the Nile; but this does not fully clear up the passage here. That this proverb was so used may appear from the words of Athenæus, xii. 516, *Τὸν τόπον καλοῦσι Γυναικῶν ἀγῶνα, γλυκὺν ἀγκῶνα*: "they call the place of the women's contest 'pleasant bend;'" which last may mean, a specious term to cover their ignominy. Casaubon does not explain it: here it seems applied to such as speak one thing and mean another.

P. 259, § 90. Falling asleep.] The Greeks usually slept at noon in summer, as it is still the custom in Italy and Spain, and in other hot countries.

P 259, § 91. *τεττίγων.*] The tettix, in Latin "cicada," is an animal with wings, the size of a man's thumb, of a dark brown colour, which sits on the trees and sings, that is, makes a noise like a cricket; but much more shrill, and without any intervals, which grows louder as the sun grows hotter. Some supposed it to live on the air, others, on dew only. It does in reality live on the exudations of plants, having a proboscis, like flies, to feed with; but is capable of living a long time, like many of the insect race, without any nourishment at all. The tettigometra, which is this creature in its intermediate state between a worm and a fly, was esteemed a delicacy to eat by the Greeks.

P. 261. The Eleatic Palamedes.] Quintilian, iii. 1—10, informs us, that the person here meant is Alcidamas of Elea. Diogen. Laert. ix. 25, takes it to be meant of Zeno Eleates, who is looked upon as the inventor of disputation and of logic, and who was at Athens when Socrates was not above eight years old, that is, above fifty years earlier than the time of this dialogue; but his contemporary Empedocles was the first who cultivated rhetoric as an art, and taught it to Gorgias, who published a book on that subject.

P. 270. *Νοῦ τε καὶ ἄνοιας.*] He (i. e. Anaxagoras) attributed the disposition of the universe to an intelligent cause, or mind, whence he himself was called **Νοῦς**. He was nearly of the same age with Pericles, and came to Athens Ol. 75, 1, where he passed about thirty years.

P. 275. This discourse of Thamus (or Jupiter Ammon) on the uses and inconveniences of letters is excellent; and he gives a lively image of a great scholar, that is, of one who searches for wisdom in books alone.

LYSIS.

THERE is no circumstance in this dialogue to inform us when it happened; but it is certain that Plato wrote it when he was yet a young man, before Ol. 95, 1, for Socrates heard it read. The scene of it is in a Palæstra, then newly built, a little without the walls of Athens, near the fountain of Panops, between the Academia and the Lycæum. The interlocutors are, Socrates; Hippothales and Ctesippus, two young men of Athens; Lysis, a boy of noble birth and fortune, beloved by Hippothales; and Menexenus, also a boy, and cousin to Ctesippus, and friend to Lysis. The characters are, as usual, elegantly drawn; but what is the end or meaning of the whole dialogue, I do not pretend to say. It turns upon the nature and definition of friendship. Socrates starts a hundred notions about it, and confutes them all himself; nothing is determined, the dialogue is interrupted and there is an end. Perhaps a second dialogue was designed on the same subject and never executed. As to all the mysteries which Serranus has discovered in it, they are mere dreams of his own.

The first part of this dialogue is of that kind called Μαιευτικός, "Obstetrical," and the second part, Πειραστικός, "Tentative."

N. B. The discourse with Menexenus is intended to correct a boy of a bolder and more forward nature than Lysis, by showing him that he knows nothing; and leaves him in the opinion of his own ignorance. The second title of the dialogue is a false or an incorrect one, for friendship is only by accident a part of it. The intent of the whole seems to be, to show in what manner we should converse with young people according to their different dispositions.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 204—211. Thus far the dialogue is very easy and elegant, particularly the short conversation with Lysis, which is an example how children of fortune and family ought to be treated, in order to correct that arrogance which those advantages are apt to inspire, and to win them gradually to reflection and good sense.

P. 206. The Hermæa.] A festival celebrated in all the places of education for boys. We see here how little the severe laws of Solon on this head were observed, which particularly forbade grown persons to be admitted on that occasion, as we learn from Æschin. in Timarch.

P. 211. Ὀρτυγα.] The passion of the Athenians for fighting quails and game-cocks is well known. See Plutarch in Alcibiade.

P. 214. The wisest.] Empedocles, perhaps, who ascribed the first formation of things to this friendship, Ἄλλοτε μέν φιλότητι συνέρχομεν εἰς ἓν απαντα, &c. as stated in Diogen. Laert. viii. 76, or Anaxagoras, who taught that the Universe was made up of small bodies consisting of similar particles, as we learn from Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.

P. 219. After drinking hemlock.] A quantity of wine, drunk after the cicuta, "hemlock," was believed to prevent its mortal effects.

P. 223. It was late.] It was a law of Solon, that school-rooms were to be closed before sunset.

ALCIBIADES I.

The title expressing the subject of this dialogue (like that of Lysis) is wrong. Dacier rightly observes, that the titles are commonly nothing to the purpose; but he is strangely mistaken in saying, they are of modern invention, and that Diogenes Laertius makes no mention of them. That author actually mentions them all, and from his account they appear to be more ancient than Thrasyllus, who lived probably under Augustus and Tiberius, and who seemingly took them to be all of Plato's own hand.

The true subject certainly is, to demonstrate the necessity of knowing one's self, and that, without this foundation, all other acquisitions in science are not only useless, but pernicious.

The time of this dialogue is towards the end of Alcibiades' nineteenth year, which (as Dodwell reckons) is Ol. 87, 1. Socrates was then about thirty-nine years old.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 106. To mount the platform.] Boys when they had undergone the Δοκιμασία, "Scrutiny," before the Thesmothetæ, who presided in the court of Heliæa, see Lysias in Diogeiton. p. 508 and 515; Aristoph. Vesp. 576; and Antiphont. de cæde Choreutæ, p. 143, ed. Steph.; and were enrolled among the men, though they were for a year excused from undertaking all Λειτουργίαι, "Public Duties," seem to have been at liberty, at this time of the republic, to vote and speak in the assembly of the people. Therefore, Potter (Archæolog. i. 17) is not correct when he affirms that they could not speak there, who were under thirty years of age. They could not indeed be chosen into the senate, &c. till that age.

P. 106. *Γράμματα και κιθαρίζειν.*] The usual education of the Athenian children from seven years old to fifteen. See Æschines de Axioco, p. 94, ed. Le Clerc, and Aristoph. in Nubibus, vs. 961.

P. 122, § 37. There is a care to not one of the Athenians.] Of old the court of Areopagus were inspectors of the education of youth. The members of it divided that care among them, and each of them in his province took note of such fathers as gave not their children an education suitable to their fortune and way of life, as Isocrates shows at large in his beautiful Areopagitic oration. At what time their vigilance on this head began to decline, I cannot fix; but it was probably towards the beginning of the administration of Pericles, when the authority of that venerable body was lessened and restrained by Ephialtes, that is, before Ol. 80, 1; yet I find the form of the thing still continued, though not the force of it: for Æschines, in Axioch. p. 367, § 8, speaking of the discipline young men were subject to, from about the age of eighteen to twenty, says that "The whole period of youth is under Moderators, and the selection of those who are placed over youths by the council of the Areopagus. The "Sophronistæ" here mentioned, are distinct from the Areopagites; being the name of a magistracy described in Etymolog. Magn. in *Σωφρονισταί*, as certain officers, chosen by votes, ten in number, one for each ward, who have the care over the temperate conduct of youths.

P. 122, § 39. Already for many generations.] We are not told, I believe, by any other writer, that the use of money was so early introduced into Lacedæmon; but there is a passage of Posidonius in Athenæus, vi. 233, that throws light on the subject. Plutarch says, that money was not even allowed for the uses of the state, till after the siege of Athens and its surrender to Lysander, when that point was carried after a great struggle; although, at the same time, it was made capital to apply it to private occasions. This happened twenty-seven years after the date of this dialogue.

ALCIBIADES II.

THIS is a continuation of the same subject; for what is said on prayer is rather accidental, and only introductory to the main purpose of the dialogue. It is nothing inferior in elegance to the former. Some have attributed it to Xenophon, but it is undoubtedly Plato's, and designed as a second part to the former.

I could be glad if it were as easy to fix the time of it, as Dacier would persuade us, who boldly fixes it Ol. 93, 1, but there are facts alluded to in it, that will neither be reconciled to that date, nor indeed to one another; and besides, it is better to allow Plato to be guilty of these inaccuracies in chronology, than of those improprieties of character which must be the consequences of Dacier's supposition. It is plain that Socrates continues, as in the preceding discourse, to treat Alcibiades with a certain gentle superiority of understanding, and that he prescribes to, and instructs him in, a manner extremely proper to form the mind of a youth just entering into the world, but ill-bred and impertinent to a man of forty years of age, who had passed through the highest dignities of the state and through the most extraordinary reverses of fortune. Plato himself may convince us of this, by what he makes Socrates say in the first Alcibiades, p. 127, § 48: "But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived that you were suffering so at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult to take care of yourself. But now you are at the very time of life, when it is meet for you to perceive it."

The principal difficulties are that he speaks of Pericles as yet living, who died Ol. 87, 4, and of the murder of Archelaus king of Macedon as a fact then recent, which did not happen till Ol. 95, 1, the same year with Socrates's death, and near five years after that of Alcibiades.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 141. *Τα παιδικα.*] Craterus conspired with Hellenocrates and Decamnichus to murder that prince, (Archelaus of Macedonia,) as he was hunting. Aristotle calls him Cratæus, and gives a fuller account of this conspiracy than any other author. Aristot. Politic. v. 10. Archelaus had promised him one of his daughters in marriage, for he had two, but gave one to the king of Elimea and the other to his own son Amyntas.

Hellenocrates was a Larissæan who had likewise been subservient to the king's pleasures.

P. 148. Sacrifices the most numerous.] The Athenians were remarkably sumptuous in their temples and public worship, beyond any other people. Two months in the year were taken up entirely in these solemnities. See Schol. on Aristoph. in Vesp. vs. 655, and Xenoph. Rep. Athen. p. 699.

P. 150. It is he of whose care you are the object.] Socrates may either mean the Divinity here, as in the former dialogue, Alcibiad. I. p. 122, § 37; for it was the character of Socrates to assume nothing to himself, but all to the demon, who directed him, whom he calls his, Ἐπίτροπος, "Guardian:" or Socrates may here mean himself, as I rather think. Some Christian writers indeed would give a very extraordinary turn to this part of the dialogue, as though Plato meant to prove the necessity of a Revelation. But I can see no such mysteries in it. Socrates has proved that we are neither fit to deal with mankind, till we know them by knowing ourselves; nor to address ourselves to the Divine power, till we know enough of his nature to know what we owe him: what that nature is, he defers examining till another opportunity, which is done to raise the curiosity and impatience of the young Alcibiades, and to avoid that prolixity, into which a disquisition so important would have naturally led him.

THEAGES.

Demodocus of Anagyrus, an old Athenian who had passed with reputation through the highest offices of the state, and now, after the manner of his ancestors, lived chiefly on his lands in the country, employed in agriculture and rustic amusements, brings with him to Athens his son Theages, a youth impatient to improve himself in the arts then in vogue, and to shine among his companions who studied eloquence,[1] and practised politics, as soon as ever their age would permit them to appear in the popular assemblies.

Socrates, at the father's desire, enters into conversation with the young man, and decoys him by little and little into a confession that he wanted to be a great man, and to govern his fellow citizens.

[1] Aristophanes ridicules in many places this turn of the age in which he lived. Reading, and the knowledge of the Belles Lettres, having more generally diffused itself through the body of the people, than it had done hitherto, had an ill effect on the manners of a nation naturally vain and lively. Every one had a smattering of eloquence and of reasoning, and every one would make a figure and govern; but no one would be governed: the authority of age and of virtue was lost and overborne, and wit and a fluency of words supplied the place of experience and of common sense.

After diverting himself with the *naïveté* of Theages, he proposes ironically several sophists of reputation, and several famous statesmen, who were fit to instruct him in this grand art: but as it does not appear that the disciples of those sophists, or even the sons of those statesmen, have been much the better for their lessons, both Demodocus and Theages entreat and insist that Socrates himself would admit him to his company and favour him with his instructions. The philosopher very gravely tells them stories of his demon, without whose permission he undertakes nothing, and upon whom it entirely depends, whether his conversation shall be of any use, or not, to his friends; but at last he acquiesces, if Theages cares to make the experiment.

The scene of the dialogue is in the portico, described by Pausanias, i. 3, of Jupiter the Deliverer, in the Ceramicus, the principal street of Athens; and the time Ol. 92, 3-4, during the expedition of Thrasyllus, in which he was defeated at Ephesus by the Persians and other allies of Sparta. Socrates was then sixty years old.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 125. Callicreté.] The poem of Anacreon on Callicreté the daughter of Cyane, is now lost. Dacier seriously imagines that she was a female politician, like Aspasia. But it is more agreeable to Anacreon's gallantry, that we should suppose the seat of tyranny was only in her face.

P. 129. Κλειτόμαχον ἐρέσθαι.] This assassination of Nicias, the son of Heroscamander, by Philemon and Timarchus, and the condemnation of the latter with Euathlus, who had given him shelter, is not recounted in any other author.

EUTHYPHRO.

Socrates,[1] about the time that an accusation had been preferred against him for impiety in the court of the Βασιλεὺς,[2] second Archon,

[1] Ol. 95, 1.

[2] Impeachments for murder were laid in the court of the Βασιλεὺς, but not tried till four months after in the court of Areopagus, where the Βασιλεὺς had himself a vote. The cause was judged in the open air, for all such as were (ὁμορόφιοι) under the same roof with the defendant were thought to partake of his guilt. The accuser gave him immediate notice not to approach the forum, the assembly, the temples, or the public games, and in that state he continued, till he was acquitted of the crime. See

called "king," meets while he is walking in the portico, where that magistrate used to sit in judgment, with Euthyphro, a person deeply versed in the knowledge of religious affairs, as sacrifices, oracles, divinations, and such matters, and full of that grave kind of arrogance which these mysterious sciences use to inspire. His father, having an estate in the isle of Naxus, had employed among his own slaves a poor Athenian who worked for hire. This man, having drunk too much, had quarrelled with and actually murdered one of the slaves. Upon which, the father of Euthyphro apprehended and threw him into a jail, till the Εξηγηταὶ,[1] Interpreters, had been consulted, in order to know what should be done. The man, not having been taken much care of, died in his confinement: upon which Euthyphro determines to lodge an indictment against his own father for murder. Socrates, surprised at the novelty of such an accusation, inquires into the sentiments of Euthyphro with regard to piety and the service of the gods, by way of informing himself on that subject against the time of his trial, and by frequent questions, entangling him in his own concessions, and forcing him to shift from one principle and definition to another, soon lays open his ignorance, and shows that all his ideas of religion were founded on childish fables and on arbitrary forms and institutions.

The intention of the dialogue seems to be, to expose the vulgar notions of piety, founded on traditions unworthy of the Divinity, and employed in propitiating him by puerile inventions and by the vain ceremonies of external worship, without regard to justice and to those plain duties of society, which alone can render us truly worthy of the Deity.

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

PLATO was himself present at the trial of Socrates, being then about twenty-nine years of age; and he was one of those who offered to speak in his defence, though the court would not suffer him to proceed, and to be bound as a surety for the payment of his fine: yet we are not to imagine, that this oration was the real de-

Antipho Orat. de cæde Herodis, and de cæde Choreutæ. Informations might also (as it seems) be laid in the court of Heliæa before the Thesmothetæ.

[1] The Ἐξηγηταὶ at Athens, like the Pontifices at Rome, were applied to, when any prodigy had happened, or any violent death, to settle the rites of expiation, or to propitiate the manes of the dead.

fence which Socrates made. Dionysius Halicarnassus says, that it "never saw even the door of the Judgment-Hall, nor of the Agora, but was written with some other design;" and what that design was, he explains himself by saying, that, under the cover of an apology, it is a delicate satire on the Athenians, a panegyric on Socrates, and a pattern and character of the true philosopher. Nevertheless, it is founded on truth; it represents the true spirit and disposition of Socrates, and many of the topics used in it are agreeable to those which we find in Xenophon, and which were doubtless used by Socrates himself; as where he mentions his demon, and the reasons he had for preferring death to life, his account of the oracle given to Chærepho, and the remarkable allusion to Palamedes, &c., the ground-work is manifestly the same though the expressions are different. In one thing only they seem directly to contradict each other: Xenophon says, he neither offered himself any thing in mitigation of his punishment, nor would suffer his friends to do so, looking upon this as an acknowledgment of some guilt. If the word in the text, ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, means that he would not submit to ask for a change of his sentence into banishment, or perpetual imprisonment, so far it is agreeable to Plato, p. 37; but if it means, that he would not suffer any mulct himself, nor permit his friends to mention it, we see the contrary, p. 38, where he fines himself one mina, all he was worth, and where his friends Crito, Critobulus, Plato, and Apollodorus, offer thirty minæ, (£96 17*s.* 6*d.*,) which was, I suppose, all they could raise, to save him. Now this being a fact, at that time easily proved or disproved, I am of opinion that Plato never would have inserted into his discourse a manifest falsity, and, therefore, we are to take Xenophon's words in that restrained sense which I have mentioned.

Potter says, that from the nature of the crime Ἀσέβεια, "Impiety," it is evident that the trial was before the court of Areopagus. But I take the contrary to be evident from the style both here and in Xenophon. He always addresses his judges by the name of Ἄνδρες, "Men," or Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, "Men of Athens;" whereas the form of speaking either to the Areopagites or to the senate of Five Hundred was constantly ὦ Βουλή, "Oh! thou the Council:" and in the courts of justice, Ἄνδρες Δικασταὶ, "Jurymen," or sometimes Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, "Men of Athens," or Ἄνδρες, "Men," alone: he therefore was judged in some of these courts.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 32. Ἐβουλευσα δέ.] Socrates was in the senate of Five Hundred, Ol. 93, 3, being then sixty-five years of age. The Prytanes presided in the assemblies of the people, were seated in the place of honour,

and attended by the Τοξόται, who, by their orders, seized any persons who made a disturbance; they introduced ambassadors, gave liberty of speaking to the orators, and of voting to the people; and (as it appears) any one of them could put a negative on their proceedings, since Socrates alone, at the trial of the Στρατηγοί, insisted, that the question was contrary to law, and would not suffer it to be put to the assembly.

P. 34. One still a youth, and two young children.] Socrates had three sons, (says Diogen. Laert. ii. 26,) Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus, the first by Xanthippe, the two others (as it is said) by Myrto, grand-daughter to the famous Aristides. Some say he married the latter first; but that is impossible, because he had Lamprocles, his eldest son, by Xanthippe; and she certainly survived him; therefore, if Myrto were his wife, he must have had two wives together. This is indeed affirmed in a treatise on nobility ascribed to Aristotle, and by Aristoxenus and Callisthenes his scholars, as well as by Demetrius Phalereus, and others. It is a very extraordinary thing, that such men should be deceived in a fact which happened so near their own time; yet Panætius, in his Life of Socrates, expressly refuted this story: and it is sure, that neither Xenophon, nor Plato, nor any other of his contemporaries, mentions any wife but Xanthippe

---

PHÆDO.

This famous dialogue was supposed by Panætius, in Antholog. Gr. i. 44, the Stoic, a great admirer of Plato, not to be genuine, or at least interpolated, rather, as it seems, from his own persuasion of the soul's mortality, than from any thing in the piece itself unlike the manner or the tenets of the philosopher, to whom it has always been ascribed. The whole course of antiquity has regarded it as one of his principal works; and what seems decisive, Aristotle himself cites it as a work of his master.

The historical part of it is admirable, and, though written and disposed with all the art and management of the best tragic writer, for the slightest circumstance in it wants not its force and meaning, it exhibits nothing to the eye but the noble simplicity of nature. Every intelligent reader will feel what those who were eye-witnesses are said to have felt, namely, "a certain unusual mixture compounded of pleasure and pain simultaneously." The innocence, the humanity, the cheerfulness, and the unaffected intrepidity of Socrates, will draw some tears from him, as it did many from them, as for the loss of a father; and will, at the same time, better than any arguments, show him a soul, which, if it were not so, at least deserved to be immortal.

The reasoning part is far inferior, sometimes weak, sometimes false, too obscure, too abstracted, to convince us of any thing; yet with a mixture of good sense and with many fine observations. The fabulous account of a future state is too particular and too fantastic an invention for Socrates to dwell upon at such a time, and has less decorum and propriety in it than the other parts of the dialogue.

Socrates attempts in this dialogue to prove that true philosophy is but a continual preparation for death; its daily study and practice being to wean and separate the body from the soul, whose pursuit of truth is perpetually stopped and impeded by the numerous avocations, the little pleasures, pains, and necessities of its companion. That, as death is but a transition from its opposite, life, (in the same manner as heat is from cold, weakness from strength, and all things, both in the natural and in the moral world, from their contraries,) so life is only a transition from death; whence he would infer the probability of a metempsychosis. That, such propositions, as every one assents to at first, being self-evident, and no one giving any account how such parts of knowledge, on which the rest are founded, were originally conveyed to our mind, there must have been a pre-existent state, in which the soul was acquainted with these truths, which she recollects and assents to on their recurring to her in this life. That, as truth is eternal and immutable, and not visible to our senses, but to the soul alone; and as the empire, which she exercises over the body, bears a resemblance to the power of the Divinity, it is probable that she, like her object, is everlasting and unchangeable, and, like the office she bears, something divine. That, it cannot be, as some have thought, merely a harmony resulting from a disposition of parts in the body, since it directs, commands, and restrains the functions of that very body. That, the soul, being the cause of life to the body, can never itself be susceptible of death; and that, there will be a state of rewards and punishments, the scene of which he takes pains in describing, though he concludes, that no man can tell exactly where or what it shall be.

Dacier's superstition and folly are so great in his notes on the Phædo, that they are not worth dwelling upon.

THE RIVALS.

THE scene lies in the school of Dionysius the grammarian, who was Plato's own master. The design is to show, that philosophy consists not in ostentation, nor in that insight (which the sophists affected) into a variety of the inferior parts of science, but in the knowledge of one's self, and in a sagacity in discovering the characters and dispositions of mankind, and of correcting and of modelling their minds to their own advantage.

The dialogue is excellent, but too short for such a subject. The interlocutors are not named, nor is there any mark of the time when it happened.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 135. The price of a slave skilled in carpenter's work, was five or six minæ, about £19 7*s*. 6*d*.; of an architect, 10,000 drachmæ, i. e. above £322 17*s*.

LACHES.

THE persons in this dialogue are men of distinguished rank and figure in the state of Athens.

1. Lysimachus, son to the famous Aristides, surnamed The Just.

2. Melesias, son to that Thucydides who was the great rival of Pericles in the administration.

3. Nicias, so often the general in the Peloponnesian war, celebrated for his goodness, for his conduct, and for his success, till the fatal expedition to Syracuse, in which he perished.

4. Laches, son of Melanopus of the district Æxone, and tribe Cecropis, commander of the fleet sent to the assistance of the Leontines in Sicily, Ol. 88, 2. in which expedition he defeated the Locrians, reduced Messene, Mylæ, and other places, and after his recall seems to have been prosecuted by Cleon for corruption in

this very year; whence it appears, that he was in the battle of Delium.

5. Thucydides, son to Melesias.
6. Aristides, son to Lysimachus. } Two youths under twenty years of age.
7. Socrates, then in his forty-seventh year.

The two first of these persons, being then very ancient, and probably about seventy years of age, and sensible of that defect in their own education, which had caused them to lead their lives in an obscurity unworthy the sons of such renowned fathers, were the more solicitous on account of their own sons, who were now almost of an age to enter into the world. They therefore invite Nicias and Laches, men of distinguished abilities and bravery, but some years younger than themselves, to a conference on that subject; and after having been spectators together of the feats of arms exhibited by Stesilaus, a professed master in the exercise of all weapons, they enter into conversation. Socrates, who happened to be present, is introduced by Laches to Lysimachus, as a person worthy to bear a part in their consultation. The first question is occasioned by the spectacle which they had just beheld, namely, "whether the management of arms be an exercise fit to be learned by young men of quality?" Nicias is desired first to deliver his opinion, which is, that it may give grace and agility to their persons, and courage and confidence to their minds; that it may make them more terrible to their enemies in battle, and more useful to their friends; and at the same time may inspire them with a laudable ambition to attain the higher and more noble parts of military knowledge. Laches has a direct contrary opinion of it: he argues from his own experience, that he never knew a man, who valued himself upon this art, that had distinguished himself in the war; that the Lacedæmonians, who valued and cultivated military discipline beyond all others, gave no encouragement to these masters of defence; that, to excel in it, only served to make a coward more assuming and impudent, and to expose a brave man to envy and calumny, by making any little failing or oversight more conspicuous in him.

Socrates is then prevailed upon to decide the difference, who artfully turns the question of much greater importance for a young man of spirit to know, namely, "what is valour, and how it is distinguished from a brutal and unmeaning fierceness." By interrogating Laches and Nicias, he shows, that such as had the highest reputation for courage in practice, were often very deficient in the theory; and yet none can communicate a virtue he possesses, without he has himself a clear idea of it. He proves, that valour must have good sense for its basis; that it consists in the knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared; and that, consequently, we must first distinguish between real good and evil, and that it is closely connected with the other virtues, namely,

justice, temperance, and piety, nor can it ever subsist without them. The scope of this fine dialogue is to show, that philosophy is the school of true bravery.

The time of this dialogue is not long after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, Ol. 89, 1, in which action Socrates had behaved with great spirit, and thence recommended himself to the friendship of Laches.

HIPPARCHUS.

THE intention of the dialogue is to show, that all mankind in their actions equally tend to some imagined good, but are commonly mistaken in the nature of it; and that nothing can properly be called gain which, when attained, is not a real good.

The time of the dialogue is no where marked.

PHILEBUS.

THIS dialogue is too remarkable to be passed over slightly: we shall therefore annex the principal heads of it. The question is, "What is the supreme good of mankind?" and, "whether pleasure or wisdom have the better pretension to it?"

The persons are, Protarchus, the son of Callias, who supports the cause of pleasure, and Socrates, who opposes it: Philebus, who had begun the dispute, but was grown weary of it, and many others of the Athenian youth, are present at the conversation. The time of it is no where marked. The end of the dialogue is supposed to be lost.

P. 12. The name of pleasure, variously applied, to the joys of intemperance and folly, and to the satisfaction arising from wisdom, and from the command of our passions.

Though of unlike, and even of opposite natures, they agree so far, as they are all pleasures alike; as black and white, though contrary the one to the other, are comprehended under the general head of colours.

Though included under one name, if some are contrary and of opposite natures to others, they cannot both be good alike.

P. 14. Vulgar inquiry, how it is possible for many to be one, and one many, laid aside by consent as childish. Obscure question on our abstracted idea of unity.

P. 15. The vanity and disputatious humours of a young man, who has newly tasted of philosophy and has got hold of a puzzling question, are well described.

Every subject of our conversation has in it a mixture of the infinite and of the finite.

P. 16. The true logician will, as the ancients prescribed, first discover some single and general idea, and then proceed to two or three subordinate to it, which he will again subdivide into their several classes, which will form, as it were, a medium beneath finite and infinite.

Example in the alphabet. The human voice is one idea, but susceptible of a variety of modulations, and to be diversified even to infinity: to know that it is one, and to know that it is infinite, are neither of them knowledge; but there can be no knowledge without them.

When we first attain to the unity of things, we must descend from number to infinity, if we would know any thing: and when we first perceive their infinity, we must ascend through number to unity. Thus the first inventor of letters remarking the endless variety of sounds, discovered a certain number of vowels, distinguished others of a different power, called consonants, some of which were mutes, and others liquids, and to the whole combination of elements he gave the form and name of an alphabet.

P. 20. The good, which constitutes happiness, must be in itself sufficient and perfect, the aim and end of all human creatures.

A life of mere pleasure considered by itself, which, if pleasure only be that good, must need no mixture nor addition.

If we had no memory nor reflection, we could have no enjoyment of past pleasure, nor hope of future, and scarcely any perception of the present, which would be much like the life of an oyster: on the other hand, a life of thought and reflection, without any sense of pleasure or of pain, seems no desirable state. Neither contemplation therefore nor pleasure are the good we seek after, but probably a life composed of both.

P. 22. Whether the happiness of this mixed state is the result of pleasure, or rather of wisdom, and which contributes most to it?

P. 23. Division of all existence into the infinite, the limited,[1]

[1] Or rather, that which limits and gives bounds, such as figure, which gives bounds to extension; as time, which limits duration, &c.

the mixed, which is composed of the two former, and the supreme cause of all.

Example of the first; all that admits of increase or decrease, greater or less, hotter or colder, &c., i. e. all undetermined quantity.

Of the second; all that determines quantity, as equality, duplicity, and whatever relation number bears to number, and measure to measure.

Of the third, or mixed; all created things, in which the infinity of matter is, by number and measure, reduced to proportion.

P. 27. Pleasure and pain, having no bounds[1] in themselves, are of the nature of the infinite.

P. 28, § 49. The supreme power and wisdom of the Deity asserted.

P. 28, § 53. But a small portion of the several elements is visible in our frame. Our soul is a small portion of the spirit of the universe, or fourth kind mentioned above.

P. 31. Pain is a consequence of a[2] dissolution of that symmetry and harmony in our fabric, which is the cause of health, strength, &c.; as pleasure results from the return and restoration of the parts to their just proportions.

Thus hunger and thirst are uneasinesses proceeding from emptiness; eating and drinking produce pleasure by restoring a proper degree of repletion. Excess of cold is attended with a sensation of pain, and warmth brings with it an equal pleasure.

Pleasures and pains of the soul alone arise from the[3] expectation of pleasure or pain of the body: these are hopes and fears, and depend upon the memory.

A state of indifference is without pleasure or pain, which is consistent with a life of thought and contemplation.

P. 33. Sensation is conveyed to the soul through the organs of the body; the body may receive many motions and alterations unperceived by the mind.

P. 34. Memory is the preserver of our sensations.

Recollection, an act of the mind alone, restores to us ideas imprinted in the memory, after an intermission.

[1] Happiness and misery, says Mr. Locke, are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not: but of some degrees of them we have very lively ideas. (Chapt. of Power, i. 41.)

[2] This is an idea of Timæus, the Locrian, p. 100, C. § 7. And Mr. Locke makes much the same observation. Excess of cold, (says he,) as well as heat, pains us; because it is equally destructive of that temper, which is necessary to the preservation and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth, or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds. Essay on H. U. ch. vii. § 4.

[3] "Hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him. Fear is an uneasiness upon the thought of future evil, likely to befall us" Locke, ib. ch. xx.

Desire, in the mind alone, by which it supplies the wants of the body: it depends on memory.

In the appetites, pleasure and pain go together, a proportionable satisfaction succeeding, as the uneasiness abates.

Memory[1] of a past pleasing sensation inspires hope of a future one, and thereby abates an uneasiness actually present; as the absence of hope doubles a present pain.

P. 36. Whether truth and falsehood belong to pleasures and pains?

They do: as these are founded on our opinions[2] of things preconceived, which may, undoubtedly, be either true or false.

P. 38. Our opinions are founded on our sensations, and the memory of them. Thus we see a figure at a distance beyond a certain rock, or under a certain tree, and we say to ourselves, it is a man; but on advancing up to it, we find a rude image of wood carved by a shepherd.

P. 39. The senses, the memory, and the passions, which attend on them, write on our souls, or rather delineate, a variety of conceptions and representations, of which, when justly drawn, we form true opinions and propositions; but when falsely, we form false ones.

On these our hopes and fears are built, and consequently are capable of truth and falsehood, as well as the opinions on which they are founded.

P. 40. The good abound in just and true hopes, fears, and desires; the bad, in false and delusive ones.

P. 41. As pleasures[3] and pains are infinite, we can only measure them by comparison, one with the other.

P. 42, § 89. Our hopes and fears are no less liable to be deceived by the prospect of distant objects, than our eyes. As we are always comparing those which are far off, with others less remote or very near, it is no wonder that we are often mistaken; especially as a pleasure, when set next a pain, does naturally appear greater than its true magnitude, and a pain less.

P. 42, § 90. So much then of pains and pleasures as exceeds or falls short of its archetype, is false.

P. 42, § 92. A state of indolence, or of apathy, is supposed by the school of Heraclitus to be impossible, on account of the perpetual motion of all things.

[1] What Plato calls by the name of Μνήμη, "Memory," and Ἀνάμνησις, "Recollection," are by Locke distinguished under the names of Contemplation and Memory, (l. i. ch. 10,) being the different powers of retention.

[2] All this head is finely explained by Locke in ch. on Power, § 61 and foll., which is the best comment on this part of Plato.

[3] "If we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison." Locke, ch. on Power, § 42.

Motions and alterations[1] proved to happen continually in our body, of which the soul has no perception.

P. 43. Therefore, (though we should allow the perpetual motion of things,) there are times when the soul feels neither pleasure nor pain; so that this is a possible state.

Pleasure, and its contrary, are not the consequences of any changes in our constituent parts, but of such changes as are considerable and violent.

P. 44. The sect of philosophers, who affirm[2] that there is no pleasure but the absence of pain, is in the wrong, but from a noble principle.

P. 45. To know the nature of pleasure, we should consider such as are strongest: bodily pleasures are such.

Pleasure is in proportion to our desires. The desires and longings of sick persons are the most violent: the mad and thoughtless feel the strongest[3] degree of pleasure and of pain; so that both the one and the other increase with the disorder and depravity of our body and mind.

P. 46. Pleasures of lust have a mixture of pain, as the pain of the itch[4] has a mixture of pleasure, and both subsist at the same instant.

Anger, grief, love, envy, are pains of the soul, but with a mixture[5] of pleasure. Exemplified in the exercise of our compassion and terror at a tragic spectacle, and of our envy at a comic one. The pleasure of ridicule arises from vanity and from the ignorance of ourselves. We laugh at the follies of the weak, and hate those of the powerful.

P. 47. Pure and unmixed pleasures[6] proved to exist: those of the senses resulting from regularity of figure, beautiful colours, melodious sounds, odours of fragrance, &c., and all whose absence is not necessarily accompanied with any uneasiness. Again: satisfactions of the mind resulting from knowledge, the absence or loss of which is not naturally attended with any pain.

P. 53, § 121. A small portion of pure and uncorrupted pleasure is preferable to a larger one of that which is mixed and impure.

P. 53, § 122. The opinion of some philosophers, that pleasure is continually generating, but is never produced, i. e. it has no real existence, seems true with regard to mere bodily pleasures.

P. 55, § 130. Inquiry into knowledge. The nature of the arts:

[1] Whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind, whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Locke, ch. ix.

[2] "Pleasure," says Mr. Selden, "is nothing but the intermission of pain, the enjoyment of something I am in great trouble for, till I have it."

[3] Vid. Plat. in Republ. iii. p. 403.

[4] Vid. Gorgiam, p 494.

[5] Vid. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. c. 2.

[6] Vid. de Republ. ix. p. 584.

such of them as approach the nearest to real knowledge, are the most[1] considerable, being founded on number, weight, and[2] measure, and capable of demonstration.

P. 55, § 131. Secondly, those attainable only by use and frequent trial, being founded on conjecture and experiment, such as music, medicine, agriculture, natural philosophy, &c.

P. 60. Recapitulation.

P. 61. Happiness resides in[3] the just mixture of wisdom and pleasure; particularly when we join the purest pleasures with the clearer and more certain sciences.

P. 63. Prosopopœia of the pleasures and sciences, consulted on the proposal made for uniting them.

P. 64. No mixture is either useful or durable, without proportion. The supreme good of man consists in beauty, in symmetry, and in truth, which are the causes of all the happiness to be found in the above-mentioned union.

MENO.

THE subject of the dialogue is this: That virtue is knowledge, and that true philosophy alone can give us that knowledge.

I see nothing in this dialogue to make one think that Plato intended to raise the character of Meno. He is introduced as a young man who seems to value himself on his parts, and on the proficiency he has made under Gorgias the Leontine, whose notions are here exposed, and the compliments Socrates makes him on his beauty, wealth, family, and other distinctions, are only little politenesses ordinarily used by that philosopher to put persons into good humour, and draw them into conversation with him.

The time of the dialogue seems to be not long before the expedition of the ten thousand into Asia, for Meno was even then a very young man, and still beardless, as he is represented here; and the menaces of Anytus (p. 94) show, that it was not long before the accusation of Socrates; so that we may place it Ol. 94, 4, if Plato may be trusted in these small matters of chronology, which, we know, he sometimes neglected. Gorgias was yet at Athens, Ol. 93, 4, and it is probable, that the approaching siege of that city might

[1] Vid. de Republ. x. p. 602.

[2] And above all, logic, to which we owe all the evidence and certainty we find in the rest. De Republ. vii. p. 534.

[3] Vid. de Republ. ix. p. 582, and de Leg. v. p. 733.

drive him thence into Thessaly, and he returned not till after Socrates's death.

Socrates here distinguishes (p. 75) the true method of disputation from the false.

P. 77. Meno's first definition of virtue is, that it consists in desiring good, and in being able to attain it. Socrates proves that all men desire good, and consequently all men are so far equally virtuous, which is an absurdity; it must therefore consist in the ability to attain it: which is true in Socrates's sense of the word good, (which makes him say, Ἴσως ἂν εὖ λέγοις): but it is necessary to know if men's ideas of it are the same. Upon inquiry, Meno's meaning appears to be, health, honour, riches, power, &c.; but, being pressed by Socrates, he is forced to own, that the attainment of these is so far from virtue, that it is vice, unless accompanied with temperance, with justice, and with piety; as then the virtue of such an attainment consists in such adjuncts, and not in the thing attained; and as these are confessedly parts of virtue only, subordinate to some more general idea, they are no nearer discovering what virtue in the abstract is, than they were at first.

Though the doctrine of reminiscence, repeated by Plato in several places, be chimerical enough; yet this, which follows it, (p. 84,) is worth attending to, where Socrates shows how useful it is to be sensible of our own ignorance. While we know nothing, we doubt of nothing; this is a state of great confidence and security. From the first distrust we entertain of our own understanding springs an uneasiness and a curiosity, which will not be satisfied till it attains to knowledge.

Whoever reads the dialogue, "On Virtue, whether it is to be taught," attributed to Æschines the Socratic, will see so great a resemblance to this of Plato, and at the same time find so great a difference in several respects, that he will believe both one and the other to be sketches of a real conversation, which passed between Socrates and some other person, noted down both by Æschines and by Plato at the time: the former left his notes in that unfinished condition, but the latter supplied them as he thought fit, and worked them up at his leisure into this dialogue.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 70. Ἐφ' ἱππικῳ τε καὶ πλοῦτῳ.] The breed of Thessalian horses was the most celebrated in Greece; and when the cities of Thessaly were united among themselves, they could raise a body of six thousand, equal to any cavalry in the world. (Xenophon, Hellenic. vi. p. 339. Pausan. x. p. 799. Plato in Hipp. Maj. p. 284.) They were of great service to Alexander in his expeditions. The country was very rich in pasture and in corn, and, as their government was generally remiss and ill-regulated, their wealth naturally introduced a corruption (Athe-

næus, xiv. p. 663) of manners, which made them first slaves themselves, and then the instruments of slavery to other people. It was they who invited the Persian (Herod. vii. and ix.) into Greece; and afterwards gave rise to the power of the Macedonians. Isocrates (Orat. de Pace, p. 183) produces them as an example of a strong and wealthy people, reduced by their own bad management to a low and distressed condition.

P. 70. *Αριστιππου του Λαρισσαιου.*] Aristippus of Larissa, one of the potent house of the Aleuadæ, descendants of Hercules, from which the Thessalians had so often elected their *Ταγοί*, or captains-general. There had been a friendship kept up between them and the royal family of Persia, ever since the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, in which they were of great use to him. This Aristippus had particular connexions with the younger Cyrus, (Xenoph. Anab. i. 145, and ii. 173,) who lent him a body of four thousand mercenaries, which he made use of to subdue the faction which opposed him in Thessaly, and seems to have established a sort of tyranny there. Meno (also of Larissa) son of Alexidemus, led a body of fifteen hundred men to the assistance of Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, Artaxerxes, Ol. 94, 4, and (after the death of Cyrus) betrayed the Greek commanders into the hands of the Persian, who cut off their heads. He himself survived not above a year, but was destroyed by the Persians. His character is admirably drawn by Xenophon, (Anab. ii. p. 173,) and many have looked on this as a mark of the enmity between Plato and Xenophon. See Athenæus, xi. p. 505 and 506; Diog. Laert. ii. sect. 57, and iii. sect. 31; and Aul. Gellius, xiv. sect. 3.

P. 76. The definition of colour, in the manner of Gorgias, (perhaps we should read *σωμάτων*, in lieu of *σχημάτων*,) is that there is from that efflux, or those effluvia, of figured bodies, an efflux which is proportioned to our sense of seeing. This is true, if understood of the particles of light reflected from bodies; but not otherwise. Empedocles, however, and after him Epicurus, in Diogen. Laert. x. 49, thought, that the immediate objects of vision were certain particles detached from the surface of the bodies which we behold.

P. 80. The torpedo.] This fish, called by the French on the coast of the Mediterranean, "la torpille," is of the skate or ray kind. As all of that species have a wide mouth and prominent eyes, the face of Socrates, who had these two remarkable features, reminds Meno of this fish. Its figure and extraordinary property of benumbing any creature which touches it are described by Mr. Reaumur, in the Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences, pour l'Année 1714, where there is a print of it.

P. 89. In the citadel.] Where the sacred treasure was kept. It consisted of one thousand talents, never to be touched, unless the city were to be attacked by a naval force; in any other case it was made capital to propose it.

GORGIAS.

P. 451. Σκολιον.] These Scolia were a kind of lyric compositions, sung either in concert, or successively, by all the guests after a banquet: the subjects of them were either the praises of some divinity, or moral precepts, or reflections on life, or gay exhortations to mirth, to wine, or to love. There were some Scolia of great antiquity; the most esteemed were those of Alcæus, of Praxilla, and of Anacreon.

P. 455. The election of physicians.] There were public physicians elected in most of the Greek cities, who received a salary from the commonwealth, and seem to have taken no fees of particular people. Those physicians who exercised this office, were said δημοσιεύειν. See Aristoph. Birds, vs. 585, and Acharn. 1029; Plut. 508; but the custom seems to have been laid aside before Ol. 97, 4, in Athens See Aristoph. Plut. 407; Gorg. p. 514; and the Statesman, p. 259.

P. 563. There is much good sense in this part of the dialogue: he distinguishes the arts, which form and improve the body, into the gymnastic, which regulates its motions and maintains its proper habit, and the medical, which corrects its ill habits and cures its distempers: those of the soul, which answer to the former, are the legislative, which prescribes rules for its conduct and preserves its uprightness, and the judicative, which amends and redresses its deviation from those rules. Flattery, ever applying herself to the passions of men, without regarding any principle or proposing any rational end, has watched her opportunity, and assuming the form of these several arts, has introduced four counterfeits in their room, viz. 1. Cookery, which, while it tickles the palate, pretends to maintain the body in health and vigour; 2. Cosmetics, which conceal our defects and diseases under a borrowed beauty; 3. Sophistry, which, by the false lights it throws upon every thing, misleads our reason and palliates our vices; and, 4. Rhetoric, which saves us from the chastisement we deserve and eludes the salutary rigour of justice.

P. 467. If a person is doing something, &c.] He is here proving that fundamental principle of his doctrine, namely, that the wicked man is doing he knows not what, and sins only through ignorance: and that the end of his actions, like that of all other men, is good, but he mistakes the nature of it, and uses wrong means to attain it.

P. 470. Yesterday and the day before.] As the time of this

dialogue plainly appears (from that passage in p. 473, "Last year becoming by lot one of the council," which is taken notice of by Athenæus, in v. p. 217) to be Ol. 93, 4, the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ, these words must be taken in a larger sense, as we say of a thing long since past, "It happened but the other day," when we would compare it with more ancient times; for Archelaus had now reigned at least nine years, and continued on the throne about six years longer. So in p. 503, by the words, "Pericles recently dead," we must understand νεωστὶ, "recently," in the same manner, for Pericles had been dead twenty-three years. But the time is there compared with that of Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades, who died many years before. Socrates indeed might have seen and remembered Cimon, the other two he could not. These particulars of Archelaus's history are curious and not to be met with elsewhere: viz. That he was the bastard son of Perdiccas by a female slave belonging to his brother Alcetas; that he caused his uncle and master Alcetas, together with Alexander his son, to be murdered after a banquet, to which he had invited them; that he caused his own brother, a child of seven years old, (the true heir to the crown and the son of Perdiccas by his wife Cleopatra,) to be drowned in a well. Athenæus (in xi. p. 506) is absurd enough to question the truth of these particulars, or, supposing them true, he says, that they are instances of Plato's ingratitude, who was much in favour with Archelaus. The passage, which he cites immediately after from Carystius of Pergamus, disproves all this, for it shows Plato's connexion to have been with Perdiccas *the Third*, who began to reign thirty-five years after Archelaus's death, and was elder brother to the famous Philip of Macedon. We have an epistle of Plato to that prince still remaining. At the time of Archelaus's death, Plato was under thirty years of age.

P. 481. Demus, the son of Pyrilampes, was much in the friendship of Pericles, and remarkable for being the first man who brought peacocks to Athens, and bred them in his volaries. (Plutarch in Pericle, and Athenæus, ix. p. 397.) Plato often put much truth and good sense into the mouth of characters which he did not approve. The Protagoras is a remarkable instance of this, where Socrates is introduced in the beginning, arguing against the very doctrine, which naturally follows from those principles, which he himself lays down in the end, and of which he obliges the sophist to confess the truth.

P. 488. First proof against Callicles, who had advanced that, by the law of nature, the stronger had a right to govern the weaker, that the many are stronger than the few, and consequently ought to govern them: so that the positive law of the commonwealth is the result of the law of nature.

P. 501. Cinesias, the son of Meles, was a dithyrambic poet

in some sort of vogue among the people at this time. He was still a worse man than a writer, and the depravity of his character made even his misfortunes ridiculous; so that his poverty, his deformities, and his distempers, were not only produced on the stage, but frequently alluded to by the orators, and exposed to the scorn of the multitude. The comic poet, Strattis, who lived at this time, made Cinesias the subject of an entire drama.

P. 503. The bold attack made in this place on some of the greatest characters of antiquity, has drawn much censure on Plato; but we are to consider that he is here proving his favourite point, which seems to me the grand aim and intention of this dialogue, that philosophy alone is the parent of virtue, the discoverer of those fixed and unerring principles, on which the truly great and good man builds his whole scheme of life, and by which he directs all his actions; and that he, who practises this noblest art, and makes it his whole endeavour to inspire his fellow-citizens with a love for true knowledge, and this was the constant view and the employment of Socrates, has infinitely the superiority not only over the masters of those arts which the public most admires, as music, poetry, and eloquence, but over the most celebrated names in history, as heroes and statesmen; as the first have generally applied their talents to flatter the ear, to humour the prejudices, and to inflame the passions of mankind; and the latter, to soothe their vanity, to irritate their ambition, and to cheat them with an apparent, not a real, greatness.

P. 511. The price of a pilot from Ægina to Attica was two oboli (about two-pence halfpenny); from Attica to Pontus, or to Egypt, two drachmæ (fifteen-pence halfpenny).

P. 514. To learn the potter's art in a pitcher.] Proverb. To begin with a jar before we have made a gallipot.

Amphora cœpit
Institui, currente rotâ cur urceus exit?

P. 515. To giving pay.] The administration of Pericles was the ruin of the Athenian constitution. By abridging the power of the Areopagus, and by impairing their authority, who were the superintendents of education and the censors of public manners, he sapped the foundations of virtue among them; by distributing the public revenue among the courts of justice, he made them mercenary and avaricious, negligent of their private affairs, and ever meddling in those of their neighbours; by the frequency and magnificence of the public spectacles, he inured them to luxury and to idleness; and by engaging them in the Peloponnesian war, he exposed them to be deserted by all their allies, and left to the mercy of the braver and more virtuous Lacedæmonians. Isocrates, although he had no prejudice against Pericles, and does justice to his disinterestedness and honesty in the

management of the public money, still he looked upon the first of these alterations as the ruin of his country, in Orat. Areopag. p. 147, &c.

The Μισθὸς Δικαστικὸς, "the pay of the jurymen," here spoken of by Socrates, was three oboli a day, paid to 6000 citizens, for so many sat in the courts of justice, which was to the state a yearly expense of one hundred and fifty talents; i. e. reckoning ten months to the year, for two months were spent in holidays, when the courts did not meet. A payment, appointed by Agyrrius about Ol. 96, 4, was made by every Athenian citizen who came to the assembly of the people. The ill effect which this had upon their manners is painted by Aristophanes with much humour in several of his dramas, and particularly in the Vespæ.

P. 517. Neither the true nor the flattering.] This shows that Plato meant only to distinguish between the use of eloquence and its abuse; nor is he in earnest when he says just above, that we have not known a single good man, who has been good for state affairs—for he afterwards himself names Aristides, as a man of uncommon probity, but only to show that he had puzzled Callicles, who could not produce one example of a statesman, who had abilities, or art, sufficient to preserve him from the fury of the people.

Ib. Nor do I blame.] Hence it appears that he only means to show how much superior the character of a real philosopher is to that of a statesman.

MINOS.

This dialogue takes its name, as also does the Hipparchus, not from either of the persons introduced in it, but from the Cretan Minos, whose character and laws are mentioned pretty much at large. Socrates, and another Athenian nearly of the same age, who is not named, are considering the nature of laws in it; and the intention of Plato is to show, that there is a law of nature and of truth, common to all men, to which all truly legal institutions must be conformable, and which is the real foundation of them all.

Unfortunately the dialogue remains imperfect: it is indeed probable that it was never finished.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 315. Human sacrifice, and particularly of their children, to Saturn was in use among the Carthaginians: the sacrifices of the Lycians and of the descendants of Athamas, though people of Greek origin, were barbarous; the ancient Attic custom is mentioned of sacrificing victims near the bodies of dead persons, before they were carried out to burial, and hiring Ἐγχυτριστριαὶ, and the still more ancient one of interring them in the houses where they died: both long since disused.

P. 318. Lycurgus.] The time of this dialogue is no where marked; but we see from p. 321, that Socrates was now advanced in years; supposing him then to be only sixty, it is 367 years from the first Olympiad of Corœbus; but most critics agree that Lycurgus lived one hundred and eight years before that time, and Eratosthenes, with the most accurate chronologers, affirms, that he was still more ancient. Plato therefore places him half a century later than any one else has done. The computation of Thucydides, who reckons it something more than 400 years to the end of the Peloponnesian war, from the time of the institution of Lycurgus's laws, comes nearest to that of Plato. For as the war ended Ol. 94, 1, Lycurgus settled the constitution about 27 years before the first Olympiad of Corœbus.

CHARMIDES.

Ol. 87, 2 or 3.

The subject of this dialogue is Ἡ Σωφροσύνη, "Temperance;" and what was Plato's real opinion of that virtue, may be seen in Rep. iv. p. 430, and Laws, iii. p. 696.

The dramatic part of it is very elegant.

P. 153. That a battle had taken place.] I take the particular action here mentioned to be the attack made on the city, soon after the arrival of Hagno and Cleopompus with fresh troops. See Thucyd. ii. 58. If we consider the purport of the narration there we shall find that Thucydides meant to say that Phormio and his 1600 soldiers, among whom were Socrates and Alcibiades, had returned from their expedition into Chalcidice, mentioned in i. 65, and had joined the army newly arrived from Potidea.

Ib. Critias.] It is extraordinary that Plato, from a partiality to his own family, should so often introduce into his writings the character of Critias, his cousin, whose very name, one should imagine, must be held in detestation at Athens even to remotest

times, he being a monster of injustice and cruelty. Plato seems to have been not a little proud of his family. See Rep. ii. p. 368.

P. 156. Zamolxis.] This person, said by some to have been a slave of Pythagoras, but by Herodotus, in iv. 94, to have been of much greater antiquity, was the king and prophet of the Getes, who were at first only a clan of the Thracians, but afterwards, having passed the Danube, became a great and powerful nation. It is very remarkable, that they had a succession of these high priests, who lived sequestered from mankind in a grotto, and had communication only with the king, in whose power they had a great share from Zamolxis down to the time of Augustus, and possibly long after. See Strabo vii. p. 297.

P. 167. The third to the Saviour.] A proverbial expression frequent with Plato, as in Philebus, p. 66, D., and in Epist. vii. p. 340, A. I imagine it alludes to the Athenian custom detailed by Athenæus from Philochorus in ii. p. 38, which was to serve round after supper a little pure wine, with these words, Ἀγαθῷ Δαίμονι, "To the good Genius," and afterwards as much wine and water as every one called for, with the form of Διὶ Σωτῆρι, "To Zeus the Saviour."

CRATYLUS.

This long dialogue on the origin of words was probably a performance of Plato when he was very young, and is the least considerable of all his works.

Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, is said to have been the master of Plato after Socrates's death; but the latter part of the dialogue is plainly written against the opinions of that sect, and of Cratylus in particular.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 398. Ancient Attic words, δαήμων, εἶρειν: and p. 401, ἐσία; 410, Ὅραι; 418, Ἵμερα, vel Ἔμερα. He remarks that the ancient Attic abounded in the I and Δ, which in his time had been often changed to the H or E and the Z, and that the women preserved much of the old language among them.

P. 409. Much of the Greek language derived from the Barbarians. Ὕδωρ, Πῦρ, Κύων, borrowed from the Phrygians.

P. 425. The Barbarians acknowledged to be more ancient than the Grecks.

P. 427. The powers of the several Greek letters, and the manner of their formation: viz. the P expressive of motion, being formed by a tremulous motion of the tongue; the I of smallness and tenuity; the Φ, Ψ, Σ, Z, of all noises made by the air; the Δ and T of a cessation of motion; the Λ of slipperiness and gliding; the same with a Γ prefixed, of the adherence and tenacity of fluids; the N of any thing internal; the A of largeness; the O of roundness; and the H expressive of length.

SYMPOSIUM.

As to the time of this dialogue, Athenæus, in v. p. 217, tells us, that Agatho first gained the prize when Euphemus was Archon, which was Ol. 90, 4. What he adds, namely, that Plato was then only fourteen years old, and consequently could not be at this entertainment, is very true, but nothing to the purpose; for it is not Plato who uses those words which he cites, but Apollodorus, who recounts the particulars of this banquet, as he had them from Aristodemus, who was present at it ten or twelve years before.

Among the ancients, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hermogenes, Athenæus, Gellius, and Ausonius, and among the moderns, Jos. Scaliger, Petavius, Ger. Vossius, Fraguier, Freret, and La Mothe le Vayer, believed the Cyropædia of Xenophon to be a romance: on the other side, are Usher, Marsham, Le Clerc, Prideaux, Bossuet, Tournemine, Banier, Lenglet, Rollin, Guyon.

P. 177. Ἄλλοις μέν τίσι τῶν θεῶν.] No hymns, nor temples, nor religious rites were offered to Love in Greece. See Sympos. p. 189.

P. 215. The figures of the Sileni in the shops of the sculptors were made hollow, which opened and discovered within the statues of the gods.

P. 219. An army.] They went thither with the supplies under the command of Phormio, Ol. 87, 1. (See Thucyd. i. 64.) Alcibiades being then twenty years of age, and Socrates thirty-nine. The folly of Athenæus, in v. c. 15, who would prove, against the authority of Plato and of Antisthenes, that Socrates was not in any of these actions, is justly exposed by Casaubon. We may add, that if the silence of Thucydides could prove any thing with regard to Socrates, it would prove, at least as strongly, that Alcibiades was not at Potidæa neither; but the contrary is certain from that very oration of Isocrates, to which Athenæus refers

Περὶ Ζεύγους, p. 352, where he is said to have gained the Ἀριστεῖα, namely, a crown and a complete suit of armour, before that city; and if the orator had not totally suppressed the name of Socrates, it would have been highly injudicious in a discourse pronounced by the son of Alcibiades, where he was to exalt the character of his father, and by no means to lessen the merit of any of his actions. He left that to his enemies, who, it is likely, did not forget the generosity of Socrates on this occasion. It is clear from the many oversights of Athenæus here, that he either trusted to his memory, or only quoted from his own extracts, and not from the originals. Plato mentions no second Ἀριστεῖα gained at Delium, and only speaks of the coolness and presence of mind shown by Socrates in his retreat; as he has done also in the Laches. Athenæus affirms, that Alcibiades was not in the battle of Delium, but he assigns no reasons. If he concludes it from the silence of Thucydides, as before, this is nothing; since that historian mentions none but the commanders-in-chief on any of these occasions, and often only one or two of the principal of these: but probably Alcibiades and Laches might then only serve as private men.

This dialogue, particularly the end of it, the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Euthydemus, &c., are strong instances of Plato's genius for dramatic poetry in the comic kind, noticed by Athenæus, in v. p. 187. See also Olympiodor. in the Life of Plato. The Phædo is an instance of Plato's power in the tragic kind.

EUTHYDEMUS.

THERE is a good deal of humour, and even of the "vis comica," in this dialogue. Its end is to expose the vanity and weakness of two famous sophists, and to show, by way of contrast, the art of Socrates in leading youth into the paths of virtue and of right reason.

P. 287. Are you so Saturn-like,] i. e. "simple and old-fashioned." It is scarcely possible to see with patience Plato seriously confuting these childish subtleties, as low as any logical quibbles, used by our scholastic divines in the days of monkery and of deep ignorance. But he best knew the manners of his own age, and doubtless saw these things in a graver light than they of themselves deserve, by reflecting on the bad effects which they had on the understandings and on the morals of his countrymen, who not only spent their wit and their time in playing with words,

when they might have employed them in inquiring into things; but, by rendering every principle doubtful and dark alike, must necessarily induce men to leave themselves to the guidance of chance and of the passions, unassisted by reason. Whereas if, in reality, there be no certain truth attainable by human knowledge, both the means and the end of disputation are absolutely taken away, and it becomes the most absurd and the most childish of all occupations.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.

We learn from this dialogue in how poor a condition the art of reasoning on moral and abstracted subjects was, before the time of Socrates; for it is impossible that Plato should introduce a sophist of the first reputation for eloquenee and knowledge in several kinds, talking in a manner below the absurdity and weakness of a child, unless he had really drawn after the life. No less than twenty-four pages are here spent in vain, only to force it into the head of Hippias, that there is such a thing as a general idea; and that, before we can dispute on any subject, we should give a definition of it.

The time of the conversation seems to be after Ol. 89, 2, for the war had permitted no intercourse between Athens and Elis before that year, and we see in the Protagoras that Hippias was actually at Athens Ol. 90, 1, so that it seems to fall naturally between these two years.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 289. Passages of Heraclitus: Πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἄλλῳ γένει συμβαλεῖν.—Ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς Θεὸν πιθήκος φάνειται. This latter passage is undoubtedly the original of that famous thought in Pope's Essay on Man, b. ii.;

"And showed a Newton, as we show an ape;"

which some persons have imagined that he borrowed from one Palingenius,* an obscure author, who wrote a poem called "Zodiacus Vitæ."

[* Pope, who was versed in the modern Latin poets, might have taken it from Palingenius, and Palingenius from Plato. EDITOR.]

HIPPIAS MINOR.

THE time of this dialogue is after the Hippias Major, with which it may be ranked.

P. 368. Hippias appeared at Olympia in a dress of his own weaving, buskins of his own cutting out and sewing, with a ring on his finger, and a seal engraved by himself, and a beautiful zone of his own embroidery. He brought with him epic poems, dithyrambics, tragedies, and orations, all of his own composition.

P. 368, § 10. Belt.] The Greeks therefore girt their under-garment with a cincture.

PROTAGORAS.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATE OF THIS DIALOGUE.

PLATO, in this dialogue, one of the noblest he ever wrote, has fallen, through negligence, into some anachronisms, as Athenæus has remarked, (in v. p. 218,) though some things in reality are only mistakes of his own, and others he has omitted, which are real faults. Dacier undertakes wholly to justify Plato. We shall show that neither of them are quite in the right.

There are two marks, which fix the time of this conversation, as it is generally thought, and as Athenæus has shown. One, that Callias is mentioned in p. 315, as then master of himself, and in possession of the estate of his father, Hipponicus, who was slain in the battle of Delium, Ol. 89, 1, so that it must be after that year; the other, that the Ἄγροικοι, "The Savages," a comedy of Pherecrates, alluded to, is said to have been played the year before. Now that play was brought upon the stage in the magistracy of Aristion, Ol. 89, 4; consequently this must have happened Ol. 90, 1

There is yet a third circumstance which may ascertain the date of the dialogue. Athenæus produces it as an instance of Plato's negligence; but he has only discovered his own by it. Hippias the Elean, he says, and others of his countrymen are introduced in p. 315, as then present at Athens, whereas it is impossible they could be there during the Peloponnesian war, while the Eleans were confederates with Sparta against the Athenians; for though a truce was agreed upon for one year, under Isarchus, Ol. 89, 1, yet it was broken through presently, and no cessation of arms ensued. But in reality Hippias might be at Athens any year after Isarchus's magistracy; since though the war broke out afresh afterwards with Sparta, yet the allies of Sparta entered not into it, as at first, but either continued neuter, or joined the Athenians, and Elis particularly entered into a defensive league with them this very year, as shown by Thucyd. v. 47; so that when Athenæus speaks of the truce as not remaining, it is plain that he did not know but that Sparta entered the war again with all the confederates which she had at first, and consequently he had read Thucydides very negligently. This very thing then may fix it to Ol. 90, 1, at least it will prove that it could not be earlier than Ol. 89, 1.

Athenæus further remarks, that Eupolis in his Κόλακες, "The Flatterers," which was played Ol. 89, 3, speaks of Protagoras as then present at Athens, and that Ameipsias in his Κόννος, "Connus," acted two years before, has not introduced him into his chorus of Φροντισταί, "The Men of Thought;" so that it is probable that he arrived at Athens in the interval between the representation of these two dramas, which is three or four years earlier than the dialogue, in which Plato nevertheless says that he had not been three days come; and that after many years' absence. Dacier attempts to answer this, but makes little of it; and indeed it was impossible to do better, since both the comedies are lost, and we do not know to what parts of them Athenæus alludes, as he cites nothing.

But in truth there are other circumstances inconsistent with the date of the dialogue, of which neither Athenæus nor Dacier have taken any notice. 1st, Alcibiades is represented as just on the confines of youth and manhood, whereas in Ol. 90, 1, he was turned of thirty. 2ndly, Criso of Himera, celebrated for gaining three victories successively in the course at Olympia, the first of which was Ol. 83, is spoken of in p. 335, as in the height of his vigour. Now it is scarcely possible, that one, who was a man grown at the time I have mentioned, should continue in full strength and agility twenty-nine years afterwards: but this I do not much insist upon. 3rdly, Pericles is spoken of in p. 320, as yet living, although he died nine years before; and what is worse, his two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, are both represented

as present at this conversation, though they certainly died during the plague some time before their father.

ANALYSIS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Socrates is wakened before day-dreak with a hasty knocking at his door: it is Hippocrates, a young man, who comes eagerly to acquaint him with the arrival of Protagoras, the celebrated sophist, at Athens, and to entreat him to go immediately and present him to that great man; for he is determined to spare no pains nor expense, so he may be but admitted to his conversation. Socrates moderates his impatience a little, and while they take a turn about the hall together, waiting for sun-rise, inquires into his notions of a sophist, and what he expected from him; and finding his ideas not very clear upon that head, shows him the folly of putting his soul into the hands of he knew not whom, to do with it he knew not what. If his body had been indisposed, and he had needed a physician, he would certainly have taken the advice and recommendation of his family and friends; but here, where his mind, a thing of much greater importance, was concerned, he was on the point of trusting it, unadvisedly and at random, to the care of a person, whom he had never seen nor spoken to. That a sophist was a kind of merchant, or rather a retailer of food for the soul, and, like other shop-keepers, would exert his eloquence to recommend his own goods. The misfortune was, we could not carry them off, like corporeal viands, set them by a while, and consider them at leisure, whether they were wholesome or not, before we tasted them; that in this case we have no vessel, but the soul, to receive them in, which will necessarily retain a tincture, and perhaps much to its prejudice, of all which is instilled into it. However, by way of trial only, they agree to wait upon Protagoras, and accordingly they go to the house of Callias, where both he and two other principal sophists, Prodicus and Hippias, with all their train of followers, were lodged and entertained.

The porter, an eunuch, wearied and pestered with the crowd of sophists who resorted to the house, mistaking them for such, gives them a short answer, and shuts the door in their face. At last they are admitted, and find Protagoras with Callias, and more company, walking in the porticos. The motions of Protagoras's followers are described with much humour; how at every turn they divided and cast off, as in a dance, still falling in, and moving in due subordination behind the principal performer. Hippias is sitting in a great chair, on the opposite side of the court, discoursing on points of natural philosophy to a circle, who are seated on forms round him; while Prodicus, in a large inner

apartment, in bed and wrapped up in abundance of warm clothes, lies discoursing with another company of admirers. Socrates approaches Protagoras, and presents the young Hippocrates to him. The sophist, having premised something to give an idea of his own profession, its use and dignity, the rest of the company, being summoned together from all quarters, seat themselves about him; and Socrates begins by entreating Protagoras to inform him, what was the tendency and usual effect of his lessons, that Hippocrates might know what he was to expect from him. His answers show, that he professed to accomplish men for public and private life, to make them good and useful members of the state, and of a family. Socrates admires the beauty of his art, if indeed there be such an art, which, he confesses, he has often doubted; for if virtue is a thing which may be taught, what can his countrymen the Athenians mean, who in their public assemblies, if the question turn on repairing the public edifices, consult the architect, and if on their fleet, the ship-builder, and laughed at such as, on pretence of their wit, of their wealth, or of their nobility, should interfere in debates which concern a kind of knowledge, in which they have neither skill nor experience; but if the point to be considered relate to the laws, to the magistracy, to the administration of peace and war, and to such subjects, every merchant, every little tradesman and mechanic, the poor as well as the rich, the mean as well as the noble, deliver their opinion with confidence, and are heard with attention. Besides, those greatest statesmen, who have been esteemed the brightest examples of political virtue, though they have given their children every accomplishment of the body which education could bestow, do not at all appear to have improved their minds with those qualities for which they themselves were so eminent, and in which consequently they were best able to instruct them, if instruction could convey these virtues to the soul at all.

Protagoras answers by reciting a fable delivered in very beautiful language. The substance of it is this. Prometheus and Epimetheus, when the gods had formed all kinds of animals within the bowels of the earth, and the destined day approached for producing them into light, were commissioned to distribute among them the powers and qualifications which were allotted to them. The younger brother prevailed upon the elder to let him perform this work; and Prometheus consented to review afterwards and correct his disposition of things. Epimetheus then began, and directed his care to the preservation of the several species, that none might ever be totally lost. To some he gave extreme swiftness, but they were deficient in strength; and the strong he made not equally swift: the little found their security in the lightness of their bodies, in their airy wings, and in their subterraneous retreats; while those of vast magnitude had the superiority of their

bulk for a defence. Such as were formed to prey on others, he made to produce but few young ones; while those, who were to serve as their prey, brought forth a numerous progeny. He armed them against the seasons with hoofs of horn and callous feet, with hides of proof and soft warm furs, their native bed and clothing all in one. But when Prometheus came to review his brother's work, he found that he had lavished all his art and all his materials upon the brute creation, while mankind, whose turn it was next to be produced to light, was left a naked, helpless animal, exposed to the rigour of the seasons and to the violence of every other creature round him. In compassion therefore to his wants, Prometheus purloined the arts of Pallas and of Vulcan, and with them fire, without which they were impracticable and useless, and bestowed them on this new race, to compensate their natural defects. Men then, as allied to the divinity and endowed with reason, were the only part of the creation which acknowledged the being and the providence of the gods. They began to erect altars and statues; they formed articulate sounds, and invented language; they built habitations, covered themselves with clothing, and cultivated the ground. But still they were lonely creatures, scattered here and there; for Prometheus did not dare to enter the citadel of Jove, where Policy, the mother and queen of social life, was kept near the throne of the god himself; otherwise he would have bestowed her too on his favourite mankind. The arts which they possessed, just supported them, but could not defend them against the multitude and fierceness of the wild beasts: they tried to assemble and live together, but soon found that they were more dangerous and mischievous to one another than the savage creatures had been. In pity then to their condition, Jove, lest the whole race should perish, sent Mercury to earth, with Shame and Justice; and when he doubted how he should bestow them, and whether they should be distributed, as the arts had been, this to one, and that to another, or equally divided among the whole kind; Jove approved of the latter, and he commanded that if any did not receive his share of that bounty he should be extirpated from the face of the earth, as the pest and destruction of his fellow-creatures.

This then, continues Protagoras, is the reason, why the Athenians, and other nations, in debates, which turn on the several arts, attend only to the advice of the skilful; but give ear in matters of government, which are founded on ideas of common justice and probity, to every citizen indifferently among them: and that this is the common opinion of all men, may hence appear. If a person totally ignorant of music should fancy himself an admirable performer, the world would either laugh or be angry, and his friends would reprimand or treat him as a madman: but if a man should have candour and plain-dealing enough to profess himself a vil-

d ignorant of common justice, what in the other case would
een counted modesty, the simple confession of truth and of
n ignorance, would here be called impudence and madness.
at will not dissemble here, will be by all regarded as an
for to own that one knows not what justice is, is to own
e ought not to live among mankind.

roceeds to show, that no one thought our idea of justice to
gift of nature; but that it is acquired by instruction and by
nce: for with the weak, the deformed, or the blind man,
is angry; no reprimands, no punishments attend the un-
te, nor are employed to correct our natural defects; but
re the proper consequences of our voluntary neglects or
s. Nor is the punishment, which follows even these, in-
to redress an evil already past, for that is impossible, but
ent a future, or at least to deter others from like offences;
proves, that wickedness is by all regarded as a voluntary
ce.

he shows, how this knowledge is acquired. It is by educa-
Every one is interested in teaching another the proper vir-
a man, on which alone all his other acquisitions must be
l, and without which he cannot exist among his fellow-
es. His parents, as soon as understanding begins to dawn
are employed in prescribing what he ought to do and what
t not to do; his masters, in filling his mind with the pre-
nd forming it to the example, of the greatest men, or in
ing his body to perform with ease and patience whatever
on commands; and lastly, the laws of the state lay down a
which he is necessitated to direct his actions. If then the
the greatest men do not appear to be greater proficients in
an the ordinary sort, it must not be ascribed to the parent's
much less must it be concluded, that virtue is not to be
l by instruction: it is the fault perhaps of genius and of

Let us suppose, that to perform on a certain instrument
qualification required in every man, and necessary to the
e of a city, ought we to wonder, that the son of an ad-
performer fell infinitely short of his father in skill? Should
bute this to want of care, or say, that music were not at-
by any art? or should we not rather ascribe it to defect of
and to natural inability? Yet every member of such a
uld doubtless far surpass all persons rude and unpractised
c. In like manner, the most worthless member of a
civilized by some sort of education and brought up under
ience of laws and of policy, will be an amiable man, if
d with a wild and uncultivated savage.

ard indeed to say, who is our particular instructor in the
irtues; as, for the same reason, it is hard to say, who
s our native tongue; yet no one will therefore deny that

we learned it. The public is in these cases our master; and all the world has a share in our instruction. Suffice it, continues the sophist, to know, that some there are among us, elevated a little above the ordinary sort, in the art of leading mankind to honour and to virtue; and among these I have the advantage to be distinguished.

Socrates continues astonished for a time and speechless, as though dazzled with the beauty of Protagoras's discourse. At last, recovering himself, he ventures to propound a little doubt which has arisen in his mind, though perfectly satisfied, he says, with the main question, whether temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest, which Protagoras has so often mentioned, and seemed to comprehend under the general name of virtue, are different things, and can subsist separately in the same person; or whether they are all the same quality of mind, only exerted on different occasions. Protagoras readily agrees to the first of these; but is insensibly betrayed by Socrates into the toils of his logic, and makes such concessions, that he finds himself forced to conclude the direct contrary of what he had first advanced. He is sensible of his disgrace, and tries to evade this closer kind of reasoning by taking refuge in that more diffuse eloquence, which used to gain him such applause. But when he finds himself cut short by Socrates, who pleads the weakness of his own memory, unable to attend to long-continued discourses, and who entreats him to bring down the greatness of his talents to the level of a mind so much inferior, he is forced to pick a frivolous quarrel with Socrates, and break off the conversation in the middle. Here Callias interposes, and Alcibiades, in his insolent way, by supporting the request of Socrates and by piquing the vanity of Protagoras, obliges him to accommodate himself to the interrogatory method of disputation, and renews the dialogue.[1]

To save the dignity of Protagoras, and to put him in humour again, Socrates proposes that he shall conduct the debate, and state the questions, while he himself will only answer them; provided Protagoras will in his turn afterwards condescend to do the same for him. The sophist begins by proposing a famous ode of Simonides, which seems to carry in it an absolute contradiction, which he desires Socrates to reconcile. Socrates appears at first puzzled, and after he has played awhile with Protagoras and with the other sophists, that he may have time to recollect himself, he gives an explanation of that poem, and of its pretended inconsistency, in a manner so new and so just as to gain the applause of

[1] The episodical characters of Prodicus and Hippias, introduced as mediating a reconciliation, are great ornaments to the dialogue; the affectation of eloquence and of an accurate choice of words in the former, and the stately figurative diction of the latter, being undoubtedly drawn from the life.

the whole company. He then brings back Protagoras, in spite of his reluctance, to his former subject, but without taking advantage of his former concessions, and desires again his opinion on the unity, or on the similitude, of the virtues. Protagoras now owns, that there is a near[1] affinity between them all, except valour, which he affirms that a man may possess, who is entirely destitute of all the rest. Socrates proves to him, that this virtue also, like the others, is founded on knowledge and is reducible to it; that it is but to know what is really to be feared, and what is not; that good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain,[2] being the great and the only movers of the human mind, no one can reject pleasure, but where it seems productive of a superior degree of pain, or prefer pain, unless the consequence of it be a superior pleasure. That to balance these one against the other with accuracy, to judge rightly of them at a distance, to calculate the overplus of each, is that science on which our happiness depends, and which is the basis of every virtue. That, if our whole life's welfare and the interests of it were as closely connected with the judgment, which we should make on the real magnitude of objects and on their true figure, or with our not being deceived by the appearance which they exhibit at a distance, who doubts but that geometry and optics would then be the means of happiness to us, and would become the rule of virtue? That there is a kind of knowledge no less necessary to us in our present state, and no less a science; and that, when we pretend to be misled by our passions, we ought to blame our ignorance, which is the true source of all our follies and vices. And now, continues Socrates, who would not laugh at our inconsistency? You set out with affirming that virtue might be taught, yet in the course of our debate you have treated it as a thing entirely distinct[3] from knowledge, and not reducible to it: I, who advanced the contrary position, have shown that it is a science, and consequently that it may be learned.

Protagoras, who has had no other share in the dispute than to make, without perceiving the consequence, such concessions as absolutely destroy what he set out with affirming, tries to support the dignity of his own age and reputation, by making an arrogant compliment to Socrates, commending his parts, very considerable, he says, and very promising for so young a man, and doing him

[1] See Gorgias, p. 507.

[2] Plato reasons on the principles of the most rational Epicurean in this place, and indeed on the only principles which can be defended. As our sense of pleasure and of pain is our earliest sentiment, and is the great instrument of self-preservation, some philosophers have called these affections, The first according to nature. See Aul. Gell. xii. 5.

[3] It was the opinion of Socrates, that all the virtues were only prudence, or wisdom, exerted on different occasions. An opinion in which, says Aristotle, in Ethic. Nicom vi. 13, he was partly right and partly wrong.

the justice to say to all his acquaintance, that he knows no one more likely, some time or other, to make an extraordinary person; and he adds that this is not a time to enter deeper into this subject; but on any other day he shall be at his service.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 320. At liberty.] Every divinity had some such animals, which fed at liberty within the sacred enclosures and pastures. Such were the oxen of the Sun, in Homer, Od. M.; the owls of Minerva in the Acropolis at Athens, (Aristoph. Lysist.,) the peacocks of Juno at Samos, (Athenæus, xiv. p. 655,) the tame serpents of Æsculapius, at Epidaurus, (Pausan. ii. 28, and at Athens, Aristoph. Plut. 733,) the fishes of the Syrian goddess, &c. (Xenoph. Anabas. i. p. 254.)

P. 328. Worthy of the money I make.] It is remarkable in what general esteem and admiration Protagoras was held throughout all Greece. If any scholar of his thought the price he exacted was too high, he only obliged him to say upon his oath, what he thought the precepts he had given were worth, and Protagoras was satisfied with that sum. Yet he got more wealth by his profession than Phidias the statuary, and any other ten the most celebrated artists of Greece, as we learn from Meno, p. 91, and Hipp. Maj. p. 282. Quintilian says, in iii. 1, that Euathlus gave him 10,000 drachmæ (about £300 sterling) for his art of rhetoric in writing. He was the first sophist in Greece who professed himself a teacher of education and virtue, and such an one as could make men better and better every time he conversed with them. See p. 318, and 349.

P. 357. The want of instruction.] The true key and great moral of the dialogue is, that knowledge alone is the source of virtue, and ignorance the source of vice. It was Plato's own principle, as shown in Epist. vii. p. 336, and elsewhere. The consequence of it is, that virtue may be taught, and may be acquired; and that philosophy alone can point us out the way to it.

IO.

As Serranus, and, I think, every commentator after him, has read this dialogue with a grave countenance, and understood it in a literal sense, though it is throughout a very apparent and continued irony; it is no wonder if such persons, as trust to their accounts of it, find it a very silly and frivolous thing. Yet under that irony, doubtless, there is concealed a serious meaning, which makes a part of Plato's great design, a design which runs through all his writings. He was persuaded that virtue must be built on knowledge, not on that counterfeit knowledge, which dwells only on the surface of things, and is guided by the imagination rather than by the judgment, (for this was the peculiar foible of his countrymen, a light and desultory people, easily seduced by their fancy wherever it led them,) but on the knowledge which is fixed and settled on certain great and general truths, and on principles as ancient and as unshaken as nature itself, or rather as the author of nature. To this knowledge, and consequently to virtue, he thought that philosophy was our only guide: and as to all those arts, which are usually made merely subservient to the passions of mankind, as politics, eloquence, and poetry, he thought that they were no otherwise to be esteemed than as they are grounded on philosophy, and are directed to the ends of virtue. They, who had best succeeded in them before his time, owed, as he thought, their success rather to a lucky hit, to some gleam of truth, as it were providentially breaking in upon their minds, than to those fixed and unerring principles which are not to be erased from a soul, which has once been thoroughly convinced of them. Their conduct therefore in their actions, and in their productions, has been wavering between good and evil, and unable to reach perfection. The inferior tribe have caught something of their fire, merely by imitation, and form their judgments, not from any real skill they have in these arts, but merely from (what La Bruyere calls) a *gout de comparaison*. The general applause of men has pointed out to them what is finest; and to that, as to a principle, they refer their taste, without knowing or inquiring in what its excellence consists. Each Muse (says Plato in this dialogue) inspires and holds suspended her favourite poet in immediate contact, as the magnet does a link of iron, and from him, through whom the attractive virtue passes and is continued to the rest, hangs a long chain of actors, and singers, and critics, and interpreters of interpreters.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 533. Dædalus was the son of Palamaon, of that branch of the royal family called Metionidæ, being sprung from Metion, the son of Erectheus. (See Pausan. vii. p. 531, and i. p. 13:) There were statues of his workmanship still preserved in several cities of Greece, at Thebes, Lebadea, Delos, Olus, and Gnossus, even in the time of Pausanias, above six hundred years after this. See Pausan. ix. p. 793, and Plato, Hippias Maj. p. 282. Epeus, the son of Panopeus, was the inventor of the Trojan horse; in the temple of the Lycian Apollo at Argos, was preserved a wooden figure of Mercury made by him. Theodorus, the Samian, son of Telecles, first discovered the method of casting iron, and of forming it into figures: he also (with his countryman Rhæcus the son of Philæus) was the first who cast statues in bronze; he worked likewise in gold, and graved precious stones.

P. 533. Ὀλυμπου.] Olympus, the Phrygian, lived in the time of Midas before the Trojan war, yet his compositions, as well the music as the verses, were extant even in Plutarch's days. Aristotel. Politic. viii. c. 5, and Plato, Sympos. p. 215. Hence also it seems that they had the music of Orpheus, of Thamyris, and of Phemius, then in being. (See Hom. Odyss. A. 325, and X. 330.)

P. 533. The Magnesian.] Euripides gave it this name, probably from the city of Magnesia near the hill of Sipylus, where it was found. Mr. Chishull tells us, that as they were ascending the castle-hill of this city, a compass, which they carried with them, pointed to different quarters, as it happened to be placed on different stones, and that at last it entirely lost its virtue; which shows that hill to be a mine of loadstone. Its power of attracting iron and of communicating its virtue to that iron, we see, was a thing well known at that time, yet they suspected nothing of its polar qualities.

P. 534. Ὑπορχήματα.] Pindar was famous for this kind of compositions, though we have lost them, as well as his dithyrambics. Xenodemus also, Bacchylides, and Pratinas the Phliasian, excelled in them. Athenæus has preserved a fine fragment of this last poet, xiv. p. 617. These compositions were full of description, and were sung by a chorus who danced at the same time, and represented the words by their movements and gestures. Tynnichus of Chalcis, whose pæan was famous, and indeed the only good thing he ever wrote.

P. 535. Ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος.] The Rhapsodi, we find, were mounted on a sort of suggestum, with a crown of gold (see p. 530 and 541 of this dialogue) on their heads, and dressed in robes of various colours, and after their performance was finished, a collection seems to have been made for them among the audience.

P. 536. The Corybantes.] This alludes to a peculiar phrensy, supposed to be inspired by some divinity, especially Cybele, and attended with violent motions and efforts of the body. Persons so affected believed they heard the sound of loud music continually in their ears, and were peculiarly sensible to certain airs, when really played, as it is reported of those who are bitten by the tarantula.

THEÆTETUS.

TERPSION meeting Euclides at Megara, and inquiring where he has been, is informed that he has been accompanying Theætetus, who is lately come on shore from Corinth, in a weak and almost dying condition, upon his return to Athens. This reminds them of the high opinion which Socrates had entertained of that young man, who was presented to him (not long before his death) by Theodorus of Cyrene, the geometrician. The conversation, which then passed between them, was taken down in writing by Euclides, who, at the request of Terpsion, orders his servant to read it to them.

The Abbé Sallier, in Mémoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions, vol. xiii. p. 317, has given an elegant translation of the most shining part of this dialogue; and also in vol. xvi. p. 70, has translated all that part of the dialogue, in which Plato has explained the system of Protagoras. The description of a true philosopher in p. 172, though a little exaggerated, and more in the character of Plato than of Socrates, has yet an elevation in it which is admirable. The Abbé Sallier has also given a sketch of the dialogue, which is a very long one, and, as he rightly judges, would not be much approved in a translation. It is of that kind called Πειραστικός, "Tentative," in order to make trial of the capacity of Theætetus, while Socrates, as he says, only plays the midwife, and brings the conceptions of his mind to light. The question is, What is knowledge? and the purpose of the dialogue is rather to refute the false definitions of it, as established by[1] Protagoras in his writings, and resulting from the tenets of Heraclitus,[2] of Empedocles, and of other philosophers, than to produce a better definition of his own. Yet there are many fine and remarkable passages in it, such as the observations of Theodorus on the faults of temper, which usually attend on brighter parts, and on the defects of genius often found in minds of a more sedate and solid turn; Socrates's illustration of his own art by the whimsical comparison between that and midwifery; his opinion, adopted by Aristotle in Metaphys. i. p. 335, ed. Sylb., that admiration is the parent of

[1] His fundamental tenet was, that every man's own perceptions of things were (to him) the measure and the test of truth and of falsehood.

[2] Viz. that motion was the principle of being, and the only cause of all its qualities.

philosophy; the explanation of active and passive powers of matter, arising from the perpetual flux and motion of all things, which was the doctrine of Heraclitus and others; the reflections on philosophical leisure, and on a liberal turn of mind, opposed to the little cunning and narrow thoughts of mere men of business; the description of Heraclitus's followers, then very numerous in Ionia, particularly at Ephesus; the account of the tenets of Parmenides and of Melissus, directly contrary to those of the former; the distinction between our senses, the instruments through which the mind perceives external objects, and the mind itself, which judges of their existence, their likeness, and their difference, and founds its knowledge on the ideas which it abstracts from them; to which we may add, the comparison of ideas fixed in the memory to impressions made in wax, and the dwelling on this similitude in order to show the several imperfections of this faculty in different constitutions.

THE SOPHIST.

I AM convinced that this is a continuation of the Theætetus, which ends with these words, "To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again," as this begins with "According to our agreement, Socrates, yesterday, we are come ourselves in due order." The persons are the same, except the philosopher of the Eleatic school, who is here introduced, and who carries on the disputation with Theætetus, while both Theodorus and Socrates continue silent. The apparent subject of it is the character of a sophist, which is here at large displayed in opposition to that of a philosopher; but here too he occasionally attacks the opinions of Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and others, on the incertitude of all existence and on the perpetual flux of matter.

This dialogue, in a translation, would suit the taste of the present age still less even than the Theætetus; particularly that part, which is intended to explain the nature of existence and of non-existence, which to me is obscure beyond all comprehension, partly perhaps from our ignorance of the opinions of those philosophers, which are here refuted; and partly from the abstracted nature of the subject; and not a little, I doubt, from Plato's manner of treating it.

The most remarkable things in this dialogue appear to be, his

description of that disorder and want of symmetry in the soul, produced by ignorance, which puts it off its bias on its way to happiness, the great end of human actions: the distinction he makes between Ἄγνοια, "the want of knowledge," and Ἀμαθία, "the want of learning;" of which the former is simply our ignorance of a thing, the latter, an ignorance which mistakes itself for knowledge, and which, as long as this sentiment attends it, is without hope of remedy: the explanation of the Socratic mode of instruction, adapted to this peculiar kind of ignorance, by drawing a person's errors gradually from his own mouth, ranging them together, and exposing to his own eyes their inconsistency and weakness: the comparison of that representation of things, given us by the sophists, and pieces of painting, which, placed at a certain distance, deceive the young and inexperienced into an opinion of their reality: and the total change of ideas in young men when they come into the world, and begin to be acquainted with it by their own sensations, and not by description. All these passages are extremely good.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 252. Eurycles.] He was a ventriloquist, and set up for a prophet. Such as are possessed of this faculty, can manage their voice in so wonderful a manner, that it shall seem to come from what part they please, not of themselves only, but of any other person in the company, or even from the bottom of a well, down a chimney, from below stairs, &c., of which I myself have been witness.

P. 265. We see here that it was the common opinion, that the creation of things was the work of blind, unintelligent nature; whereas the contrary was the result of philosophical reflection and disquisition, believed by a few people only.

THE STATESMAN.

THIS dialogue is a continuation of the Sophist, as the Sophist is a continuation of the Theætetus; and they were accordingly ranged together by Thrasyllus in that order, as stated by Diog. Laert. iii. 58, though Serranus in his edition has separated them. The persons are the same, only that here the younger Socrates is introduced, instead of Theætetus, carrying on the conversation with the stranger from Elea. The principal heads of it are the following:

P. 258. The division of the sciences into speculative and practical.

P. 259. The master, the economist, the politician, the king; which are taken as different names for men of the same profession.

The private man, who can give lessons of government to such as publicly exercise this art, deserves the name of royal no less than they.

No difference between a great family and a small commonwealth.

The politician must command on his own judgment, and not by the suggestion of others.

P. 262. The absurdity of the Greeks, who divided all mankind into Greeks and barbarians. The folly of all distinction and division without a difference.

P. 269. The fable of the contrary revolutions in the universe at periodical times, with the alternate destruction and reproduction of all creatures.

P. 273. The disorder and the evil in the natural world, accounted for from the nature of[1] matter, while it was yet a chaos.

The former revolution, in which the Divinity himself immediately conducted every thing, is called the Saturnian age; the present revolution, when the world goes the contrary way, being left to its own[2] conduct. Mankind are now guided by their own free-will, and are preserved by their own inventions.

P. 275. The nature of the monarch in this age is no other

[1] Plato, with the Pythagoreans, looked upon matter as co-eternal with the Deity, but receiving its order and design entirely from him.

[2] Here too, as in the Timæus, p. 63, A., he considers the universe as one vast, animated, and intelligent body.

than that of the people which he commands. His government must be with the consent of the people.

P. 276. Clear and certain knowledge is rare and in few instances; we are forced to supply this defect by comparison and by analogy. Necessity of tracing things up to their first principles. Examples of logical division.

Greater, or less, with respect to our actions, are not to be considered as mere relations only depending on one another, but are to be referred to a certain middle term, which forms the standard of morality.

P. 284. All the arts consist in measurement, and are divided into two classes: 1st, Those arts which compare dimensions, numbers, or motions, each with its contrary, as greater with smaller, more with less, swifter with slower; and 2dly, Those, which compare them by their distances from some middle point, seated between two extremes, in which consists what is right, fit, and becoming.

The design of these distinctions, and of the manner used before in tracing out the idea of a sophist and a politician, is to form the mind to a habit of logical division.

The necessity of illustrating our contemplations, on abstract and spiritual subjects, by sensible and material images, is stated.

P. 286. An apology for his prolixity.

Principal, and concurrent, or instrumental causes, are named; the division of the latter, with their several productions, is into seven classes of arts which are necessary to society: viz.

1. Τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἶδος. That class which furnishes materials for all the rest; it includes the arts of mining, hewing, felling, &c.

2. Ὄργανον. The instruments employed in all manufactures, with the arts which make them.

3. Ἀγγεῖον. The vessels to contain and preserve our nutriment, and other movables, furnished by the potter, joiner, brazier, &c.

4. Ὄχημα. Carriages, seats, vehicles for the land and water, &c., by the coach-maker, ship and boat-builder, &c.

5. Προβλημα. Shelter, covering, and defence, as houses, clothing, tents, arms, &c., by the architect, weaver, armourer, &c.

6. Παίγνιον. Pleasure and amusement, as painting, music, sculpture, &c.

7. Θρέμμα. Nourishment, supplied by agriculture, hunting, cookery, &c., and regulated by the gymnastic and medical arts.

P. 289. None of these arts have any pretence to, or competition with, the art of governing; no more than the class which voluntarily exercise the employment of slaves, such as merchants, bankers, and tradesmen: the priesthood too are included under this head, as interpreters between the gods and men, not from their own judgment, but either by inspiration, or by a certain prescribed ceremonial.

P. 291. There are three kinds of government, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy: the two first are distinguished into four, royalty, tyranny, aristocracy, and oligarchy-proper.

P. 294. The imperfection of all laws arises from the impossibility of adapting them to the continual change of circumstances, and to particular cases.

P. 296. Force may be employed by the wise and just legislator to good ends.

P. 298. The supposition of a set of rules in physic, in agriculture, or in navigation, drawn up by a majority of the citizens, and not to be transgressed under pain of death, applied to the case of laws made by the people.

P. 307. Some nations are destroyed by an excess of spirit; others by their own inoffensiveness and love of quiet.

P. 308. The office of true policy is to temper courage with moderation, and moderation with courage. Policy presides over education.

This dialogue seems to be a very natural introduction to the books *De Republicâ*, and was doubtless so intended. See particularly iii. p. 410, &c., and iv. p. 442.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 290. The Egyptian kings were all of them priests, and if any of another class usurped the throne, they too were obliged to admit themselves of that order.

THE REPUBLIC.

The scene of this dialogue lies at the house of Cephalus, a rich old Syracusan, father to Lysias the orator, then residing in the Piræeus, on the day of the Bendidea, a festival, then first celebrated on the 19th day of the month Thargelion, answering to the middle of June, with processions, races, and illuminations in honour of the Thracian Diana. The persons engaged in the conversation, or present at it, are Cephalus himself, Polemarchus, Lysias, and Euthydemus, his three sons; Glauco and Adimantus, sons of Aristo and brothers to Plato; Niceratus, son of Nicias; Thrasy-

machus the sophist of Chalcedon; Clitophon, son of Aristonymus, and Charmantides of Pæania, and Socrates.

As to the time of these dialogues, it is certain that Cephalus died about Ol. 84, 1, and that his son Lysias was born fifteen years before Ol. 80, 2, consequently they must fall between these two years, and probably not long before Cephalus's death, when he was seventy years old or more; and Lysias was a boy of ten or twelve and upwards. Therefore I should place it in the 83rd Ol. See Fastos Atticos, Corsini, vol. ii. Dissert. 13, p. 312. But I must observe that this is not easily reconcilable with the age of Adimantus and Glauco, who are here introduced as men grown up, and consequently must be at least thirty-six years older than their brother Plato. If this can be allowed, the action at Megara there mentioned must be that which happened Ol. 83, 2, under Pericles; and the institution of the Bendidea must have been Ol. 83, 3 or 4. It is observable also that Theages is mentioned in vi. p. 496 of this dialogue, as advanced in the study of philosophy. He was very young, when his father Demodocus put him under the care of Socrates, which was in Ol. 92, 3, and consequently thirty-five years after the time which Corsini would assign to this conversation.

BOOK I.

HEADS OF THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

The pleasures of old age and the advantages of wealth.

P. 335. The just man hurts no one, not even his enemies.

P. 338. The sophist's definition of justice, namely, that it is the advantage of our superiors, to which the laws of every government oblige the subject to conform, is refuted.

P. 341. The proof, that the proper office of every art is to act for the good of its inferiors.

P. 343. The sophist's attempt to show, that justice is not the good of those who possess it, but of those who do not; and that injustice is only blamed in such as have not the art to carry it to its perfection, refuted.

P. 347. In a state composed all of good men, no one would be ambitious of governing.

P. 349. The perfection of the arts consists in attaining a certain rule of proportion. The musician does not attempt to excel his fellows by straining or stopping his chords higher or lower than they; for that would produce dissonance and not harmony; the physician does not try to exceed his fellows by prescribing a larger or less quantity of nourishment, or of medicines, than conduces to health; and so of the rest. The unjust man therefore, who would surpass all the rest of his fellow-creatures in the

quantity of his pleasures and powers, acts like one ignorant in the art of life, in which only the just are skilled.

P. 351. The greatest and most signal injustices, which one state and society can commit against another, cannot be perpetrated without a strict adherence to justice among the particular members of such a state and society: so that there is no force nor strength without a degree of justice.

P. 352. Injustice even in one single mind must set it at perpetual variance with itself, as well as with all others.

P. 353. Virtue is the proper office, the wisdom, the strength, and the happiness of the human soul.

BOOK II.

HEADS OF THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

P. 357. Good is of three kinds: the First we embrace for itself, without regard to its consequences; such are all innocent delights and amusements. The Second, both for itself and for its consequences, as health, strength, sense, &c. The Third, for its consequences only, as labour, medicine, &c. The second of these is the most perfect: the justice of this class. Objection—To consider it rightly we must separate it from honour and from reward, and view it simply as it is in itself.

P. 358. Injustice is a real good to its possessor, and justice is an evil: but as men feel more pain in suffering than inflicting injury, and as the greater part are more exposed to suffer it than capable of inflicting it, they have by compact agreed neither to do nor to suffer injustice; which is a medium calculated for the general benefit, between that which is best of all, namely, to do injustice without fear of punishment, and that which is worst, to suffer it without a possibility of revenge. This is the origin of what we call justice.

Such as practise the rules of justice do it from their inability to do otherwise, and consequently against their will. Story of Gyges's[1] ring, by which he could make himself invisible at pleasure. No person, who possessed such a ring, but would do wrong.

P. 360. Life of the perfectly unjust man, who conceals his true character from the world, and that of the perfectly just man, who seems the contrary in the eye of the world, are compared: the happiness of the former is contrasted with the misery of the latter.

P. 362. The advantages of probity are not therefore, according to this representation, in itself, but in things exterior to it, in

[1] See Cic. de Offic. iii. c. 9, where he attributes to Gyges himself what Plato relates of one of his ancestors.

honours and rewards, and they attend not on being, but on seeming honest.

P. 363. Accordingly the praises bestowed on justice, and the reproaches on injustice, by our parents and governors, are employed not on the thing itself, but on its consequences. The Elysian fields and the punishments of Tartarus are painted in the strongest colours by the poets; while they represent the practice of virtue as difficult and laborious, and that of vice, as easy and delightful. They add, that the gods often bestow misery on the former, and prosperity and success on the latter; and, at the same time, they teach us how to expiate our crimes, and even how to hurt our enemies, by prayers, by sacrifices, and by incantations.

P. 366. The consequence is, by this mode of argument, that to dissemble well with the world is the way to happiness in *this* life; and for what is to come, we may buy the favour of the gods at a trifling expense.

P. 369. The nature of political justice. The image of a society in its first formation: it is founded on our natural imbecility, and on the mutual occasion we have for each other's assistance. Our first and most pressing necessity, is that of food; the second, of habitation; the third, of clothing. The first and most necessary society must therefore consist of a ploughman, a builder, a shoemaker, and a weaver: but, as they will want instruments, a carpenter and a smith will be requisite; and as cattle will be wanted, as well for their skins and wool, as for tillage and carriage, they must take in shepherds and the herdsmen. As one country produces not every thing, they will have occasion for some imported commodities, which cannot be procured without exportations in return, so that a commerce must be carried on by merchants; and if it be performed by sea, there will be an occasion for mariners and pilots. Further; as the employment of the shepherds, agricultors, mechanics, merchants, and such persons will not permit them to attend the markets, there must be retailers, and tradesmen, and money to purchase with; and there must be servants to assist all these, that is, persons who let out their strength for hire. Such an establishment will not be long without a degree of luxury, which will increase the city with a vast variety of artificers, and require a greater extent of territory to support them: they will then encroach on their neighbours. Hence the origin of war. A militia will be required; but as this is an art, which will engross the whole man, and take up all his time, to acquire and exercise it, a distinct body will be formed of chosen men for the defence of the state.

P. 374. The nature of a soldier: he must have quickness of sense, agility, and strength, invincible spirit tempered with gentleness and goodness of heart, and an understanding apprehensive and desirous of knowledge.

P. 376. The education of such a person. Errors and dangerous prejudices are instilled into young minds by the Greek poets. The scandalous fables of Homer and of Hesiod, who attribute injustice, enmity, anger, and deceit to the gods, are reprobated; and the immutable goodness, truth, justice, mercy, and other attributes of the Divinity are nobly asserted.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 363. Ἐπαγωγαὶ καὶ κατάδεσμοι τῶν Θεῶν.] Incantations and magical rites, to hurt one's enemies, were practised in Greece and taught by vagabond priests and prophets: a number of books ascribed to Musæus and Orpheus were carried about by such people, prescribing various expiatory ceremonies and mysterious rites: so the chorus of Satyrs in the Cyclops of Euripides, vs. 642.

P. 372. Chick-peas and beans.] This was a common dessert among the Greeks, both eaten raw, when green and tender, or when dry, parched in the fire. See Athenæus, ii. p. 54; Theocritus, Id. vii. 65. Crobylus (quoted by Athenæus, p. 54) calls this kind of eatables, "the monkeys' dessert."

BOOK III.

HEADS OF THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

P. 386. Wrong notions of a future state are instilled into youth by the poets, whence arises an unmanly fear of death.

P. 388. Excessive sorrow and excessive laughter are equally unbecoming a man of worth.

P. 389. Falsehood and fiction are not permitted, but where they are for the good of mankind; and consequently they are not to be trusted but in skilful hands.

P. 390. Examples of impiety and of bad morality in the poets, and in other ancient writers.

P. 392. Poetic eloquence is divided into narration, in the writer's own person, and imitation, in some assumed character. Dithyrambics usually consist wholly of the former; dramatic poesy, of the latter; the epic, &c., of both mixed.

P. 395. Early imitation becomes a second nature. The soldier is not permitted to imitate any thing misbecoming his own character, and consequently he is neither permitted to write, nor to play, any part which he himself would not act in life.

P. 396. Imitative expression in oratory, or in gesture, is restrained by the same principle.

P. 398. Music must be regulated. The Lydian, Syntono-Lydian, and Ionian harmonies are banished, as accommodated to the soft, enervate passions; but the Dorian and the Phrygian

harmonies are permitted, as manly, decent, and persuasive. All instruments of great compass and of luxuriant harmony, the lyra, the cythara, and the fistula, are allowed; and the various rhythms or movements are in like manner restrained.

P. 401. The same principle is extended to painting, sculpture, architecture, and to the other arts.

P. 403. Love is permitted, but abstracted from bodily enjoyment. Diet and exercises, plain and simple meats, are prescribed.

P. 405. Many judges and physicians are a sure sign of a society ill-regulated both in mind and in body. Ancient physicians knew no medicines but for wounds, fractures, epidemical distempers, and other acute complaints. The diætetic and gymnastic method of cure, or rather of protracting diseases, was not known before Herodicus introduced it.

P. 409. The temper and disposition of an old man of probity, fit to judge of the crimes of others, is described.

P. 410. The temper of men, practised in the exercises of the body, but unacquainted with music and with letters, is apt to run into an obstinate and brutal fierceness; and that of the contrary sort, into indolence and effeminacy. The gradual neglect of this, in both cases, is here finely painted.

P. 412. Choice of such of the soldiery, as are to rise to the magistracy; namely, of those who, through their life, have been proof to pleasure and to pain.

P. 414. An example of a beneficial fiction. It is difficult to fix in the minds of men a belief in fables, originally; but it is very easy to deliver it down to posterity, when once established.

P. 416. The habitation of the soldiery: all luxury in building to be absolutely forbidden them: they are to have no patrimony, nor possessions, but to be supported and furnished with necessaries from year to year by the citizens; they are to live and eat in common, and to use no plate, nor jewels, nor money.

BOOK IV.

HEADS OF THE FOURTH DIALOGUE.

P. 419. Objection—That the Φύλακες, or "soldiers," in whose hands the government is placed, will have less happiness and enjoyment of life than any of the meanest citizens.

Answer—That it is not the intention of the legislature to bestow superior happiness on any one class of men in the state; but that each shall enjoy such a measure of it, as is consistent with the preservation of the whole.

P. 421. Opulence and poverty are equally destructive of a state; the one producing luxury, indolence, and a spirit of inno-

vation; the other producing meanness, cunning, and a like spirit of innovation.

The task of the magistracy is to keep both the one and the other out of the republic.

P. 422. Can such a state, without a superfluity of treasure, defend itself, when attacked by a rich and powerful neighbour?

As easily as a champion, exercised for the Olympic games, could defeat one or more rich fat men unused to fatigue, who should fall upon him in a hot day.

The advantage of such a state, which neither needs riches nor desires them, in forming alliances.

Every republic formed on another plan, though it bear the name of a state, is in reality several states included under one name; the rich making one state, the poor another, and so on; always at war among themselves.

P. 423. A body of a thousand men bred to war, and united by such an education and government as this, is superior even in number to any thing that almost any state in Greece could produce.

P. 424. No innovation is to be ever admitted in the original plan of education. A change of music in a country betokens a change in their morals.

P. 425. Fine satire on the Athenians, and on their demagogues.

P. 428. The political wisdom of the new-formed state is seated in the magistracy.

P. 429. Its bravery is seated in the soldiery: in what it consists.

P. 430. The nature of temperance: the expression of *subduing one's self*, is explained; when reason, the superior part of the mind, preserves its empire over the inferior, that is, over our passions and desires. The temperance of the new republic, whose wisdom and valour, in the hands of the soldiery, exercise a just power over the inferior people by their own consent, is described.

P. 433. Political justice distributes to every one his proper province of action, and prevents each from encroaching on the other.

P. 435. Justice in a private man: its similitude to the former is stated. The three distinct faculties of the soul, namely, appetite, or desire, reason, and indignation, or the concupiscible, the rational, and the irascible, are described.

P. 441. The first made to obey the second, and the third to assist and to strengthen it. Fortitude is the proper virtue of the irascible, wisdom of the rational, and temperance of the concupiscible, preserving a sort of harmony and consent between the three.

P. 443. Justice is the result of this union, maintaining each faculty in its proper office.

P. 444. The description of injustice.

P. 445. The uniformity of virtue, and the infinite variety of vice. Four more distinguished kinds of it are enumerated, whence arise four different kinds of bad government.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 420. Ἀνδριάντος.] This word seems to be used here for a painting, not a statue, as elsewhere.

Ib. Fine garments.] The Ξυστίς was a long variegated mantle, which swept the ground, worn by the principal characters in tragedy, and on great solemnities by the Greek women. See Theocrit. Id. ii. 73.

P. 435. The Scythians, the Thracians, and other northern nations were distinguished by their ferocity, the Greeks by their curiosity and love of knowledge, and the Phœnicians and Egyptians by their desire of gain. Plato marks the threefold distinction.

BOOK V.[1]

HEADS OF THE FIFTH DIALOGUE.

P. 451. On the education of the women. There is no natural difference between the sexes, but in point of strength; their exercises, therefore, both of body and mind, are to be alike, as are their employments in the state.

P. 452. Custom is forced in time to submit to reason. The sight of men exercising[2] naked was once held indecent in Greece, till the Cretans first, and then the Lacedæmonians, introduced it: it is still held scandalous by the Persians, and by other barbarians.

P. 454. When the entire sexes are compared with each other, the female is doubtless the inferior; but, in individuals, the woman has often the advantage of the man.

P. 456. Choice of the female soldiery.

P. 457. Wives in common to all men of the same class. Their times of meeting to be regulated on solemn days, accompanied with solemn ceremonies and sacrifices, by the magistracy, who are to contrive by lots, the secret management of which is known to them alone, that the best and bravest of the men may be paired with women of like qualities, and that those, who are less fit to breed, may come together very seldom.

[1] It is probable that this 5th book, and perhaps the 3rd, were written when Plato was about thirty-five years old, for he says in his 7th Epistle, p. 326, when speaking of himself before his first voyage to Sicily—And I was compelled to say while praising true philosophy, &c.; and Aulus Gellius asserts in xiv. 3, that Xenophon, after reading the two books of Plato's Republic which were first published, wrote in opposition to them his Cyropedia. I know not how ancient the division of this work into ten books may be; but there is no reason at all for it, the whole being one continued conversation.

[2] The Lacedæmonians, says Thucydides in i. 6, were the first to undress themselves and to appear naked in public; whereas formerly the Athletes in the Olympic contests wore a girdle round their middle; and not many years have passed since the custom was left off. This change is said to have been made about the 32nd Olymp.

P. 460. Neither fathers nor mothers are to know their own children, which, when born, are to be conveyed to a separate part of the city, and there, so many of them as the magistrate shall choose, to be brought up by nurses appointed for that purpose.

The time of propagation to be limited, in the men from thirty years of age to fifty-five, in the women from twenty to forty. No children born of parents under or above this term to be brought up, but exposed, and the parents severely censured; as are all who meet without the usual solemnities, and without the licence of the magistrate.

P. 461. All children, born within seven or ten months from the time any person was permitted to propagate, are to be considered as their own children: all that are born within the time, in which their parents are suffered to breed, are to regard each other as brethren. Marriage is to be prohibited between persons in these circumstances.

P. 462. Partiality and dissension among the soldiery are prevented by these appointments. A fellow-feeling of pleasures and of pains is the strongest band of union which can connect mankind.

P. 466. Children are to be carried out to war very early, to see and to learn their intended profession, and wait on their parents in the field.

P. 468. A soldier who deserts his rank, or throws away his arms, is to be reduced to the rank of a mechanic: he who is taken prisoner alive is never to be ransomed.—The reward of the bravest.

P. 469. It is not permitted to reduce a Greek to captivity, nor to strip the dead of any thing but of their arms, which are forbidden to be dedicated in the temples; it is not permitted to ravage the country further than to destroy the year's crop, or to burn the buildings.

P. 472. The reason why a state, thus instituted, seems an impossibility. No people will ever be rightly governed, till kings shall be philosophers, or philosophers be kings.

P. 474. The description of a genius truly philosophic.

P. 476. The distinction of knowledge and opinion.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 460. This was actually the practice of Sparta, as we learn from Plutarch in Lycurg., where the old men of each tribe sat in judgment on the new-born infants, and, if they were weakly or deformed, ordered them to be cast into a deep cavern, near Mount Taygetus. Thence also are borrowed the prohibition of gold and silver, the ξυσσιτία, "the eating together" in public, the naked exercises of the women, the community of goods, the general authority of the old men over the young, the simplicity of music and of diet, the exemption of the soldiery from all other business, and most of the fundamental institutions in Plato's republic, as Plutarch observes in his Lycurgus.

BOOK VI.

HEADS OF THE SIXTH DIALOGUE.

Plato is no where more admirable than in this book: the thoughts are as just as they are new, and the elocution is as beautiful as it is expressive; it can never be read too often: but towards the end it is excessively obscure.

P. 485. The love of truth is the natural consequence of a genius truly inclined to philosophy. Such a mind will be little inclined to sensual pleasures, and consequently will be temperate, and a stranger to avarice and to illiberality.

P. 486. Such a mind, being accustomed to the most extensive views of things and to the sublimest contemplations, will contract an habitual greatness, and look down, as it were, with disregard on human life and on death, the end of it; and consequently will possess the truest fortitude. Justice is the result of these virtues.

Apprehension and memory are two fundamental qualities of a philosophic mind.

P. 487. Such a genius is made by nature to govern mankind.

Objection from experience—That such as have devoted themselves to the study of philosophy, and have made it the employment of their maturer age, have turned out either very bad men, or entirely useless to society.

P. 488. Their inutility, with regard to government, is allowed and accounted for. The comparison of a bad government to a ship, where the mariners have agreed to let their pilot have no hand in the steerage, but to take that task upon themselves.

P. 491. Those very endowments, before described as necessary to the philosophic mind, are often the ruin of it, especially when joined to the external advantages of strength, beauty, nobility, and wealth, when they light in a bad soil, and do not meet with their proper nurture, which an excellent education only can bestow.

Extraordinary virtues and extraordinary vices are equally the produce of a vigorous mind: little souls are alike incapable of one or of the other.

The corruption of young minds is falsely attributed to the sophists, who style themselves philosophers: it is the public example which depraves them; the assemblies of the people, the courts of justice, the camp, and the theatres inspire them with false opinions, elevate them with false applause, and fright them with false infamy. The sophists do no more than confirm the opinions of the public, and teach how to humour its passions and to flatter its vanities.

P. 495. As few great geniuses have strength to resist the general contagion, but leave philosophy abandoned and forlorn, though it

is their own peculiar province, the sophists step into their vacant place, assume their name and air, and cheat the people into an opinion of them. They are compared to a little old slave, worth money, dressed out like a bridegroom to marry the beautiful, but poor, orphan daughter of his deceased lord.

P. 495, § 10. A description of the few of true genius who escape depravation, and devote themselves really to philosophy; which happens commonly either from some ill fortune, or from weakness of constitution. The reason why they must necessarily be excluded from public affairs, unless in this imaginary republic.

P. 500. The application of these arguments to the proof of his former proposition, namely, that until princes shall be philosophers or philosophers shall be princes, no state can be completely happy.

P. 503. The Φύλακες, "Guardians," therefore, are to be real philosophers. The great difficulty is to find the requisite qualifications of mind united in one person. Quickness of apprehension and a retentive memory, vivacity and application, gentleness and magnanimity, rarely go together.

P. 508. The idea of the supreme good is the foundation of philosophy, without which all acquisitions are useless. The cause of knowledge and of truth is compared to light; truth, to the power which bodies have of reflecting light, or of becoming visible; and the sovereign good itself is compared to the sun, the lord and father of light.

P. 509. The author of being is superior to all being.

P. 510. There are different degrees of certainty in the objects of our understanding.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 485. The existence that is for ever.] Our general abstracted ideas, as they exist in the mind independent of matter, which is subject to continual changes, were regarded by Plato as the sole foundations of knowledge, and emanations, as it were, from the divinity himself.

P. 497. Those who engage in it, &c.] This is a remarkable passage, as it shows the manner in which the Athenians usually studied philosophy, and Plato's judgment about it, which was directly opposite to the common practice.

BOOK VII.

HEADS OF THE SEVENTH DIALOGUE.

P. 514. The state of mankind is compared to that of persons confined in a vast cavern from their birth, with their legs fettered, and with their heads so placed in a machine that they cannot

turn them to the light, which shines full in at the entrance of the cave; nor can they see such bodies as are continually in motion, passing and repassing behind them, but only the shadows of them, as they fall on the sides of the grotto directly before their eyes.

If any one should set them free from this confinement, oblige them to walk, and drag them from their cavern into open day, they would hang back or move with unwillingness or pain; their eyes would be dazzled with the brightness of each new object, and comprehend nothing distinctly; they would long for their shadows and darkness again, till, being more habituated to light, they would first be brought to gaze on the images of things reflected in the water, or elsewhere; then on the bodies themselves; then on the skies, on the stars, and the moon, and gradually on the sun himself, whom they would learn to be the source and the author of all these beautiful appearances.

If any thing should induce one of these persons to descend again into his native cavern, his eyes would not for a long time be reconciled to darkness, his old fellow-prisoners would treat him as stupid and blind, would say that he had spoiled his eyes in those upper regions, and grow angry with him, if he proposed to set them at liberty.

P. 518. An early good education is the only thing which can turn the eyes of our mind from the darkness and uncertainty of popular opinion to the clear light of truth. It is the interest of the public neither to suffer unlettered and unphilosophic minds to meddle with government, nor to allow men of knowledge to give themselves up for their whole life to contemplation, as the first will have no principle to act upon, and the others no practice nor inclination to business.

P. 526. The use of the mathematics, in education, is principally to abstract the mind from sensible and material objects, and to turn it to contemplate certain general and immutable truths, whence it may aspire to the knowledge of the supreme good, who is immutable, and is the object only of the understanding.

The great improvement of a mind versed in these sciences, which quicken and enlarge the apprehension, and inure us to intense application, and what are their practical uses, particularly in military knowledge, is eloquently described.

P. 537. The Φύλακες, "Guards," to be initiated in mathematical knowledge and studies before seventeen, and for three years more are to be confined to their continual and necessary exercises of the body, that is, till about twenty years of age; they are not to enter upon logic till after thirty, in which they are to continue five years.

Knowledge is not to be implanted in a free-born mind by force and violence, but by gentleness accompanied with art, and by every kind of invitation.

The dangerous situation of the mind, when it is quitting the first prejudices of education and has not yet discovered the true principles of action, is here admirably described. It is compared to a youth brought up in affluence, and surrounded by flatterers, by persons who have passed hitherto for his parents, but are not really so; when he has found out the imposition, he will neglect those whom he has hitherto obeyed and honoured, and will naturally incline to the advice of his flatterers, till he can discover those persons to whom he owes his duty and his birth.

The levity, the heat, and the vanity of our *first* youth make it an improper time to be trusted with reasoning and disputation, which is only fit for a mind grown cooler and more settled by years; as old age on the other hand weakens the apprehension, and renders us incapable of application.

From thirty-five to fifty years of age the Φύλακες, "Guards," are to be obliged to administer the public affairs, and to act in the inferior offices of the magistracy; after fifty they are to be admitted into the highest philosophy, the doctrine of the supreme good, and are in their turn to submit to bear the superior offices of the state.

BOOK VIII.

HEADS OF THE EIGHTH DIALOGUE.

Plato here resumes the subject which he had dropped at the end of the fourth book.

P. 544. Four distinct kinds of government are enumerated, which deviate from the true form, and gradually grow worse and worse: namely, 1. The timocracy, so he calls the Lacedæmonian or Cretan constitution; 2. The oligarchy; 3. The democracy; and 4. Tyranny: they are produced by as many different corruptions of the mind and manners of the inhabitants.

P. 545. The change from the true aristocracy (or constitution of Plato's republic) to a timocracy is described. Every thing, which has had a beginning, is subject to corruption. The introduction of property, and the division of land among the Φύλακες. The encroachment on the liberty of the inferior part of the commonwealth. Secret avarice and love of pleasure are the consequence of private property. The neglect of music and of letters. The preference given to the exercises of the body. The prevalence of the irascible over the rational part of the soul.

The character of a citizen in such a state and the origin of such a character are described.

P. 550. The change from a timocracy into an oligarchy, where none are admitted to the honours and offices of the commonwealth,

who do not possess a certain proportion of property. The progress of avarice is the cause of this alteration. Such a state is always divided into two, always at enmity among themselves, the rich and the poor, which is the cause of its weakness. The alienation of property, which is freely permitted by the wealthy for their own interest, will still increase the disproportion of fortune among the citizens. The ill consequences of prodigality, and of its attendant extreme poverty, in a state. The poor are compared to drones in a bee-hive, some with stings and some without.

P. 552. The gradual transition of the mind from the love of honour to the love of money.

When a young man has seen the misfortunes which ambition has brought upon his own family, as fines, banishment, confiscation, and even death itself, adversity and fear will break his spirit and humble his parts, which he will now apply to raise a fortune by securer methods, by the slow and secret arts of gain: his rational faculties and nobler passions will be subjected to his desire of acquisition, and he will admire and emulate others only in proportion as they possess the great object of his wishes: his passion for wealth will keep down and suppress in him the love of pleasure and of extravagance, which yet, for want of philosophy and of a right education, will continue alive in his heart and exert itself, when he can find an opportunity to satisfy it by some secret injustice at the expense of others.

P. 555. The source of a democracy: namely, when the meaner sort, increasing with a number of men of spirit and abilities, reduced to poverty by extravagance and by the love of pleasure, begin to feel their own strength, and compare themselves to the few wealthy persons who compose the government, whose body and mind are weakened by their application to nothing but to the sordid arts of lucre. The change of the constitution. The way to the magistracy laid open to all, and decided by balloting. A lively picture of the Athenian commonwealth.

P. 558. The distinction between our necessary and unnecessary desires, is stated; when the latter prevail over the former by indulgence, and by keeping bad company, they form a democratic mind. The description of such a soul, when years have somewhat allayed the tumult and violence of its passions; it is the sport of humour and of caprice, inconstant in any pursuit, and incapable of any resolution.

P. 562. When liberty degenerates into extreme licence and anarchy, the democracy begins to tend towards tyranny. The picture of the Athenian government and manners is continued with great force and severity: where youth assumes the authority and decisiveness of age, and age mimics the gaiety and pleasures of youth; where women and slaves are upon the same footing with their husbands and masters; and where even the dogs and horses

march directly onwards, and refuse to give way to a citizen. The common mutation of things from one extreme to another.

P. 564. The division of those who bear sway in a democracy into three kinds: 1. The busy, bold, and active poor, who are ready to undertake and execute any thing; 2. The idle and insignificant poor, who follow the former, and serve to make a number and a noise in the popular assemblies; and 3. The middling sort, who earn their bread by their labour, and have naturally little inclination to public affairs, nor are easily brought together, but when allured by the hopes of some gain, yet, when collected, are the strongest party of all. The conversion of a demagogue into a tyrant, from necessity and from fear, the steps which he takes to attain the supreme power, the policy of tyrants, and the misery of their condition, are excellently described.

P. 568. The accusation of the tragic poets, as inspiring a love of tyranny, and patronized by tyrants; they are encouraged also in democracies, and are little esteemed in better governments.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 544. The Cretan.] Lycurgus borrowed his constitution from that of the Cretans, as Herodotus, Strabo, Plutarch, and other writers, allow; and it is plain, that Plato thought it the best form of government that any where existed, which seems indeed to have been the general opinion of the greatest men in Greece.

P. 547. Dwellers around and domestics.] The Lacedæmonians gave the name of Περίοικοι, "Dwellers around," to their subjects, the inhabitants of Laconia, who were not Spartans. As they were used, I imagine, hardly enough by their superiors, and had no share in the government, many authors do not distinguish them from the Heliotæ, who were absolutely slaves; yet, in reality, they seem to have been on a distinct footing being reckoned free men, and employed by the Spartan government to command such troops as they often send abroad, consisting of Heliotæ, to whom they had given their liberty. The Περίοικοι likewise seem to have had the property of lands, for when Lycurgus divided the country into thirty thousand portions, and gave nine thousand of them to the Spartans, to whom did the other twenty-one thousand portions belong, unless to the Περίοικοι? who else should people the hundred cities, besides villages, which were once in Laconia? It is plain also, that the Περίοικοι served in war, as ὁπλῖται, "heavy-armed foot," which the Heliotæ never did, as we learn from Thucydides, iv. p. 238, and as in the battle of Platææ, according to Herodotus in ix. 29, there were ten thousand Lacedæmonians, of which five thousand were Spartans; it follows, that the other five thousand were Περίοικοι; for he mentions the Heliotæ by themselves, as light-armed troops in number thirty-five thousand, that is, seven to each Spartan; and Xenophon, in Lacedæmon. Republ. p. 289, and Græc. Hist. i. p. 256, plainly distinguishes the Ὑπομείονες, who were Spartans, but excluded from the magistracy, the Νεοδαμώδεις, who were Heliotæ

made free, the Heliotæ, and the Περίοικοι. See also Isocrates in Panegyr. p. 11, and in Panathen. p. 270. The Cretans called their slaves, who cultivated the lands, Περίοικοι. See Aristot. Polit. ii. c. 10

BOOK IX.

HEADS OF THE NINTH DIALOGUE.

P. 571. The worst and most lawless of our unnecessary desires are described, which are particularly active in sleep, when we go to our repose after drinking freely, or eating a full meal.

P. 572. The transition of the mind from a democratic to a tyrannical constitution. Debauchery, and what is called love, are the great instruments of this change. Lust and drunkenness, names for two different sorts of madness, between them produce a tyrant.

P. 573. Our desires from indulgence grow stronger and more numerous Extravagance naturally leads to want, which will be supplied either by fraud or by violence.

P. 575. In states in which there are but a few persons of this turn, and the body of the people are uncorrupted, they usually leave their own country, and enter into the guards of some foreign prince, or serve him in his wars: or, if they have not this opportunity, they stay at home and turn informers, false evidences, highwaymen, and housebreakers, cut-purses, and such characters; but, if they are numerous and strong, they form a party against the laws and liberties of the people, set at their head commonly the worst among them, and erect a despotic government.

The behaviour of a tyrannical nature in private life; unacquainted with friendship, always domineering over, or servilely flattering, his companions.

P. 577. The comparison between a state enslaved, and the mind of a tyrant. The servitude, the poverty, the fears, and the anguish of such a mind are described; and it is proved to be the most miserable of human creatures.

P. 578. The condition of any private man of fortune, who has fifty or more slaves. Such a man with his effects, wife and family, supposed to be separated from the state and his fellow-citizens, in which his security consists, and placed in a desert country at some distance, surrounded with a people, who look upon it as a crime to enslave one's fellow-creatures, and are ready to favour any conspiracy of his servants against him: how anxious and how intolerable would be his condition! Such, and still worse, is that of a tyrant.

P. 581. The pleasures of knowledge and of philosophy are

proved to be superior to those which result from honour or from gain, and from the satisfaction of our appetites. The wise man, the ambitious man, the man of wealth and pleasure, will each of them give the preference to his favourite pursuit, and will undervalue that of the others, but experience is the only proper judge which can decide the question, and the wise man alone possesses that experience; the necessity of his nature must have acquainted him with the pleasure which arises from satisfying our appetites. Honour and the public esteem will be the consequence of his life and studies, as well as of the opulent or of the ambitious man; so that he is equally qualified with them to judge of their pleasures, but not they of his, which they have never experienced.

P. 584. Most of our sensual joys are only a cessation from uneasiness and pain, as are the eager hopes and expectations which attend them. A fine image is drawn of the ordinary life of mankind, of their sordid pursuits, and of their contemptible passions.

P. 588. The recapitulation, and conclusion, that the height of injustice and of wickedness is the height of misery.

P. 590. The intention of all education and laws is to subject the brutal part of our nature to the rational. A scheme of life, worthy of a philosophic mind, is laid down.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 578. Fifty slaves.] The more wealthy Greeks had very large families of slaves. In Athens the number of slaves was to that of citizens as 20 to 1: the latter being about 21,000; the former, 400,000. Mnaso of Phocis, a friend of Aristotle, had 1000 slaves or more, as had likewise Nicias, the famous Athenian. In Corinth, there were reckoned 460,000 slaves; at Ægina, above 470,000; and many a Roman had in his own service above 20,000: this was a computation made Ol. 110, by Demetrius Phalereus.

BOOK X.

HEADS OF THE TENTH DIALOGUE

P. 595. Plato's apology for himself. His reasons for banishing all imitative poetry from his republic: 1. Because it represents things not as they really are, but as they appear; 2. The wisdom of the poets is not equal to their reputation; 3. There is no example of a state having been better regulated, or of a war better conducted, or of an art improved, by any poet's instructions; and 4. There is no plan of education laid down, no sect nor school found-

ed, even by Homer and the most considerable of the poets, as by the philosophers.

P. 602. Their art concurs with the senses to deceive us and to draw off the mind from right reason, it excites and increases the empire of the passions, enervates our resolution, and seduces us by the power of ill example.

P. 604. The passions and vices are easy to imitate by reason of their variety; but the cool, uniform, and simple character of virtue is very difficult to draw, so as to touch or delight a theatre, or any other mixed assembly of men.

P. 607. The power of numbers and of expression over the soul is great, which renders poetry more particularly dangerous.

P. 608. Having shown that virtue is most eligible on its own account, even when destitute of all external rewards, he now comes to explain the happiness which waits upon it in another life, as well as in the present. The immortality of the soul and a state of future rewards and of future punishments are asserted.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 595. Plato professes a great admiration, even from a child, for Homer, but yet is forced to exclude him from his commonwealth, for a man is not to be held in honour before truth. The Greeks had carried their admiration for Homer to a high pitch of enthusiasm in Plato's time: it was he, they said, who first had formed Greece to knowledge and humanity; and in him were contained all the arts, all morality, politics, and divinity.

P. 600. Εἰς τέχνας.] Thales is said to have discovered the annual course of the sun in the ecliptic, and to have made several improvements in astronomy and geometry. To Anacharsis is ascribed the invention of anchors, and of the potter's wheel. See Diog. Laertius.

P. 608. By Zeus, not I.] Is it possible that the immortality of the soul should be a doctrine so unusual, and so little known at Athens, as to cause this surprise in Glauco?—Yet in the Phædo likewise, p. 70, Cebes treats this point in the same manner.

P. 611. Like those who see Glaucus.] He speaks as if this divinity were sometimes actually visible to seafaring men, all covered with sea-weed and shells.

P. 614. The story of Er, the Pamphylian, who, when he had lain twelve days dead in appearance on the field of battle, and was placed on the funeral pile, came to life again, and related all he had seen in the other world. The judgment of souls, their progress of a thousand years through the regions of bliss or of misery, the eternal punishment of tyrants, and of others guilty of enormous crimes, in Tartarus, the spindle of Necessity, which turns the eight spheres, and the employment of her three daughters, the Fates, are all described, with the allotment and choice of lives (either in human bodies, or in those of brute animals) permitted to those spirits who are again to appear on earth; as of Orpheus,

who chooses that of a swan, Ajax, of a lion, Thersites, of a monkey, Ulysses, that of an obscure private man, &c.: their passage over the river Lethe is also mentioned. The whole fable is finely written.

Milton alludes to the spindle of Necessity in his entertainment called the *Arcades*. Virgil has also imitated many parts of the fable in his sixth Æneid, and Tully in the Somnium Scipionis. See Macrob. i. c. 1.

THE LAWS.

THE persons of the dialogue are Clinias, a Cretan of Gnossus, and two strangers, who are his guests, the one a Lacedæmonian, called Megillus, the other an Athenian, who is not named, but who appears by the character and sentiments to be Plato himself. See Diog. Laert. iii. 52. They are, all three, men far advanced in years, and as they walk or repose themselves in the fields under the shade of ancient cypress trees, which grew to a great bulk and beauty, in the way that led from the city of Gnossus to the temple and grotto of Jupiter, (where Minos was believed to have received his laws from the god himself,) they enter into conversation on the policy and constitution of the Cretans.

There is no procemium nor introduction to the dialogue, as there is to most of Plato's writings. I speak of that kind of procemium usual with Plato, which informs us often of the occasion and of the time of the dialogue, and of the characters of the persons introduced in it. In reality the entire four first books of "the Laws" are but introductory to the main subject, as he tells us himself in the end of the fourth book, p. 722.

BOOK I.

HEADS OF THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

P. 625. The institutions of Minos were principally directed to form the citizens to war. The great advantages of a people superior in military skill over the rest of mankind are stated. Every people is naturally in a state of war with its neighbours; even particular cities, nay, private families, are in a like situation within themselves, where the better and more rational part are always contending for that superiority which is their due, over the lower

and the less reasonable. An internal war is maintained in the breast of each particular man, who labours to subdue himself by establishing the empire of reason over his passions and his desires.

P. 628. A legislator, who makes it the great end of his constitution to form the nation to war, is shown to be inferior to him who reconciles the members of it among themselves, and prevents intestine tumults and divisions.

P. 631. The view of the true lawgiver is to train the mind and manners of his people to the virtues in their order, that is, to wisdom, to temperance, and to justice, and, in the fourth place, to valour. The method he ought to lay down in the disposition of his laws is stated.

P. 634. The fault of the Cretan and of the Lacedæmonian laws is, that they do not fortify the soul as well against pleasure as against pain. Youth is not permitted to examine into the rectitude of those laws by which they are governed, nor to dispute about them; this is the privilege of age, and only to be practised in private.

P. 636, § 8. The division of the citizens into companies, called Συσσιτία, which daily assembled to eat together in public, was apt to create seditions and conspiracies. The regular naked exercises of the youth were often the cause of an unnatural passion among them. Crete and Lacedæmon are blamed particularly on this account.

P. 636, § 9. Pleasure and pain are the two great sources of all human actions: the skill of a legislator consists in managing and opposing one of them to the other.

P. 639. The use of wine, when under a proper direction, in the education of youth.

P. 642. An apology for his own garrulity and diffuseness, which is the characteristic of an Athenian.

P. 643. The nature and intent of education.

P. 644. Mankind are compared to puppets: but whether they are formed by the gods for their diversion, or for some more serious purpose, (he says,) is uncertain. Their pleasures and pains, their hopes and fears, are the springs which move them, and often draw contrary ways at once. Reason is the master-spring which ought to determine their motions; but as this draws gently and never uses violence, some of the passions must be called to its aid, which may give it strength to resist the force of the others.

P. 645. The effects of wine upon the soul: it heightens all our passions and diminishes our understanding, that is, in reality, it reduces us again to childhood. As physicians, for the sake of our body, give us certain potions, which for a time create sickness and pain in us, and put our whole frame into disorder; so possibly might the legislator, by a singular experiment, make wine subservient to a good purpose in education, and, without either pain

or danger, put the prudence, the modesty, and the temper of youth to the trial, and see how far they could resist the disorder of the mind which is naturally produced by this liquor.

P. 647, § 14. The fear of dishonour is opposed to the fear of pain; the first is a great instrument in the hands of a wise legislator to suppress and to conquer the latter.

P. 647, § 15. If there were any drug or composition known that would inspire us with fear and with dejection of spirits, for the time its influence lasted, what need would there be of fatiguing our youth with long laborious exercises, or of exposing them in battle to real danger, in order to fortify the soul against the attacks of fear and of pain? This draught alone, properly applied, would be a sufficient trial of our valour under the eye of the magistrate, who might confer honour and disgrace on a youth, according to his behaviour during the operation. Unluckily, there is no such drug discovered; but there is a potion which exalts our spirits, and kindles in the mind insolence, and imprudence, and lust, and every fiercer passion, while it lays open to view our ignorance, our avarice, and our cowardice. Why should we wait till these vices exert themselves into real action, and produce their several mischiefs in society; when, by a well-regulated use of this liquor, we might, without danger, discover them lurking in the disposition of youth, and suppress them even in their infancy?

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 629. *Διαβάντες δὲ εὖ.*] The Spartans, when they passed the frontier of their own state to enter into the territory of an enemy, always performed sacrifice; and if the victims proved inauspicious, they retired, and gave over their enterprise.

P. 630. Of the mercenaries.] In Plato's time, about Ol. 106, and soon after, the intestine tumults in the Greek cities, joined to a sort of fashion, which prevailed, of going to seek their fortune in a foreign service, had so depopulated Greece, that Isocrates tells Philip of Macedon, that he might form a better and stronger army out of these mercenaries, than he could out of the citizens themselves, who continued in their own country. The strength of the Persian king's armies was entirely composed of these Greeks, as was that of his enemies also, the kings of Egypt and of Cyprus, and the revolted viceroys in Asia Minor. They were also employed by Athens, and by other states of Greece, to save their own troops; so that the Athenian heavy-armed infantry now consisted of mercenaries, though the citizens themselves served as rowers on board the fleet; just contrary to what had been the ancient practice, when the ships were manned by foreigners and slaves, and the Athenians themselves were the heavy-armed.

P. 636. *Ἐπιτήδευμα.*] This seems to me to be the nominative, and *Νόμιμον* the accusative; and the sense will thus be, "This practice (of exercising constantly naked) appears to me to have weakened greatly

that ancient and natural law, by which the pleasures of love, not only among human creatures, but even in the brute creation (mutually belong to the two sexes)." This is a remarkable passage: and Tully judges in the same manner of these exercises. How far the Cretans indulged their passions in the way here mentioned, may be seen in Ephorus, quoted by Strabo x. The purity of manners at Sparta is strongly asserted by Xenophon, De Lacedæmon. Republ. p. 395, and by Plutarch in Lycurgus; but here is a testimony on the other side at least of equal authority.

P. 637. *Ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμαξαις.*] A sort of drunken farces performed in the villages of Attica, during the Dionysia, which seem to be the origin of the ancient comedy and tragedy. Hence the proverb, *Ἐξ ἁμαξης λέγειν*: and hence, too, Aristophanes gives the name of *Τραγῳδία* to comedy. Acharnenses, vs. 498, 499, and 627. They seem to have still continued in use in the country.

P. 642. The hearth of our city.] As each private family had its Vesta, to whom the hearth was particularly sacred, so that of the public was seated in the Prytaneum, as we learn from Pindar, Nem. Od. 11; where in most cities a perpetual lamp was kept burning in honour of this goddess: and as every private family of rank had their *Πρόξενοι*, "public hosts," in several cities of Greece, with whom they were connected by the ties of hospitality, and in whose houses they were lodged and entertained, so cities themselves had a like connexion with each other; and there were public *Πρόξενοι* nominated to receive and to defray the expenses of such as came on business from other cities in alliance with them.

P. 647. *Αἰδῶ.*] This is, what we call honour, that is, the fear of shame; and which is left to supply, as well as it can, the place of all the virtues among us. Plato calls this sentiment, in p. 674, *θεῖος φόβος*, "a divine fear." Montesquieu makes it the grand principle of monarchical governments, in L'Esprit des Loix, i. 6, and in France its effects are most conspicuous.

BOOK II.

HEADS OF THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

P. 653. The great purpose of a right education is, to fix in the mind an early habit of associating its ideas of pleasure and of desire with its ideas of virtue, and those of pain and aversion with that of vice: so that reason, when it comes to maturity, and happy are they with whom, even in their old age, it does come to maturity! may look back with satisfaction, and may approve the useful prejudices instilled into the soul in its infancy.

The early inclination of children to noise and motion is noticed, which, when reduced to order and symmetry, produce harmony and grace, which are two pleasures known only to humankind. The origin of music and of the dance.

P. 655. In what kind of imitation their true beauty consists. Every sound or movement, or attitude, which naturally accom-

panies and expresses any virtue, or any laudable endowment of mind and of body, is beautiful, as the contrary is deformed and unpleasing. The error of such as make pleasure the sole end of these arts.

Reasons for the diversity of men's taste and judgment in them are assigned. Some from having been early depraved, and little accustomed to what is lovely, come to approve and take delight in deformity: others applaud what is noble and graceful, but feel no pleasure from it, either because their mind has a natural depravity in it, though their education has been good, or because their principles are right, but their habits and practice have not been conformable to them. The danger of this last defect is stated, when men delight in what their judgment disapproves.

P. 657. The restraint, which ought to be laid on poets in all well-disciplined states, is named. Musicians in Egypt[1] were confined by law, even from the remotest antiquity, to certain simple species of melody, and the painters and sculptors to some peculiar standards for their measures and attitudes, from which they were not to deviate.

P. 658. A reflection on the usual wrong determinations of the persons appointed to judge of their musical and poetical entertainments at Athens, who, though they took an oath to decide impartially, were biassed, either through fear or from the affectation of popularity, by the opinion of the crowd; whereas they ought to have considered themselves as masters and directors of the public taste. From this weakness arose the corruption of their theatrical entertainments. In Italy and in Sicily the victory was adjudged by the whole audience to that poet who had the greatest number of hands held up for him.

P. 659. The manners, exhibited in a drama to the people, ought always to be better than their own.

P. 662. The morality inculcated by the poets, even in Sparta and in Crete, where all innovations were by law forbidden, was defective enough. What sentiments they ought to inspire. Plato's[2] great principles are explained, namely, that happiness is inseparable from virtue and misery from wickedness, and that the latter is rather an error of the judgment than of the will.

P. 663. If these opinions were actually as false, as they are immutably founded on truth, yet a wise lawgiver would think

[1] This will account for the little improvement the Egyptians ever made in the fine arts, though they were perhaps the inventors of them: for undoubtedly the advancement and perfection of these things, as well as their corruption, are entirely owing to liberty and innovation.

[2] Aristotle looked upon this as the distinguishing part of Plato's doctrine; as we see from a fragment of his elegy to Eudemus, preserved in Olympiodorus's commentary on the Gorgias.

himself obliged to inculcate them as true, by every method possible.

It is easy to persuade men, even of the most absurd fiction; how much more of an undoubted truth!

P. 664. The institution of the three choruses, which are to repeat in verse, accompanied with music and with dances, these great principles of society, and to fix them in the belief of the public: the first chorus is composed of boys under eighteen, and sacred to the Muses; the second, from that age to thirty, and sacred to Apollo; the third, to Bacchus, consisting of all from thirty to sixty years of age.

P. 666. The use of wine is forbidden to boys; it is allowed, but very moderately, to men under thirty; after that age, with less restraint: the good effects of it in old age are mentioned.

P. 667. The principles and qualifications which are required in such as are fit to judge of poetry, and of the other imitative arts.

P. 669. Instrumental music by itself, which serves not to accompany the voice, is condemned, as uncertain and indefinite in its expression. The three arts of poetry, of music, and of the dance, (or action,) were not made to be separated.

P. 671. The regulation of entertainments, with the manner of presiding at them, is enforced; without which the drinking of wine ought not to be permitted at all, or in a very small degree.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 658. It is here said, that puppet-shows and jugglers' tricks are best accommodated to the taste of young children; as comedy is to that of bigger boys, tragedy to that of young men, and of the women of the better sort, and of the bulk of the people in general, and the rhapsodi to that of the older and wiser sort.

P. 665. After practising their voices.] The singers in these choruses were subjected to a course of abstinence and of physic, for a considerable time before they put their voices to the trial. See Antipho. Orat. de Cæde Choreut.

BOOK III.

HEADS OF THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

P. 676. The immense antiquity of the earth, and the innumerable changes it has undergone in the course of ages. Mankind are generally believed to have been often destroyed, a very small remnant excepted, by inundation and by pestilence.

The supposition of a handful of men, probably shepherds, who

were feeding their cattle on the mountains, and were there preserved with their families from a general deluge, which had overwhelmed all the cities and inhabitants of the country below.

P. 677. The destruction of arts and sciences, with their slow and gradual revival among this infant society, is nobly described.

P. 680. The beginnings of government: the paternal way first in use, which he calls the justest of all monarchies. Assemblies of different families agree to descend from the mountain-tops, and to settle in the hill-country below them; and as each of them has a head or a prince of its own, and customs in which it has been brought up, it will be necessary to describe certain laws in common, and to settle a kind of senate, or of aristocracy.

P. 683. The causes of the increase and declension of states, are exemplified in the history of Sparta, Messene, and Argos. The original league between the three kingdoms founded by the Heraclidæ, and the mutual engagements entered into by the several kings and by their people, are stated.

P. 684. The easiness of establishing an equality of property in a new conquest, which is so difficult for a legislator to accomplish, who would give a better form to a government already established.

P. 688. States are destroyed, not so much for the want of valour and of conduct, as for the want of virtue, which only is true wisdom. The greatest and the most pernicious of all ignorance is, when we do not love what we approve.

P. 691. Absolute power, unaccountable to any and uncontrolled, is not to be supported by any mortal man. The aiming at this was the destruction of the Argive and Messenian monarchs. That which probably preserved the Lacedæmonian state, was the originally lodging the regal power in the hands of two; then the institution of the senate by Lycurgus; and lastly, that of the Ephori by Theopompus. Had the three kingdoms been united and governed in the Spartan manner, the Persian king would never have dared to invade Greece: his repulse was entirely due to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and not to the common efforts of the Greeks.

P. 693. The two great forms of government, from which all the rest are derived, are monarchy and democracy: Persia is an example of the first carried to its height, and Athens an example of the latter. The best constitution is formed out of both.

P. 694. The reason of the variations observable in the Persian power is given; the different administration of different princes, who succeeded one another, and the cause of it, is accounted for from their education. The care of Cyrus's children, while he was abroad in the field, was trusted entirely to the women, who bred them up in high notions of that grandeur to which they were to succeed, and in the effeminate and luxurious manners of the Medes.

Darius, who succeeded them, had been bred as a private soldier, and he restored the declining empire to its former greatness. Xerxes, his son, brought up as great princes usually are, by his folly weakened it again, and ever since it has been growing worse and worse.

P. 696. Honour is the proper reward of virtue only; in what manner it ought to be distributed in a well-regulated state.

P. 697. The impossibility is stated of any government's subsisting long, where the people are enemies to the administration, which, where despotism in its full extent prevails, must always be the case.

P. 698. A picture of the reverse of this, a complete democracy, as at Athens. The constitution of that state was different before the Persian invasion. The reasons for their distinguished bravery on that occasion. An account of the change introduced in their music, and the progress of liberty, or rather of licence, among them.

P. 701. The great aim of a legislator is to inspire liberty, wisdom, and concord. Clinias, being appointed with nine other citizens to superintend and to form a body of laws for a new colony they are going to settle, asks advice of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian strangers on that head.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 677. Ὅ, τι μὲν γὰρ μυριάκις.] I imagine he means to say, "For, without supposing some such destruction as this, how can we account for all the useful arts among mankind, invented, as it were but yesterday, or, at farthest, not above two thousand years old? It is impossible that men in those times should have been utterly ignorant of all which had passed so many thousand ages, unless all records, and monuments, and remains of their improvements and discoveries had perished." Compare Lucret. v. 329.

BOOK IV.

HEADS OF THE FOURTH DIALOGUE.

P. 704. The advantages and disadvantages arising from the situation of a city, and the great difficulty of preserving the constitution and the morals of a maritime and trading state, are described.

P. 706. The manner of carrying on a war by sea is unworthy of a brave and free people; it impairs their valour, depends too much on the lower and more mechanic arts, and is hardly ever decisive. The battles of Artemisium and of Salamis could not have pre-

served Greece, as it has been commonly thought, from the Persians, had they not been defeated in the action at Platææ.

P. 708. The difficulties which attend new colonies, if sent out by a single city, are stated: they will more hardly submit to a new discipline, and to laws different from those of their native country: but then they concur more readily in one design, and act with more strength and uniformity among themselves. If they are collected from various states, they are weak and disjointed, but more apt to receive such forms and impressions as a legislator would give them.

The constitution of states and of their laws is owing more to nature, or to chance, or to the concurrence of various accidents, than to human foresight: yet the wise lawgiver will not therefore despair, but will accommodate his art to the various circumstances and opportunities of things. The mariner cannot command the winds and the waves, yet he can watch his advantages, and make the best use possible of both, for the expedition and security of his voyage.

P. 709. The greatest advantage which a lawgiver can ever meet with is, when he is supported by an arbitrary prince, young, sober, and of good understanding, generous and brave; the second lucky opportunity is, when he can find a limited monarch of like disposition to concur in his designs; the third is, when he can unite himself to the leading men in some popular government; and the fourth and most difficult is, in an oligarchy.

P. 711. The character and manners of a whole people, in a despotic government, are easily changed by the encouragement and by the example of their prince.

P. 712. The best governments are of a mixed kind, and are not reducible to any of the common forms. Thus those of Crete and of Sparta were neither tyrannical, nor monarchical, nor aristocratical, nor democratical, but had something of all these.

P. 713. The fable of the Saturnian age is introduced, when the gods or dæmons in person reigned over mankind. No mortal nature is fit to be trusted with an absolute power of commanding its fellow-creatures: and therefore the law, that is, pure reason, divested of all human passions and appetites, the part of man which most resembles the divinity, ought alone to be implicitly obeyed in a well-governed state.

P. 715. The first address to the citizens of the new colony, is to inculcate the belief of providence and of divine justice, humility, moderation, obedience to the laws, and piety to the gods and to parents: this should be by way of proœmium to the laws; for freemen are not to be treated like slaves; they are to be taught and to be persuaded, before they are threatened and punished.

P. 721. The laws of marriage, and the reasons and inducements to observe them, are stated.

P. 722. The necessity and the nature of general and of particular introductions are stated.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 704. The great advantage of a maritime power with respect to its influence, its commerce and riches, its politeness of manners and language, and the enjoyment of every pleasure and convenience of life, are admirably explained by Xenophon in Athen. Republ. p. 204, who considers it in every light, in which Montesquieu and the best modern political writers would do. But Plato extended his views farther. He never regarded statesmanship as the art of preserving mankind in a certain form of society, or of securing their property or their pleasures, or of enlarging their power, unless so far as all these were consistent with the preservation of their virtue, and of that happiness which is the natural result of it. Isocrates, in Panathen. p. 256, is constrained to own, that when Athens became a great naval power, she was forced to sacrifice her good order and morals to her ambition; although he justifies her for doing so from necessity; but in the Orat. on Peace, p. 174, he speaks his mind more freely, and shows that the dominion of the sea was every way the ruin of the Athenians, and afterwards of the Lacedæmonians.

P. 714. Conducive to the continuance of its own power.] This was the doctrine of Thrasymachus, and it is in appearance that of Montesquieu in his Esprit des Loix; but this great man did not dare to speak his mind, in a country almost despotically governed, without disguise. Let any one see the amiable picture which Montesquieu draws of freer governments, and, in contrast to it, his idea of a court, and they will not be at a loss to know his real sentiments. That constitution and policy which is founded, as he says himself, on every virtue, must be the only one worthy of human nature.

BOOK V.

HEADS OF THE FIFTH DIALOGUE.

P. 726. After showing the reason of that duty, which men owe to the gods and to their parents, he comes to that, which we owe to ourselves; and first, of the reverence due to our own soul; that it consists not in flattering its vanity, nor indulging its pleasures, nor in soothing its indolence, nor in satisfying its avarice.

P. 728. The second honours are due to our body, whose perfection is not placed in excess of strength, of bulk, of swiftness, of beauty, nor even of health, but in a mediocrity of all these qualities; for a redundancy, or a deficiency, in any one of them is always prejudicial to the mind.

The same holds with regard to fortune. The folly of heaping

up riches for our children is exposed, as the only valuable inheritance which we can leave them is a respect for virtue. The reverence due to youth is inculcated. True education consists not in precept, but in example.

The duty to relations and to friends: strict justice, hospitality, and compassion, are due to strangers and foreigners, but above all to suppliants.

What is that habit of the mind which best becomes a man of honour and a good citizen. Veracity is the prime virtue. Justice consists in this; not only to do no injury, but to prevent others from doing any, and to assist the magistrate in punishing those who commit them. Temperance and wisdom: the persons who possess these or any other virtues deserve our praise: those who impart them to others, and multiply their influence, are worthy of double honours. The use of emulation in a state: the hatefulness of envy and detraction.

P. 731. Spirit and indignation are virtues, when employed against crimes and vices, which admit of no other cure than extreme severity: yet they are not inconsistent with lenity and tender compassion, when we consider that no man is voluntarily wicked, and that the fault is in his understanding, and not in his intention. The blindness of what is called self-love. Excessive joy and sorrow are equally condemned.

P. 733. A life of virtue is preferable to any other, even with respect to its pleasures. This passage is admirable.

P. 736. The method of purgation requisite in forming a society, in order to clear it of its noxious parts, either by punishments, or by sending out colonies.

P. 737. The number of citizens limited. Equal divisions of lands among them. The institution of temples and sacred rites, in which nothing of novelty is to be permitted nor the slightest alteration made; but ancient opinions and traditions are to be religiously followed. Festivals and general assemblies serve to familiarize the citizens to one another, and to bring the whole people acquainted with the temper and character of each particular man.

P. 739. The recommendation of his first scheme of government laid down in his Republica, v., p. 462, in which all things are in common; and the whole state, their possessions, their families, their passions, are so united as that they may all act together, like the faculties of a single person. The present scheme comes next to it in perfection.

The number of the shares allotted to the citizens is never to be diminished nor increased. Each man is to choose one among his sons who is to succeed to his portion; the rest to be given in adoption to those who have none of their own. The supreme magistrate

is to preside over this equality, and to preserve it. If the number of children exceed the number of shares, he may send out a colony; if it fall short, he may, in cases of great necessity, introduce the sons of foreigners. No alienation of lands to be permitted.

P. 741. The increase of fortune by commerce is to be prohibited, and the use of gold or silver small money, of a species not valued, nor in request with other people, only permitted for the ordinary uses of life. The common coin of Greece is to be in the hands of the public, or employed only on occasion of an embassy, or of an expedition into foreign states. No private person may go abroad without leave of the government; and if he bring back with him any foreign money, he must deposit it in the hands of the magistrate, or he, and all who are privy to the concealment, shall forfeit twice the value and incur disgrace.

P. 742. No securities shall be given among citizens in any case; no fortune paid on a marriage; no money lent on interest.

The folly of a legislator who thinks of making a great, a flourishing, a rich, and a happy state, without regard to the virtue of the inhabitants.

P. 743. The inconsistency of great wealth and of great virtue. The good men will never acquire any thing by unjust means, nor ever refuse to be at any expense on decent and honest occasions. He, therefore, who scruples not to acquire by fair and by unfair means, and will be at no expense on any occasion, must naturally be thrice as rich as the former. A good man will not lavish all he has in idle pleasures and prodigality; he will not therefore be very poor. Business and acquisition ought to employ no more of our time than may be spared from the improvement of our mind and of our body.

P. 744. A colony cannot be formed of men perfectly equal in point of fortune: it will be therefore necessary to divide the citizens into classes according to their circumstances, that they may pay impositions to the public service in proportion to them. The wealthier members are also, cæteris paribus, to be preferred before others to offices and dignities of expense; which will bring every one's fortune gradually to a level.

Four such classes to be instituted: the first worth the value of his land; the fourth, four times as much. Above or below this proportion no one is to go, on pain of forfeiture and disgrace: therefore, the substance of every man is to be publicly enrolled, under the inspection of a magistracy.

P. 745. The division of the country. Every man's lot is to consist of two half-shares, the one near the city, the other near the frontier: every one also is to have two houses, likewise within the city, the one near the midst of it, the other near the walls. The country is to be divided into twelve tribes, and the city into as

many regions; and each of them to be dedicated to its several divinity.

P. 746. An apology for this scheme, which to some will seem impracticable.

P. 747. The great difference of climates and of situations, and the sensible effects which they produce, not on the bodies alone, but on the souls of men, are stated.

[It is matter of just but unavailing regret that Mr. Gray proceeded no further in his analysis and annotations on the books of Plato De Legibus. The editor had once intended to endeavour to analyse the remaining five books; but, on the maturest consideration, a respect for the reader and for the memory of Mr. Gray prevented his attempting to offer any writing of his own, as a continuation of the work of so great and so consummate a master.

Perhaps, indeed, the reader may be inclined to consider this fragment in that point of view in which the elder Pliny, in language of refined eloquence, speaks of some productions of ancient art, as peculiarly interesting from the very circumstance of their being left unfinished; "In lenocinio commendationis dolor est manûs, dum id ageret, extinctæ."—EDITOR.]

THE EPISTLES.

DIOGENES Laertius, who lived probably about the time of Septimius Severus, in the catalogue he gives us of Plato's works, counts thirteen epistles, and enumerates their titles, by which they appear to be the same as those which we now have. Yet we are not thence to conclude them to be all genuine alike. Fictions of this kind are far more ancient than that author's time; and his judgment and accuracy were not sufficient to distinguish the true from the false, as plainly appears from those palpable forgeries, the letters of the seven sages, which yet easily passed upon him as genuine.

EPISTLE I. Ol. 103, 2.

This letter is not from Plato, but from his favourite scholar, the famous Dion; nor is it possible that the philosopher himself could have any hand in it, he being with Dionysius at Syracuse, as he tells us himself, when Dion was forced away, and continuing there some time after. It is sent by Baccheus, who had conducted Dion on his way, together with a sum of money, which Dionysius had ordered to be given to him for his expenses, which he returns to the tyrant with much contempt. The spirit of it and the sentiments are not amiss; and yet it is not very consistent with the indignation which Dion must have felt, and with the suddenness of the occasion, to end his letter with three scraps of poetry, though never so well applied. To say the truth, I much doubt of this epistle, and the more so as it contradicts a fact in Plutarch, who assures us that at the very time when Dion was hurried away, his friends were permitted to load two ships with his wealth and furniture, and to transport them to him in Peloponnesus; besides which, his revenues were regularly remitted to him, till Plato went into Sicily for the last time, which was at least six years after.

EPISTLE II. Ol. 105, 1.

This epistle appears to have been written soon after Plato's return from his third voyage to Syracuse, and the interview which he had with Dion at the Olympic games, which he himself mentions, Epist. vii. p. 350, and in this place also. Archedemus, who brought the letter from Dionysius, and returned with this answer, was a friend and follower of Archytas, the Pythagorean of Tarentum, as stated in Epist. vii. p. 339, p. 521, but was himself probably a Syracusan; at least he had a house in that city where Plato was lodged, after he had been turned out of the citadel, as shown in p. 349. He was sent on board a ship of war, with Dionysius's letters of invitation to Plato, wherein he pressed him to come the third time into Sicily, as a person well known and much esteemed by the philosopher, and he is mentioned as present in the gardens of the palace at an interview which Plato had with Dionysius, about three weeks before he returned home again. See Epist. iii. p. 319.

EPISTLE III. Ol. 105, 4.

This epistle, like those to the friends of Dion afterwards, was apparently written to be made public, and is a justification of Plato's conduct, as well as an invective against the cruelty and falsehood of Dionysius. The beginning of the letter is a reproach, the more keen for being somewhat disguised; and in the rest of it he observes no longer any measures with the tyrant: whence I conclude that it was written after Dion's expedition against him was professedly begun, and perhaps after his entry into Syracuse, particularly from p. 315, But now that I have taught Dion to do these very things, &c.

EPISTLE IV. Ol. 105, 4.

This was written probably the same year with the former, or the beginning of the next, on account of those differences which Dion had with Heraclides and his uncle Theodotes, who at last drove him out of Syracuse: their history may be seen in the 7th Epistle, and in Plutarch.

EPISTLE V. Ol. 103, 4.

Perdiccas, the second son of Amyntas, succeeded to the crown of Macedon, after the death of his brother-in-law, Ptolemy of Alorus, Ol. 103, 4. There seem to have been ancient ties of hospitality and of friendship between the royal family of Macedon, from Archelaus's time, and the principal literati of Athens. Plato here recommends his friend and scholar, Euphræus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa, to be of Perdiccas's council, and his secretary. He grew into the highest favour with Perdiccas, and was trusted with the entire management of all his affairs. He used his power arbitrarily enough. Caristius, of Pergamus, quoted by Athenæus, xi. p. 506, and 508, gives the following instance of it, that he would not suffer any one to sit at the king's table who was ignorant of geometry or of philosophy. And yet to Plato and to Euphræus did the great Philip of Macedon owe his succession to the kingdom, as Speusippus writes in a letter to Philip reproaching him with his ingratitude, for by them was his brother Perdiccas persuaded to bestow on him some districts as an *appanage*, where, after his death, Philip was enabled to raise troops and to recover the kingdom. Euphræus, upon the death of his master, having

rendered himself hateful to the principal Macedonians, was obliged, as it seems, to retire into his own country; where, soon after Philip was settled on the throne, Parmenio was ordered to murder him.

Ficinus and H. Stephanus, finding in the margin of some manuscripts this fifth epistle ascribed to Dion and not to Plato, seem inclined to admit that correction, but without reason. Plato has in his other undoubted epistles spoken of himself, as he has done in this, in the third person. He is here apologizing for his recommendation of a man who was to have a share in the administration of a kingdom. Some may object, says he, "How should Plato be a competent judge, he who has never meddled in the government of his own country, nor thought himself fit to advise his own citizens?" He answers this by showing his reasons for such a conduct; but the last sentence is not at all clear. The thought is the very same with that in the 7th Epistle, p. 330, but some principal word seems to be omitted; perhaps after *δρᾶσαι ἂν* should be inserted *ἰατρικὸν ἄνδρα*, or *ἰατρὸν ἀγαθὸν*.

EPISTLE VI.

This letter, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus in Strom. v., and by Origen contra Celsum vi., Menage, in Diog. Laert. iii., tells us is no longer extant among the epistles of Plato, and is supposed to be a fiction of the Christians. Bentley, in Phileluther. Lips., had reason to wonder at the negligence of that critic, who did not know that the epistle was still preserved: and he adds, that there is no cause to believe the letter not to be genuine, as there are passages in the Dialogues themselves as favourable to the Christian opinions as any thing in this epistle. The passage which those Fathers cite is at the end of the letter, and has indeed much the air of a forgery. I do not know any passages in the Dialogues equally suspicious; nor do I see why it might not be tacked to the end of an undoubtedly original letter: there is nothing else here but what seems genuine.

Erastus and Coriscus[1] were followers of Plato, and born at Scepsis, a city of Troas, seated on Mount Ida, not far from the sources of the Scamander and of the Æsepus; they seem to have

[1] See Strabo, xiii. p. 602, and 607. The Coriscus here mentioned has a son called Neleus, a follower of Aristotle and a particular friend of Theophrastus, who left his library, in which was contained all that Aristotle had ever written, in the original manuscript, to him when he died. It continued in the possession of his family at Scepsis, about one hundred and fifty years, when Apellicon of Teos purchased and transferred it to Athens, whence, soon after, Sylla carried it to Rome.

attained a principal authority in their little state, and Plato recommends to them here to cultivate the friendship of Hermias their neighbour, and sovereign of Assus and Atarneus, two strong towns on the coast of the Sinus Adramyttenus near the foot of Ida. Coriscus had also been scholar to Plato, though an eunuch, and slave to Eubulus, a Bithynian and a banker. His master, having found means to erect a little principality in the places before mentioned, made Hermias his heir. He gave his niece Pythias in marriage to Aristotle, who lived with him near three years, till Ol. 107, 4, about which time Memnon, the Rhodian general to the Persian king, by a base treachery got him into his hands, and sending him to court he was there hanged. See Strabo xiii. p. 610, and Suidas. Aristotle wrote his epitaph, and a beautiful ode or hymn in honour to his memory, which are still extant.

EPISTLE VII. Ol. 105, 4.

Callippus, after the treacherous murder of Dion, was attacked in Syracuse by the friends of that great man, but they were worsted by him and his party; and being driven out they fled to the Leontini, and he maintained his power in the city for thirteen months, as we learn from Diodor. Sic. xvi. 36; until Hipparinus, nephew to Dion, and half-brother to Dionysius, found means to assemble troops; and while Callippus was engaged in the siege of Catana, he, at the head of Dion's party, re-entered Syracuse, and kept possession of it for two years. At the end of which time, Hipparinus in a drunken debauch was assassinated, but by whom I do not find; and his younger brother, Nysæus, succeeded to his power, and made the most arbitrary use of it for near five years; when Dionysius, returning from Locri, as stated by Plutarch in the Life of Timoleon, became once more master of Syracuse, and, as it seems, put Nysæus to death.

Who were the friends of Dion to whom Plato writes, it is hard to enumerate. The principal were his son Hipparinus, and his sister's son, likewise called Hipparinus, and his brother, Megacles, if living, though I rather imagine he had been killed in the course of the war before the death of Dion; and Nicetas, who afterwards was tyrant of the Leontines.

Plato was about forty years of age when first he came to Syracuse. His fortieth year was Ol. 97, 4.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 324. Relations and acquaintances.] Critias, a man as remarkable for the brightness of his parts as for the depravity of his manners and for the hardness of his heart, was Plato's second cousin by the mother's side; and Charmides, the son of Glauco, was his uncle, brother to his mother Perictione. The first was one of the Thirty, the latter one of the Ten, and both were slain in the same action. Plato's family were deeply engaged in the oligarchy; for Callæschrus, as we learn from Lysias in Eratosthen. p. 215, his great-uncle, had been a principal man in the Council of Four Hundred. (Ol. 92, 1.) It is a strong proof of Plato's honesty and resolution, that his nearest relations could not seduce him to share in their power or in their crimes at that age. His uncle, though a great friend of Socrates and of a very amiable character, had not the same strength of mind.

Ib. Against one of the citizens.] The Thirty, during the short time of their magistracy, which was less than a year, put fifteen hundred persons to death, as we learn from Isocrates in Areopag. p. 153, most of whom were innocent, and they obliged about five thousand more to fly. The prisoner here meant was Leo, the Salaminian. See Apolog. p. 32.

P. 328. And not as some imagined.] Plato had been most severely reflected upon for passing his time at the court of Dionysius. Athenæus, whose book is highly valuable for the numberless fragments of excellent authors, now lost, of which it is composed, has preserved abundance of scandal on this head, in xi. p. 507. This and the third Epistle are Plato's justification of himself, and are written with a design to clear his character.

P. 342.] I know not what to say to this very uncommon opinion of Plato, that no philosopher should put either his system, or the method of attaining to a knowledge of it, into writing. The arguments he brings in support of it are obscure beyond my comprehension. All I conceive is, that he means to show how inadequate words are to express our ideas, and how poor a representation even our ideas are of the essence of things. What he says on the bad effects which a half-strained and superficial knowledge produces in ordinary minds, is certainly very just and very fine. See the Phædrus, p. 274—276, where he compares all written arts to the gardens of Adonis, which look gay and verdant, but, having no depth of earth, soon wither away. Lord Bacon, in Nov. Organ. i. 43 and 59, expresses himself strongly on this head. See Book i. App. 43 and 50, Bohn's Edition.

EPISTLE VIII. Ol. 105, 4.

From this Epistle, p. 364, it appears that Plato and Herodotus make Lycurgus the author of the institution of the Ephori, and not Theopompus, as later writers do. See Aristot. Politic. v. c. 11.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 353. Opici.] The ancient inhabitants of Campania, particularly that country which lies round the Bay of Naples. See Aristot. Politic. viii. 10. In a passage cited from Aristotle by Dionys. Halic. i. p. 57, he seems to extend the name to all the inhabitants of that coast to the south of the Tuscans. Aristotle mentions the Opici as the same people with the Ausones. But Polybius judged them to be a distinct people. See Strabo, v. p. 242. The Siculi probably might speak the same tongue, having been driven out of Italy, as we learn from Thucyd. vi., by these Opici some years after the Trojan war, and settling in a part of this island. This name grew into a term of reproach, which the more polished Greeks bestowed upon the Romans, as Cato the censor complains in Pliny, xxix. 1, "Nos quoque dictant barbaros, et spurciùs nos quam alios *Opicos* appellatione *fœdant*;" and in time it became a Latin word to signify barbarous and illiterate.

P. 355. My own son.] This directly contradicts both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, who particularly describe the tragical end of Hipparinus, Dion's son, when just arrived at man's estate. All that story, and the apparition which preceded it, must be false, if this epistle be genuine, which I see no reason, but this, for doubting. The only way to reconcile the matter is, by supposing that Plato might here mean the infant son of Dion, who was born after his father's death; and who was not yet destroyed by Hicetas, for Plutarch intimates, that he continued to treat both the child and its mother well for a considerable time after the expulsion of Callippus. What makes against this supposition is, that in the end of this letter, p. 357, he speaks of Dion's son, as of a person fit to judge of, and to approve, the scheme of government which he has proposed to all parties.

EPISTLE IX.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 358. Each of us is born not for himself alone, &c.] This fine sentiment is quoted by Cicero De Officiis, i. 7, and again, De Finibus ii. 14, so that the 7th, the 4th, and this epistle, are of an authority not to be called in question.

EPISTLE XII.

This epistle is marked in the first editions of Plato as spurious: and so it is in a Vatican MS. Serranus sees mysteries here, where there are none. The same is said also of the 13th Epistle: but there seems no reason for it.

EPISTLE XIII. Ol. 303, 3 or 4.

In order of time this is the second epistle in the collection. It is marked in the MSS. as spurious, and, I must own, it does little honour to Plato's memory; yet it is sure that Plutarch esteemed it genuine. He cites T. i. p. 966, E., a passage from it relating to Areté, the wife of Dion; and in T. ii. p. 474, D., he mentions the character of Helico the Cyzicenian, which is to be found here. I know not what to determine; unless we suppose some parts of it to be inserted afterwards by some idle sophist who was an enemy to Plato's character. It is observable, that Plutarch. in the place last mentioned, says it was written at the end of the epistle, whereas the words alluded to are here not far from the beginning. Possibly some fragments of the true epistle might remain, which were patched together and supplied by some trifler.

NOTE ON THE GREEK TEXT.

P. 362. The expensive linen of Amorgus.] The fine linen of Amorgos, of which they made tunics for women, was transparent. See Aristoph. Lysist. vss. 46, 150, and 736, where the Scholia call the plant of which the thread was made, *ἡ λινοκαλάμη*, and say, that it was in fineness *ὑπὲρ τὴν βύσσον, ἢ τὴν κάρπασον*: they were dyed of a bright red colour.

INDEX.

Abaris, incantations of, iv. 120.
Accounts, auditing of, in the model state, v. 504.
Accusation, both parties to be heard on an, vi. 113.
Accusers of Socrates, their motives examined, i. 10.
Acesimbrotus, iii. 303.
Achæmenes, iv. 342.
Achelous, i. 304.
Acheron, its fabled course, i. 121.
Acherusian lake, i. 122.
Achilles, his contempt of death, i. 15—his love for Patroclus, iii. 490—his character in Homer examined, iv. 265, 273.
Acropolis of the model state, v. 185.
Acumenus, a physician, i. 347.
Acusilaus, iii. 487.
Adimantus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21, ii. 1, iii. 401.
Admetus, iii. 546.
Adonis, gardens of, i. 356.
Adrastia, ii. 134.
Adrastus, i. 348.
Adulterations, punishment for, in the model state, v. 462.
Æacus, grandfather of Achilles, iv. 235, 406.
Æacus, one of the judges of the dead, i. 228.
Æantodorus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21.
Ægina, fare of the boatmen from, to Athens, i. 215.
Ægina, son of, a name given to Æacus, i. 231.
Ægisthus, iv. 406.
Æneas, praised for his skill in flight, iv. 165.
Æschines, a pupil of Socrates, i. 21—present at his death, 56.
Æschylus, citation from, ii. 40.
Æschylus of Phlius, a friend of Plato, vi. 420.
Æsculapius, sons of, ii. 87.
Agamedes, story of, vi. 46.
Agamemnon, ii. 73, iii. 304.
Agathocles, a sophist, i. 245.
Agathon, encomium on Love, by, iii. 527.
Age, consolations of, ii. 1—reverence for, in the model state, v. 398.
Agis, iii. 303—king of Lacedæmon, iv. 348.
Aglaophon, iv. 293.
Agra, i. 303.
Agricultural laws for the model state, v. 337.
Aias, son of Telamon, iii. 372.
Ajax, iii. 570.
Albinus, Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato, by, vi. 315.
Alcestis, her love for her husband, iii. 489.
Alcetas, i. 165.
Alexander murdered by Archelaus, i. 165.
Alcibiades, i. 179—his account of Socrates, iii. 561.
Alcibiades, the First, iv. 311—371
Alcibiades charged with ambitious hopes by Socrates, 313—is obliged to confess he cannot distinguish the just from the unjust, 327—therefore an unfit adviser of

the people, 328 — justice inculcated, 330 — self-improvement urged on Alcibiades, 338 — the Persian and Lacedæmonian kings, 343—question how to become as excellent as possible, 349—friendship, 355—self-knowledge, 356—Gray's notes, vi. 425.

ALCIBIADES, the SECOND, iv. 375—398.

The ignorance of men evinced by their praying for things really hurtful, shown by various examples, 376—Œdipus, 376—tyrants, 381—generals, 381—parents, 382—general prayers recommended, 383, 393—Gray's notes, vi. 427.

Alcinous, ii. 304.

Alcinous, Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato, by, vi. 241.

Alcmæon, iv. 384.

Amatory matters, v. 326.

Amazons, contests of, with the Athenians, iv. 192.

Ambassadors who neglect their duty, punishment of, v. 498.

Amestris, iv. 347.

Ammon, the god, iii. 189.

Ampheres, ii. 421.

Amphilytus, iv. 406.

Amphion, i. 183.

Amphipolis, Socrates at, i. 16.

Amphiraus, vi. 46.

Amphitryon, i. 410.

Amycus, v. 262.

Amynander, ii. 324.

Amyntor, curses his son Phœnix, v. 487.

Anacharsis, ii. 289.

Anacreon, iv. 440.

Anatomy and physiology, ancient, ii. 381.

Anaxagoras, theories of, i. 13, 103, 158, iii. 314.

Andromache, iv. 298.

Andromedes, iv. 553.

Andron, son of Androtion, i. 185.

Andron, a friend of Callicles, i. 185.

Androtion, i. 185.

Animals, two kinds of, mortal and immortal, vi. 22—lower, creation of the, ii. 407.

Antæus, i. 403, v. 262.

Antenor, iii. 572.

Anthemion, father of Anytus, iii. 34.

Antilochus, iv. 301.

Antimœrus, of Mende, a sophist, i. 248.

Antipho, of Rhamnous, an orator, iv. 186.

Antiphon, of Cephisus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21.

Antisthenes, vi. 418 — present at the death of Socrates, i. 56.

Anytus, iii. 33—one of the accusers of Socrates, i. 4, 10.

Apaturia, festivals in honour of Dionysus, ii. 324.

Apemantus, ii. 263.

Aphrodite, meaning of the name, iii. 327.

Apollo, meaning of the name, iii. 322.

Apollodorus, a pupil of Socrates, i. 21 — present at his death, 56, vi. 419.

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, i. 3—29.

Preamble, 3—his most formidable accusers, 4—charges against him, 5—disclaims the power of teaching, 5—how the charges originated, 6—his various opponents, Melitus, Anytus, Lycon, 12—dialogue with Melitus, 12—the multitude prejudiced against him, 15—the study of philosophy an act of duty, 15—fear of death not wisdom, 16—his death an injury to Athens rather than to himself, 18—why he took little part in public affairs, 19 — appeal to his contemporaries as to his teaching, 21—declines to supplicate for mercy, 22—is condemned to death, 23—his own award, 23—address to his judges, 26—to those who voted for his acquittal, 27—death a blessing, 28—purposed occupation in Hades, 28—Gray's notes, vi. 430.

Apuleius on the Doctrines of Plato, vi. 323.
Arbitrators and tribunals in the model state, v. 523.
Archæanassa, a mistress of Plato, vi. 191.
Archedemus, iv. 479.
Archelaus, of Macedonia, iv. 381—atrocities committed by, i. 165.
Archepolis, iii. 303.
Archidamus, iv. 348.
Archidemus, iv. 482.
Archilochus, ii. 45, iv. 289.
Archinus, an Athenian orator, iv. 184.
Archippus, iv. 547.
Archon king, the, iv. 113.
Archytas, of Tarentum, epistles of Plato to, iv. 547—letter of, to Dionysius, vi. 186.
Ares, meaning of the name, iii. 329.
Aridæus, ii. 306.
Ariphron, tutor of Clinias, i. 248.
Aristides, son of Lysimachus, iv. 415—eulogy on, i. 230, iii. 39.
Aristippus of Larissa, a noble Thessalian, iii. 3.
Aristocracy, need of one, iii. 188—should be superior in virtue, not in wealth, 188.
Aristocrates, son of Scellius, i. 166.
Aristocritus, iv. 556.
Aristodemus, iii. 475.
Aristodorus, epistle of Plato to, iv. 548.
Aristogiton, iv. 441.
Ariston, i. 21.
Aristonymus, iv. 467.
Aristophanes, encomium on Love, by, iii. 508.
Armed sports, in the model state, v. 262—question as to the use of such, iv. 151.
Artaxerxes, iv. 343.
Artemis, meaning of the name, iii. 325.
Artisans, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 469.
Aspasia, her skill in oratory praised, iv. 106—her (pretended) oration on the slain at Nemea, 187.
Assaults, punishment for, in the model state, v. 397.
Assembly, nocturnal, for the preservation of the laws of the model state, v. 533—the guardians of the city, 536.
Astronomer, the true, necessarily the wisest man, vi. 31.
Astronomy, errors in, v. 307.
Astyanax, iii. 298.
Astylus, his temperance, v. 333.
Atalante, ii. 311.
Ate, a goddess, iii. 520.
Athamas, iv. 453.
Athene, ii. 416—meaning of the name, iii. 327.
Athenians, the primitive, said to resemble the citizens of the ideal Republic, ii. 417—polity of the, v. 113.
Atlantic isles, story of the, ii. 328, 420.
Atlas, i. 105.
Atreus, iii. 209.
Atropus, ii. 308.
Attica, polity of, v. 113.
Auditing of accounts, v. 504.
Auditors, honours to, in the model state, v. 507.
Autochthon, ii. 421.
Autochthones, a name assumed by the Athenians, iv. 188.
Autolycus, ii. 10.
Axiochus; or, on Death, vi. 39—56.
Reasons against the fear of death, 41—no part of life free from pain, 44—the immortality of the soul, 51—future judgment, 53.
Axiochus, iii. 56, vi. 39.
Azaes, ii. 421.

B

Bacchus, choir of, v. 63.
Bachelors, punishment of, in the model state, v. 228.
Bacis, iv. 406.
Bad government, different kinds of, ii. 233.

Bad sons of good fathers, i. 255.
Banquet, The; or, on Love, iii. 473—576.
Encomium on Love, by Phædrus, 486—by Pausanius, 490—by Eryximachus, 500—by Aristophanes, 508—by Agatho, 518—Socrates' comments, 527—his argument with Diotima, 531—Alcibiades' account of Socrates, 561—Gray's notes, vi. 450.
Barbarians and Greeks, an unsound distinction, iii. 198.
Beautiful, the, discussions on, iv. 222, 263.
Being and non-being, discussion on, iii. 432, 462.
Bendideia, festival of the, ii. 1.
Bias, of Priene, i. 273.
Body and soul, v. 16.
Bones and flesh, nature of the, ii. 385.
Boreas, i. 303, v. 57.
Boys, unruliness of, v. 283.
Brasidas, iii. 572.
Brave, honours to the, ii. 153.
Briareus, iii. 89.
Bride and bridegroom, duties of the, in the model state, v. 246.
Bryson, iv. 551.
Building, rules for, in the model state, v. 184, 236.
Buying and selling, laws relating to, v. 460.

C

Cadmus, i. 100.
Cæneus, metamorphosis of, v. 504.
Callæschrus, i. 244.
Calliades, iv. 338.
Callias, a general, iv. 338.
Callias, a companion of Socrates, vi. 417.
Callias, the Parian, i. 6—his defence of might against right, 181.
Callicles, a friend of Gorgias the Leontine, i. 136.
Callicrete, iv. 408.
Calliope, i. 336.
Callistratus, v. 101
Callixenus, vi. 49.
Cambyses, iv. 193
Carthaginians, money of the, vi. 71.
Cebes, iv. 555—a friend of Socrates, i. 33—present at his death, 56, vi. 419.
Cecrops, ii. 417.
Celibacy, punishment of, v. 228.
Cemeteries, in the model state, v. 528.
Cephalus, his happy old age, ii. 3.
Cepis, i. 244.
Cerberus, ii. 279.
Cercyon, v. 262.
Ceres. *See* Demeter.
Chæredemus, iii. 87.
Chærephon, vi. 418—his inquiry of the oracle regarding Socrates, i. 7.
Charioteer and steeds, the soul likened to a, i. 322.
Charmantides, the Pæonian, ii. 3.
Charmides; on Temperance, iv. 113—144.
Charmides' definition of temperance, 121—doubts of Socrates, 121—Critias' opinion, 131—objections of Socrates, 131—temperance a great good, 144—Gray's notes, vi. 448.
Charmides, the son of Glauco, iii. 574, vi. 420.
Charondas, the lawgiver, ii. 289.
Children, procreation of, v. 230, 246—community of, ii. 141—nursing of, v. 253—sports of, 258, 264—education of, 43—the sexes to be separated at six years of age, 259—belong rather to the state than to their parents, 277.
Chilo, of Lacedæmon, i. 273.
Chimæra, ii. 279.
Chiron, ii. 71.
Chryses, ii. 73.
Chrysippus, iii. 305.
Cimon, iv. 409—his treatment by the Athenians, i 220.
Cinesias, a musician, i. 203.
Cinyras, wealth of, v. 56.
Citizen. *See* Crito.
Citizen, duty of the, i. 31.
Citizen rules for building the, in the

model state, v. 184—city stewards, 203.
Civil government, its origin, v. 78—who should be rulers, 99—various polities discussed, 105, 112, 113.
Cleobulus, of Lindus, i. 273.
Cleombrotus, i. 56.
Cleopatra, i. 165.
Cleophantus, his skill in horsemanship, iii. 38.
Clinias, the Cnossian, v. 8.
Clinias, brother of Alcibiades, i. 248.
Clito, ii. 421.
Clitomachus, iv. 413.
CLITOPHO, iv. 467—474.
Comments on several of the Socratic doctrines, 468—question as to reducing them to practice, 470—Socrates' teaching said to be incomplete, 473.
Clitophon, son of Aristonymus, ii. 3, iv. 467.
Clotho, ii. 308.
Cnossus, the model state to be founded from, v. 195.
Cocytus, a river, i. 122.
Codrus, iii. 546.
Colonization, art of, v. 126.
Colony, government and laws for a new, v. 129.
Common tables for men in the model state, v. 239—for women, 242.
Community of goods carried to its extreme in the model state, v. 174, 176.
Compacts, law of, v. 455.
Computation, a science to be taught, v. 300.
Connexions, illicit, v. 248.
Connus, iii. 83.
Consultation among the ignorant, mere guess work, vi. 100, 105.
Contests, running and other, rules for, v. 321.
Contributions and offerings, laws relating to, v. 522.
Corinthus, son of Jupiter, iii. 79.
Coriscus, iv. 497.
Correction, house of, in the model state, v. 452.
Corybantes, their inspiration, iv. 295, 300.
Cosmos, its original meaning, i. 210.
Council of the model state, v. 198.
COUNSEL, ON TAKING. *See* SISYPHUS.
Courage shown to be contained in knowledge, i. 293.
Cratinus, iv. 555.
Cratistolus, iv. 479.
CRATYLUS, THE, iii. 283—395.
Do names express the properties of things? 283—examination of names in Homer, 298—in Hesiod, 310—names of the gods, 316—of prudence, wisdom, &c., 336—other words examined, 343—imitation, 362—name-givers, 373—names to be composed from elements, 383—Gray's notes, vi. 449.
Creator and Father of the universe, ii. 332.
Credence not to be too quickly given, vi. 117.
Creon, the Thessalian, i. 269, iv. 398
Creophilus, the epic poet, ii. 289.
Cresphontes, v. 90.
Cretan state, laws of the, adapted to a state of war, v. 3.
Crison of Himera, a runner, i. 266.
CRITIAS, THE, ii. 413—429.
The primæval Athenians, 415—said to resemble the citizens of the ideal Republic, 417—the story of the Atlantic island, 420.
Critias, his opinion on temperance, iv. 131.
Critias, son of Phæax, vi. 59.
CRITO; OR, THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN, i. 31—45.
Opinion of the many not to be regarded, 31—a man should not be anxious about living, but about living well, 37—his duty to act justly at all hazards, 37—evasion of the laws unjust, 39—children, friends, and life less to be regarded than acting justly, 44.
Crito, a friend of Socrates, i. 21—endeavours to prevail with him to

escape from prison, 33—present at his death, 56, vi. 420.
Critobulus, son of Crito, i. 21, vi. 417—present at the death of Socrates, i. 56.
Crœsus, iv. 480.
Crysson, his temperance, v. 333.
Ctesippus, the Pæanian, i. 482—present at the death of Socrates, 56.
Curetes, armed sports of the, v. 262.
Cyane, iv. 409.
Cyanus, a metallic substance, i. 122.
Cybele, votaries of, i. 44.
Cyclopes, v. 85.
Cypselus, iv. 406.
Cyrus, iv. 139.
Cyrus and Darius, their conduct contrasted, v. 107.
Cyzicum, naval battle at, iv. 197.

D.

Dædalus, skill of, i. 470, iii. 44.
Dæmon of Socrates, i. 19, iv. 311, 413.
Dæmons, origin and meaning of the term, iii. 310.
Damon, a celebrated musician, ii. 82.
Dances, various kinds of, v. 295.
Darius, iv. 193.
Datis subdues the Eretrians, iv. 193.
Death, fear of, censured, i. 15, 37, vi. 41.—a great gain, i. 28—only the separation of soul and body, 229.
Defence of the model state, v. 206—walls rejected, 237.
Definitions, vi. 123—144.
Delium, Socrates at, i. 16.
Delphi, declaration of the oracle at, regarding Socrates, i. 7.
Demeter, meaning of the name, iii. 321.
Democracy, ii. 244—ironical commendation, 246—no share in government to be allowed to the ignorant, v. 99—democracy and monarchy, 105.
Democrates of Æxone, i. 483.
Demodocus, vi. 109—119.
The folly of advising on, or giving judgment about, matters of which men are ignorant, 110—both parties to be heard on any accusation, 113—on lending money, 115—on giving credence too quickly, 117.
Demodocus, iv. 401.
Demophon, i. 486.
Demus, son of Pyrilampes, i. 179.
Deucalion, ii. 325.
Diana, meaning of the name, iii. 325.
Dialogues of Plato, classification of, ii. Int. vii.—Introduction to, by Albinus, vi. 315.
Diaprepes, ii. 421.
Different, the, and the one, iii. 420, 437.
Dinomache, mother of Alcibiades, iv. 314.
Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato, by, vi. 175.
Diomedean necessity, what, ii. 180.
Diomedes, iv. 397.
Dion, epistle of, to Dionysius, iv. 477—to Perdiccas, 495—Plato's epistle to Dion, 493—Plato's epistle to the friends and kindred of Dion, 499, 539.
Dionysia, festivals at Athens so called, ii. 162.
Dionysius, the grammarian, iv. 419.
Dionysius, the tyrant, epistle of Dion to, iv. 477—of Plato to, 479, 486, 550.
Dionysodorus, iii. 54.
Dionysus, meaning of the name, iii. 327.
Diopompus, his temperance, v. 333.
Dioscuri, v. 263.
Diotima, her teaching on Love, iii. 531.
Dis, iii. 312.
Diseases, origin of, ii. 396.
Disobedience, fines for, v. 512.
Divorce, regulations for, in the model state, v. 248.
Doctrines of Plato, Analysis of, by

Alcinous, vi. 241—by Apuleius, 323.
Dodona, shrine at, v. 172.
Dorieus, v. 88.
Doris, iv. 482.
Dropides, ii. 323.

E

Early rising, importance of, v. 283.
Earth, speculations on its form, i. 117.
Echecrates, of Phlius, i. 54, iv. 547.
Education, in general, v. 249—to be regulated by law, 252—gymnastics and music, 261, 293, 295—public schools, 276.
Egypt, regulation of music and dancing in, v. 267.
Elasippus, ii. 421.
Elements, four in number, ii. 336.
Eleven, the, magistrates so called, at Athens, i. 56.
Empedocles, i. 382.
Employments for women, in the ideal Republic, v. 279.
Endymion, i. 72.
Engineer, services of the, i. 215.
Entities, quantity and quality of, discussed, iii. 143.
Epeius, v. 262.
Epeus the Panopean, ii. 311.
Ephialtes, vi. 48.
Ephialtus, iii. 509.
Ephori, power of the, its effects, v. 103.
Epicharmus, i. 382.
Epicrates, i. 301.
Epigenes, a pupil of Socrates, i. 21—present at his death, 56, vi. 419.
Epimenides, v. 81.
Epimetheus, legend of, i. 249.
Epinomis; or, the Philosopher, vi. 3—36.
The sciences necessary to man, 6—the science of number, 9—its origin divine, 12—body and soul, 16—two kinds of animals, immortal and mortal, 22—eight powers of heaven, 25—piety the greatest part of virtue, 30—the true astronomer necessarily the wisest man, 31—the moon and sun, 32—powers of numbers, 33—all things full of the gods, 35.
Epistles, iv. 477—558.
Dion to Dionysius, 477—Plato to Dionysius, 479, 486, 550—Plato to Dion, 493—Dion to Perdiccas, 495—Plato to Hermias and others, 497—Plato to the kindred and friends of Dion, 499, 539—Plato to Archytas of Tarentum, 547, 549—Plato to Aristodorus, 548—Plato to Laodamas, 548—Gray's notes, vi. 499.
Epitaphs and monuments, in the model state, v. 528.
Erasistratus, vi. 60.
Erastus, iv. 497, 553.
Erato, i. 336.
Erechtheus, ii. 417.
Erichthonius, ii. 417.
Erisichthon, ii. 417.
Eros, the winged, i. 328.
Erus, apologue of, on future rewards and punishments, ii. 304.
Eryxias; or, on Wealth, vi. 59—81.
What is the real wealth, 61—doubts whether riches are good, 66—the argument of Prodicus, 68—various kinds of wealth, 72—property consists of all useful things, 73—things useful only to those who can properly employ them, 77—the person with but few wants the really wealthy man, 81.
Eryximachus, encomium on Love, by, iii. 500.
Eternal punishment only to be incurred by kings and potentates, i. 230.
Ethonoe. *See* Athene.
Euæmon, ii. 421.
Euathlus, iv. 413.
Euclides of Megara, present at the death of Socrates, i. 56.
Eudicus, ii. 263.
Eudoxus, iv. 551.

Euenor, ii. 421.
Euenus, i. 345.
Eumelus, ii. 421.
Eumolpus, the founder of the Eleusinian mysteries, ii. 42.
Euphemus of Himera, i. 319.
Euphræus, iv. 495.
Euphronius of Sunium, i. 372.
Eupolemus, iii. 303.
Euribius, iv. 491.
Euripides, saying of, quoted, i. 384.
Europa, iv. 459.
Eurybates, a profligate, i. 256.
Eurybius, iv. 534.
Eurycles, a ventriloquist, iii. 159.
Eurymedon, naval battle at, iv. 195.
Euryplus, treatment of his wound, ii. 87.
Eurysaces, iv. 342.
Eurysthenes, king of Lacedæmon, v. 90.
Euthydemus, iii. 51—100.
Ridicule of the pretensions of the sophists to impart all knowledge, 52—specimens of their teaching, 57—their discourse specious, not truthful, 98—Gray's notes, vi. 451.
Euthydemus, iii. 52.
Euthyphro, iii. 333.
Euthyphron; or, on Holiness, i. 458—476.
Question as to what holiness consists in, 462—said to be what is pleasing to the gods, 464—objections of Socrates, 464—holiness said to be a part of justice, 470—holiness a kind of service to the gods, 474—disproved, as men cannot benefit the gods, 475—the discussion broken off, 476—Gray's notes, vi. 429.
Eutychides, iii. 309.
Evasion of the laws unjust, i. 39.
Evenor, ii. 421
Evenus, the Parian, i. 6—message of Socrates to, 58—his rhetorical arts, 345.
Evils existing in states, ii. 159.
Exercises, military, v. 317—question as to their value, iv. 151—women to be trained to, ii. 293.
Exiles, punishment for harbouring, v. 521.
Expediency, political, censured, i. 406—justice confounded with, ii. 14.
Exports and imports, regulation of, in the model state, v. 345.

F

Fables, poetic, ii. 58—inconsistent with right views of the Deity, 60.
False witness, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 496.
Falsehoods respecting the gods not to be allowed, ii. 64.
Family quarrels, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 482.
Fearlessness not bravery, iv. 173.
Federation, early Greek, v. 89—how broken up, 97.
Festivals of the gods, in the model state, v. 313.
Fines for disobedience, v. 512.
Fisherman, his art compared with that of the sophist, iii. 106.
Fishing and hunting, rules for, v. 310.
Folly, how shared among mankind, iv. 379.
Foreign travel, restrictions on, v. 514.
Foreigners, treatment of, in the model state, v. 350, 517.
Fortifications of the model state, v. 237—no wall to the city, 237.
Fortitude. *See* Laches.
Fortitude, various kinds of, iv. 167.
Freed men, laws regarding, in the model state, v. 458.
Friends, who to be called, i. 492.
Friendship. *See* Lysis.
Future judgment, the, i. 227, vi. 53—rewards and punishments, ii. 304.

G

Gadeirus, ii. 421.

Gain, love of, iv. 435—men injured by iniquitous gain, 439—gain neither good nor bad in itself, 443.
Ganymede, fable of, i. 332, v. 19.
Gelon, iv. 511.
General, necessary attainments of the, ii. 211—generals in the model state, v. 197.
Generation, process of, ii. 407.
Geometric or fatal number, ii. 235, 430.
Geryon, iii. 89, 261.
Glaucon, brother of Plato, ii. 1.
Glaucus, ii. 301—art of, a proverbial expression, i. 117.
Gobryas, vi. 52.
Gods, all things full of the, vi. 35—existence of the, v. 406—concerned in human affairs, 411, 437, 440.
Gold and silver not to be possessed by private persons in the model state, v. 179.
Good men, so from their birth, vi. 89.
GOOD, THE GREATEST. *See* PHILEBUS.
GORGIAS; OR, ON RHETORIC, i. 136—232.

Questions as to what rhetoric consists of, 138, 154—defined by Socrates as a species of flattery, 155—better to suffer than to do injustice, 162—a man justly punished is benefited thereby, 173—but rhetoric being generally employed to screen from punishment, is harmful, 177—question as to what constitutes a happy life, 180—examples of Themistocles and others discussed, 205—advantages of a virtuous life, 209—the future judgment, 227—Gray's notes, vi. 444.

Gorgias the Leontine, i. 5—discourses on rhetoric with Socrates, 138—his rhetorical arts, 345.
Gorgons, i. 304.
Governing, the art of, iv. 407.
Government, no share in, allowed to the ignorant, v. 99.
Grasshoppers, myth of the, i. 336.
Gray, Thomas, Some Account of the Dialogues and of the Epistles of Plato, by, vi. 405.
Greek federation, the early, v. 89, 97.
Greeks and Barbarians, an unsound distinction, iii. 198.
Greeks, war not to be carried to extremes between, ii. 156—kings of the, how their power was destroyed, v. 100.
Guarantees, in the model state, v. 519.
Guardians of the state, ii. 55—their functions, 102.
Gyges and the ring, story of, ii. 37
Gymnastics, ii. 57, v. 213.

H

Hades, meaning of the name, iii. 321—removal to, a cause of joy to the good and wise man, i. 28, 66—also a place of punishment, ii. 45.
Happiness only the portion of the good, i. 164.
Harbouring exiles, punishment for, v. 521.
Harmodius, iv. 441.
Harmonies, various kinds of, ii. 80.
Heaven, or the world, ii. 332—eight powers of, vi. 25.
Hecaergus, vi. 53.
Hecamede, her potion to Machaon, iv. 302.
Hector, iii. 300.
Hecuba, iv. 298.
Hegesippus, son of Ariston, iv. 486.
Helen, ii. 277.
Helicon, iv. 551.
Helotes, the, their condition, iv. 345, v. 233.
Hephæstus, ii. 416—meaning of the name, iii. 328.
Hera, meaning of the name, iii. 321.
Heraclean stone, iv. 294.
Heracleides, iv. 534.
Heraclides of Clazomenæ, a general in the service of Athens, iv. 307.
Heraclitus, doctrine of, as to motion, i. 415.

Hercens, a name of Jupiter, iii. 93.
Hercules, iv. 342.
Hermes, meaning of the name, iii. 329.
Hermias and others, epistle of Plato to, iv. 497.
Hermocrates, ii. 319.
Hermogenes, present at the death of Socrates, i. 56, vi. 419.
Herodicus of Selymbria, a sophist, i. 245—his mode of life, ii. 88.
Heroes, the ancient, all demi-gods, iii. 311.
Heroscomander, iv. 414.
Hesiod, on the golden age, iii. 310.
Hesperus, vi. 27.
Hestia, v. 184.
Hesychius of Miletus, Life of Plato, by, vi. 229.
Hiero, iv. 480.
Hieronymus, i. 482.
Hipparchs in the model state, v. 197.
Hipparchus, The, iv. 435—446.
On the love of gain, 435—men injured by iniquitous gain, 439—story of Hipparchus, 440—gain denied to be either good or bad in itself, 443—Gray's notes, vi. 436.
Hipparchus, story of, iv. 440.
Hipparinus, iv. 499.
Hippias Major, iv. 211—259.
Gains of the sophists, 214—sophists little esteemed in Lacedæmon, 217—discussion on the beautiful, 222—definitions by Hippias, 224, 233, 239, 243, 246, 258—objections by Socrates, 225, 234, 239, 243, 246, 258—Gray's notes, vi. 452.
Hippias Minor, iv. 263—283.
The subject of the beautiful further discussed, 263—Hippias questioned by Socrates as to his talents and acquirements, 267—questions as to truth and falsehood, as shown by Homer in the characters of Achilles and Ulysses, 265, 273—which are the better men, they who err willingly, or unwillingly? 277—Gray's notes, vi. 453.
Hippias the tyrant, iv. 406.
Hippias the Elean, i. 5—his definitions of the beautiful, iv. 224, *et seq.*—objections of Socrates, 225, *et seq.*
Hippocrates of Cos, i. 239.
Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, i. 238.
Hippodamia, iii. 306.
Hippolytus, v. 96.
Hipponicus, i. 6.
Hippothales, i. 482.
Holiness. *See* Euthyphron.
Homer, the wisest of poets, v. 253—all arts to be learnt from his works, according to Ion, iv. 317—his character of Achilles and Ulysses discussed, 265, 273—his character of Minos, 462—the leader of tragedy, ii. 284.
Homeridæ, the, iv. 289.
Homogrius, a title of Jupiter, v. 402.
Honours to the brave, ii. 153—funeral oration for those who fell at Nemea, iv. 187.
Horomasius. *See* Oromazdes.
Horse-races, rules for, v. 323.
Hucksters, laws for, in the model state, v. 464—the sophist compared with the, iii. 114.
Human beings, formerly three kinds of, iii. 508—original form of, 508.
Hunter, his art compared to that of the sophist, iii. 111.
Hunting, various kinds of, iii. 108.
Hunting and fishing, rules for, v. 310.
Hymns to the gods allowed, but not the pleasurable muse, ii. 297.

I

Iatrocles, iv. 557.
Ibis, i. 354.
Ibycus, i. 318.
Iccus of Tarentum, a sophist, i. 245—his temperance, v. 333.
Idealities. *See* Parmenides.
Ignorant, no share in government allowed to the, v. 99.

Illicit connexions, v. 248.
Immortality. *See* Soul.
Impiety, punishment of, in the model state, v. 450.
Imports and exports, regulation of, in the model state, v. 345.
Inachus, ii. 62.
Injustice, sophistical arguments in favour of, ii. 36.
Insanity, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 492.
Inspectors, in the model state, v. 515.
Intellect alone not the supreme good, iv. 27—pleasure joined to intellect, 102.
Intestines, cause of their convolutions, ii. 385.
Intoxication prohibited in Sparta, v. 20—its prevalence elsewhere, 20.
Iolaus, iii. 86.
Ion, iv. 287—308.
The art of the rhapsodist a divine allotment, 294—poetic inspiration, 296—as the rhapsodist speaks on all subjects, he must therefore understand them all, 300—this shown not to be the case, by various examples, 301—the rhapsodist fancying he knows the art of war from Homer, ironically recommended to turn general, 307—Gray's notes, vi. 462.
Iphicles, iii. 86.
Iris, i. 385.
Ischomachus, a companion of Socrates, vi. 417.
Isis, v. 50.
Isles of the blessed, i. 227.
Ismenias, of Thebes, iii. 34.
Isocrates, iv. 551—encomium on, i. 359.
Isolochus, iv. 338.

J

Japetus, iii. 519.
Judges, how appointed in the model state, v. 218—punishment of attempts to corrupt, 497.
Judges of the dead, i. 228.
Judgments, ill-considered, vi. 110.
Juno, i. 329—her treatment of Bacchus, v. 74.
Jupiter, i. 329.
Jurymen in the model state, v. 511.
Just and unjust things, vi. 92.
Justice, Dialogue on, vi. 91—95.
Discussion on things just and unjust, 92—justice the result of wisdom, 95.
Justice, the virtue of the soul, ii. 32—the result of wisdom, vi. 95——its effects on the state, ii. 49.
Justice, courts of, in the model state, v. 216.

K

Kingly rule, its origin, v. 87.
Kings and potentates only exposed to eternal punishment, according to Homer, i. 230.
Kronos, ii. 345, iii. 213.

L

Labour, division of, ii. 50.
Labour and danger found in every political establishment, v. 168.
Lacedæmon, sophists little esteemed in, iv. 217—kings of, 343—polity of, v. 16.
Lacedæmonians, their cultivation of philosophy, i. 272—their wealth, iv. 345.
Lachesis, ii. 308.
Laches; on Fortitude, iv. 147—179.
Question as to learning military exercises, 151—anecdote of Stesilaus, 154—attempt to define fortitude, 164—Socrates' objections, 164—various kinds of fortitude, 167—fearlessness not bravery, 173—the question as to what fortitude is not settled, 178—Gray's notes, vi. 434.
Laches, iv. 146.
Laius, story of, alluded to, v. 327.

Lamachus, an Athenian general, iv. 184.
Lamiscus, a friend of Plato, in Sicily, iv. 536.
Lampido, iv. 348.
Lamprus, a musician, iv. 185.
Lands and dwellings, distribution of, in the model state, v. 170.
Language, invention of, iv. 19.
Laodamas, epistle of Plato to, iv. 548.
Laomedon, iv. 550.
Lasciviousness, laws against, v. 404.
Latona, meaning of the name, iii. 325.
Law, question as to what it is, iv. 449.
The Laws, v. 1—548.

Book I. The Cretan laws adapted to a state of war, 3—such not the aim of a true lawgiver, but rather internal peace, 7—the duty of the legislator, 11—the Laconian polity, 16 — intoxication, 20—early education, 30—man, the plaything of the gods, 32—recommendation to temperance, 39.

Book II. Education discussed, 43 — music and dancing, 45 — to be regulated by law, 49—wine not to be touched by boys, 64—further prohibitions, 77 — music not to be esteemed as a source of pleasure merely, 68 — rhythms and harmonies, 75.

Book III. Commencement of civil government, 78—its origin among the survivors of a deluge, 80, 83—patriarchal government, 85—kingly rule, 87—early Greek federation, 89—how broken up, 97—no share in government to be allowed to the ignorant, 99—who should be rulers, 99—monarchy and democracy, 105 — Cyrus and Darius, 107—the Persian polity, 112 — the polity of Attica, 113—Athenian laws regarding music, 116—true aim of the legislator, 118 — foundation of a colony, 119.

Book IV. The neighbourhood of the sea unfavourable to virtue, 121 — colonization, 126 — the colony to be governed by a tyrant, docile, brave, and of a magnificent disposition, 129—the government of Saturn, 134—such to be imitated in states, 135—the safety of the state found only in the observance of the law, 138—piety, 141 — restraint on poets, 145—the law for marriage, 148 —prelude to laws, 151.

Book V. A man's soul the most divine of all his possessions, 153—self-love to be avoided, 161 —temperance and intemperance, 165—labour and danger found in every political establishment, 168 —distribution of lands and dwellings in the model state, 170—all things in common therein, 174—this theory applied to wives and children, 176 — regulation of population, 177—no private person to possess gold or silver, 179 — lawsuits discouraged, 182 — neither wealth nor poverty to exist, 183—rules for building the city, 184.

Book VI. Appointment of magistrates, 189 — guardians of the laws, 195—other magistrates, 196—the council, 198—city stewards, market stewards, and priests, 203—rural stewards, 205 — defence of the state, 206 — leaders in music and gymnastics, 213 — courts of justice, 216 — monthly meetings for sacrifice and social intercourse, 224 — punishment for celibacy, 228 — regulations for marriage, and procreation, 230, 246—treatment of slaves, 234—buildings, rules for, 236—walls of defence rejected, 237—common tables for men, 239 —for women, 242—divorce, 248 —illicit connexions, 248 — marriageable age, 248.

Book VII. Nurture and educa-

tion of children, 249—such to be regulated by law, 252—nursing, 253—sports of children, 258, 264—nurses, 259—the sexes to be separated at six years of age, 259—gymnastics and music, 261, 293, 295—the Egyptian method, 267—laws for the regulation of music, song, and dancing, 269—restrictions on poets, 272—eulogium on the tragic poets, 299—public schools, 276—employments for women, 279—early rising, 283—unruliness of boys, 283—women to learn the use of arms, so as to be able to defend their homes, 293—computation and other sciences to be taught, 300—astronomy, 307—rules for hunting and fishing, 310.

Book VIII. Festivals of the gods, 313—martial exercises, 317—why not practised in other states, 318, 320—rules for running and other contests, 321—amatory matters, 326—agricultural laws, 337—laws for trades, 344—imports and exports, 345—foreigners, 350.

Book IX. Lawsuits, 351—sacrilege, 353—treason, 357—theft, 359—murder, 372—wounding, 394—assaults, 397—reverence for age, 398—violence to parents, 402.

Book X. Laws against violations of property, 404—lasciviousness and insolence of young men, 404—existence of the gods, 406—question whether concerned in human affairs, 411—answered in the affirmative, 437, 440—nature and chance, 412—the nature of the soul, 417, 426—motion, 421—mind, 428—impious to suppose the gods pardon men acting unjustly, 448—punishment of impiety, 450—no one to have holy places in private houses, 454.

Book XI. Law of compacts, 455—slaves and freedmen, 458—buying and selling, 460—adulterations, 462—hucksters, 464—artificers, 469—wills, 472—orphans and guardians, 479—family quarrels, 482—neglect of parents, 488—poisons, 489—insanity, 492—libel, 494—injury to property, 495—false witness, 496—attempt to corrupt judges, 497.

Book XII. Ambassadors who neglect their duty, 498—stealing, 499—military discipline, 500—auditing accounts, 504—honours to the auditors, 507—jurymen, 511—fines for disobedience, 512—restrictions on foreign travel, 514—inspectors, 515—foreigners, 517—guarantees, 519—search for stolen property, 519—harbouring exiles, 521—contributions and offerings, 522—arbitrators and tribunals, 523—cemeteries, monuments, and epitaphs, 528—nocturnal assembly for the preservation of the laws, 533—this assembly to possess every virtue, 536—the city to be delivered to its care, 548.

Laws (personified), address of, to Socrates, i. 39—laws of different countries, 453—laws of Minos, 459—laws of the model state, v. 351—guardians of the laws, 195, 536.

Lawsuits discouraged, v. 182, 351.

Leaders in music and gymnastics in the model state, v. 213.

Learning-selling trade, the sophist's a, iii. 115.

Legislator, duty of the, v. 11.

Lending money, on, vi. 115.

Leochares, iv 552.

Leocolophides, i. 244.

Leon the Salaminian, Socrates refuses to concur in the death of, i. 20.

Leontius, story of, ii. 125.

Leotychides, iv. 345.

Leptines, iv. 552.

Leucippe, ii. 421.

Libel, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 494.

Licymnius, a sophist, i. 346.
Life, no part of, free from pain, vi. 44.
Locris, in Italy, excellence of its laws, ii. 322.
Lotophagi, ii. 250.
Love, On. *See* Banquet, The.
Love, disquisition on the nature of, i. 305.
Lucifer, vi. 26.
Lycea, human sacrifices at, iv. 453.
Lycon, one of the accusers of Socrates, i. 10.
Lycophron, iv. 485.
Lycurgus, iii. 549—laws of, v. 13.
Lynceus, iv. 528.
Lysanias of Sphettus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21.
Lysias, sophistical speech of, about love, i. 305.
Lysiclides, iv. 486.
Lysimachus, iv. 414.
Lysis; or, on Friendship, i. 482—507.
Who are to be called friends? 492—like must be friendly to like, 495—disputed, as no friendship exists among the wicked, 495—like hostile to like, 497—disputed, as leading to an absurdity, 497—can what is neither good nor evil be friendly to the beautiful and the good? 498—the presence of evil not the cause of love, 504—no solution of the question arrived at, 507—Gray's notes, vi. 424.

M

Macareus, v. 330.
Machaon, at the siege of Troy, ii. 89.
Madness, different kinds of, i. 320.
Magistracy, constitution of the, in a prosperous state, ii. 133.
Magistrates, appointment of, in the model state, v. 189—to appoint the judges, 218.
Magnesian stone, iv. 294
Man, creation of, ii. 346—anatomy and physiology of, 381
Man-woman said to formerly exist, iii. 508.
Many. *See* Multitude.
Many-stringed instruments proscribed, ii. 81.
Margites, knew all things, but knew all badly, iv. 392.
Marianduni enslaved by the Heracleotes, v. 233.
Market, regulation of the, ii. 51—market stewards, v. 205.
Marriage, laws for, in the model state, v. 148, 227, 230, 236—marriageable age, 248—celibacy punished, 228—illicit connexions, 248.
Mars, iii. 329, 521, v. 73.
Marsyas, the satyr, iii. 561.
Matthias' Preface to Gray's Account of the Dialogues and Epistles of Plato, vi. 406.
Medea, iii. 69.
Meetings, monthly, in the model state, for sacrifice and social intercourse, v. 224.
Megillus, one of the speakers in the Laws, v. 1.
Melampus, iv. 303.
Melanippe, iii. 483.
Meles, a musician, i. 203.
Melesias, iii. 40, iv. 148, 415.
Melitus, one of the accusers of Socrates, i. 5—his personal appearance, 458—his cross-examination by Socrates, 10.
Melody, the various kinds of, ii. 80.
Menelaus, iii. 477.
Menexenus, iv. 183—208.
Ironical praise of oratory, 184—pretended oration in honour of those who fell at Nemea, 187—various anachronisms and perversions of history pointed out in notes, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198, 201.
Menexenus, i. 482—present at the death of Socrates, 56.
Meno; or, respecting Virtue, iii. 3—48.
Is virtue to be taught? 3—answered in the negative, 47—Gray's notes, vi. 441.

Mencetius, v. 502.
Mercury, vi. 27.
Mestor, ii. 421.
Metion, iv. 293.
Metis, iii. 536.
Metrobius, iii. 53.
Metrodorus of Lampsacus, iv. 289.
Miccus, a sophist, i. 482.
Midas, wealth of, v. 56.
Midias, the quail-feeder, iv. 340.
Midwives, i. 377.
Military class, in the ideal Republic, ii. 10.
Military discipline, v. 197, 500.
Military exercises, question as to learning, iv. 151—women to be trained to, ii. 293.
Miltiades, his treatment by the Athenians, i. 220.
Mind, speculations on the, v. 428.
Minerva. *See* Athene.
Minos, The, iv. 449—463.
Question as to what is law, 449—various laws of different countries, 453—the laws of Minos, 459—Homer's character of Minos, 460—Rhadamanthus, 461—Minos vituperated by the Athenian poets, 462—Gray's notes, vi. 447.
Minos, laws of, iv. 459—vituperated by the Athenian poets, 462—the arbiter of the judgments on the dead, i. 228.
Mithæcus, a writer on Sicilian cookery, i. 222.
Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses, i. 431.
Mnesitheus, iii. 303.
Momus, ii. 173.
Monarchy and democracy, v. 105.
Money, on lending, vi. 115.
Monkeys, fable of the, iii. 205.
Moon and sun, the, v. 307, vi. 32.
Morychian house, the, i. 301.
Motion, doctrine of Heraclitus as to, i. 415.
Motion and rest, iii. 159.
Multitude, opinion of the, not to be regarded, i. 32—no share in government allowed to the, v. 99.
Murder, punishment of, in the model state, v. 372.
Muses, origin of the name, iii. 325—inspire poets and rhapsodists, iv. 295.
Museus, ii. 421.
Museus, the poet, his picture of the rewards of the just, ii. 42.
Music not to be esteemed a source of pleasure only, v. 68—laws regarding it, 116, 269—music, gymnastics, and dancing, ii. 81, v. 213, 261, 269, 293, 295.
Myrtilus, iii. 305.
Myronides, iv. 557.
Myson of Chene, i. 273.
Mystæ and Epoptæ, iv. 513.
Mysteries, purgations so called, ii. 44, iii. 549.

N

Names, examination of, iii. 283.
Nature and chance, v. 412.
Nature and law, opposition of, i. 181.
Nature, Soul of. *See* Timæus the Locrian.
Nausicydes, the Cholargean, i. 185.
Neglect of parents, laws regarding, v. 488.
Neith, an Egyptian divinity, ii. 325.
Nemea, pretended funeral oration for those who fell at, iv. 187.
Nemesis, ii. 134—the messenger of Justice, v. 142.
Neoptolemus, iv. 221.
Neptune. *See* Poseidon.
Nestor, iv. 221.
New Platonists, their perversions of the philosophy of Plato, ii. Int. i.
Niceratus, son of Nicias, ii. 2, vi. 418.
Nicias, the general, ii. 2, iv. 147.
Nicias, son of Heroscomander, iv. 414.
Nicias, son of Niceratus, i. 166.
Nicostratus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21.
Ninus, v. 92.

Niobe, ii. 325.
Number, divine origin of the science of, vi. 12—power of, 32—classes of, i. 377—geometric or fatal, ii. 235, 430.
Non-being, discussion on, iii. 462.
Nurses, and nursing of children, in the model state, v. 253, 259.

O

Ocean, a large stream, i. 121.
Oceanus, the father of the gods, i. 382.
Œagrus, iii. 489.
Œdipus, unwise prayer of, iv. 376.
Œnopides, iv. 419.
Œnophyta, battle of, iv. 196.
Offerings and contributions in the model state, v. 522.
Oligarchy, its evils, ii. 239.
Old age, consolations of, ii. 1.
Olympiodorus, Life of Plato, by, vi. 232.
Olympus, the musician, iv. 294.
One, the, and the different, iii. 420, 437.
Opis, vi. 53.
Opson, meaning of, ii. 52.
Oration, pretended funeral, for those who fell at Nemea, iv. 187.
Oratory, ironical praise of, iv. 184.
Orestes, iii. 304, iv. 384.
Orichalcum, a precious metal, ii. 422.
Orithyia, legend of, i. 303.
Oromazdes, iv. 344.
Orphans and guardians, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 479.
Orpheus, iii. 489, iv. 294.
Orthagoras of Thebes, i. 247.
Others, the, discussion on, iii. 439.
Otus, iii. 509.

P

Pain and pleasure, i. 57, iv. 37, 70—no part of life free from pain, vi. 44.
Palamedes, v. 82—a name for Zeus of Elea, i. 339.
Pallas, meaning of the name, ii. 327.
Pan, the two-formed son of Hermes, iii. 331.
Panathenaic festivals, ii. 2.
Pancratiasts, iii. 52.
Pandarus, violation of oaths and treaties by, ii. 60.
Paralus, a friend of Socrates, i. 21, 256.
Parents, reverence for, v. 398—punishment for violence to, in the model state, 402—neglect of, 488—children cursed by, 489.
Parmenides; or, on Idealities, iii. 401—469.
Whether things are one or many, 404—whether "the one" is, or is not, 420—being, 432—"the different," 437—"the others," 439—"non-being," 462.
Parmenides, i. 382, iii. 134, 403.
Patriarchal government, v. 85.
Patrocles, iii. 490.
Patroclus, a title of Jupiter, v. 402.
Pausanias, encomium on Love, by, iii. 490.
Pausanias of Ceramis, i. 244.
Pedlar-priests, tricks of the, ii. 43.
Pegasus, i. 304.
Peleus, iv. 406.
Pelias, iii. 69.
Pelops, iii. 306.
Penestæ enslaved by the Thessalians, v. 233.
Penelope, iv. 325.
Peparethus, island of, iv. 334.
Perception and science not the same, i. 424.
Perdiccas, epistle of Dion to, iv. 495.
Periander, iv. 407.
Pericles, i. 147, 166—his conduct discussed, 219—praise of, as an orator, 349—his sons, 248, vi. 86.
Perictione, the mother of Plato, vi. 175, 232.
Perseus, iv. 332.
Persian kings, their splendour, iv. 343—polity, v. 112.
Phædo; or, the Immortality of the Soul, i. 46, 127.
Pleasure and pain, connexion

of, 57—philosophy a preparation for death, 61—Socrates had pursued such a course, 68—questions as to what becomes of the soul when separated from the body, 69—the soul not annihilated by death, 72—argument for the pre-existence of the soul, 76—immortality of the soul proved from various considerations, 80—objections, 89—answer of Socrates, 96—the immortality of the soul a motive to a wise and good life, 116—the regions to which the good and the bad are sent after death, 117—Gray's notes, vi. 432.
Phædo, a friend of Socrates, vi. 419.
Phædondes present at the death of Socrates, i. 56.
PHÆDRUS, i. 301—360.
A sophistical speech of Lysias on the subject of love, 305—ironically commended, and its views apparently concurred in by Socrates, 308—his real views on the nature of love, 319—comparison of the soul to a pair of winged steeds and a charioteer, 322—the perfect soul with wings, 322—inferior souls, 324—beauty, 326—the obedient and the unruly steed, 330—myth of the grasshoppers, 336—inquiry as to correct speaking and writing, 337—rhetoric a trick, 340—its pretended rules ridiculed, 345—praise of Pericles as an orator, 349—the invention of letters, 354—writing, 355—the more excellent kind of discourse, 356—duty of the speaker to be acquainted with the true nature of his subject, 358—message to Lysias, 359—encomium on Isocrates, 359—prayer for wisdom, 360—Gray's notes, vi. 421.
Phædrus, encomium on Love, by, iii. 486.
Phænarete, the mother of Socrates, iv. 364.
Phænon, vi. 27.
Phaethon, vi. 27.
Phanosthenes of Andros, a general in the service of Athens, iv. 307.
Pharmacea, a companion of Orithyia, i. 303.
Phason, i. 238.
Phemius, the rhapsodist, iv. 294.
Pherecrates, his picture of men without laws or virtue, i. 256.
Phidias, iii. 36.
Philagrus, iv. 556.
Philaides, iv. 556.
PHILEBUS; ON THE GREATEST GOOD, iv. 3—110.
Not pleasure, but wisdom, the supreme good, 3—pleasures, some good, some evil, 7—Theuth, the inventor of language, 19—intellect alone not the supreme good, 27—pleasure and pain, 37—desire not produced from the body, 51—the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains produced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, 70—self-ignorance, 75—pleasure not a good, 87—the good and the pleasant different in nature, 96—pleasure joined with intellect, 102—Gray's notes, vi. 436.
Philebus, his argument on the greatest good, iv. 5.
Philemon, iv. 414.
Philemonides, iv. 414.
Philippides, son of Philomelus, i. 243.
Philistion, iv. 486.
Philolaus, a Pythagorean of Crotona, i. 58.
Philomelus, i. 243.
Philonides, iv. 547.
PHILOSOPHER, THE. *See* EPINOMIS.
Philosophers the proper rulers of states, ii. 185.
Philosophy a preparation for death, i. 61—not a substitute for skill in the useful arts, iv. 427—true, despises political offices, ii. 209—its proper subject, 198.
Philostratus, iv. 221.
Phocylides, his exhortation to virtue, ii. 89.

Phœnician fable, a, ii. 97.
Phœnix, iii. 475.
Phœnix, son of Amyntor, cursed by his father, v. 487.
Phorcys, ii. 345.
Phoroneus, ii. 325.
Phratria, an appellation of Minerva, iii. 93.
Phratrius, an appellation of Jupiter, iii. 93.
Phrynichus, iv. 462.
Phrynion, iv. 548.
Phrynondas, a profligate, i. 256.
Phylarchs in the model state, v. 197.
Phyle, or parish, in the model state, v. 185.
Physicians, the want of, a proof of bad training, ii. 87.
Piety the greatest part of virtue, vi. 30.
Pilot, value of the art of the, i. 214—his modesty, as compared with the rhetorician, 215.
Pindar, his praise of a just and holy life, ii. 6.
Pirithous, ii. 72.
Pisistratus, iv. 440.
Pittacus of Mitylene, i. 273.
Plato, sketch of the life of, ii. Intr. ii.—his birth, ii.—his intercourse with Socrates, iii.—his travels, iii.—his death, v.—general sketch of his works, v. (see each title)—view of his philosophy as a whole, ix.—his ethical doctrines, xvi.—his political philosophy, xix.—his Epistles, iv. 477—Life of, according to Diogenes Laertius, vi. 175—by Hesychius of Miletus, 229—by Olympiodorus, 232—Introduction to the Doctrines of, by Alcinous, 241—by Apuleius, 323—to the Dialogues, by Albinus, 315—account of the Dialogues and Epistles of, by Gray, 405—general view of the works of, by Sydenham, 409.
Plato, a philosopher of Rhodes, vi. 228.
Plato, a writer of the old comedy, vi. 228.
Pluto, i. 228—meaning of the name, iii. 323—helmet of, ii. 302.
Podalirius, at the siege of Troy, ii. 89.
Poetry, threefold distribution of, ii. 73—what kinds allowed in the ideal Republic, 297.
Poets, censure of, and restrictions on, ii. 65, v. 145, 272—to be vigilantly superintended, ii. 83—excluded from the ideal Republic, as unable to teach virtue, 290.
Poetic inspiration, iv. 296.
Poisons, laws regarding, v. 489.
Polemarchus, ii. 2.
Political expediency censured, i. 406—offices despised by the true philosopher, ii. 209—science, Plato's notions of, ii. Intr. xvi.
Polus, a friend of Gorgias the Leontine, i. 137—his discourse with Socrates, 158.
Polycletus, a statuary, i. 239.
Polycrates, iii. 34.
Polydamas, the wrestler, ii. 15.
Polydus, iv. 480.
Polygnotus, iv. 293.
Polyhymnia, iii. 504.
Polytion, vi. 62.
Polyxenus, iv. 479.
Population, regulation of, in the model state, v. 177.
Poseidon, ii. 420—meaning of the name, iii. 323.
Potentates, the generality invoked, i. 231.
Potidæa, Socrates at, i. 16.
Poverty and Plenty, apologue of, iii. 534.
Poverty nor wealth, neither to exist in the model state, v. 183.
Prædones, v. 234.
Prayers, general, recommended, iv. 383, 393.
Praying, on. *See* Alcibiades, the Second.
Priam, iv. 298.
Priests, in the model state, ii. 203.
Prisons, in the model state, v. 450.
Procreation of children, laws regarding the, v. 230, 246.

Procles, king of Lacedæmon, v. 90.
Prodicus, the Cean, i. 5, iv. 412—his argument regarding wealth, vi. 68.
Prometheus, i. 228—his friendliness to man, 249.
Property, consists of all useful things, vi. 73—laws for protection of, in the model state, v. 404, 495—search for stolen, 519.
Proserpine, iii. 19—meaning of the name, 322.
Prospaltius, a ward of Athens, iii. 308.
Protagoras; or, the Sophist, i. 237—294.
What advantages to be derived from association with the sophists, 241, 246—whether virtue can be taught, 249—fable of Prometheus and Epimetheus, 249—whether virtue is one thing, or several, 257—ode of Simonides discussed, 269—courage attempted to be distinguished from virtue, 280—shown to be contained in knowledge, 293—Gray's notes, vi. 453.
Protagoras the sophist, of Abdera, i. 243—his discussion with Socrates, 245—examination of his theory, 381—his rhetorical arts, 346.
Protarchus, son of Callias, iv. 3.
Proteus, an Egyptian sophist, iii. 72.
Prytanes in the model state, v. 197.
Public schools, v. 276.
Punishment, various degrees of, in the lower world, i. 122, 229, ii. 304—in the model state, v. 498, *et seq.*
Puroeis, vi. 28.
Pyppax Hercules, iii. 94.
Pyrilampes, i. 179, iii. 402, iv. 119.
Pyriphlegethon, a fabled river, i. 122.
Pyrrha, ii. 325.
Pyrrhic fame, its uses, v. 295.
Pythagoras, his estimable mode of life, ii. 289.
Pythagorean doctrine of order, i. 210.
Pythian priestess, her answer regarding Socrates, i. 7.
Pythoclides, iv. 337.
Pythoclides of Ceos, a sophist, i. 245.
Pythodorus, iii. 402, iv. 338.

Q

Quarrels, family, laws regarding, v. 482.

R

Religious rites, ii. 111—no one to have holy places in private houses, v. 454.
Republic, The, ii. 1—312.
Book I. Consolations of age, 4—Simonides' definition of justice, 7—inadequate justice, 9—justice confounded with expediency, 14—the sycophants, 17—the rulers should have in view the advantage of the governed, not their own, 24—justice more powerful than injustice, 29—justice the virtue of the soul, 32.
Book II. Sophistical arguments in favour of injustice, 36—inquiry into justice in its effects on the state, 49—origin of the state, 49—division of labour, 50—the market, 51—superfluous trades, 53—war, 54—state guardians, 55—should be philosophers, 57—gymnastics, 57—fables of the poets, 58—right ideas of the Deity, 60—falsehoods respecting the gods not to be allowed, 64.
Book III. Censure of the poets, 65—threefold distinction of poetry, 73—the magistrates not to be imitators (actors or orators), 75—song and melody, 72—many-stringed instruments proscribed, 81—also elaborate

rhythm, 82—poets and all other craftsmen to be vigilantly superintended, 83—gymnastics, 85—physicians, want of, a proof of bad training, 87—a Phœnician fable, 97—rules for the military class, 100.

Book IV. True position and functions of the guardians, 102—size and boundaries of the state, 106—religious rites, 111—virtues essential to the state, 111—wisdom, 112—fortitude, 113—temperance and justice, 114—injustice, 129.

Book V. Constitution of the magistracy in a prosperous state, 133—duties of men and women common in a state, 138—community of wives and children advocated, 141—honours to the brave, 153—evils existing in states, 159.

Book VI. True philosophy indispensable in a well-ordered state, 170—philosophers the proper rulers, 185—the idea of good the proper subject of philosophy, 198.

Book VII. True philosophy despises political offices, 209—necessary attainments of the guardians, 211—mathematical studies, advantage of, 215—dialectics, 222—learning not to be acquired on compulsion, 227—age at which to be pursued, 230—after a certain time the guardians to be admitted to the highest offices of the state, 230.

Book VIII. The different kinds of bad government, 233—timocracy, 234—oligarchy, 239—democracy, 244—ironical commendation of democracy, 246—tyranny, 251—career of the tyrant, 255.

Book IX. Unnecessary pleasures and desires, 260—the slave of such, the most wicked and miserable of men, 265—condition of a rich man with his slaves in a hostile state, 268—the condition of the tyrant even more wretched, 269—pleasures of knowledge and philosophy preferred to sensual ones, 276—the true regulation of life, 282.

Book X. Poets excluded from the state, as unable to teach virtue, 290—hymns to the gods allowed, but not the pleasurable muse, 297—justice the best reward to the soul, 302—apologue of Erus, on future rewards and punishments, 304.

Republic, discussion of the practicability of the ideal, ii. 319.

Restrictions on poets, v. 145, 272—on foreign travel, v. 514.

Rewards and punishments, future, apologue on, ii. 304.

Rhadamanthus, a Cretan judge, iv 461—a judge of the dead, i. 28, 228.

Rhapsodist, art of the, a divine allotment, iv. 294—ridicule of the pretences of the, 300.

Rhea, ii. 345.

Rhetoric, a species of flattery, i. 155—therefore harmful, 177—its pretended rules ridiculed, 345.

Riches, doubts whether really a good, vi. 66.

Rings, attracted by the Magnesian stone, iv. 294.

Rivals, The, iv. 419—431.

Should the study of philosophy be pursued, or athletic exercises? 421—moderation recommended in these last, but not in philosophy, 424—philosophy not a substitute for skill in useful arts, 427—to philosophize is not to be great in learning, 431—Gray's notes, vi. 434.

Rulers, duty of, ii. 24.

Running and other contests, rules for, v. 321.

Rural stewards, in the model state, v. 205.

S

Sacred ship of the Athenians, its history, i. 54.
Sacrifice, monthly meetings for, in the model state, v. 224.
Sacrilege, punishment of, in the model state, v. 353.
Sannio, the beautiful, his fate predicted by Socrates, iv. 414.
Sappho, i. 309.
Sarambus, the tavern-keeper, i. 222.
Sarpedon, ii. 68.
Saturn, life under the government of, iii. 213, v. 134—such to be imitated in states, 135.
Satyrus, a slave, i. 238.
Scamandrius, iii. 298.
Scellius, i. 166.
SCIENCE. *See* THEÆTETUS.
Sciences necessary to man, vi. 6—to be taught in the model state, v. 300.
Sciron, a noted robber, i. 402.
Scopas, the Thessalian, i. 269.
Scylla, ii. 279.
Sea, neighbourhood of, unfavourable to virtue, v. 121.
Self-improvement, iv. 338.
Self-knowledge, iv. 356.
Self-love to be avoided, v. 161.
Sibylla, the, an oracle-chaunter, iv. 406.
Sicilian cookery, ii. 86.
Signs peculiar to Plato's writings, vi. 207.
Silenus, iii. 564.
Simmias, the Theban, i. 317—a friend of Socrates, 33—present at his death, 56, vi. 419.
Simon the shoemaker, a philosopher, vi. 83.
Simonides, ode of, discussed, i. 269—his definition of justice, ii. 7.
SISYPHUS; OR, ON TAKING COUNSEL, vi. 99—108.
Consultation, being about things which the parties do not know, is nothing better than a guess, or off-handed divination, 100, 105.
Sisyphus, i. 230.
Slaves, treatment of, in the model state, v. 233—slaves and freedmen, laws relating to, 458.
Smicrion, an Athenian, iii. 374.
Social intercourse, monthly meetings for, in the model state, v. 224.
Socrates, the chief speaker in the Republic and the other dialogues, ii. 1—notice of, and his friends, vi. 416—Alcibiades' account of him, iii. 561—his poverty, iv. 158—his dæmon, i. 19, iv. 311, 413—his doctrines questioned, iv. 470—his teaching said to be incomplete, 473—his defence at his trial, i. 3 (*see* APOLOGY)—his age at the time, 3—his condemnation, 23—refuses to escape from prison, 44 (*see* CRITO)—his death, 127.
Solon, wisdom of, i. 273—his travels in Egypt, ii. 325.
SOPHIST, THE, iii. 103—186.
The nature of the sophist examined, 106—compared with the fisherman, 106—with the hunter, 111—with the huckster, 114—the teaching art, 124—quantity and quality of entities discussed, 143—motion and rest, 159—the beautiful, 168—the sophist not a philosopher, but a mere imitator, 185—Gray's notes, vi. 465.
SOPHIST. *See* PROTAGORAS.
Sophists, their pretensions examined, i. 237, iii. 52, 106—specimens of their teaching, iii. 57—their gains, iv. 214—the sophist not a philosopher, iii. 185.
Sophocles, his remark on old age, ii. 4.
Sophroniscus, iii. 87.
Sosias, iii. 309.
SOUL OF THE WORLD. *See* TIMÆUS THE LOCRIAN.
Soul, the most divine of man's possessions, v. 153—the immortal and the mortal or sensuous soul, ii. 380—immortality of the, a motive to a good and wise life, i. 116—proved from various consider-

ations, 80, vi. 51—nature of the, v. 417, 426—transmigration of, ii. 407—winged and wingless, i. 322, 324.
Speusippus, iv. 486.
Sphagia, capture of the Lacedæmonians at, iv. 196.
Sphynx, corruption of the name, iii. 344.
State, the ideal, its size and boundaries, ii. 106—virtues essential to it, 111—the magistracy, 133—duties of men and women common in, 138—its safety to be found in the observance of the laws, v. 128—its magistrates, 189—its guardians, ii. 55, 102, v. 533.
Statesman, The, iii. 189—280.
The statesman, the king, the despot, and the head of the household, different names for men of the same profession, 191—Greeks and barbarians, an unsound distinction, 198—the revolutions of the universe, 210—the age of Saturn, 213—the king and the tyrant, 222—the various arts of life, 226—distinct from the art of governing, 242—the various kinds of state rule, 245—imperfection of the laws, 251—laws should oppose, not flatter, the prejudices of the people, 254—an aristocracy therefore necessary, 254—these should excel, not in wealth, but in virtue, 256—a monarchy with law, the best government, 264—the king must combine in his people as well as himself firmness and moderation, 279—Gray's notes, vi. 467.
Stealing, laws against, in the model state, v. 359, 499.
Stephanus, iii. 40.
Stesichorus, ii. 277—story of, i. 318—speech of, 319.
Stesileus, anecdote of, iv. 154.
Stesimbrotus, of Thasus, iv 289.
Stewards, various, of the model state, v. 203
Stone, how produced, ii. 369.
Styx, its colour, i. 122.
Suicide, unlawfulness of, i. 59.
Sunium, a promontory of Attica, i. 32.
Sun and moon, motion of the, v. 307, 308.
Sybils, the, and augury, i. 320.
Sycophants, the, ii. 17.

T

Talus, why called the brazen, iv. 461.
Talantatus, iii. 306.
Tanagra, battle of, iv. 196.
Tantalus, exposed to eternal punishment, i. 230.
Tartarus, a vast chasm of the earth, i. 120.
Taureas, iv. 113.
Taxiarchs in the model state, v. 197.
Teaching art, the, as practised by the sophists, iii. 124.
Telemon, i. 28.
Telemachus, v. 276.
Telephus, his description of the path to Hades questioned, i. 116.
Temenus, king of Argos, v. 90.
Temperance. *See* Charmides.
Temperance, attempts to define, iii. 121—a great good, iv. 144—exhortation to, v. 39.
Terillus, iv. 556.
Terpsichore, i. 336.
Terpsion, of Megara, i. 368—present at the death of Socrates, 56.
Tethys, the mother of the gods, i. 382, iii. 318.
Thales, of Miletus, i. 273, ii. 289.
Thamus, an Egyptian king, his opinion on the invention of letters, i 355.
Thamyris, iv. 294, v. 315.
Thaumas, i. 385.
Theætetus; or, on Science, i. 369—455.
Question as to what science is, 374—defined by Theætetus to be

perception, 381—examination of the theory of Protagoras, 381—argument of Theætetus, and replies of Socrates, 381—life of the politician and the philosopher contrasted, 407—censure of political expediency, 406—not every man, but the wise man only, the true measure of things, 414—doctrine of Heraclitus as to motion, 415—perception and science proved not to be the same, 424—science said to be true judgment, 425—inquiry as to false judgments, 425—what it is to know, 430—difference between to have and to possess, 438—misuse of what we possess, 440—true judgments arrived at without science prove that true judgment and science are not the same, 443—science said to be true judgment in conjunction with reason, 443—objections of Socrates, 444—examination of the component parts of a syllable, 445—question of the meaning of the word logos, 452—the argument broken off, 455—Gray's notes, vi. 464.

Theætetus, his argument with Theodorus of Elea, iii. 105.

Theages, The, iv. 401—426.

Theages desires to learn the art of governing, 407—is advised to associate with statesmen, 410—or with sophists, 412—the dæmon of Socrates, 413—Gray's notes, vi. 428.

Theages, a pupil of Socrates, i. 21.

Thearion the baker, i. 222.

Theft, punishment for, in the model state, v. 359, 499.

Themis, ii. 61.

Themistocles, his treatment by the Athenians, i. 220—his reply to his reviler, ii. 5.

Theoclymenus, iv. 303.

Theodorus of Byzantium, an orator, i. 345.

Theodorus the geometrician, i. 370.

Theodorus of Elea, iii. 103.

Theodotes, iv. 534.

Theodotus, iv. 491—a pupil of Socrates, i. 21.

Theognis, iii. 41, v. 8.

Theonoe, a name of Athene, iii. 328.

Theophilus, iii. 303.

Theramenes, vi. 49.

Thersites and other common men escape eternal punishment, as not capable of committing the greatest crimes, i. 230—turned into an ape, ii. 311.

Theseus, ii. 417, v. 96.

Thespis, iv. 462.

Thessalian witches, i. 216.

Thessalians, their skill in horsemanship, iii. 3.

Thetis, ii. 64, v. 502.

Theuth, the inventor of language and of many sciences, i. 354, iv. 19.

Thrasyllus, iv. 414.

Thrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, ii. 3—takes part in the dialogue on the Republic, 12.

Thucydides, iii. 40, iv. 415.

Thyestes, iii. 209.

Timæus, The, ii. 319—409.

Discussion of the practicability of the philosophy of the Republic, 319—the story of the Atlantic isles, 328—the universe generated according to a pattern existing in the Divine Mind, 334—the nature and structure of the universe, 339—creation of time, 341—peopling with living beings, 343—creation of man, 346—anatomy and physiology, 381—origin of the lower animals, 407—transmigration of souls, 407.

Timæus the Locrian, on the Soul of the World and Nature, vi. 147—168.

Enumeration of causes, 147—form and matter, 148—harmonic progression, 150—movements of the heavenly bodies, 154—the elements, 157—living beings and man, 159—the senses, 161—dis-

eases, 164—the gymnastic and medical arts, 166—transmigration of souls, 168.
Timarchus, iv. 413.
Time, generation of, ii. 341.
Timocracy, a form of bad government, ii. 234.
Timotheus, iv. 555.
Tiresias, alone, intelligent in Hades, iii. 48.
Tisander, the Aphidnæan, i. 185.
Tisias, his rhetorical arts, i. 345.
Tison, iv. 556.
Tityus, exposed to eternal punishment, i. 230.
Torpedo, the, iii. 18.
Trades, laws for, in the model state, v. 344—superfluous, in the ideal Republic, ii. 53.
Tragedy, Homer the leader of, ii. 284.
Transmigration of souls, ii. 407.
Treason, punishment of, in the model state, v. 357.
Tribunals and arbitrators, v. 523.
Triptolemus, i. 28, v. 243.
Trophonius, vi. 46.
Tynnichus, the composer of the pæan, iv. 297.
Typhon, i. 304.
Tyranny and tyrants, ii. 255.
Tyrtæus, praise of his poetry, v 7.

U

Ulysses, his character in Homer examined, iv. 265, 273.
Universe, its origin and structure, ii. 334—the intelligible and the sensible, 340—time, 341—living beings, 343—man, 346.
Urania, i. 336.

V

Venus, two, or two Loves, iii. 491.
Vesta, i. 323, v. 184.
Virgo and Demeter, v. 243.
Virtue, On, vi. 85—90.
Virtue not to be taught, but exists by a divine allotment to those who possess it, 85, 90—the sons of Pericles and others cited in proof, 86—the good naturally so from their birth, 89.
Virtue. *See* Meno.
Virtue not to be taught, i. 249, iii. 47, vi. 85—piety its greatest part, vi. 30.
Vulcan, iii. 512.

W

Walls not needed for the model city, v. 237.
War, laws of the Cretans adapted to a state of, v. 3—preparations for, in the ideal Republic, ii. 54, v. 500.
Water, corrupting by drugs, punishment for, v. 343.
Wealth, On. *See* Eryxias.
Wealthy man, the truly, vi. 81.
Weaving art, the, iii. 228.
Wills, laws relating to, in the model state, v. 472.
Wine not to be touched by boys, v. 64.
Winged soul, the, i. 322—how its wings are lost, 324.
Wisdom the supreme good, iv. 3.
Wives and children, community of, advocated, ii. 141.
Women, in the model state, their nature improved, v. 244—to be possessed in common, 174—yet to be married, ii. 148—to be trained to military exercises, 293.
World, Soul of the. *See* Timæus the Locrian.
Wounding, punishment for, in the model state, 394.

X

Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, i. 57.
Xanthippus, a friend of Socrates, i. 256.
Xenophanes, iii. 143.
Xerxes, i. 181, iv. 343.

Y

Young men, laws against the lasciviousness and insolence of, v. 404.

Z

Zaleucus, the lawgiver of Locris, ii. 322.
Zamolxis, the Thracian king, iv 117.
Zethus, i. 183.
Zeus, of Elea, i. 343.
Zeus, analysis of the name, iii. 307.
Zeuxippus of Heraclea, i. 247.
Zeuxis, the painter, i. 143.
Zopyrus, of Thrace, the preceptor of Alcibiades, iv. 345.
Zoroaster, iv. 344.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
DUKE STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND GREAT WINDMILL STREET, W.